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THE DECCAN POLICY
OF
THE MUGHULS

THE DECCAN STATES IN THE SIXTEENTH & SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES



THE DECCAN POLICY OF THE MUGHULS

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TO MY MOTHER
KALSOOM KHANAM

CONTENTS

FOREWORD

The study of Mughal relations with the Deccan states during the reigns of Akbar, Jahangir and Shah Jahan is a valuable exercise for those who wish to understand the political character and to estimate the military potential of the Mughal empire. Imperialism, as the recent study by Koebner and Schmidt has shown, is a concept to which 'circumstances give their distinguishing colour and discriminating effect' and it is useful to have a study of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Mughal brand. Furthermore, for those—and they are many—who seek for portents and intimations of future mortality in history—Mughal involvement in the Deccan has a strong macabre interest for it was certainly there that the Mughal military machine met its match in the guerilla warfare of the Marathas.

The observer of Mughal relations with the Deccan Muslim states must surely be struck by a certain absence of a sense of urgency in the conduct of Mughal policy. For reasons which Dr. Yar Muhammad Khan carefully describes, Akbar felt obliged to leave an active Deccan policy until he was middle-aged ; by his death in 1605, he had prepared but a bridgehead for further diplomatic and military operations, if his successor cared to undertake them. Jahangir never gave Deccan affairs his full attention for long and the fits and starts in Mughal activity is an indication more of the current state of court politics around him than of current pressures in Mughal-Deccani relationships. Even Shah Jahan, after 1636, put Deccan question 'on ice' for nearly two decades.

One useful consequence of Dr. Yar Muhammad Khan's work which is based upon a full utilisation of the Persian material is perhaps to underline the necessity of bringing the economic historian to the aid of the political historian. From his study it would appear that Mughal imperialism in the Deccan was a question of prestige,

not of material gain. At times, however, it appears as if the Deccan campaigns were means of providing outdoor relief for the Mughal *mansabdars*. Until one has more knowledge of the prospects a posting to the Deccan offered the average Mughal officer, it would be as well to be cautious in rejecting any economic hypotheses. The study of Deccan history in the Mughal period faces many obstacles, particularly linguistic, and historians are still in the very early stages of trying to penetrate beneath the surface glitter of official life as refracted in the lenses provided by the Persian histories. On the other side, however, the evidence of the Persian histories, for the psychology of the ruling elite of the times should not be wholly devalued and it may be that the prestige hypothesis has still some way to run. Certainly, until the time of Shivaji, or even later, it is hard to contend that the Deccan was an area vital to the survival or even to the supremacy of the Mughal empire in India.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Yar Muhammad Khan's work, by providing the necessary political framework of Mughal-Deccani relationships, will make it easier for others to go on from there. I am very happy to have this opportunity of commending his book to readers and of hoping that it will be received by the scholarly public as it deserves. It is always pleasant for a teacher to see the work of a former student in print, and the publishers are to be congratulated on their decision to publish.

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PREFACE

No comprehensive and consistent study has so far been made of the Mughuls' relations with the Deccan States. I have chosen the period from Babur to Shah Jahan because the study of Aurangzeb 'Alamgir's relations with the Deccan States requires a separate work. Aurangzeb spent about twenty-five years of his life fighting against the Deccan kingdoms and the Marathas. The non-availability of all the principal source material in Pakistan for the reign of Aurangzeb was another factor responsible for not including his reign in the present work.

Besides the secondary works, I have used the contemporary available sources in original and tried to make my account as intelligible as possible. More light has been thrown on Akbar's motives in extending his political dominance in southern India and examine the political ideas of the time. Smith, the biographer of Akbar, relied on English translations of Persian sources, which often misled him in his conclusions as the translations were not always correct.

New points have been discussed in analysing the causes of the weak administration under Jahangir. The court politics under Shah Jahan have thoroughly been examined and new conclusions have been drawn justifying the Mughul invasions of Golconda and Bijapur in 1656-57.

In the end I gratefully acknowledge the encouragement which I received from my friend Muhammad Ajmal Qureshi to undertake my research in England. I owe my gratitude to Dr. Peter Hardy, who supervised my work and wrote a Foreword for this book. My thanks are due to Professor Shaikh Abdur Rashid, former Head of the Department of History, Punjab University, Lahore, for his inspiring encouragement and removing my difficulties whenever I sought

his help. I am indebted to Group Captain S. Fayyaz Mahmud for giving me useful suggestions. I shall be failing in my duty if I did not acknowledge the help which I received from the staff of the Libraries of School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London ; British Museum ; India Office, London and the Punjab University, Lahore.

Lastly I would like to thank my publishers, Messers United Book Corporation Ltd., for taking keen interest in the publication of this book.

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Pakistan

YAR MUHAMMAD KHAN

INTRODUCTION

The Vindhyas divide the Indian subcontinent into two parts—north and the south. Southern India comprises the Deccan, which lies between 13° 59′ and 20°33′ N. and 72°54′ and 84° 26′ E. The Deccan is a corruption of the Sanskrit word *Dakshina*, meaning "right hand" or "the South". The name is repeatedly found in ancient Indian literature and inscriptions. Though the term Deccan is sometimes applied to the entire southern peninsula, yet it is more often used for its northern and central regions. The *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* written by a Greek seaman of the first century A.D. calls it "*Dachinabades*" for *Dachaons* in the local language means, South. Fa Hien, the Chinese traveller, who visited India in the 5th Century A.D. calls it *Ta-Thsin*. It is variously known as *Dandaka*, *Dakshinatya*, *Dakshinasa* and *Dashina Patha*.[1]

But the Indian classical literature differs about its geography. Whereas *Matsya Purana* places its northern boundary at Karusha stretching to the Kaimur spur of the Eastern Vindhyas, the Pali literature takes it to Avanti close to the Western Vindhyas. The histories of the Chalukya period define Deccan as stretching from "Adam's Bridge to the Nerbadha." Harishena, the panegrist of Samudra Gupta, includes in the Deccan the area from Mahanadi Valley to Kanchi.[2]

The Deccan is a high rocky tableland with steep sides. It consists of large plains, formed of horizontal Deccan lavas ranging from 2,000 to 10,000 feet in thickness and cover an area of 20.000 square miles.[3] There are many mountains, forests and rivers in the Deccan.

1. G. Yazdani, *The Early History of the Deccan*, i—vi, London, 1960, p. 3 ; J.D B. Gribble, *A history of the Deccan*, London, 1896, p. 1 ; A.L. Basham, *The wonder that was India*, London, 1956, p 2.
2. Yazdani, *The Early History os the Deccan*, p. 3.
3. W.G. East, and O H.K. Spate (ed.), *The Changing Map of Asia*, London, 1950, pp. 120—21 ; O.H.K. Spate, *India and Pakistan*, London, 1954, pp. 8—13, 637—41.

The forests starting from Baster along the Godawari to the Seuna region that touches Daulatabad and Nasik are known to be remnants of the famous Dandakaranya. The rivers remain dry for six months and pass through the Ghats ; the Mahanadi, the Godawari, the Krishna and the Kaveri flow eastwards to the sea, whereas the Narbada and the Tapti flow westwards. The Godawari a Sanskritized form of the Dravadian term 'Goda' meaning limit of boundary is one of the main rivers of the South. Its tributaries are Kadrava, Pravara, Pranhita, Wardha and Wainganga. Flowing through Trimbak and Eastern Ghats, it falls into the sea by seven branches. The Krishna probably derives its name from the black soil, *Krishna-bhumi*, *Kare-nadu,* which it moistens with its water. It starts from the northwest of Sitara and passing through Amaravati and Vijayavatika, falls into the sea.[4] The Deccan is mostly savannah. Its hills are girdled with thick forests, in particular the steep and mildly cut scarp of the Western Ghats, the southern part ending in the Nilgris.[5]

Generally speaking the rate of rainfall in the South is very low, except in the coastal area. However there are many dams and tanks throughout the Deccan for irrigation purposes. The two lakes—Pakhal and Ramappa in the Warrangle district are very famous.

History records that the rulers of North and South India always tried to dominate each other. But the rulers of North India were more successful in their ambition than their southern rivals. Under Chandragupta Mauraya (322—298 B.C.) and his successor Bindusara, the Maurayan Empire reached as for as Madura in the South. Asoka (269-232 B.C.) attempted to bring the South under his control and fought the famous battle of Kalinga in 264 B.C. for this purpose. The Andhras refused to acknowledge the successor of Asoka as their overlord. Simuka, the founder of *Salivahana* or *Stavahana* overpowered the last Kanva ruler in the last century B.C. and annexed

4. Yazdani, *The Early History of the Deccan*, pp. 9—12, Basham, p. 2.
5. East, and Spate (ed.) pp. 120—21, *Imperial Gazetteer*, iii, London, 1885, p. 42.

Magdha. The Sakas, expelled the Andhras from Malwa and seized the North-Western part of the Deccan. But Gantamiputra Satakarni defeated the Sakas and seized Gujarat and Rajputana. After establishing himself in Northern India, Samudragupta (335—376 A. D.) advanced towards the South. He defeated twelve kings in his southern campaigns and reached as far as Pallava kingdom of Kanchi.[6] Apprehending administrative difficulties if he annexed the newly conquered area in the South, he appears to have been satisfied by being acknowledged by the southern rulers. Chandragupta II (376—415 A.D.) and Skandagupta (455—467 A.D.) of the Gupta dynasty also forced their supremacy on the Deccan rulers,[7]

Pulakesin II (609—655 A.D.) of Chalukya dynasty of the South and Harsha (606—647 A.D.) were ambitious rulers. The Aihole Inscription and the account of Hiuen Tsang confirm that Pulakesin II defeated Harsha who wanted to extend his borders in the South. The battle was probably fought between 630 and 634 A. D. Vinayaditya (680—696 A.D.) of Chaulukya dynasty defeated the Malavas and Haihayas of the North. The Rashtrakuta king, Indra III, defeated Mahipala of Pratiharas and occupied Qannuj in 916 A. D. Dhruva of Rashtrakutas subdued Vasaraja and Dharmapala, the rulers of northern India in 789, A.D. and brought the Doab region uplying between the Ganges and the Jamna under his control.

Sultan 'Ala-ud-Din Khalji (1296—1316 A.D.) was the first Muslim king of India who cherished the dea of world couquest. In partial fulfilment of his desire, he brought the South under his supremacy. The Deccan was then divided into four major kingdoms—Devagiri under the Yadavas ; Telingana under the Kakityas, Dwarsamudra under the Hoysalas and Ma'bar under the Pandyas. Malik Kafur led successful campaigns during 1308—1311 against these states and forced their rajas to acknowledge Sultan 'Ala-ud-Din Khalji as

6. Basham, pp. xix, 61, 63—65.
7. Ibid., pp. 65—66.

their suzerain. The instructions issued to Malik Kafur by Ala-ud-Din Khalji clearly show that the Sultan wanted to obtain wealth in the form of diamonds and elephants etc., an annual tribute and demanded his recognition as an overlord from the southern rajas[8] and he had no intention of annexing the conquered lands. In view of recurring Mongol invasions during that period Ala-ud-Din Khalji perhaps could not afford to extend his sphere of administration by bringing the Deccan states directly under the Delhi rule. However, he was successful in achieving his objectives.

Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq (1325—1351) reversed the policy of his predecessor and annexed the Deccan to the Delhi empire. He had experienced that the Hindus of the South remained submissive to the Delhi Sultan as long as the Delhi army was stationed in the Deccan. Once the Muslim army withdrew to the North, the southern rajas refused to pay the agreed tribute and acknowledge the superiority of the Delhi king. In order to establish the Muslim footing in the South he planned to habilitate Muslims there and convert the Deccani Hindus to Islam through propagation of his faith. With this view he moved to Daulatabad in 1327, which was declared the second capital of the Empire. His hold in the South grew weak in the second half of his reign. It was during this period that the Bahmani kingdom in the South was founded by 'Ala-ud-Din Hasan Bahman Shah, on Friday, the Rajab 24, 748/August 3, 1347.[9]

The Bahmani kingdom had a rival Hindu state of Vijayanagar in the South with whom the Bahmanis were constantly at war. The

8. Zia-ud-Din Barani, *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi*, Bib. Ind. ed. by Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Calcutta, 1862, pp. 327—37, Amir, Khusrau, *Khazain-ul-Futuh*, ed. by Sayyid Moinul Haq, Aligarh, 1927, pp. 104—113, 141—49, 153, 155 ; S K. S. Aiyangar, *South India and Muhammadan Invaders*, Madras, 1921, pp. 116—19.

9. Firishta, *Tarikh-i-Firishta*, i, Lucknow, 1874, pp. 279—82, 'Abdul Jabbar, *Tazkira-i-Salatin-i-Deccan*, Hyderabad, India, 1911, pp. 66—68.

Vijayanagar kingdom is said to have been founded in the end of the 14th century by one Sangana. After the establishment of Muslim rule in north India, this was the only kingdom which upheld the Hindu cause. The constant quarrels of the Bahmanis with Vijayanagar weakened the Bahamani Sultanate and sometimes even threatened the very existence of this Muslim state itself. The chief cause of rivalry between these kingdoms was religion. To fulfill their desire of territorial aggrandizement, the sultans sometimes used the name of religion and advanced against Vijayanagar.

In view of small number of Muslims in there own kingdom, the Bahmani Sultans encouraged emigrants from foreign lands. Such emigrants who came from Arabia, Iraq and Iran and settled in Bahmani kingdom were chiefly *Shias* and variously known as *Pardesi*, *Gharib-ud-Dayyar*, *Afaqi* or *New Comers.* They included reputed soldiers, men of letters, jurists and administrators. The natives, mainly *Sunni*, were called Deccanis. As the New Comers had come to seek their fortunes at Gulbarga, they proved more hard working and industrious than their counterparts. Sultan Muhammad II (1378 to 1398) himself a learned scholar, spent vast amounts in calling men of letters to his court. He appointed Mir Fazlullah Inju as *Sadr-i-Jahan.* Khwaja Hafiz Shirazi is said to have been invited by the Sultan but the poet could not come.[10] Sultan Taj-ud-Din Firoz (1397—1422) invited men like Lutfullah Sabzwari, Hakim Hasan Gilani and Sayyid Mahmud Ghazzuni.[11] Khwaja Imam-ud-Din better known as Khwaja Mahmud Gawan came in the time of Sultan 'Ala-ud-Din Ahmad Shah (1436—1458) The Khwaja was so reputed in the fields of litereture and administration, that the history of the Bahmanis is incomplete without mentioning his name. These cultural ties with

10. H.K. Sherwani, *Bahmanis of the Deccan*, Hyderabad, India, 1953, pp. 114—15.

11. Firishta, i, pp. 312, 316; Sherwani, *Bahmanis of the Deccan*, pp. 147—48.

Iraq and Iran, once initiated by the Bahmani sultans, were carried on by the rulers of the Deccan sultanates.

The religious differences between the two groups resulted in the decline of the Bahmani empire. Mahmud Gawan tried to create political equilibrium among the opposing groups, but himself fell a victim to the intrigue of the Deccanis when he was assassinated in 1481.[12] After his assassination the Bahmani kingdom right up to its extinction in 1528 was like the Mughul empire after 1764 when the position of the sultan was no more than that of a *roi faineant*.

For about forty years before the fall of the Bahmani dynasty, the governors of the five *'Atrafs'* (provinces) where ruling the area under their command almost independently though paying formal homage to the nominal sultans. These administrative units were: (1) Ahmadnagar under Nizam-ul-Mulk ; (2) Bijaipur under 'Adil Khan (3) Golconda under Qutb-ul-Mulk (4) Berar under 'Imad-ul-Mulk and (5) Bidar under Barid-ul-Mulk. After the death of Kalimullah, the last ruler of his dynasty in 934/1527-28[13], all the five governors declared their independence. Thus came into existence the five Muslim Deccan states, three of which namely, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda played an important role in the Mughul-Deccan relations.

While the Mughuls in the North were *Sunnis*, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda had long accepted *Shiism*. Burhun Nizam-ul-Mulk, son of Ahmad Nizam-ul-Mulk (the founder of Ahmadnagar kingdom) accepted *Shiism* through the influence of his *Shia* wazir Shah Tahir in 944/1537.[14] Shah Tahir who claimed his descent from the Fatimid caliphs of Egypt, left his master Shah Ismail Safawi and came to India in 1520. Malik Ahmad's father Malik Hasan was a Hindu convert whose original name was Timma Bhat. He was cap-

12. Firishta, vi, p. 357, H.K. Sherwani, *Mahmud Gawan*, Allahabad, 1942, pp. 171—72.

13. Sherwani, *The Bahmanis of the Deccan*, pp. 16—19, Firishta, i, p. 376 ; C. H. Philips, *Handbook of Oriental History*, London, 1951, p. 91.

14. Firishta, ii, pp. 109, 114—15.

tured by Ahmad Shah Bahmani III during his campaign against Vijayanagar in 1423. Sultan Shams-ud-Din Muhammad Shah (1463-1482) gave him the title of Ashraf-i-Humayum Nizam-ul-Mulk.[15] Yusuf 'Adil Khan accepted *Shiism* as his creed in 908/1503 and three years later i.e. in 1506 he actually ordered *khutba* to be read in Shia style in Bijapur.[16] According to Firishta, Yusuf 'Adil Khan was a son of Ottoman Sultan Murad II (1421—5I) whereas Rafi-ud-Din Shirazi is of the opinion that he belonged to the family of a Persian noble. Sultan Quli Qutb-ul-Mulk who came from the Qara-Quvinlu tribe of Hamdan, had accepted *Shiism* long before the establishment of the Safawis in Iran.[18] The remaining two states Berar and Bidar were *Sunni.*

The rulers of the Safawi dynasty, founded in Iran in 1502, tried to promulgate their creed in India. The ties of friendship with the Deccan commenced by Shah Ismail Safawi were strengthened by his successors. In 920/1514, Shah Ismail sent an ambassador to Isma'il 'Adil Khan who received the envoy warmly. 'Adil Khan acknowledged the Shah of Iran as his religious head. The Safawi Shah was so much pleased at Isma'il 'Adil Khan's response that he sent costly presents to Bijapur and addressed him as 'Shah'. To prove his loyalty further with Iran, Isma'il 'Adil Khan ordered that in future soldiers should use a twelve peaked cap (after the Safawi pattern) as a part of their uniform. Agha Salman better known as Mehtar Jamal came to Ahmadnagar as Persian ambassador to the court of Burhan Nizam-ul-Malik I, with costly gifts.[20] In 1542, Shah Tahmasp

15. Ibid., pp. 93, 110.

16. Ibid., pp. 11, 12, 168.

17. Ibid., p. 2.

18. Ibid., pp ii, pp. 167—68, *Bulletin of School of Oriental and African Studies*, London, 1955, pp. 71—73.

19. Firishta, ii, pp. 18—19.

20. Ibid., p. 117.

sent a letter to Shah Tahir recognizing his efforts in promulgating *Shia* faith in Ahmadnagar.

The friendly relations between the Safawis and the Deccani sultans and the efforts of the latter to obtain help from Iran was bound to rouse Mughul wrath against the Deccanis, since the Mughuls and the Safawis were not sincere to each other. The Mughul could never brook for a single moment that any state within their reach should acknowledge the superiority of a foreign power. In the coming pages it has been shown that Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda exchanged diplomatic missions with the Irani courts and secured Mughul displeasure. The political history of these five states of the Deccan since their birth, is a record of almost continuous strife against each other. Despite the fact that the royal houses of these states were connected with each other through matrimonial alliances, each state tried to assert its dynastic superiority against the other. Threatened by Vijayanagar, all the three states were forced to make a league against the common enemy. A decisive batttle took place in 1565 at Talikota, which resulted in the final defeat of Vijayanagar.[21] The victorious sultans divided a large portion of Vijayanagar kingdom among themselves but allowed their victim to drag on like a sickman. Free from the danger, the Deccanis resumed their normal course of matual quarrels, which encouraged the Mughuls to march into their country.

Two main reasons could be attributed to the inter-state dispute. First was the absence of a strong power in the North. The Delhi Sultanate was disintegrating during the 1520s. Babur and Humayun were more concerned in establishing themselves in northern India than extending their southern borders. The Afghan rule under the Surs was so short that none of their rulers could pay attention to the affairs of the South. Secondly, Akbar had to spend the first forty

21. Firishta, ii, pp. 38—40.

years of his reign in establishing his mastery over his northern possessions before he could take active part in the Deccan politics.

Though the Deccanis bowed down temporarily to the Mughuls whenever the latter marched toword the South in pursuit of their rebels, yet the fact remains that there was no serious threat from the North. Hence the rulers of the Deccan states felt themselves free to pursue internal warfare, which ultimately caused their decline.

The political structure of these states was another cause of their mutual disputes. The Deccan states were monarchical states based on an army which was supplied by *jagirdars* and *silahdars*. The central government had no direct control over the soldiers, who were loyal to their immediate master and not to the Sultan.

Such a system gave encouragement to ambitious nobles to defy the orders of a sultan. The nobility was thus involved in mutual quarrels, and weakened the position of the central government.

An important point in the Mughul-Deccan conflict is the strategy of war. The Mughul army mainly consisted of soldiers who were experienced in fighting in plains and in pitched battles. The imperial army was armed with heavy equipment and was not mobile. The Deccanis took full advantage of their geographical condition and employed guerilla tactics. They would withdraw strategically for some distance, entice the enemy into difficult hilly passes, attack them suddenly and run away before the enemy could take position. The Deccanis were lightly mounted and could move swiftly. It took long before the Mughuls could master this new technique of warfare and we find that many experienced Mughul commanders suffered heavy losses from guerilla tactics of the Deccanis.

CHAPTER II

CAUSES OF THE MUGHUL INVASION OF THE DECCAN

The state of Mughul relations with the Deccan powers was a weather gauge to the strength of their position in the North. The Mughuls pursued an active policy towards the Deccan when the general condition of their political economy was flourishing, and become quiescent when other preoccupations in the North were most pressing.

The proclamation of Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar as *padshah* at Kalanaur on Friday, *Rabi-us Sani* 2, 963/February 14, 1556 was not more than a registration of a claim to sovereignty. He had a precarious hold on certain parts of the Punjab only. Kabul was then held by his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim, who proved to be a source of trouble for Akbar till his death. Bengal was under Sulaiman, an Afghan chief; Rajputana enjoyed her independence under its own rulers; Malwa and Gujarat had thrown off allegiance to Delhi long ago; Gondwana, Malwa and Orissa acknowledged their own chiefs. In the South the Muslim Deccan states—Khandesh, Berar, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda were independent but were generally at war with the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. On the western coast the Portuguese were encroaching upon Indian soil and commanded the entire maritime trading route to the Arabian and Red seas. In the North, Kashmir and Tibet enjoyed independence and 'Abdullah Khan of Turan was a source of perpetual danger to Mughul rule.

Akbar's aim was first to bring all northern India under one sceptre, then to move into the Deccan and finally to proceed to the conquest of Turan. To accomplish this purpose, Akbar preferred to win over his enemies by enlisting and promoting them in his service rather than to drive them to despair by harsh treatment. He thus wanted to utilize their military resources to promote his imperial

designs and consolidate his position in the country. The years 1556-1560 saw the fall of Delhi, Agra and Gwaliar.[1]

Akbar's first contact with the Southern states

The first contact between the Mughuls and the southern states of India came in 1561 when Akbar resolved to send an expedition to Malwa.[2] During this campaign the Mughul sword measured its strength against the Deccanis who proved to be far inferior to the Mughuls, thus encouraging the Emperor to believe that he could subdue the Deccan states easily. In the days of Sher Shah Suri, Malwa, had been held by Shuja'at Khan and after his death in 963/1555, his son Baz Bahadur succeeded him.

Baz Bahadur had given himself up to sensuality and neglected the administration of the country. In 1561 Mughul commanders Adham Khan, Pir Muhammad Khan and 'Abdullah Khan were deputed to subdue the province. Baz Bahadur showed little resistance and fled to Burhanpur to seek help from the ruler of Khandesh.[3]

After the conquest of Malwa, Pir Muhammad was appointed its governor. He collected an army to subdue Asirgarh and Burhanpur where the fugutive Baz Bahadur was taking refuge. He laid seige to Bijagarh in 1561, took it by storm and put all the garrison to sword. He then advanced towards Asirgarh where Baz Bahadur and Miran Mubarak Shah were preparing to resist the Mughuls. Mubarak Shah appealed to Tufail Khan of Berar, who joined him. The allies marched against Pir Muhammad. The Mughuls, laden with plunder became disorderly and were defeated at Bijagarh. Pir Muhammad Khan fled towards Mandu and was

1. Abu'l Fazl, *Akbar Namah*, ii, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1877, pp. 35-45, 57, 65-71 ; Firishta, i, pp. 246-47.
2. Khafi Khan, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, Bib. Ind., ii, Calcutta, 1865, pp. 160-61 ; Nizam-ud-Din Bakhshi, *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, ii, Calcutta, 1564, pp. 151; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, ii, pp. 89-90.
3. Bakhshi, ii, pp. 151-52 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, ii, p. 90 ; Firishta, i, pp. 250-51 ; Harsukh Rai, *Majma'-ul-Akhbar*, B.M. or. 1624, f. 457 b.

drowned while crossing the Narbada and according to Badauni, "by way of water, he went to fire and the sighs of orphans and captives did their work with him".[4] The retreat of the imperialists resulted in the temporary restoration of Baz Bahadur to Malwa. This defeat at the hands of the Deccanis was a great shock to Mughul prestige, but on the other hand events had shown that a strong Mughul force could easily subdue the states lying beyond the borders of Malwa and Gujarat.

It was essential to retrieve the disaster of Malwa to restore Mughul prestige. 'Abdullah Khan Uzbek was, therefore, appointed in 969/1562 to lead the Mughul army.[5] Unable to face the attack, Baz Bahadur fled to Rana Udai Singh of Chittor. Later on he preferred to throw himself on the mercy of the Mughul Emperor who granted him a *mansab* of 2,000. Mandu was re-occupied and Mughul rule was thus established in Malwa.[6]

The victorious 'Abdullah Khan entertained the idea of rebellion, which proved a blessing in disguise for the imperial rule in the South. Akbar took the command himself and reached Mandu in 971/1564. 'Abdullah Khan fled to Chingiz Khan in Gujarat, which was then independent of the Mughuls. Akbar appointed Qara Beg as governor of Malwa. The neighbouring *zamindars* came to pay homage to the Mughul Emperor who received them graciously.[7]

The presence of Akbar near the borders of Khandesh alarmed Miran Mubarak Shah. He saw advantage in sending envoys to Akbar, to apologise for his past conduct. The ambassadors were warmly received. When they wanted to return, an imperial *farman* was sent to Miran Mubarak Shah, directing him to send any one of

4. Firishta, i, pp. 251-52, ii, pp. 286-87; 'Abd-ul-Qadir Badauni, *Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh*, ii, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1865, pp. 156, 58 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 458 b.
5. Bakhshi, ii, pp. 157.
6. Firishta, i, pp. 252 ; Bakhshi, pp. 157.
7. Firishta, i, p. 253.

his daughters whom he thought worthy to attend upon Akbar. The Emperor also sent his own envoy 'Itmad Khan with presents to Khandesh. "When Mubarak Shah received the gracious communication," says the court writer, "he was greatly delighted and sent his daughter with a suitable retinue and paraphernalia to the Emperor." It was agreed that Mubarak Shah would acknowledge Akbar's overlordship and would henceforth cause *Khutba* to be read in his name. The districts of Bijagarh and Hindiya were given in dowry to the Khandeshi bride.[8]

The treaty concluded between the Mughuls and Khandesh in 1564 made no alteration in the status to which the rulers of Khandesh had long been accustomed. Since 1417 Khandesh had been acknowledging the suzerainty of Gujarat. It appears, however, that Mahmud III, the feeble ruler of Gujarat, had not ventured to assert his overlordship over Khandesh and the Deccan states. Khandesh, therefore, now merely exchanged her former allegiance to Gujarat for the Mughul emperor.

The years 1567-1569 saw the fall of Chittor, Ranthambor and Kalinjar.[9] The reduction of these mighty fortresses secured Akbar's position in the North ; now he wanted to annex Gujarat, which had become the hotbed of conspiracies against the Mughuls.[10] It was during the campaign of Gujarat that Akbar made up his mind for the conquest of the Deccan, after being fully secured in the North, as the rebels driven out from Gujarat had taken refuge in the Deccan. Since Bahadur Shah's death in 1537, kings of Gujarat had been mere puppets in the hands of their nobles. The kingdom was divided into warring principalities, over which Muzaffar III, exercised only nominal sovereignty. He was guided by two of his

8. Bakhshi, ii, p. 172; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 68, 69, 164-65 ; Firishta, i, p. 257.

9. Faizi Sirhindi, *Akbar Namah*, B.M. or. 169, ff. 48, 52, 55 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.* ii, pp. 316-41 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 214-19, 225, 226.

10. Firishta, i, pp. 259-60 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.* ii, p. 265.

chief nobles *i.e.* 'Itmad Khan and Sher Khan Fuladi. These nobles belonged to rival groups. In 1567 Gujarat was involved in a civil war which was an indirect invitation to Akbar to intervene. Furthermore, Gujarat had another importance for the Mughuls. It lay on the pilgrim's route to Mecca and was a big trading entrepot. Its weak administration invited aggression of the Portuguese both against its trade and against pilgrimage.

Akbar himself assumed command of the Mughul army and set out for Gujarat on July 4, 1572. Hearing the news of the march of imperial troops towards Gujarat, Sher Khan Fuladi, who had been besieging Ahmadabad for six months, raised the siege and fled to Junagarh. Gujarat was conquered by the Mughuls after a little resistance.[11] Many of Gujarati nobles and Abyssinians escaped to Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Khandesh, thinking that Akbar would not be able to penetrate into the South.[12] 'Itmad Khan, Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk and many other chiefs waited upon the Emperor.[13]

Though the Gujarati nobles had outwardly submitted to Akbar, yet they where plotting secretly against him. 'Itmad Khan was suspected of designing a rebellion, and was produced before the Emperor. Akbar discussed the future of the suspect with Shah Abu Turab, the author of *Tarikh-i-Gujarat*. Being apprehensive of 'Itmad Khan's intentions and of those who had sought refuge in the Deccan, Shah Abu Turab suggested to the Emperor to carry on the campaign further in the South, i. e. the Deccan. Akbar pondered over the suggestion seriously and kept silent for a while.[14] The

11. Mirza Muhammad Husain known as 'Ali Muhammad Khan, *Mirat-i-Ahmadi*, i, Calcutta, 1928, pp. 8-11, Firishta i, p. 259, Abd'l Fazl, *A.N.*, ii, pp. 5-8, Shah Abu Turab, *Tarikh-i-Gujarat*, Calcutta, 1909, pp. 51-53.
12. Sayyid Mohiy-id-Din Pirzada, *Ahwal-l-Salatin-i-Bijapur*, B.M. Add. 26270 f. 18, Khafi Khan, i, p. 170.
13. Badauni, ii, p. 141, 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, 109 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, p. 7 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 239.
14. Abu urab, pp. 73, 74.

reason for not pushing the Mughul border further in the South was obvious considering Akbar's own political power in India at that time. The designs of Mirza Mahammad Hakim of Kabul, the Uzbek menace and the eastern provinces of India still lying out of the Mughul sway were in Akbar's mind. A shrewd politician like Akbar, therefore, was not ready to risk his northern holdings for the sake of the Deccan. Moreover, the geographical situation of the Deccan was such that full attention was needed to subdue the plateau. It appears that Akbar intended to subjugate it at his first opportunity but was obliged to put off the task. After the annexation of Gujarat, Akbar appointed Mirza 'Aziz Koka as governor of the province and himself left for Cambay. Seizing opportunity of the Emperor's absence, Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk fled to Ahmadnagar.'[15]

Akbar's own cousins, the sons of Mirza Sulaiman, were a source of trouble to him. They fled from Agra and took refuge at Surat. Akbar, therefore, planned to take Surat, where Muhammad Husain Mirza was strengthening himself.[16] Meanwhile Ibrahim Husain Mirza murdered a Mughul commander Rustam Khan and raised disturbances in Gujarat. Akbar dropped the idea of capturing Surat for the time being and set out to chastise Ibrahim Husain Mirza. A fierce batte took place at Sarnal in September 1572 and Ibrahim Husain Mirza was lucky enough in saving his life and fled first to Ahmadnagar and then to Sirohi.[17]

Akbar was now free to take Surat. The fortress of Surat was small but secure and remarkable among fortreses. Safar Aqa, entitled Khudawand Khan, a slave of Sultan Muhmud Gujarati had built it on the seashore in 947/1540, in order to resist the attacks of the

15. Abu'l Fazl, *A N*, iii, p. 10; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, *Ma'asir-i-Rahimi*, i, Calcutta, 1924, p. 779 ; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 112 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 240.

16. 'Abd-ul-Baqi, i, p 700 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N*,. ii, p. 11.

17. Bakhshi, ii, pp. 241-44; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N*,, iii, pp. 12-16; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, i, pp. 781-83 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 446 ; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, pp. 113, 114.

Portuguese. Before the fort was built, the Portuguese came to the city and brutally massacred the Muslims. When they failed to prevent the erection of the fort by force of arms, they offered large sums of money to stop its construction. But Khudawand Khan rejected their offer and completed it.[18]

After defeating Ibrahim Hussain Mirza, Akbar set out to capture Surat.[19] When the imperial forces arrived in the neighbourhood of the fort, Gul Rukh Begum, the daughter of Mirza Kamran and wife of Ibrahim Husain Mirza, took her young son Muzaffar Hussain Mirza and fled to the Deccan. The imperialists pursued her for fifty *kos* but could not capture her.[20]

The besieged forces in Surat approached the Portuguese of Goa for help and in return promised to hand over the fortress to them. The Portuguese set out to help the Mirzas. When they saw the strength of the imperial force and the extent of the siege train, they lost all hope of capturing the fort and pretended to be ambassadors to the Mughul court. They produced many rarities of their country and in return received many marks of favour. The response of the Portuguese to the invitation of the Mirzas gave the impression to Akbar of their hidden designs againt the imperial rule and of taking advantage of the weakness of native rulers to make territorial gains. But Akbar also dissimulated, and bided his time. He showed his interest in knowing about their country and made many inquiries about the wonders of Portugal and manners and customs of the people of Europe. He cultivated friendly relations with them and they promised safe conduct for Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.[21]

18. Abu Turab, p. 75 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 73, 74 ; Badauni, ii, pp. 113, 143, 146 147.
19. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 17, 18.
20. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 73, 143 b ; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 115 ; Amir Haider Husaini Wasti Bilgrami, *Sawani-i-Akbari*, B.M. or. 1665, f. 150 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 246,
21. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 27 ; V.A. Smith, *Akbar—The Great Mughal*, Oxford, 1902, p. 113.

Surat was taken on February 26, 1578 by Akbar.[22] But the Mirzas continued creating troubles for Akbar. 'Aziz Koka inflicted defeat on Muhammad Husain Mirza and his ally Sher Khan Fuladi. The former fled to the Daccan while the later took refuge with Amin Khan of Junagarh.[23]

As soon as Akbar withdrew to North, the fugitives started-reemerging from their safe refuge in the Deccan and renew their activities. After Akbar's departure for Agra in 980/1573,[24] Muhammad Husain Mirza who was in Daulatabad attempted to re-capture Surat. Failing in his efforts, he turned to Cambay which he took from Hasan Khan .[25] More than 12,000 imperial rebels joined under Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk who captured Idar.

'Aziz Koka sent urgent messages to Akbar to come himself. The speed with which Akbar came like a wind to Gujarat is a remarkable feature of his military prowess. He started on Sunday, *Rabi-ul-Akhir* 24, 981/August 23, 1573, with a few of his companions and covered the distance of four hundred miles in nine days.[26] He reached the neighbourhood of Ahmadabad on September 1, 1573. When he saw Mirza Muhammad Husain with a red canopy over his head, Akbar feared that the Mirza had declared himself as a rival king and his own sovereignty was in danger.[27] He, relying on 'God's favour', dashed to the field with his three thousand followers and won the day. Both the Mirza and Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk were captured

22. 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 322; Faizi Sarhindi, f. 79b; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 247-48.
23. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 31 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 460b ; Abu Turab. p. 56 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 250-52.
24. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii pp. 33-34.
25. Faizi Sirhindi ; f, 90; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 626 ; Nur-ul-Haq, *Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh*, B. M. or. 10580, f. 186a.
26. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 45, 51; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 264-68.
27. 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 126.

and put to death. Gujarat was finally annexed on September 21, 1573.[28]

Despite the fact that Gujarat had been incorporated in the Mughul domain, it remained a centre of sedition as long as the Deccan served as a refuge for the rebels. Gul Rukh Begum who had fled to Khandesh in 1572, made Sultanpur her base for future operations. After a period of six years, she returned to Gujarat in 986/1578 with her son who was now fifteen years old. Being defeated at Dulaka, she escaped to Junagarh. She made another attempt but was driven back by Wazir Khan, the governor of Gujarat and finally took refuge in Khandesh. Raja 'Ali Khan the ruler of Khandesh, who showed marks of his faithfulness to the Mughul Emperor, captured Muzaffar Husain Mirza and sent him to Agra,[29]

From the above narrative of events, it should be evident that Akbar had excellent reasons by the 1570s for regarding the Deccan as a refuge and a centre of intrigue for all those who had fled before his armies or who had rebelled against him. It was evident that the Deccan states were so weak that a group of rebels could seize their territory easily. However, the serious preoccupation in the North prevented Akbar from a more active policy of expansion south of Narbada or a more active diplomacy viv-a-vis the Deccan states.

GUJARAT

With the conquest of Gujarat, Akbar naturally wished to assume the same rights which the previous rulers of Gujarat had enjoyed in relations to the Deccan states. These were the rights of overlordship. Since 1417 the Deccan states had acknowledged the Sultan of Gujarat, had read the *Khutba* in his name and had paid him an annual tribute. The position may now be described in more detail.

28. Nur-ul-Haq, f 197; Abu Turab, pp. 83-95 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 51-62 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 269-72 ; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, i, pp, 801, 802.
29. Amir Haider, ff. 383, 85; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, pp. 136, 137 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 133-45 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 331, 332.

Nasir Khan Faruqi, son of Raja, Founder of the Faruqi dynasty of Khandesh, once advanced in 820/1417 to seize Nandarbar and Sultanpur-south-eastern districts of Gujarat. Ahmad Shah of Gujarat came to oppose him and forced Nasir Khan to take refuge n the fortress of Thalner. Peace was restored on the submission of Nasir Khan who acknowledged Sultau Ahmad Shah as his overlord. In return the Sultan conferred on him the title of Khan and gave him *Chatar* and a red tent-enclosure. Since then rulers of Khandesh had always acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultan of Gujarat and read *Khutba* in his name.[30] The acknowledgement of the Gujarati Sultan by the Deccanis is also corroborated by the coins which were struck in his name. Two coins have been found which belonged to Ahmad Shah of Gujarat (813/1410-846/1442) had the years 848/1440 and 846/1443 respectivly and were struck at the mint of Ahmadnagar.[31]

The powerful Sultans of Gujarat always kept the ruler of Khandesh under strict control. If that ruler ever attempted to assert his independence, he was forced by the Sultan of Gujarat to abadon the idea. Miran 'Ina known as 'Adil Khan Faruqi b. Mubarak Shah did not send the annual tribute for some years upon which Sultan Mahmud Baigra sent on army in 894/1498 under Qazi Pir. 'Adil Khan Faruqi was defeated and purchased peace by presenting himself personally at Mahmudabad, acknowledged the Sultan as his overlord and paid the arrears of tribute.[32] Only once in 893/1492 when Nizam-ul-Mulk of Ahmadnagar penetrated into Khandesh, 'Adil Khan Faruqi II had to seek the help of Nasir-ud-Din of Malwa and in return agreed to read his name in the *Khutba*,[33] but that was a temporary phase in their relations.

30. Firishta, ii, pp. 279, 280.
31. H. N. Wright, *Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum*, ii, Oxford, 1901, p. 226.
32. Firishta, ii, p. 281.
33. Ibid., p. 282.

The Sultan of Gujarat not only controlled the external affairs of these states but also interferred in their internal affairs. In 865/1460 Sultan Mahmud Shah of Gujarat deposed 'Imad-ul-Mulk and confirmed his son Shihab-ud-Din on the throne of Berar. Similarly when Daud Shah Faruqi died in 914/1508 leaving no male issue to succeed him, it was only through the efforts of Gujarat that 'Adil Khan Faruqi III succeeded him. The Sultan further strengthened Gujarat-Khandesh relations by having 'Adil Khan III married to the daughter of Muzaffar b. Mahmud, who latter on became Sultan Muzaffar II of Gujarat. Being apprehensive of Nizam-ul-Mulk's revengeful and aggressive designs on Khandesh, 'Adil Khan III wrote to Sultan Mahmud who replied to him that Nizam-ul-Mulk was one of his subordinate allies and would not dare attack him.[34]

Miran Muhammad was the first ruler of the Faruqi dynasty who enjoyed the title of Shah, conferred on him by Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Bahadur Shah favoured him so much that he appointed him his heir-apparent.[35] Bahadur Shah was a powerful ruler and all rulers of the Deccan states bowed their heads before him. In 934/1527, Burhan Nizam-ul-Mulk with the help of Amir Barid advanced against 'Imad-ul-Mulk of Berar and captured Illichpur. Unable to withstand him, 'Imad-ul-Mulk fled to Miran Muhammad Shah. The combined forces of 'Imad-ul-Mulk and Miran Muhammad Shah were also defeated and the latter appealed to Bahadur Shah for help. Bahadur Shah advanced towards the Deccan in 935/1528 via Nandarbar. 'Imad-ul-Mulk became alarmed at the Sultan's march, offered his submission and had the *Khutba* read in Berar in the name of Bahadur Shah.[36]

34. Muhammad Hadi, *Haft Gulshan*, B.M or. 1796, f. 122 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 206, 205,

35. Firishta, ii, pp. 216, 225, 284; Haji Dabir, *Zafar-ul-walih bi Muzaffar Wa Alih*, i, London, 1910, p. 150.

36. Firishta, ii, pp. 107, 215—17, 284.

Accepting 'Imad-ul-Mulk's submission, Bahadur Shah advanced towards Ahmadnagar, which he took without striking a blow. He stayed there for forty days and took homage from the nobles. He then marched towards Daulatabad and laid siege to it. Hearing of the advance of Nizam-ul-Mulk and Qasim Barid towards Burhanpur, he sent 'Imad-ul-Mulk and Miran Muhammad Shah in advance and himself followed them towards Burhanpur. When he reached Bir, Qasim Barid offered his submission which was accepted and Bahadur's name was read in *Khutba* in Bedar.[37] Bahadur Shah then pursued Nizam-ul-Mulk who had taken refuge at Burhanpur. Pressed hard, Burhan now begged for peace in 936/1529. He promised to give back the seized elephants both to 'Imad-ul-Mulk and Miran Muhammad Shah and to read *Khutba* in Bahadur Shah's name in Ahmadnagar.[38] Some time later, Burhan sent a letter and many gifts through his envoy Shah Tahir who conveyed the message that the *Khutba* was actually recited in Sultan Bahadur's name in Ahmadnagar.

The events of 937/1630 which have been mentioned in the following pages, will clearly show that the Deccan states owed their political standing entirely to the Sultan of Gujarat. In order to bring Ahmadnagar-Gujarat relations closer, Shah Tahir most prudently managed a meeting between Bahadur Shah and Burhan Nizam-ul-Mulk. A great *darbar* was held in Burhanpur in 937/1531, Bahadur Shah graciously received Burhan, who acknowledged him as his overlord and begged forgiveness for his past deeds. Bahadur Shah was very much pleased with Burhan, gave him a jewelled sword a dagger, horses etc, and conferring the title of Shah on him, honoured him with a *chatar* and other paraphernalia of royalty.[40]

37. Haji Dabir, i, p. 151; Firishta, ii, pp. 105, 217.
38. Firishta, ii, p. 217 ; Haji Dabir, i, pp. 52—53.
39. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 152, 53.
40. Firishta, ii, pp. 107—09, 219 284 ; Rafi-ud-Din Shirazi : *Tazkirat-ul-Muluk*, B.M. Add. 23883, f. 48 a, Muhammad Hadi, f. 127 a; Haji Dabir, i, pp. 152-54.

Similarly Bahadur Shah went to Ahmadnagar where 'Adil Khan of Bijapur and Qutb-ul-Mulk of Golconda were also invited. In a ceremony held at *Kala Chubutra*, Sultan Bahadur Shah conferred the titles of 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah on 'Adil Khan and Qutb-ul-Mulk ; gave them *chatars* and other insignias of kingship.[41] Like other rulers of the Deccan states, both 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah also acknowledged Sultan Bahadur as their overlord.

When Sultan Bahadur captured Mandu towards the end of 937/1530 and *khutba* was read in Malwa in his name, Burhan Nizam Shah sent congratulations on the Sultan's success. Thus we conclude that the Sultan of Gujarat was at one time the undisputed suzerain not only of the Deccan states but of Malwa and Khandesh as well. After the death of Bahadur in 943/1536. Miran Muhammad Shah of Khandesh was declared Sultan of Gujarat by some Gujarati nobles and *khutba* was read 'in absentia' in his name. While Miran Muhammad Shah was on his way to Gujarat, he fell ill and died.[42]

Miran Muhammad Shah was succeeded by Miran Mubarak Shah in Khandesh, who considered the throne of Gujarat as his legal right. Many Gujarati nobles who opposed Sultan Mahmud, the new lord of Gujarat, fled to Khandesh and espoused Miran Mubarak Shah's cause. Sultan Mahmud asked Miran Mubarak to expel the rebels from his state and on his rufusal, the former led an army into Khandesh. Sultan Mahmud forced Miran Mubarak Shah to acknowledge him and in return Khandesh was conferred upon him as his fief.[43]

So it was natural therefore, that once Akbar had brought Gujarat under him, he should asume the right to exercise his suzerainty over the Deccan states.

41. Muhammad Sharif-al-Hanafi, *Majalis-us-Salatin* B.M or. 1003, f. 112.

42. Nur-ul-Haq, f. 311 a; Firishta, ii, pp. 225—287; Muhammad Hadi, ff. 130—136 b.

43. Muhammad Hadi, f. 130 b; Abu Turab, ff. 39, 40, 44 ; Firishta, ii, p. 286.

THE PORTUGUESE

To push the Portuguese into the sea was another cause of Akbar's intention to subjugate the Deccan states. He had many justifications for his grievances against them.

The western coastal tract of the Indian peninsula separated from Vijayanagar by the Ghats was an area where mutually hostile small princes held independent sway. This region extending from Manglore to Cape Camorin, Cochin and Calicut was known as Malabar. The inhabitants call themselves *Mallealler.* Malabar means mountaineers because the original colonists were of a mountainous race.[44] Cochin is situated at the mouth of a river, rich in fish. It has many islates which are planted with coconut palms. Calicut the capital of Malabar is called by the notive people *Kırrek-ovre.* which signifies Hencoop. The reason they put forward for that name is that when Cheramperumal divided his kingdom, he gave to the Zamorin as his share only 'so much land as the sound of a cock crowing from its perch could be heard over.' It was a commercial town and Zamorin collected 5%import duty.[45]

The sea ports such as Goa, Diu, Daman and Chiul which control the sea route to Arabian and Red seas lay on the northwest coast of India. The rulers of these ports were not skilled enough in naval warfare so as to oppose the Portuguese. The native did not know the art of besieging and bombarding. The geographical position of the two Deccan states, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur whose boundaries touched the southern coast, was such that there lay many petty independent kingdoms of Malabar and the mighty mountains between them and the western coast that it was impossible for them to pay serious attention to the Portuguese at an early stage. More-

44. K. P. P. Menon, *History of Kerala*, i, Ernakulam, (n.d.), p. 1 (letters).

45. C. F. Danver, *The Portuguese in India*, London, 1894, pp. 28—48 ; Menon, pp. 10—12 (Letters).

over. there was no strong kingdom at Delhi in the earlier phase of the establishment of the Portuguese power in India to oppose their growth.

The Portuguese, the first European power to touch the Indian coast came in 1498. In those days any general combination against them was impossible. The Bahmani and Vijayanagar rulers were engaged in a death-struggle against each other and both looked on the intruding Portuguese as unclean corsairs who were unworthy of serious attention, "When Vasco da Gama reached Calicut in 1498, the search for 'Christian and spices' rather than new world to conquer was what had brought the Portuguese to India."[46] They therefore, tried to cultivate friendly relations with some of the coastal powers in order to obtain trade facilities. But the internecine warfare of the Deccan states for superiority made the Portuguese realize the political weakness of these states and they found suitable opportunities for their aggrandisement. It can therefore, be said the Indians of the south were themselues responsible for inducing the Portuguese to encroach upon their territories. Akbar realised the danger of the Portuguese activities in India and regarded them as his enemies.

Though the Portuguese could not establish strong empire yet in order to secure their trade, they seized some strategic places on the south western coast of India.[47] In 1500 they built factories in Calicut and Cochin. They employed inhuman methods to terrorise the local rulers to submit. King of Calicut sent his envoys in 1502 to Vasco da Gama to settle peace terms. The envoy way tied to the mast of a ship and burning embers were put on his body. His lips and ears were cut off and replaced by dog's ears. In this condition he was sent back.[48] Three years later i.e. in 1503, they obtained permission from the Raja of Cochin to build a fort in his state.[49] By 1509

46. H. V. Livermore, *Portugal and Brazil*, Oxford, 1953, p. 185.
47. Ibid., p. 192.
48. Danver, i, p. 90.
49. Ibid., i, pp. 69, 77, 99, 82-184.

they had attained such a power so as to defeat Zamorin of Calicut. The King of Portugal sent orders to the Portuguese governor in India to capture Calicut and Cochin. In December 1509 the Portuguese plundered Calicut and set its *Jami Masjid* on fire. Though the Portuguese could not capture these places, yet the Raja of Cochin and the Zamorin of Calicut were made tributaries to the King of Portugal.[50] In 1509 Don Francisco de Almeida demanded an annual subsidy of 10,000 *cruzados* from Ahmad Nizam Shah but the Nizam Shah paid only 2000 *cruzados* [51] In 931/1510 the Portuguese commander, Albuquerque conquered the Bijapuri port of Goa,[52] With Goa as their base, the Portuguese intended to capture the entire Deccan. When Goa was lost temporarily to Bijapur in 1510, some Portuguese officers opposed the idea of recapturing it. But Albuquerque was firm in his decision of retaking Goa. He argued that if once Goa was under them, it would become easier for the Portuguese to achieve their ultimate aim of the conquest of the Deccan. In 1511 King Manuel wrote to Albuquerque to surrender Goa to 'Adil Khan if the latter would agree to become tributary to Portugal. But the Portuguese commander declined to obey the order and wrote to the King :

> "But when once Goa was conquered, everything else was at our command without any further trouble......

50. R. S. Whiteway : *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India*, London, 1899, pp. 128-29 ; Danver, i, pp. 330-31 ; ii, p. 3 ; M. K. Panikar, *Malabar and the Portuguese*, Bombay, 1929, pp. 66, 82, 86.
51. Danvers, i, pp. 141-42.
52. Ghulam Murtza, *Basatin-us-Salatin*, B. M. Add. 26269, f. 19; Firishta, i, pp. 12—14; M. K. Panikar, *Asia and Western Dominance*, London, 1953, p. 47 says that after the conquest of Goa, Albuquerque wrote to the King of Portugal that he had put every Moor in Goa to sword. The Portuguese commander added "Wherever he could find them, no Moor has spared and they filled mosques with them and set them on fire."

> And if your Highness in deference to the opinions of those who have written this advice to you, thinks (*sic*) it possible to secure your dominions in these parts by means of the fortresses of Cochin and Cananor, it is impossible ; for, if once Portugal should suffer a reverse at sea, your Indian possessions have not powers to hold out a day longer than the kings of the lands choose to suffer it....... If your highness, either now or at any other time, surrender Goa to the Turks, then plainly Our Lord desires that the Portuguese dominion in India should come to an end. And as for me, Your Highness may be sure that so long I am governor, although I be put to much trouble, I shall not at any rate, send you the painted pictures of fictitious places, but rather kingdoms taken by forces of arms from their masters, and fortified by me in such a manner that they may give a good account of themselves in all time."[53]

The aim of the conquest of the Deccan by the Potuguese is further proved by a letter of Albuquerque to King Manuel in 1614. He wrote that with the fall of Danda and Chiul, the Portuguese would be in a better position to subjugate the Deccan.[54]

Muslims suffered heavily in the defence of Goa. Six thousand of them lost their lives in the defence. After its fall, Albuquerque gave orders to his officers that Muslims should be beheaded if caught whereas Hindus were to be spared. Regarding the Muslims, the commander 'was determined to leave no seed of this race.' Muslim women were seized and distributed among the Portuguese who converted them to Christianity aud married them. All petty states, which

53. Danvers, i, pp. 259-63.

54. Ibid., p. 291.

hitherto had been paying allegiance to 'Adil Shah, the ruler of Goa, now changed their loyalty to the Portuguese.[55]

In December 1530, the Portuguese commander, Nuno da Cunha advanced with a fleet of 400 boats including 3600 soldiers, 1460 seamen all Portuguese, besides 2000 Malabaris and Canaris, 8000 slaves and 5000 native seamen towards Daman and captured it. Diogo da Silveria plundered and burnt the towns of Patam, Pate and Mangalor in 1531.[56]

The period 1531-1533, was one of rapid success for the Portuguese power in India, During these years Tarapur, Bulsar, Thana, Keiva, Agashi and Mahim submitted to them. In 1534 Bahadur Shah of Gujarat concluded a treaty with them. The terms were : erection of a Portuguese fort at Diu ; Bassein to be ceded to the Portuguese ; all vessels sailing from India for the straits would first call at Bassein for passes and on their return voyage call there again in order to pay the customary dues, under penalty and risk of seizure ; no ship of war to be built at any of the ports in the kingdom of Gujarat except trading ships. Bahadur agreed not to allow any Rumis (Ottoman Turks) to enter his dominion nor assist the Turkish fleet in the Indian seas and in return of all these concessions, the Sultan of Gujarat would receive Portuguese help against his enemies.[58] It should be noted that the Portuguese help against the enemies of Bahadur meant assistance against the Mughuls because at that time Bahadur Shah was pressed hard by Humayun. In 1534, they took ports of Daman, and Diu which belonged to Gujarat.[59] In 1547 the Portuguese concluded a treaty with Ahmadnagar according to which they solemnly promised to assist Nizam Shah against his

55. Ibid., pp. 210-12, 217.
56. Ibid., pp. 400-04.
57. Ibid., pp. 400-02
58. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 192, 272-18 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 222-24; Danvers, i, pp. 416-17 ; Whiteway, pp. 235—37.
59. Danvers, ii, p. 32.

enemies except the ruler of Vijayanagar with whom the former had friendly relations.[60] In 1546 'Adil Shah was forced to cede two peninsulas of Bardes and Salsette and he swore by Prophet Muhammad to be a perpetual friend of the King of Portugal and promised never to fight with them.[61] In 1554 their territory was further increased by the cession to them by 'Adil Shah of the whole of Konkan—the area from about 17° to latitude 19° North. In 1556 the Portuguese attacked Thatta, killed eight thousand people and destroyed property of millions of rupees and took away with them "the richest booties ever taken in Asia."[62] Bijapur, Ahmadnagar and Calicut made a common cause against the Portuguese in 1570 but the combined forces suffered a defeat at the hands of Dom Francisco de Mascarenhas, Luiz Ferreira de Andrade and Nuno Aluarez Pereira.[63] In 1575 Dom Joao da Costa, the Portuguese admiral of the Malabar seas, burnt the town of Gaipur and killed more than 1500 people.[64] Coastal towns of Calicut, Ponnani, Calegate, Marate, Conche and the island of Daruti were burnt by the Portuguese in 1582.[65] In 1592 Murtaza Nizam Shah invaded Reekvanda near Chiul. The siege continued for two years and sixty thousand Muslims lost their lives.[66] In 1581 the Queen of Olava and the Queen of the mountains

60. Radey Shyam, *The Kingdom of Ahmadnagar*, Delhi, 1966, p. 336; Danvers, i, p. 478; Robert Sewell, *Historical Inscription of South India*, Madras, 1932, p. 251.

61. Danvers, i, pp. 465, 475, 476:

62. Ibid., p. 508.

63. Ibid., pp. 551-72; ii, p. 41; Robert Sewell, p. 256.

64. Danvers, ii, p. 11.

65. Ibid., pp. 49–51.

66. Fuzuni Astrabadi, *Futuhat-i-'Adil Shahi*, B. M. Add. 27251, ff. 120-24 Firishta, ii, p. 154; Danvers, ii, pp. 89, 90 says that Farhad Khan, the Nizam Shah commander and his daughter were made Catholic Christains and sent to Portugal.

between Calicut and Cannanore agreed to pay tribute to King Philip.[67] In a letter dated January 22, 1598, the King of Portugal seriously urged the viceroy of Goa to fortify the same.[68]

Secondly, the Portuguese regarded the Mughuls as their arch enemy and encouraged other states to make a common cause against them. They gave active support io such states to destroy the Mughul prestige in the South. In 1530, Burhan Nizam Shah was asked by the Portuguese to help Bahadur Shah of Gujarat against the Mughuls.[69]

The Muslim pilgrims suffered at the hands of the Portuguese. In 1531 the Portuguese seized a home-bound ship of Muslim pilgrims, made two hundred pilgrims slaves and captured its cargo worth 60,000 *Paradaos*.[70] The Portuguese forced the ruler of Calicut to sign a treaty in 1540 according to which Calicut agreed to stop her trade with Mecca. In 1546, they captured a Bijapuri ship returning from Hijaz.[71]

The naval power of the Portuguese was so superior that once the Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman (1520-66) sent Sulaiman Pasha, the governor of Egypt in 1538 to capture Diu. The Ottoman force included seventy ships and seven thousand soldiers. The Muslim army was further strenghened by six thousand Gujaratis. A fierce battle took place and the Ottomans were defeated.[72]

The Muslims were so depressed by the Portuguese brutality against the pilgrims that once Makhdum-ul-Mulk Maulana 'Abdullah Sultanpuri, a religious leader during Akbar's reign, issued a *fatwa* that the ordinance of pilgrimage was no longer binding on the Muslims of Mughul India. Justifying his statement he said that both the

67. Danvers, ii, p. 41.
68. *Corpo chronologico*, iii, pp. 211-13.
69. Danvers, i, p. 312.
70. Ibid., p. 403.
71. Ibid., pp. 443, 507.
72. Ibid., pp. 421-27, 433-36.

roads to Mecca—one through Iran and the other through Gujarat were impracticable. Going overland, the *Sunni* pilgrims had to suffer injuries at the hands of the *Shias* of Iran and by sea they had to submit to indignities from the Portuguese on account of the passport requirements and heavy sums they were required to pay.[73] When Akbar went to Cambay in 1572 he met the Portuguese authorities of Goa and arranged for the safety of Muslim pilgrims. We find that Gulbadan Begum, the paternal aunt of Akbar, could only go for *Haj* when arrangements were made with the Portuguese for her safe return.[74] In 985/1577 Akbar sent Sultan Khwaja Naqshbandi as *Mir Haj* to Mecca and gave him six lakh rupees for the expenses and Rs. 12,000 to distribute among the poor of Hijaz. Though the Portuguese had promised safe conduct to the pilgrims yet they obstructed their way and demanded extortionate sums. The ship was delayed and Qulij Khan was despatched to bring the Portuguese to heel. He took an army from Idar and went to Surat and obtained permission for the passage of the ship.[75]

Any ship sailing from the Mughul port of Surat had to obtain a passport from Goa, Diu or Daman. Any ship which did not possess the requisite permission was confiscated. The Portuguese commander of Daman seized two Mughul ships near Surat in 1569 and their commodities worth more than 100,000 *ducats* were confiscated on the plea that the ships were loaded without Portuguese permission. Similarly, they seized the imperial ships returning from Jedda and its passengers were treated with great contempt.[76] It is mentioned that the Muslim ships such as Rahimi, Mahuammadi and others traded with the Middle East and Turkey. The letter of Squania (Rodolfi) to the Provincial at Goa, dated September 27, 1582 shows

73. Badauni, ii, p. 203.

74. Abu'l Fazl, *A. N*, ii, p. 145.

75. Badauni, i, p. 242; Amir Haider, ff. 377—78.

76. Danvers, i, pp. 403, 543.

that when the Portuguese captured a Mughul ship, the imperialists became perturbed at Agra. The letter reads:

"The day before yesterday news came of the capture of the ships. The emperor has not spoken to me of this, but as I am writing the emperor's mother has sent for me." Refering to the same incident, Coryate clearly mentions that a Mughul ship was seized by the Portuguese. Akbar's mother became furious and asked him to take revenge. As the Emperor, then wanted to avoid any open conflict with the Portuguese, he appeased her anger diplomatically.[77]

The past history of the Portuguese was known to Akbar. He had himself experienced their support of his enemies, who had concluded agreements with them. But he pretended friendship and bided his time because his own government was not fully established and secure in the North. He used to send his agents ostensibly as ambassadors to Goa to import European craftsmen to have facilities for sea trade, but in fact to know their secret designs and to ascertain their military and naval strength. He always sent his agents at times when ships were said to be due from Portugal so that they might take note of what came in them whether in the way of marchandise or men. He planned to send an envoy in 1583 to Philip II of Spain to congratulate him for his occupation of Portugal in 1580. The ambassador came back from Goa as there was no ship due to sail for Portugal, that year,[78]

Many times Akbar expressed his intention of ousting the Portuguese from India. In his letter of 1586 to 'Abdullah Khan of Turan, he wrote that Hindu Rajas and his other opponents had obeyed the imperial power. He, therefore, wanted to establish peace and order in the newly conquered areas. He had kept before his mind

77. *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta, 1896, p. 58. See also foot notes on pp. 58—59.

78. Smith, *Akbar*, pp. 205-06; Thomas Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India*, London, 1936, p. 37.

the firm idea that when he would be free from these tasks (i.e. establishing rule in the North) he would under the guidance of God's favour, undertake the destruction of the *Firingi* i.e. (European) infidels who had come to the island of the ocean ; had raised the head of rebellion and oppressed the pilgrims going to holy places. They had become numerous and were a source of trouble both to pilgrims and to traders. He had thought of going in aerson and cleaning that road from thorns and weeds.[79] Similarly, on another occasion, Akbar told his nobles that the Portuguese were like chicken and that he would easily overcome them when he would go to the South.[80] Father Xavier also writes that, after conquering the Deccan, Akbar intended to conquer Goa and Malabar.[81]

Before the invasion of the Deccan by Akbar, the imperial forces attempted twice to push the Portuguese into the sea, but they were unsuccessful. In 987/1580 Qutb-ud-Din Khan was despatched with an army to capture Portuguese holdings. The nobles of Malwa and Gujarat were ordered to assist the imperial commander. The rulers of the Deccan were also informed to fight the *Firingis*, who were a great menace in the way of Muslim pilgrims to Hijaz. The Deccanis were bidden to regard that news as an opportunity for showing their loyalty and directed to join the imperial army,] to prove their sincerity to the Mughul cause.[82] Probably due to lack of support from the Deccan rulers and not having full attention from the North, the campaign seemed to have been unsuccessful as nothing more was heard of it. The Mughuls made their second attempt in 1001/1593 when Mirza 'Aziz Koka led an army against the Portuguese of Diu. The Mirza stopped the coming and going of traders from all

79. Abu'l Fazl *A. N.*, iii, pp. 497-99.

80. Du Ja'ric, *Histoire des Choses Plus Memorables* . . . . Tr. into English by C. H. Payne as *Akbar and the Jesuits*, London, 1926, p. 113.

81. *Indian Antiquary*, 1924, p. 33 ; Du Jarric, p. 102.

82. Abu'l Fazl, *A. N.*, iii, pp. 280-81.

parts of Gujarat—a traffic which made Diu prosperous. Though the Mughul army could not capture the fort, still the Portuguese who were put to straits, agreed to give some concessions. It was decided that the Mughul ship *Jahaz-i-Ilahi,* which was always loaded at Diu should only be half-loaded there and the remainder of the passengers and cargo should be embarked where its captain chose. It was further agreed that one thousand *Mahmudis,* which was the hire would not be paid to the Portuguese. The Portuguese also issued a licence to 'Aziz Koka authorising him to go to Mecca by sea.[83] Akbar could never forget the double shock to the Mughul prestige at the hands of the Portuguese but he waited for a right opportunity to take a strong action against them.

While describing the province of Gujarat in the *Ain*, Abu'l Fazl also accuses the Portuguese who had captured the sea ports of Gujarat. He writes : "Owing to the negligence of officers of the state, and commanders of the frontiers, many of these *sarkars* such as Daman, Sanjan, Tarapur, Mahim (i.e. Bombay), and Base (i.e. Basein) are in the possession of the *Firingis*".[84]

It can be concluded since the Portuguese were increasing their power rapidly both on land and at sea while they made agreements with the southern states of India against the Mughuls and actively supported them against the imperial rule. A mighty conqueror like Akbar could not sit patiently and watch a foreign power encroaching upon the land which he regarded as his own by right. Since the Mughuls had no naval power, to defeat the Portuguese could only be possible by land. Akbar, therefore, expected full eo-operation of the Deccan states in pushing the Portuguese into the sea. But on the other hand the Deccan states, which were more exposed to the Portuguese than the Mughuls, were not ready to take the risk of making the Portuguese, who were their immediate neighbours, their perpetual

83. 'Ali Muhmmad Khan, i, p. 181; Abu'l Fazl, *A. N.*, ii, p. 638.

84. Abu'l Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, i, Calcutta, 1877, p. 488.

enemy. They had already suffered defeats at the hands of the Portuguese in the past. Geography obliged the Deccanis to maintain friendly relations with the Portuguese on whom depended their sea trade and safety of their own frontiers, Akbar, therefore, was forced to conquer these Deccan states first if he wanted to overthrow the Portuguese by land.

MUGHUL ARMY

The army which Humayun brought with him on his return from Iran in 1554, was small. It was composed of such heterogeneous elements that after it had served the temporary purpose of re-occupying the country, it naturally threatened to become a source of danger rather than a source of strength to Humayun. Similarly, when Akbar succeeded his father he had only a small army. In the course of time, the Mughul army increased and *mansabdars* grew more. According to the *Ain* the total strength of the Mughul army under Akbar was forty-four lakhs including one thousand eight hundred and three *mansabdars.* It is true that the number given in the *Ain* was that of 1596[85] but it does not alter the fact that as the imperial kingdom extended the number of the army and *mansabdars* grew more.

When Akbar was fully established in the North, should he have disbanded such a large army because his work in northern India was complete? If he disbanded his soldiers or relieved some of the *mansabdars* of their positions, anarchy would have prevailed and the labour of nearly forty years would have become fruitless. If not, he should have to find some work where he could engage the army. Recording happy sayings of Akbar, Abu'l Fazl mentions that according to the Mughul Emperor, "a monarch should be ever intent on conquest, otherwise his neighbours rise in arms against him. The army should be exercised in warfare lest from want of training they become self-indulgent."[86] After bringing northern India under him, the area

85. Ibid., pp. 175, 281.
86. Ibid., p. 244.

which could occupy Akbar's attention was the South, which in itself was an open invitation for him.

IDEA OF CHAKARVARTIN

Akbar cherished, it would seem, the ambition to be regarded as *Chakravartin* i,e., the world conqueror. The idea of world conquest based on the ceremony of *Asvamedha* (i e. horse sacrifice) dates from the Rig Vedic period. A world grasper was known variously as *Paramesvara ; Paramabhattaraka*; *Maharajadhiraj*; *Akhandabhumipa*; *Raja Raja*; *Visvaraja* and *Caturantesa.*[87] But the term *Cakravartin* or *Chakra Variin* was the best known of all the epithets. In Sanskrit, the word stands for "a ruler, the wheels of whose chariot roll everywhere without obstruction, ruler of a *chakra* or country extending from sea to sea or who is King of kings."

It has been recorded that the twelve princes beginning with Bharata were considered as *Chakravartin*. If the word *Chakravartin* is to be applied to India, it would mean the supreme lord of India.

Some of the Gupta kings such as Chandra Gupta I, Samudra Gupta and Chandra Gupta II, Vikramaditya seemed to have enjoyed such title.[88] The Hoysala king Vira Ballala III of Dwarsamudra in Southern India had also been described as one of *Chakravartin* Rajas of India.

Sultan Alaud-din Khalji expressed his desire to become a world conqueror.[89] He wanted to be called as *Sikandar Sani* and inscribed these words on his coins. It was only through the good counsel of Malik 'Ala-ul-Mulk that the Sultan dropped the idea of

87. Basham, pp. 83-85 ; John, W. Spellman, *Potical Theory of Ancient India*, Oxford, 1964, pp. 170-75 ; Paul Masson-oursel and others, *Ancient India and Indian Civilization*, London, 1967, pp. 52, 53, 91.

88. S. Krishnasvami Aiyangar, *Ancient India and South Indian History and Culture*, i, Poona, 1941, pp. 183, 211, 217, 227, 229, 251, 263.

89. Barani, p. 263.

world conquest and took to the conquest of those parts of India which were still lying outside the Delhi sway.[90] In fact his Deccan policy was the outcome of his desire to become the supreme lord of India by bringing the South under the North.

Akbar was the first Mughul king of India, who had such a vast area under his command. He had secured his position firmly in the North by 1593. His authority extended over an empire for greater than that of Harsha Hc was undisputed master of the whole of ancient Aryavarta extending from the Himalayas to the Narbada and Koh Hindu Kush to Bengal and was recognized by the vast majority of his Hindu subjects as fulfilliag their idea of an Aryan monarch, But the South stood as a challenge to Akbar's pride to be known as a' *Chakarvartin* ruler of India.

His notion of '*Chakarvartian*' appears to be due to the influence of his Hindu associates, his matrimonial alliance with the Rajputs. in permitting his Hindu wives to perform their religious rites, his Hindu *mansabdars* and courtiers, A sizeable portion of the Mughul army under him consisted of the Rajputs. All these factors if put together, give us an idea which could have created in his mind the desire to assume the status of a *Chakarvartin*. The Emperor had adopted many Hindu religious social customs and etiquette at his court. For example, the institution of *Nau Ratan* which Akbar introduced at his court was purely Hindu in its origin. Badauni records that once some Brahmins told Akbar that he was an incarnation of God, like Rama or Krishna, and that the lord of the world had assumed his shape. In order to convince the Emperor, they produced some old Sanskrit verses said to have been taken from the sayings of ancient Hindu saints who had predicted that a great conqueror would rise in India who would respect Brahmins and protect cow and would govern with justice. In the end Badauni remarks that the Emperor believed them.[91] Though full credit cannot be given to the authenticity of the

90. Ibid., pp. 263-71.
91. Badauni, ii, p. 326.

details of Badauni's story, yet there is no doubt that Abbar used to converse with the Brahmans and discussed Hindu Philosophy with them. It can be concluded that Akbar being an expansionist wanted to be listed among the *Chakravartin* ruler of India and his desire could only be put into practical shape if he mastered both North and South India.

HEREDITARY RIGHT

Akbar regarded domination over the Deccan as the hereditary right of the Mughuls. He knew that the Deccan states had recog: nised his Mughul predecessors as their overlord in the past and he was therefore eager to enjoy the same right himself, The events of the past history given below would justify Akbar's demand,

In 1400 it was rumoured that Timur intended to march to India once again to capture its remaining parts. In order to save his own kingdam, Sultan Firuz Shah Bahmani. the then ruler of the Deccan, sent Amir Naqi-ud-Din and Maulana Lutf-Ullah Sabzwari as ambassadors to the court of Timur at Samarqand, along with valuable gifts and a letter of acknowledgement of his overlordship. The Deccani Sultan assured Timur of his sincerity and full cooperation whenever he needed it. The ambassadors remained six months at the court of Timur who treated them well. Timur conferred the sovereignty of the Deccan, Gujarat and Malwa on Firuz Shah and awarded him a *'Chatar'*. He was so much pleased at the submission of Firuz that Timnr addressed him as 'his well-wishing son'. At the time of the departure of the Deccani ambassadors, Timur sent a belt, a jewelled sword, a royal *charqubbah*, a Turkish slave and four horses for Firuz Shah Bahmani.[92]

In 1528 Nizam-ul-Mulk of Ahmadnagar, pressed by 'Imad Shah and Muhammad Shah Faruqi and apprehending that Babur, who was then advancing towards Bihar and Orissa, might not enter his own state, sent him a letter of congratulation and acknowledged

92. Firishta, i, p. 312.

him as his overlord. Nizam-ul-Mulk assured Babur of his full support in his career of conquest. He said that he wanted to send his envoys in 1526 to congratulate him but he could not do so owing to lack of safe passage to Delhi.[93] When Burhan Nizam Shah was threatened by Bahadur Shah of Gujarat in 1529 he appealed to Babur for assistance and in return promised to acknowledge him as his overlord. But Babur could not attend to the call of Burhan.[94]

When Humayun went to annex Malwa in 1534, he also wanted to seize Khandesh. He sent his imperial envoy, Asaf Khan, to Nizam-ul-Mulk to seek the latter's help. Miran Muhammad Shah, the ruler of Khandesh, appealed to Burhan Nizam-ul-Mulk to request the Emperor on his behalf to spare his state and offered his submission. Burhan wrote a recommendatory letter to Humayun asking him to spare Miran Muhammad Shah's kingdom.[95] The fears of the Deccanis were ill-founded as Humayun was much harassed by the activities of Bahadur's Amirs in Gujarat and was disturbed by the progress of his formidable opponent Sher Khan. He was, therefore, unable to stay any longer in Gujarat and retired to Mandu. Similarly, in 244/1537 when Khandesh and Gujarat united against Nizam-ul-Mulk, the latter saw his safety in seeking help from the North and in rerurn promised to acknowledge Humayun as his overlord. He wrote a tetter to Humayun that the friendship between the two houses existed since Babur's time and he wanted to strengthen it. He promised his full cooperation to the Mughul Emperor against the latter's enemies. He assured Humayun that if he came to curb down his opponents it wonld be an opportunity for him to show his loyalty towards him. Humayun received Rasti Khan, the Nizam Shahi envoy, and honoured

93. Shah Tahir-al-Husaini, *Insha-i-Tahir-al-Husaini*, B. M. Hail 499, ff. 5-9a ; Khafi Khan, i, p 264 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 105, 107, 217 ; Haji Dabir, pp. 152-53.

94. Firishta, iii, p. 218 ; Badauni, iii, p. 165.

95. Shah Tahir-al-Husaini, ff, 17-19a ; Firishta, i, p. 215.

him. As Hamayun was himself busy with Sher Khan, he therefore, could not pay much attention to Nizam-ul-Mulk's request.[96]

It can be inferred from these instances that the Deccan states were too weak to stand against the Mughuls. Whenever the Mughuls advanced towards the borders of these states, their rulers hurriedly submitted to them. Akbar whose Empire was much stronger and better establishod than his Mughul predecessors, was tempted, therefore, to have himself recognized by these states as their overlord.

WEALTH OF THE DECCAN STATES.

The wealth of the Deccan states tempted Akbar to bring the Deccan plateau under his rule. It was a custom in the ancient South that a Raja upon his accession did not spend the accumulated wealth of his predecessors but took pride on adding to it. In this way the wealth went on increasing with time. Moreover, the rulers of the South banned the export of precious stones from their states. The booty which Ala-ud-Din Khalji collected from Deogir in 1299 testifies to the riches of Deccan. It included six hundred *mans* of gold, seven *mans* of pearls, two *mans* of diamond and other precious stones, one thousand *mans* of silver and numerous other articles.[97]

Ala-ud-Din Khalji was so much impressed by the wealth of the Deccan that he sent Malik Kafur repeatedly to rob the Southern states of their riches. *Khazain-ul-Futuh* and *Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi*[98] give a detailed account of Malik Kafur's expeditions to the South and the wealth gained from there. The Muslim commandar took from Rudra Deva ; the Raja of Warangal 100 elephants, 7000 horses and other valuable articles including the famous *Koh-i-Noor*[99] The Raja promised to pay one kror rupees as tribute to the Sultan of

96. Firishta, ii, p. 116.

97. K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, Allahabad, 1950, p. 56.

98. Amir Khusrau, *Khazain-ul-Fatuh*, pp. 87, 93, 96, 101, 106, 12, 123, 133, 141, 144-46, 155-64 ; Barani, pp 328-34.

99. K. S. Lal, p. 199 ; Barani, p. 330.

Delhi. According to Barani the total booty captured by Malik Kafur during the years 1309-1311 from the Deccan included 612 elephants, 20,000 horses and 96000 *mans* of gold. The author remarks that since the establishment of Muslim rule in India so much wealth was never treasured by earlier kings collectively as was brought by Malik Kafur from his Deccan campaigns.[100]

The Bahmani kingdom was rich in resources and had flourishing trade with the outer world. The southern Muslim states increased their wealth after the battle of Talikota in 1565 when Ram Raj, the ruler of Vijaynagar was finally defeated and a large portion of his state was divided by these states among themselves.

The contemporary accounts are full of praise of the Vijayanagar wealth. After visiting the state in 1442-43, 'Abd-ur-Razzaq observes that there were numerous underground royal halls filled with molten gold. People of all sorts, rich or poor, wore diamonds and jewels. He added that the kingdom had three hundred seaports, the most flourishing being Calicut on the Malabar coast. It exported rice, iron, pepper and saltpetre to Arabia, and other lands.[101] Nicolo dei Conti, Domingos Paes and Nuniz, the European travellers who visited South India in ihe 15th and 16th centuries, have also described the immense wealth the Vijaynagar state possessed.[102]

Gifts and *peshkesh* offered to Jahangir and Shah Jahan by the Deccan states reveal the extent of wealth, which these states possessed. Evaluating the gifts brought by Prince Shah Jahan in 1618 from Bijapur, Golconda and Ahmadnagar, Jahangir remarked that such *peshkesh* had never been offered to any of his Mughul predecess-

100. Barani, p. 333.

101. Abd-ur-Razzaq, *Matla-us-Sadain wa Majm'a-ul-Bahrain*, tr. in *Elliot and Dowson*, iv, Allahbad, 1964, pp. 103, 105, 109.

102. Basham, p. 76, Smith, *The Oxford History of India*. Oxford, 1911, p. 310.

ors.[103] Bijapur and Golconda had gold and diamond mines in Masulipatam and Manaar. Diamonds brought from the mines of Karnatak were famous all over India and fetched high price.[104] Thevenot says that Mir Jumla had obtained twenty *mans* of diamonds from Karnatak.[105] Shah Jahan was so much convinced, of the Deccan wealth that he preferred to send his newly appointed Prime Minister. i.e. Mir Jumla, to capture the Deccan than to retake Qandhar from the Safawis.[106]

While describing different provinces of Mughul India, Abu'l Fazl also could not help praising gold and diamond mines and fertile land of the South. He wrote that the province of Khandesh was famous for its fertile land where crops were gathered thrice a year. They were rich in high class cloth factories, Its revenue was 12,647,062 Berari *tankas*. After its conquest when it was properly administered by Mughul financial experts, the revenue increased and totalled 455,294,232 *dams*.[107] The province of Berar had iron and mines of other metals in the districts of Indore and Narnol, It brought a large revenue of 642,603,272 Akbari *dams*.[108]

103. Jahangir, *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri*, ed, by Saiyyid] Ahmad Khan, Aligarh, 1864, p. 198.

104. Count Von Noer, *Kaiser Akbar*, i, Calcutta, 1890, pp. 289-90; Jahangir, p. 236; Niccolao Manucci, *Storio do Mogor*, i, tr. by W. Irvine, London, 1906, p. 239.

105. Jean de Thevenot, *The Travels of Monsieur de Thevenot into the Levant*, Part III, (*Travels into the Indies*) tr. by Archibald Lovell, London, 1687, p. 103.

106. Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire* tr. by Archibald Constable, London, 1891, pp. 22, 23; Manucci, i, p 237; William Foster, *The English Factories in India*, x, Oxford, 1906-09, p. 73.

107. Abu'l Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, ii, pp. 473-74.

108. Ibid., pp. 477-78.

CHAPTER III

WEAKNESSES OF THE DECCAN STATES

For a powerful and ambitious ruler like Akbar, the Deccan states offered both an easy and a glittering prize. For half a century before he became actively interested in their politics or in expansion at their expense, they had been engaged in internecine warfare which seriously threatened their resistance against outside attack.

MUTUAL QUARRELS AMONG THE DECCANIS

The state of Ahmadnagar was the strongest of the Deccan states and Nizam Shah checked any other ruler who wanted to strengthen his position at the expense of his weaker neighbours. In 938/1531, Burhan Nizam Shah advanced against Isma'il 'Adil Shah who wanted to seize Bidar. Burhan was defeated and it was agreed in 839/1532 that Burhan be permitted to add Berar, a bigger state than Bidar, while Isma'il 'Adil Shah be allowed to reduce Karnatak which was under Qutb Shah. It was also decided that neither would interfere in each other's affairs, but both the parties could not carry out the proposed annexations.[1]

In 976/1568, the agreement was reaffirmed by both the states, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur, but with a slight change. This time Murtaza Nizam Shah was allowed to reduce Bidar also, while 'Ali 'Adil Shah would acquire an equivalent area out of the Qutb Shahi territory.[2] 'Ali 'Adil Shah conquered the fortresses of Dahur, Bankapur and Karur. Murtaza Nizam Shah advanced towards Berar in 1547 and defeated Tufail Khan who fled to Burhanpur. Murtaza wrote to Miran Muhammad Shah to drive away Tufail Khan and his son from his country. In utter helplessness, Tufail Khan appealed to Akbar for help and wrote that owing to religious prejudices, Murtaza had captured

1. Firishta, ii, p. 25 ; Fuzuni, ff. 113.
2. Firishta, ii, p. 135.

his state. He further stated that if he received imperial help, he would surrender Berar to the Mughuls. Akbar, always on the lookout for such an opportunity, sent an envoy to Murtaza demanding that he should refrain from the annexation of Berar as Tufail Khan had joined the imperial service. Murtaza knew the preoccupations of the Emperor and put forward some excuses. Akbar also did not pay much heed to the Deccan affairs at this stage, as he was then engaged in the conquest of Bengal. Tufail Khan and his son were captured by Murtaza and both died in captivity.[3]

After annexing Berar, Murtaza Nizam Shah advanced towards Bidar. Miran Muhammad Shah became alarmed at the usurpation of Berar by Murtaza lest the latter should one day capture his own state, and corresponded secretly with the rulers of B japur and Golconda who promised to help him. Thus encouraged, Miran Muhammad Shah advanced with six thousand horses, seized a large portion of Berar and forced Khudawand Khan and Khurshid Khan, the Nizam Shahi commanders, to flee. Murtaza returned hastily from Bidar and marched to Burhanpur. Miran Muhammad Shah shut himself in Asirgarh and begged for peace. He sent six lakh *Muzaffaris* to Murtaza and four lakhs to his minister Chingiz Khan as war indemnity. Qutb Shah sent his envoy Shah Mirza Isfahani to congratulate Murtaza on his success and requested him to desist from capturing Bidar, but the request was declined.[4]

KHANDESH'S RELATIONS WITH AKBAR

The death of Miran Muhammad Shah in 984/1576 was a turning point in the history of the relations of Khandesh with the Mughuls Khandesh which had hitherto acknowledged the suzerainity of Gujarat was now to be regarded as tributary of the Mughuls and was to take a more active part in conjunction with the imperialists against the Deccan states. Miran Muhammad Shah left a minor

3. Bakhshi, iii, p. 69 ; Firishta, ii, p. 136.
4. Firishta, ii, pp. 137-38.

son of fourteen, Hasan Khan by name, and a brother Raja 'Ali Khan to dispute the succession. According to Firishta, Raja 'Ali Khan was at Akbar's court at Agra when his brother died. Hasan Khan was enthroned but was deposed in favour of Raja 'Ali Khan who had come from Agra.[5] But Haji Dabir, the celebrated author of *Zafar-al-Walih*, gives quite a different story. According to him, Raja 'Ali Khan was present at his brother's death bed. It was agreed that Hasan should be the king and the Raja would act as his guardian. After the discovery of a plot, which was planned to assassinate Raja 'Ali Khan, the latter deposed Hasan and enthroned himself.[6]

Firishta and Muhammad Hadi, both write that when Raja 'Ali Khan assumed power, Akbar had obtained possession not only of northern India including Bengal, but also of Malwa and Gujarat. Hence Raja 'Ali Khan refrained from inciting the imperial wrath by assuming the traditional title of Shah. He regarded himself as Akbar's vassal and sent him annual tribute ; but on the other hand he maintained friendly relations with the Deccan states.[7]

Firishta's statement does not seem to be wholly correct, for Haji Dabir's account states that Raja 'Ali Khan assumed the title of 'Adil Shah IV. He has been described many times by the same title in *Zafar-al-Walih*. It also seems that the title of 'Adil Shah IV was not employed only in Khandesh but was also used in the correspondence between Khandesh and the Deccan states.[8] The title of Raja by which he is known was probably adopted by Raja 'Ali Khan in imitation of the founder of his dynasty as a word which etymologically carries the same meaning as Shah and at the same time could not be objected to by Akbar who enrolled many rulers of the

5. Muhammad Hadi, f. 138a ; Firishta, ii, p. 228 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 30.

6. Haji Dabir, i, p. 66.

7. Muhammad Hadi, f. 138b ; Firishta, ii, p. 288.

8. Haji Dabir i, pp. 67, 73, 78, 79, 85.

Hindu states among his *mansabdars* with the same title Though Raja 'Ali Khan had acknowledged Akbar's overlordship yet he had full internal autonomy within Khandesh. But that cannot be called full submission of Khandesh to Akbar or an act outside the traditional policy of Khandesh which always recognized the ruler of Gujarat as its overlord. It was merely the reaffirmation by Khandesh of her sincerity as she had already acknowledged Akbar as its overlord in 1564. Such acknowledgement served Akbar's purpose as Khandesh might provide a *point d appui* for the conquest of the Deccan.

Raja 'Ali Khan, who had bowed his head before the Mughul storm was in reality sympathetic towards the Daccan states. Cultural ties and geographical conditions obliged Raja 'Ali Khan to foster friendly relations with the Deccan states and to make them realize the impending danger. He apprehended the aggressive designs of Akbar and vainly attempted to make a confederation of the Deccan states against the ever-increasing expansionist policies of the Mughuls. Hence he kept secret missions with them and adopted a hostile attitude from the beginning of his rule towards the Mughuls. Abu'l Fazl also criticizes this duplicity of the Raja when he mentions that he read *Khutba* in the name of Akbar only in the presence of imperial envoy and acted foolishly.[9]

The first recorded instance when Raja 'Ali Khan was punished by Akbar for his hostile attitude was in 1578, when the Emperor celebrated New Year's feast in Malwa at Dipalpur. On that occasion local zamindars and other chiefs came to pay homage to the Emperor. It seems, however, as if Raja 'Ali Khan did not care much for the royal presence in Malwa. Akbar became furious at Raja 'Ali's attitude and appointed an army of 10,000 horse under Shihab-ud-Din to chastise him. The Mughuls ravaged the country as far as Bijagarh. Raja 'Ali Khan was forced to beg pardon. He promised to send tribute including elephants to the imperial court.[10]

9. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 696.
10. Bakhshi, ii, p. 333; Nur-ul-Haq, f. 211b.

Submission was forced on Raja 'Ali Khan who was not ready to accept it easily. In 1579, Shah Budagh Khan, the governor of Malwa, sent his son 'Abdul Muttalib Khan to demand the agreed tribute. Raja 'Ali Khan refused to fulfil the imperial demand replying that he had collected his revenue for no one but for his army. He sent a contingent to drive away 'Abdul Muttalib, who fled across the Narbada with great difficulty while his elephants, standards and other war material were seized by the Khandeshi soldiers.[11]

These instances clearly show that even Raja 'Ali Khan whose state ran with the Mughul frontiers and who was more exposed to the Mughul danger than any other Deccani ruler, was not ready to acknowledge Akbar willingly. He adopted such a policy because he knew that Akbar's hands were then not free to pay full attention to the southern affairs. But once Akbar became fully established in the North, Raja 'Ali Khan also revived his policy and gave active support to the Mughul cause in the Deccan.

DISSENSIONS IN AHMADNAGAR

The civil war prevailing in Ahmadnagar attracted Akbar's attention lest some advantage could be taken of the political weakness of the state. The cold behaviour of Murtaza Nizam Shah towards his relatives and nobles repeated the old story of Lodi nobles who invited Babur against Ibrahim Lodi. Burhan Nizam Shah, the younger brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah, managed to escape from the fortress of Lohgarh in 922/1584. He was supported by a party which opposed Murtaza for his insane activities. It was planned first to assassinate Salabat Khan, the all-powerful *wazir* of Murtaza and then to kill the latter and enthrone Burhan. The very day when the plan was to be executed, Salabat Khan came to know of the treachery and defeated the pretender who fled to Konkan. Unsuccessful in his second attempt too, Burhan eventually

11. Haji Dabir i, p. 67.

went to Agra.[12] Burhan's arrival was a blessing in disguise to Akbar, as it proved a means of extending the Mughul influence in the Deccan. Akbar received the fugitive graciously and conferred a *jagir* in Bangash on him.[13]

The arrival of Burhan was not the last Mughul opportunity to fish in the troubled waters of Ahmadnagar politics. The incapability of Murtaza Nizam Shah encouraged Akbar to believe that Nizam Shahis would fall into the Mughul net because of their own incompetency and revalries. Murtaza Nizam Shah had retired from active politics and left the entire administration to his minister, Salabat Khan. Salabat's harsh treatment allienated many and a civil war ensued. In 1584, Beraris, including Khudawand Khan and Sher Khan Nohani, advanced under Sayyid Murtaza to oppose Salabat. A battle took place six miles from Ahmadnagar and the Beraris were defeated. Sayyid Murtaza and Khudawand Khan fled towards Burhanpur to go to Agra. In order to avoid Mughul interference in the Deccan affairs, Raja 'Ali Khan tried to induce the fugitives to refrain from their march to the North. The Beraris did not agree and a battle took place. The Khandesh army seized one hundred and fifty elephants of the fugitives, who crossed the Narbada and reached Agra.[14] Akbar welcomed the opportunity and gave them *jagirs* and *mansabs*. Being apprehensive of Akbar's designs, Raja 'Ali preferred to return the seized elephants. He also sent some gifts and a letter of apology to Akbar through his son Ibrahim. The presents were accepted and he was instructed to get ready for the impending military operation in the Deccan.[15]

12. Firishta, ii, p. 144 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 407-08 ; Bakhshi, iii pp. 75-76 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 188 ; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, p. 887 ; Rai Chatraman, *Chahar Gulshan*, B.M. or. 1791, f. 99b.

13. Bakhshi, iii, p. 69.

14. Firishta, ii, p. 288 ; Nur-ul-Haq, f. 231b ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 138b ; Muhammad Husain Azad, *Darbar-i-Akbari*, Lahore, 1921, p. 260.

15. Firishta, ii, p. 288 ; Badauni, ii, p. 343 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 393-94.

AKBAR FREE IN NORTHERN INDIA

The preoccupations of Akbar in northern India together with threats to his Empire both by the Uzbeks and his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul withheld him from taking any active measure in the South. He did not waste that period, but cultivated friendly relations with the Deccan states by exchange of diplomatic missions and allured them by his false pretensions. He had imperial ambitions and had his motto clear, *i.e.* either the states should acknowledge him peacefully as their overlord or take the consequences of their obstinacy.

The year 1572 records the departure of Mir Mohsin Rizwi, the imperial envoy on a goodwill mission to the Deccan. The Deccani rulers received him graciously and he returned with gifts. In 985/1577, Nizam-ul-Mulk despatched Wafa Khan with a letter and some presents for the Emperor in the company of Baqi Khan, the retiring Mughul ambassador.[16] Bijapur and Golconda also exchanged diplomatic missions with Agra. Khwaja 'Abdullah and his son Shahi Beg were despatched by 'Adil Shah in 987/1580 to the imperial court.[17] The year 988/1581 marked the despatch of great embassy of Hakim 'Ali to Bijapur. When the Mughul ambassador was about to return, 'Adil Shah died. Abu'l Fazl does not seem to be satisfied with the late 'Adil Shah, when he remarks : "He was a man of feeble intellect and corrupt, who did not properly obey royal commands and was ever guarding himself by vulpine tricks from the onset of the armies of fortune."[18] The same year *i.e.* 1581, Qutb Shah sent an envoy with the rarities of the state, but the court writer does not seem to be pleased with him either, for he writes that though the rulers of the Deccan were not happy in their manner of service and obedience yet they

16. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 205.
17. 'Abd-ul-Baqi, i, pp. 863-64.
18. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 298 ; Badauni, ii, p. 268 ; Ghulam Murtaza, f. 31b ; Firishta, ii, p. 470 ; Bakhshi, ii. p. 333.

always by sending requests and gifts considered themselves to be loyal to the Mughuls.[9] It is evident that though the Deccani rulers were not sincerely submissive yet Akbar avoided any direct clash with them.

The death of Mirza Muhammad Hakim in 1585 relieved Akbar of at least one permanent danger to his Empire. He brought some administrative changes in his southern provinces. He appointed Mirza 'Aziz Koka to the government of Malwa while Khan Khanan was sent to Gujarat. Burhan Nizam Shah, Sayyid Murtaza and Khudawand Khan were sent to 'Aziz Koka who was ordered to invade Berar.[20] Shihab-ud-Din, the governor of Ujjain, Raja 'Askran and 'Abdul Muttalib were instrtucted to assist 'Aziz Koka. Fath Ullah was made *Bakhshi* and Mukhtar Beg *diwan* of the imperial army.[21]

The imperial army sent in 1585, under 'Aziz Koka was divided into two hostile groups. Shihab-ud-Din had been accused of participating in the murder of Atgah Khan, the father of 'Aziz Koka. This accusation the Mirza could not forget or forgive.[22] Shihab-ud-Din was vexed and went back to his *jagir* of Raisan without the permission of 'Aziz Koka who became enraged and sent an army to punish him. A clash was about to ensue but was avoided by the intervention of other nobles. 'Aziz Koka also became suspicious of Tulak Khan, an old Baburi officer, and imprisoned him.[23]

The disunity in the imperial camp encouraged the Deccanis to unite themselves. Raja 'Ali Khan was observing the events in the Mughul camp carefully. His sympathies were with the Deccanis but his state ran with the Mughul border. The Mughul danger of

19. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 297.
20. Badauni, ii, p. 360 ; Firishta, i, p. 265. Bakhshi, ii, pp. 383-84.
21. 'Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 465.
22. Bakhshi, ii, p. 384 ; Firishta, ii, p 288-89.
23. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 469.

which he was afraid was coming nearer. He wanted to save the Deccanis from the imperial bondage as far as he could. He, therefore, availed himself of the situation arising out of the dissenssions in the Mughul camp and chose to resist the imperial advance in the Deccan. He refused to listen to Mir Fath Ullah who had gone to persuade him to join the Mughuls.[24]

After the return of the imperial envoy from Burhanpur, Raja 'Ali Khan mustered his troops and joined the Nizam Shahis. He and Mirza Muhammad Taqi, the Nizam Shahi commander advanced towards Hindiya, a town at Malwa-Deccan border, with 50,000 soldiers and encamped at a distance of one *kroh* opposite the Mughul camp. Perceiving that he could not stand against the enemy, 'Aziz Koka fled towards Illichpur, the capital of Berar without giving any battle. The Mughuls took the city by storm on March 23,1586. Differences arose among the Mughuls, as some urged a further advance to Ahmadnagar while others were satisfied with the campaign in Berar. Meantime the Deccanis finding Hindiya empty of the Mughuls, burnt the place and advanced to pursue them. Unable to maintain his ground, 'Aziz Koka proceeded towards Nandarbar. The Deccanis followed the Mughuls closely and inflicted on them heavy losses. Leaving his army at Nandarbar, 'Aziz Koka went to Ahmadabad to seek help from Khan Khanan. The campaign was postponed to the next year owing to rainy season but it was never carried out.[25]

The causes of the failure of the campaign were chiefly two. First, the lack of co-operation on the part of Raja 'Ali Khan on whom the Mughuls had counted much. Second, Akbar could not devote

24. Firishta, i, p. 265 ; ii, p. 288 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 188 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 489.

25. 'Abd-ul-Baqi, pp. 897-98 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 388-89 ; Rai Chatraman, ff. 98b, 99a ; Nur-ul-Haq, f. 237 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 384-85 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 188.

himself completely to the affairs of the South in 1585-86, as the Uzbek danger was not yet over in the North.[26] Thus the Deccan enjoyed a brief respite from foreign aggression. Akbar felt the defeat of 'Aziz Koka so much that he dismissed him from the governorship of Malwa, although when the wrath cooled down, 'Aziz Koka was later reinstated.[27]

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE AGE AMONG THE DECCANIS

The Deccan states still failed to appreciate the danger facing them from the North. The Mughuls had been unsuccessful so far but they were neither appeased nor deterred from their long-term aims. Oblivious of these realities, the Deccan states continued their quarrels with each other. In order to understand the reasons, which made the Deccanis adopt such a course, we have to examine the political idiom of the age. Since these dynastic states came into existence, there was no ruler in the North strong enough to dictate his terms to the Deccanis. They, therefore, were free from any serious danger to their states and continued with their dynastic wars for superiority over each other.

The preoccupations of Babur and Humayun would have given an impression to the Deccanis that the Mughul rule in the North was not as much a danger as they had thought at first. Akbar had established himself more securely than his predecessors, but it seemed that the Deccanis did not pay any attention to him either. They considered the arrival of imperial envoys under Akbar not more than mere goodwill missions. But Akbar had secret designs in sending his envoys. The Deccanis, therefore, failed to understand Akbar's diplomacy and the danger, which could destroy their existence. They continued their normal course of mutual wars.

26. Muhammad Jahangir Khan, *The Northwest Policy of the Mughals*, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Cambridge University, England, 1937, pp 43, 87-88.

27. Khafi Khan, i, p. 195.

The other cause was the nature of aristocracy, which was not a nobility of birth but of office. A noble could enjoy the title but not the rank of his father after the latter's death. The number of *pardesis* went on increasing. They occupied more and more state jobs. For example, in Golconda, the *Pardesi* group remained dominant throughout the Qutb Shahi reign till they were ousted from power in 1684 when 'Abul Hasan Qutb Shah appointed Madanna, a local Hindu, as his *wazir*.[28] The Deccanis counteracted the rise of foreigners and thus the state drifted into anarchy. The nobles gave their loyalty to a person rather than to a political abstraction—the state. As long as their ambition was fulfilled by their master, they were ready to serve him. But once they lost any hope of promotion in their own country, they deserted to the other government which could offer them high ranks. The nobles knew that in case of a final defeat of their king, harm would come to the royal family and not to them. They, therefore, cared more for themselves, than for the dynasty's welfare. There are instances of Burhan Nizam Shah, Sayyid Murtaza, Khudawand Khan and others, who were given high *mansabs* by the Mughuls.

CONFUSION IN AHMADNAGAR

The brutal activities of Murtaza Nizam Shah divided the Ahmadnagaris into two hostile groups and caused anarchy which ultimately provoked Akbar to interfere in their state. Murtaza believed that his son Husain wanted to kill him and he, therefore, made an unsuccessful attempt to kill his son instead. The insanity of Murtaza turned his nobles against him. They supported his son, who put his father to death in 1588, by suffocating him in the bath of steam. Husain Nizam Shah II became the ruler in 1588. But the usurper was killed in less then a year by his minister Mirza Khan. Isma'il, a boy of twelve years, was made the king, in April 1589.[29]

28. Khafi Khan, ii, pp. 293, 313.
29. Firishta, ii, pp. 59, 147; Abu'l Fazl *A.N.*, iii, p. 539; Muhammad Hadi, ff 200-02; Bakhshi, iii, pp. 72-74.

The reign of the minor king Isma'il was a period of terror and persecution in the state. Jamal Khan, the champion of the Deccanis and guardian of the boy king was a Mahdawi. He made Amjad-ul-Mulk, his fellow Mahdawi, *Amir-ul-Umara*. He massacred *pardesis* so ruthlessly that three thousand innocent persons were put to death. Some of the *pardesis* were hanged publicly and few of them escaped to Bijapur and Golconda. Among the exiles was Firishta, the famous author of *Tarikh-i-Firishta*, who reached Bijapur with great difficulty.[30] The atrocities of Jamal Khan roused the Berari chiefs but they were defeated by him. 'Adil Shah wanted to fish in the troubled water of Ahmadnagar. He, therefore, sent an army under Dilawar Khan. Both the armies halted for fifteen days opposite to each other at Ashti and eventually peace was concluded. The Nizam Shahis agreed to pay a war indemnity of seventy thousand *huns*. Chand Bibi, the widow of 'Ali 'Adil Shah, was sent back to Bijapur and Parinda was ceded to Bijapur.[31]

The confusion prevailing in both Ahmadnagar and Bijapur certainly offered Akbar more than sufficent opportunity for intervening in the Deccan. He had Burhan with him in whose name he could march into the Deccan and retrieve the Mughul prestige which had suffered badly in 1586. He, therefore, called Burhan from Bangash and offered him full support in obtaining the Nizam Shahi throne for the latter. Burhan declined the Emperor's offer, representing that the presence of the imperial army would alienate the people of Ahmadnagar from him ; if he went alone he might be able to win the Nizam Shahis. Akbar was satisfied with that plea and gave him Hindiya in *jagir* to meet the expenses of the campaign. But at the same time, the Emperor issued orders to Raja 'Ali Khan and 'Aziz Koka to prepare themselves to assist Burhan if necessary. When Burhan

30. Firishta, ii, p. 150.

31. Bakhshi, iii, p. 76 ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 201 ; Firishta, ii, pp, 61-62, 151-52 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 539.

reached Hindiya, he won over many Nizam Shahi *zamindars*. He entered Berar by the route of Kandwana but was opposed by Jahangir Khan Habshi who forced him to retreat.[32]

The defeat of Burhan was another set-back to the imperial prestige. But Akbar was not the ruler who would easily admit his defeat at the hands of the Deccanis. He took a more active part in his second attempt at enthroning Burhan in Ahmadnagar. He asked Raja 'Ali Khan to accompany him. Raja 'Ali Khan who had bided his time and avoided helping the Mughul cause hitherto, had to change his tactics when he realized that the Emperor was becoming active in the affairs of the Deccan.

In order to become sure of success, Akbar asked 'Adil Shah to send reinforcements against the common opponent, Jamal Khan.[33] 'Adil Shah sent Dilawar Khan with an army of 10,000 soldiers who were defeated by Jamal Khan. 'Adil Shah then sent another reinforcement of 90,000 horsemen to Dilamark. Burhan advanced in April 1591 towards Ahmadnagar. A battle took place in May 1591, near Faridpur. Raja 'Ali Khan fought against Jamal Khan who was killed. Isma'il was brought as a prisoner before his father, and was put into confinement. Burhan Nizam Shah was declared king.[35]

BURHAN NIZAM SHAH AND AKBAR

Burhan had been placed on the Nizam Shahi throne through the efforts of Akbar. However he not only forgot the favour, which he had received from his benefactor but also ignored him altogether. Akbar could not forget and forgive such ingratitude easily. He had helped Burhan for his own motives. Burhan had promised to become a vassal of the Mughuls, if he became successful. Like Khandesh,

32. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 568 ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 201b.
33. Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 136a ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 183a.
34. Fuzuni, f. 186a.
35. Firishta, ii, pp. 151-52 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 587 ; Bakhshi, iii, pp. 75-77 ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 202b.

Akbar also wanted Ahmadnagar to serve as his base for his future military operations in the Deccan. "But the wine of success", writes Abu'l Fazl, "robbed him of his senses and he forgot the numerous favours he had received from the Emperor. He oppressed the weak and considered his gain in destroying the others."[36] The complaint which the court writer made against Burhan seems to be on two counts-Burhan's refusal to become a vassal of Akbar and not fulfilling his promise of handing over Berar to the imperialists on his successful return to Ahmadnagar.[37]

There were two main reasons of Akbar's interests in Ahmadnagar. The geographical situation of the state and her position of political superiority over the other Deccan states. The state of Ahmadnagar ran with the Mughul border and, therefore, could provide easy entrance to Mughul armies. If Ahmadnagar acknowledged Akbar as sovereign, it might induce other states to recognize the Mughul authority and help the Mughuls in bringing the states under their control by force. Ahmadnagar, therefore, was the first state to be dealt with.

It was in Burhan's interest to ally himself with 'Adil Shah to whom he was already in debt for assistance. Instead, he waged war against him. 'Adil Shah demanded the return of his three hundred elephants which had been sent for Burhan's help but were seized by Jamal Khan. Moreover, Dilawar Khan, the Regent of 'Adil Shah had left his master and gone to Ahmadnagar. Burhan received the deserter warmly. 'Adil Shah asked Burhan to send Dilawar Khan back to Bijapur, but Burhan refused to comply with the request.[38]

36. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 596.

37. Firishta, i, p. 269 ; ii, p. 61 ; 'Ali bin 'Azizullah Tabatabai, *Burhan-i-Ma'asir*, B.M. Add. 9998, f. 153a.

38. Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, ff. 140b-141b ; Firishta, ii, pp. 151-53.

It was certainly unwise of Burhan, who was aware of Akbar's designs on the Deccan, to have rejected 'Adil Shah's demands. A close alliance of the three chief Muslim states of the Deccan with the help of Raja 'Ali, and the southern Hindu states, could have resulted in open defiance of the Mughul army. Burhan, however, was guilty of allowing himself to be entrapped into a declaration of war with Bijapur and thus weakened his own position. He further worsened his position by making war on the Portuguese. In order to take Reekwinda, he marched with a large army. The Portuguese came with a force of four thousand men at Kherla and slaughtered twelve thousand Muslims in defeating the Nizam Shahis.[39]

IMPERIAL MISSIONS TO THE DECCAN

At first, Akbar had wanted to persuade the Deccanis to submit by show of force but later he had recourse to diplomacy. He decided to send four diplomatic missions to the states to know if Burhan and other Deccan rulers were ready to acknowledge him as their suzerain. If Burhan offered such a recognition, it was imperative that Bijapur and Golconda should do likewise and as has been already pointed, Ahmadnagar was then the most powerful state in the Deccan. Shaikh Faizi was sent to Raja 'Ali Khan; Khwaja Amin-ud-Din to Ahmadnagar; Mir Muhammad Rizwi to 'Adil Shah and Mir Munir to Qutb Shah. Shaikh Faizi was asked to proceed to Ahmadnagar after completing his mission in Khandesh.[40] The envoys left Agra in August 1591.[41]

39. Firishta, ii, p. 155 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 667-68.

40. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 569-97 ; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, p. 922 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 197b ; Both Bakhshi, ii, p. 412 and Firishta, i, p. 267 say that Mir Muhammad Amin was sent to Bijapur. Firishta, i, p. 267 also differs with Abu'l Fazl and writes that Mirza Mas'ud was sent to Bhagnar i e. Golconda.

41. Firishta, i, p. 267.

Accordingly Shaikh Faizi went to Khandesh and met Raja 'Ali Khan, who had lost all hopes of forming a Deccani confederation against the Mughuls, showed his marks of submission to the Emperor. Faizi's letter, which records the interview with Raja 'Ali Khan illustrates a complete change in Raja 'Ali's policy towards the Mughul Emperor. It aims at the fulfilment of Akbar's long-standing ambition to use Khandesh as *'point d' appui'* for his future operations in the Deccan. The contents of the letter are as follows :

"After travelling a long distance, I reached on the 20th of Pur (December) at a distance of fifty *kos* from Burhanpur. The next day I arranged my tent in a manner worthy of a servant of the imperial court. The tent was divided into two rooms, the innermost of which, the royal throne was placed with gold-embroidered cushion on it, over which the *chatar* of velvet and gold embroidery was erected. The imperial sword, the *khil'at* and the royal letter were placed on the throne while men were standing around with folded hands. Raja 'Ali Khan in the company of his followers, *wakils* and other nobles approached with great respect that expressed their obedience and loyalty to Your Majesty. They alighted from their horses at some distance from the tent and were taken into the outer room. They came respectfully and entered the second chamber. When they saw the imperial throne, they saluted it and advanced bare-foot. When they came nearer, they were asked to stand and salute three times, which they did and stood for some time at the same place. I then took the royal letter in my hands, called the Raja a little nearer and said, that His Majesty, the viceregent of God, had sent Your Highness two royal orders with great love and kindness. He took the letter and put it on his head respectfully and saluted it three times. I then said that His Majesty has honoured you with a *Khila't*. Upon this he bowed, kissed it and bowed again. In the same way he paid homage to the sword and called Your Majesty's name.

After performing the due formalities, Raja 'Ali Khan said, 'I had desired for years to be seated in your presence.' and at the same time he seemed eager to do so. I then asked him to be seated and he sat down humbly in your servant's presence. When the opportune moment came, I addressed him and told him how he could best show his loyalty but my discourse mainly consisted of praises and eulogiums of Your Majesty. He answered that he was devoted servant of the Emperor and felt himself greatly honoured on His Majesty's royal favour. I replied that His Majesty's affection towards him was great and he considered him among his confidential servants ; the great proof of which was that he sent a man of rank to him. At this time he bowed several times and was much pleased.

During the period of my interview, I twice made signs to finish the discourse but he said, that he was not yet satisfied with my interview and wanted to sit there till the evening; and he sat there for an hour and a half. In the end betel-leaves and scents were brought. I asked him to give me with his own hands. I also gave him some betel-leaves with my own hands and he bowed many times. I then asked him to pray together for the long life of Your Majesty. He did so and the interview ended.

He moved back a little and stood attentively in the corner of the carpet opposite the throne He kissed reins of the royal horses, put them on his shoulders and saluted them. He then took his leave. He made altogether twenty five salutations. When he first came to me, he said, 'If you order me I am ready to make one thousand salutes in honour of the Emperor and I am ready to sacrifice my life for him'. "[42]

Raja 'Ali Khan was a strict *Sunni* and Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda being *Shi'a* states might have easily excited the

42. Shaikh Faizi, *Waqi'at-i-Shaikh Faizi*,. B.M. or. 1856, ff. 4b-6.

Emperor's fanatical opposition. It was imperative for Akbar to avoid religious collision as well as every thing which might in the smallest degree prejudice the royal dignity. Raja 'Ali Khan realized the importance of the time. If he wanted to save his state, he had to bow before the Mughul might. Any negligence on his part might bring the imperial forces into his state which was more exposed to incursions than any other state of the Deccan. He not only reaffirmed the acknowledgement of Akbar's supremacy, but sent his daughter with choice gifts for Prince Salim.[43]

Faizi, who was asked to proceed to Ahmadnagar after meeting Raja 'Ali, returned after a period of one year, eight months and fourteen days and reported to the Emperor the failure of his mission to Ahmadnagar.[44] "Burhan" says Abu'l Fazl, "due to his arrogance did not send suitable gifts and prepared the material for his destruction."[45] The other rulers also dismissed the imperial envoys with paltry gifts.[46]

The refusal of the Deccani rulers to acknowledge Akbar left no alternative for him but the use of force. Apart from the court writers, even 'Abd-ul-Baqi and Badauni blame Burhan for his ingratitude to the Emperor and hold him responsible for the ruin of his state.[47] Firishta, also records that on the failure of the imperial mission, the Emperor resolved on war.[48]

The imperial envoys returned to Akbar on May 7, 1593. Burhan persisted in the same insubordinate attitude as before but

43. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 639.

44. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 218a ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 423.

45. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 639.

46 Firishta, i, p. 269 ; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, pp. 930-31 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 218a, 249a.

47. 'Abd-ul-Baqi, pp. 930-31 ; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 218a ; Bakhshi, ii, p 423 ; Badauni, iii, p. 389.

48. Firishta, i, p. 269.

the Emperor does not seem to have sent any further remonstrance. For that Akbar had many reasons. Junagarh and Somnath fell in August 1592.[49] The acquisition of Qandahar in 1004/1593[50] placed Akbar in complete possession of his hereditary kingdom beyond the Indus and nearly at the same time he had completed the conquest of Hindustan proper. Sind had fallen in 1592; the last attempt of rebellion in Kashmir was quashed about the same time. The reduction of Bengal was completed by the submission of Orissa which extended the Mughul border further south, confronting the Deccan states.[51] All the disturbances in Gujarat ended with the death of Muzaffar Gujarati in 1593 so that the whole of northern India to the Narbada was now under Akbar's authority. The Rana of Udaipur indeed continued unsubdued but was reduced to extremities, while the other Rajput chiefs changed from averse tributaries to active and attached adherents.[52] Faizi Sirhindi and Abu'l Fazl offer the same reason for Akbar's activeness in the South—that the Emperor was determined to subjugate the Deccan once his hands were free in northern India.[53]

During the period of absence of the imperial envoys to the Deccan, Akbar was getting ready to meet the crisis in the South. It was necessary that the provinces of Malwa and Gujarat, which were the bases of his preparatory operations should be properly administered under able generals. After the departure of Mirza 'Aziz Koka for Mecca, Gujarat was given to Murad in April

49. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 619-20.

50. Iskandar Beg Turkman, *Tarikh-i-'Alam Ara-i-'Abbasi*, Teheran, 1955, pp. 485-86 ; Badauni, iii, p. 388 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 423.

51. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 200-02 ; Bakhshi, ii, pp. 420-22, Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 608-17 ; 668-69 ; Nur-ul-Haq, ff. 230-41.

52. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 624 ; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, pp. 892-83; 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, pp. 180-81 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 189.

53. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 248b ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 624.

1593,[54] while Mirza Shah Rukh was appointed to the governorship of Malwa and was married to Shukr-un-Nisa, Akbar's daughter, and was raised to the rank of 5000.[55]

THE MUGHUL PREPARATIONS FOR THE DECCAN CAMPAIGN

Akbar moved from Agra in July 1593 in order to organize and commission an army for the Deccan. Prince Daniyal was appointed leader of the army of 70,000 men, including Khan Khanan, Rai Singh and many other noted soldiers. Shah Rukh Mirza, Shahbaz Khan and other nobles in Malwa were ordered to equip their troops and to proceed to the Deccan. The importance of the campaign may well be realised by the fact that even Raja Man Singh was ordered to join the imperial army if his distant province of Bengal permitted his absence. Prince Murad was told to keep himself in readiness and wait for orders. After making all these arrangements, Akbar left Agra for Sultanpur on December 24, 1593, ostensibly on a hunting expedition but with the secret intention of speeding the march of the imperial army.[56]

Akbar's expectations turned out to be true as the movement of the army was very slow. When Akbar reached Haibatpur, the news came that Daniyal was still at Sirhind. Akbar summoned Khan Khanan to come post haste to review the situation. Khan Khanan suggested that the best time for the imperial army to enter the Deccan was after the rainy season when water and forage would be plentiful and corn cheap and explored that on that account movement was slow.[57] It was further decided that the command

54. Khafi Khan, i, p. 203 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 639 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 422, 'Ali Muhammad Khan, i, p. 182.

55. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 644 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 203 ; Badauni, ii, p. 388.

56 'Abd-ul-Baqi, p 931 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 424, Abu'l Fazl, *A.N*, iii, pp. 646-47 ; Nur-ul-Haq, f. 239.

57. Badauni, ii, p. 389 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 647-48 ; Bakhshi, ii, p. 424.

of the army should be transferred from Daniyal to Murad. Akbar expressed his view that since he ordered Murad to serve under Daniyal, his younger brother, perhaps the former had taken it ill. Qulij Khan was sent to bring Daniyal back and the Prince was appointed to the governorship of the Panjab.[58]

CIVIL WAR IN AHMADNAGAR

While the Mughuls were preparing to penetrate into the Deccan, the events in Ahmadnagar were going from bad to worse. Unity, the most urgent need of the hour, was conspicuous by its absence and civil war broke out in Ahmadnagar.

After the death of Burhan Nizam Shah on Sha'ban 20, 1003/ April 12, 1595, the state of Ahmadnagar was divided into many political factions. Burhan was succeeded by his son Ibrahim, a boy of twelve years.[59] This was a chance for the ambitious nobles to gain power for themselves in the name of the boy-king. In the beginning there were two rival parties—one headed by Ikhlas Khan and the other by Mian Manju. They busied themselves in over-powering each other and the administration of the country was thrown into disorder. One sentiment united the rival parties, i.e. their common enmity against Bijapur. Mir Safawi, the Bijapuri envoy who had come to congratulate the new Nizam Shah was insulted. Ibrahim 'Adil Shah was much incensed by this uncivil and unwise act and sent an army against Nizam Shah.[60]

Realising the impending danger from the Mughuls who were

58. 'Ali Muhammad Khan, pp. 424-25; Badauni, ii, p. 389; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 647-48; Muhammad Husain Azad, p. 93.

59. Badauni, ii, p. 402; Firishta (i, p. 269) says that when Khan Khanan reached Mandu, Burhan sent his envoy 'Inayat Shirazi to Khan Khanan and promised to surrender Berar to the Mughuls. Before Berar could be taken by the Mughuls, Burhan died. But this episode has not been mentioned by any other chronicler.

60. Firishta, ii, pp. 156-57.

mustering at the Deccan borders, Mian Manju suggested the conclusion of peace with Bijapur. On the other hand Ikhlas Khan insisted on war and advanced with 30,000 men towards Bijapur. Mian Manju sent word to Hamid Khan, the Bijapuri commander, that Nizam Shah was too young to understand the importance of the situation and requested him to retire as he would induce Nizam Shah to retreat. The Bijapuris responded to the request and retraced their steps. Considering that Bijapuris had retreated due to their own weakness, Ikhlas Khan forced war on them. A battle took place in which Ibrahim Nizam Shah was killed on July 29, 1595.[61]

The death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah was a signal for anarchy which ultimately resulted in the extinction of the kindgdom itself. The rival *condottiere* grew even more numerous and the parties sought for a king in whose name they should rule. In the words of a German scholar, "Akbar hovered like an eagle on the northern horizon and watched the fighting cocks of the southern states, rendering and wearying each other until his own time should come to prey."[62]

In order to establish its authority, it was necessary for each party to settle the question of succession. The lawful heir to the throne was Bahadur, the only surviving son of Ibrahim Nizam Shah.[63] The child was a year and a half old and weak in health.[64] Mian Manju who held the fort of Ahmadnagar was not ready to accept Bahadur since his survival was not sure. He sent Bahadur to the fort of Chaund and despatched Khwaja Nizam Astrabadi to Junair to bring Ahmad son of Shah Tahir, who, he asserted, was of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Ahmad was declared king and the

61. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 670 ; Firishta, ii, p. 157.

62. Von Noer, p. 236.

63. Firishta, ii, p. 158.

64. Muhammad Hadi, f. 205a ; Rai Chatraman, f. 100a.

khutba was read in his name on August 6, 1595.[65] Chand Bibi was put under surveillance. She was the daughter of Husain Nizam Shah I and wife of 'Ali 'Adil Shah I. After the death of her husband in 1580, she acted for sometime as dowager-regent during the minority of her nephew Ibrahim 'Adil Shah II. But later, returned to Ahmadnagar.

In declaring Ahmad as Nizam Shah, though Mian Manju had overcome his opponents for the time being, yet the contest was not complete. Ikhlas Khan was not the man to admit his defeat easily. He and his party challenged the parentage of Ahmad. Firishta and Fuzuni Astrabadi, the author of *Futuhat-I-'Adil Shahi* relying on 'the best available sources', disproved Ahmad's claim to the Nizam Shahi throne. After ten or fifteen days of Ahmed's succession, the nobles came to know of the false statement of Mian Manju and turned against him.[66]

The discovery of Ahmad's parentage, was an opportunity for Ikhlas Khan to demand the pretender's deposition. He ordered

65. Firishta, ii, p. 158 ; Fuzuni, f. 223b ; Rai Chatraman, f. 100a ; 'Ali *bin* 'Azizullah, f. 214a ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 670.

66. Firishta, ii, p. 158 ; Fuzuni, f. 224b. When Burhan Shah b. Husain Shah b. Ahmad Nizam Shah died, his son Husain Nizam Shah declared himself as his successor. His brothers Sultan Muhammad Khudabanda, Shah 'Ali, Muhammad Baqir, 'Abd-ul-Qadir and Shah Haider fled to different places to save their lives. A long time after, during the reign of Murtaza Nizam Shah, a person reached aiderabad (Daulatabad according to *Futuhat-i-'Adil Shahi*) and claimed himself to be the son of Sultan Khudabanda. He said that on such and such date Sultan Khudabanda died in Bengal. Salabat Khan and other Ahmadnagaris tried to inquire the truth but could not succeed. In order to avoid any confusion, the claimant was imprisoned. Some of the Deccanis, who knew Sultan Khudabanda personally were despatched to Burhan II, who was then residing with Akbar. Burhan II told the Deccanis that Sultan Khudabanda died at his residence and his sons were living with him. He added that any such person who claimed to be the Sultan's son, in the Deccan, was an impostor.

the governor of Daulatabad to release Abhang Khan Abyssinian and Habshi Khan from prison while on the other hand, he despatched orders to the governor of Chaund (or Jond) to release Bahadur. The governor of Chaund refused to surrender Bahadur to Ikhlas Khan, without the permission of Mian Manju. Ikhlas Khan solved the difficulty easily. He picked up a boy named Moti Shah from the bazar of Ahmadnagar, declared him to be of the Nizam Shahi dynasty and proclaimed him new Nizam Shah.[67] But that was not all. Chand Bibi, espoused the cause of Bahadur as the lawful heir to the throne. The fourth party was led by Abhang Khan Habshi. who supported Shah 'Ali bin Burhan Shah, an old prince of seventy years.[68]

The struggle for power in Ahmadnagar gave an immediate opportunity to the Mughuls to interfere in the Deccan affairs. Ikhlas Khan mustered a large army and forced Mian Manju to take shelter in the fortress of Ahmadnager. Mian Manju sent his son Mian Hasan with seven hundred men against Ikhlas Khan, who defeated Mian Hasan instead. Pressed hard, Mian Manju in a state of helplessness, appealed to Murad for help.[69] The Prince, who was already preparing for his march, hurried towards the Deccan at the invitation of Mian Manju.

The efforts of Mian Manju, Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan in establishing their authorities clearly show that none of them was true to the cause of the dynasty The sincerity of Ahmadnagaris to their state was such that Mian Manju who had once preached unity and twice attempted to avert war against Bijapur, himself became so selfish that he invited a foreign power to assist him. His invitation proves that the Deccanis generally sought help from the North to overthrow their rivals. There was no doubt that the Mughuls were already making arrangements for the conquest of the Deccan, but the Deccanis themselves provided them with an incentive to hasten their march.

67. Firishta, ii, p. 158.
68. Ibid., ii, p. 158-59.
69. Fuzuni, f. 225b ; Rai Chatraman, f. 100a ; Firishta, ii, pp. 90, 158-59 ; 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, f. 124b.

CHAPTER IV

CONQUEST OF AHMADNAGAR BY AKBAR

The Mughuls were already preparing to move towards the Deccan when Mian Manju's invitation arrived in Gujarat, but the imperial mobilisation was delayed.

The dissensions which seemed a common characteristic of oriental commanders also arose between Murad and Khan Khanan, when the former was asked to lead the army. The main cause of their delay was the difference of opinion about strategy. Murad insisted that all troops should assemble in Gujarat from whence the imperialists should advance to the Deccan; while Khan Khanan wanted first to go to Raja 'Ali Khan without whose help the proposed invasion seemed to be incomplete and then from Burhanpur to proceed to Gujarat via Malwa. Eventually the Prince left Ahmadabad and after staying for some time in Broach proceeded in June 1595 towards the Deccan. In order to make further preparations, Khan Khanan went to his *jagir* in Bhilsa where he stayed till July 18, 1595 and appealed to Murad to stay for a time in Gujarat.[1] This was the time when Murad received the invitation of Mian Manju.

To be sure of success, the Mughuls had to have the support of Raja 'Ali Khan. Khandesh was a place which could serve as an imperial base for the Deccan operations. When Khan Khanan met Raja 'Ali he found him unfavourably disposed to the Mughuls. Raja 'Ali's sympathies were with the Deccanis and his opposition to Khan-i-'Azam's filibustering expedition was well known. It was thought advisable that Khan Khanan should not only assure himself of the Raja's acquiescence in the Mughuls forthcoming Deccan

1. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 698-99.

expedition but also should convert him into an active ally. To achieve their aim, the Mughuls bribed him with the district of Nandarbar in Gujarat and assured him of other favours; altogether these inducements secured the Raja's help. The movements of 30,000 Mughul soldiers near his own borders forced Raja 'Ali Khan to join the imperialists. If he refused to join them, he was likely to lose his own state. 'Bending with good grace before the wind', Raja 'Ali Khan decided to aid the Mughuls.

No sooner did Murad receive the invitation of Mian Manju than he advanced towards Ahmadnagar without waiting for Khan Khanan and Raja 'Ali Khan. When Khan Khanan heard of Murad's departure he left the main army behind and hastened to join the former whom he met on November 29, 1595, near Chaund, thirty miles from Ahmadnagar.[2] The main army, numbering more than 30,000 soon followed. The combined forces of the Faurqis and the Mughuls, advanced towards the garden of *Hasht Bihisht* and invested the fort of Ahmadnagar on *Rabi-us-Sani* 23, 1004/December 16, 1595.[3]

Before the invitation of Mian Manju could reach Gujarat, events took a sudden change in Ahmadnagar. Many of the Abyssinians, who in the beginning had opposed Mian Manju, later on withdrew their help from Ikhlas Khan and Abhang Khan and joined Mian Manju. Being reinforced, Mian Manju defeated Ikhlas Khan in the neighbourhood of *Namazgah* on *Muharram* 25, 1004/September 18, 1595 but the success proved to be temporary[4] The Mughuls had come to measure swords with the Deccanis. Mian Manju now repented having invited the Mughuls to intervene in the domestic affairs of Ahmadnagar. He provisioned the fort

2. Ibid., iii, p. 699.

3. Firishta, ii, p. 159; Muhammad Hadi, f. 205b; Fuzuni, f. 226a; Von Noer, i, p. 327.

4. Firishta, ii, p. 159.

and appointed Ansar Khan to command in his absence. Taking Ahmad with him he set out for Ausa to obtain help from Bijapur and Golconda.[5]

How could the nobles dare aspire for supremacy? The reply lies in the nature of political allegiance in those days. Every noble had a *mansab* according to which he commanded a certain number of soldiers. The recruitment of the army was based on the tribal system. In other words, soldiers owed their immediate allegiance to the noble under whom he served and not to the king. A noble, therefore, could rebel against his master or contest his opponent. That is why we find that all the four parties of the Nizam Shahis had gathered their supporters and were trying to overthrow each other. Under such a political structure only a forceful king could assert his authority on his nobles. Weakness of a ruler could mean an invitation to anarchy. The death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in July 1595 led to the question of his succession. Until that problem was settled, there was every possibility for an ambitious noble to struggle for power. Later events would show that Nizam Shahi nobles never made a common cause against the Mughuls except for a short time under Chand Bibi. The Mughuls took full advantage of their dissensions which eventually led to the downfall of the Ahmadnagar state.

The obstinacy of Ansar Khan the supporter of Mian Manju, in yielding to Chand Bibi's genuine demand for the surrender of the fort, is another example of the character of the political allegiance of that period. Chand Bibi asked Ansar Khan to hand over the defence of the fort of Ahmadnagar to her. But Ansar Khan, who was appointed by Mian Manju refused to meet Chand Bibi's request without the permission of his master.

In order to achieve her goal, Chand Bibi procured the assassination of Ansar Khan. She sent a person to Chaund to bring

5. Fuzuni, f. 226a ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 205 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 699.

Bahadur to Ahmadnagar. On the refusal of the commander of the fort to deliver Bahadur, she proclaimed him king 'in absentia' and *Khutba* was read in his name. She made a general appeal to Nizam Shahis to defend their capital. Her appeal affected varying groups, which tried to assist her.[6] In fact the nobles had gathered round the person of Chand Bibi for their own selfish motives and not for the cause of the dynasty. As soon as the immediate danger vanished, they resumed their hostilities.

Ikhlas Khan was the first to respond to the request of Chand Bibi and set out for Ahmadnagar, at the head of his 10,000 followers. Khan Khanan sent an army under Daulat Khan Lodi and Sher Khwaja to oppose Ikhlas Khan. After a severe battle at Patan, Ikhlas Khan was defeated and fled towards Bijapur.[7] Abhang Khan was next to come to the help of Ahmadnagaris. He came with a cavalry of 7,000 and encamped six miles from the fort. He planned to enter the fort on the night following his arrival through the eastern part of the fort where a breach had been caused the previous day. It was bad luck for Abhang Khan that when Murad came to reconnoitre the fort the next day, he found the fort unguarded. He ordered Khan Khanan to place a contingent to complete the ring of investment. According to his previous plan, Abhang Khan advanced at night with a selected contingent of three thousand *suwars* and a thousand artillery men. A fierce engagement took place and under cover of heavy fire discharged by the besieged, he managed to throw himself with his four hundred followers into the fort. Seven hundred Nizam Shahis sacrificed their lives in this attempt while the remaining including Shah 'Ali the pretender, fled to Bijapur.[8]

Like the Deccanis, the Mughul camp was also not free from disunity. There were two main causes. First, the inefficiency

6. Firishta, ii, p. 159.
7. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700 ; Firishta, ii, p. 160.
8. Fuzuni, ff. 228b, 229a ; Firishta, ii, p. 160.

of the imperialists in matching the guerilla tactics of the Deccanis and their accusations for holding each other responsible for the delay in the progress of the imperial army. Second, being far in the South, the imperialists were free from the personal observation of the Emperor, and thus they indulged in mutual disputes. The imperial camp was divided into two groups—one headed by Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan and the second by Murad and his tutor Sadiq Khan. It was decided earlier that each of the three armies should take upon itself one of the three responsibilities—first, to take the fort; second, to conquer the country side and the third to guard the captured area. "But nothing was done" write Abu'l Fazl, "due to non-co-operation in the imperial camp."[9] Somehow all the great nobles, such as Sayyid Murtaza Sabzwari, Raja Jagan Nath and Raja 'Ali Khan who had been assigned duties to dig trenches round the fort, made only half-hearted efforts and progress was slow.

The disunity of the imperialists encouraged Raja 'Ali Khan to help the Deccanis. Though he had joined the Mughuls against his wishes yet he did not acquiesce in the armed intervention of the latter in the Deccan affairs. He took advantage of the prevailing dissensions in the imperial camp, by sending supplies into the fort. He was also in correspondence with the besieged. Whenever a reinforcement of artillerymen came for the garrison, he enabled them to enter the fort or sometime even sent a few artillerymen from his own camp into the fort. When Murad came to know of the duplicity of Raja 'Ali Khan, he replaced him by Raja Jagan Nath.[10]

The besieged had held the fort gallantly so far, but they needed more help. There was an interesting feature in the history of the three Deccan states that though they were generally at war with each other, yet they united themselves against foreign aggression. Chand Bibi, therefore, made an appeal for help both to 'Adil Shah and

9. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700.

10. 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, f. 141a.

Qutb Shah. "The three states of the Deccan," writtes Faizi Sirhindi, "had settled to unite themselves against a foreign invader, irrespective of their mutual rivalries and dynastic wars".[11] Ibrahim 'Adil Shah sent an army of 30,000 under his general Suhail Khan. Similarly Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah also despatched Mehdi Quli Sultan Turkman with an army of 10,000 men. All the reinforcements including the followers of Ikhlas Khan were ordered to assemble at Shahdark and from there to advance towards Ahmadnagar under the supreme command of Suhail Khan.[12]

The Mughul progress was delayed due to difference in the strategy of war. Khan Khanan being an experienced soldier preferred to carry out his own plan, while Murad wanted to dictate his own. The differences arose to such an extent that once Murad stated that the campaign could not become successful as long as Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan were present in the invading army.[13] "Chand Bibi", writes Abu'l Fazl, "would have surrendered to the Mughuls, had there been unity among the imperialists".[14] Encouraged by the dissensions of the besiegers, the garrison resolved to hold the fort. The exchange of artillery continued for sometime but no decisive result was obtained.

Unsuccessful in their attempt to take the fort by storm, the Mughuls tried to persuade the enemy to surrender by peaceful means. The Mughuls thought that Raja 'Ali Khan might induce the Deccanis to submit. The position of Raja 'Ali Khan became very awkward. He did not wish the fall of the Nizam Shahis but could not refuse the imperial orders either. He showed some reluctance to meet

11. Faizi Si hindi, f. 235b.

12. 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, f. 142; Fuzuni, f. 229; Khafi Khan, i, p. 207; Firishta ii, p. 160; *Tarikh-i-Sultan Muhammad Qutb Shahi*, B.M. Add. 6542, f. 160b.

13. Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 218.

14. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 699.

the imperial demand, but when pressure was put, he wrote a letter to the besieged stating diplomatically that he had accompanied the Mughuls with the purpose of saving the honour and prestige of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Justifying his position, he explained that the fort would sooner or later fall. If it was taken by storm, the besieged might suffer badly. To avoid the worst, it would be better if they surrendered Ahmadnagar voluntarily and in return, any other fort which the besieged would prefer would be given to them.[15]

The letter of Raja 'Ali Khan caused bewilderment in the fort. Afzal Khan, the besieged commander, replied angrily to Raja 'Ali Khan. He said that it was he, who had brought the Mughuls to their country. He (Raja 'Ali Khan), therefore, should be ready to face Nizam Shahis who with the Deccani reinforcements, would be able to defeat the Mughuls easily.[16] Raja 'Ali Khan's position became embarrassing by that reply as he lost faith in the eyes of his Deccani fellows.

Failing in their attempt to persuade the enemy to surrender, the Mughuls could only exert their utmost military efforts. They planned to take the fort before the arrival of the Deccani reinforcements; otherwise they would be caught between two fires. Orders were given to dig mines and blow up the fort walls. Five mines were dug on Thursday, February 20, 1596, and were filled with gunpowder. It was planned that the mines would be set on fire after the Friday prayers. Khwaja Muhammad Khan, one of the imperialists felt pity for the besieged and secretly told them of the location of the mines. The garrison worked all night and emptied four of them by the following morning. The naphtha was ignited on February 21, after Friday prayers.[17]

15. 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, f. 141.
16. Ibid., f. 141.
17. Fuzuni (f. 231a) gives the name of Khwaja Muhammad Jan Sabzwari who deserted to the besieged ; 'Ali bin 'Azizullah (f. 143b) records the name of 'Irfan Khwaja Muhammad ; while Abu'l Fazl, (*A.N.*, iii, p. 700) does not mention any name.

To the surprise of the besiegers, only one mine exploded and caused a breach of fifty yards in the fort wall. Murad wanted to enter the fort through the breach but Khan Khanan and Shahbaz Khan advised him to wait for the explosion of other mines.[18] He thus missed an irreplaceable chance of capturing the fort. Some of the besieged, such as Murtaza Khan, Shamshir Khan and Muhammad Khan became disheartened and contemplated surrendering. But Chand Bibi came to their rescue. Wearing full armour and with an unveiled face, she stood all night by the breach with a sword in her hand. The besieged worked all night and by the early hours of the morning, under the continued discharge of artillery, were able to raise the wall. The Mughuls attempted many times to hamper the erection of the wall but were repulsed every time.[19]

However the besieged became disheartened by the continuation of the siege. Suhail Khan, the Bijapuri commander was still on his way. Chand Bibi sent him urgent message to hasten his march. The Nizam Shahi messenger was caught by the advance guard of the imperialists. The Mughul commander, in the pride of his strength, wrote to Suhail Khan on the back of the same paper that the Mughuls were waiting for him since long to settle the matter with him. He, therefore, should come as early as possible.[20]

The prolongation of the siege without any decisive result, obliged both the Mughuls and the besieged to make peace. Each party had its own reason to come to that decision. The imperialists were frightened by fast approach of the enemy's reinforcements. The disunity among the imperial commanders demoralized common soldiers, who slackened their efforts. The scarcity of food and fodder

18. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700 ; Firishta, ii, p. 161.

19. Firishta, ii, p. 161 ; Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 218 ; 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, ff. 146b, 147a, Fuzuni, f. 213b.

20. Fuzuni, f. 232 ; Firishta, ii, p. 162.

in the imperial camp made the task more difficult for the invaders and there was no hope for immediate supply of provisions from the North. A council of war was held to review the situation. It was decided to open negotiations with the Deccanis.[21] On the other side, the besieged thought that now the imperialists were frightened by the approach of the Deccani reinforcements and were inclined to make peace. If the reinforcements were also defeated, the Mughuls would take the fort by storm and in such a case an immeasurable damage could be expected. The small number of the besieged and the shortage of arms and provisions in the fort, were the other factors, which obliged them to seek peace terms. In short, mutual fear forced the parties to come to terms.

So negotiations were opened. All the Deccani chronicles agree that the initiative was taken by the Mughuls,[22] but Abu'l Fazl gives a contrary account. A minute and critical study of Abu'l Fazl's account makes us believe that the Deccani version is correct. Abu'l Fazl writes "Observing the dissesions in the Mughul camp, the garrison recovered their courage; became somewhat bewildered and suggested a peace."[23]

The Mughuls demanded the surrender of Berar, which had already been offered by Tufail Khan in 1574 to Akbar but was seized by Murtaza Nizam Shah. The Mughuls further argued that Berar had been promised to them by Burhan Nizam Shah on his successful return to Ahmadnagar, but the promise was not fulfilled. The besieged hesitated to comply with the Mughul demand at first, but had to agree eventually. The treaty was signed on February 23, 1596. The terms settled were :—Berar would be ceded to the Mughuls and Bahadur Shah, son of Ibrahim Nizam Shah, would be recognized

21. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700.

22. Firishta, ii, p. 162; 'Ali bin 'Azizullah, ff. 150b, 151a; Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 218b; Rai Chatraman, f. 100b; Muhammad Hadi, f. 206a.

23. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700.

as new Nizam Shah and a vassal of the Mughul Emperor.[24] The treaty was ratified by both the parties and the siege was raised.

With the annexation of Berar, the first phase of Akbar's Deccan policy came to an end. Berar was now a foot-hold for the Mughuls, who were determined to subjugate the whole of the peninsula. The imperial border expanded further south and came in closer contact with the Deccan states. The Mughuls had retired temporarily to renew their preparations but did not give up their desire to capture the South.

As soon as the Mughuls withdrew from Ahmadnagar, the Nizam Shahis resumed hostilities. When Suhail Khan, the Bijapuri commander, arrived at Ahmadnagar, he found the Nizam Shahis in a bad state of affairs. Mian Manju, who had once regretted on his folly in invoking the Mughul help, became selfish again. He wanted the recognition of his own candidate, i.e. Shah Ahmad, in whose name he could exercise power. In fact he had gone to seek help from Bijapur and Golconda to achieve his own motive. His plan was first to drive the Mughuls out of Ahmadnagar, with the help of the Deccani reinforcements and then to strive for the supremacy of Shah Ahmad. When he came back to Ahmadnagar, he lost all hopes. Bahadur had been recognized by the Mughuls and Chand Bibi was the regent of the boy-king. Suhail Khan reported the situation in Ahmadnagar to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah who sent Murtaza Khan with 4,000 soldiers to persuade Mian Manju to give up his demand. Mian Manju agreed and went to Bijapur, where he was given a *jagir*. Similarly, Ahmad, the pretender was also given a *jagir*.[25]

The removal of Mian Manju from Ahmadnagar was not the end of Chand Bibi's difficulties. Though she had unselfish motives,

24. Fuzuni, f. 232b ; Firishta, ii, p. 162 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 700 ; Rai Chatraman, ff. 100b, 154-55b ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 206a ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 208.

25. Firishta, ii, p. 162 ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 206a.

yet she failed to establish her authority. Whereas her efforts were to keep the dynasty alive, the aim of the selfish nobles was to seize power in their own hands. Muhammad Khan became *wakil* and *peshwa* of the boy-king and had the support of vast number of his followers. He, therefore, aspired to oust Chand Bibi and seize power. He sent his opponents such as Abhang Khan and Shamshir Khan to jail, while others, fled to Bijapur and Golconda.[26]

The activities of Muhammad Khan obliged Chand Bibi to seek help from 'Adil Shah. She wrote a very pathetic letter to 'Adil Shah. She bewailed her helplessness and said that if peace was not restored, the state would soon fall to the enemy, who was sitting " in an ambush and waiting for his prey." Ibrahim 'Adil Shah once again attempted to warn the Nizam Shahis of the consequences of their dissensions. He asked Suhail Khan, to bring Muhammad Khan to heel. Pressed hard, Muhammad Khan saw his safety in invoking Mughul help. He requested the Mughuls to help him against Chand Bibi and in return promised to hold the state in the name of the Mughul Emperor. When his treachery was known to Ahmadnagaris, he was seized and handed over to the queen-dowager. Abhang Khan was appointed as new *peshwa*. After establishing peace in Ahmadnagar, Suhail Khan left for Bijapur.[27]

The Mughuls busied themselves in the administration of the newly ceded area of Berar. Murad made Shahpur, a town six miles from Balapur, as his headquarters. Mir Murtaza was appointed to Illichpur, while Mirza 'Ali Beg and Shaikh Daulat were ordered to assist him. Sadiq Muhammad Khan was made guardian of the frontiers while general administration of the province was left to Khan Khanan and Mirza Shah Rukh.[28] It was evident to Khan Khanan

26. Firishta, ii, p. 162.

27. Firishta, ii, p. 162 ; Rai Chatraman, f. 100b.

28. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 702-03 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 208 ; Fuzuni, f. 33a.

that Akbar would never be satisfied with the capture of only a corner of the Deccan, i.e. Berar. In order to exact more help from Raja 'Ali Khan for the Mughuls' future operations in the Deccan, he arranged for Raja 'Ali Khan's grand-daughter (i.e. the daughter of Bahadur) to be married to Murad.[29] Thus Khandesh-Mughul relations became closer than before.

Though according to the treaty, the Beraris had to submit to the Mughuls, yet they never accepted their domination at heart. Twice they attempted to overthrow the Mughul yoke but were crushed.[30] The Mughuls after the battle of November 1596, had taken Pathri which according to them was included in old Berar while the Nizam Shahis claimed it as a part of Ahmadnagar.[31] It seems that the Nizam Shahis who were defeated twice in their previous attempts were now encouraged by Bijapur and Golconda and attacked some Mughul posts. Skirmishes took place and the Nizam Shahis suffered heavy losses. Chand Bibi appealed both to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah to send immediate help. Suhail Khan was again ordered to lead the confederate forces which numbered more than 60,000 cavalry besides a large number of foot soldiers.[32]

The march of the combined forces of Bijapar and Golconda obliged the Mughuls to forget their mutual disputes. The decisive time had come for which the Mughuls had been long waiting. When Khan Khanan heard the news of the advance of the Deccanis, he left Jalna and came to Shahpur to inform the Prince.[33] Murad wanted to lead the army but Khan Khanan, in order to

29. Khafi Khan, i, p. 208.

30. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 711, 715.

31. Firishta, ii, p. 163; Fuzuni, f. 235a; Muhammad Hadi, f. 206; Rai Chatraman, f. 101a.

32. Muhammad Hadi, f. 207a; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 209-11; Firishta, ii, p. 163; 'Abd-ul-Baqi, p. 932.

33. Firishta, ii, p. 163.

credit the victory to his name, assumed the command himself. For the time being Murad agreed to Khan Khanan's proposal. The seriousness of the situation demanded full cooperation and harmony in the imperial army. Khan Khanan, therefore, asked his rival Sadiq Muhammad Khan to stay with the Prince at Shahpur with his five thousand soldiers.[34] The imperial army including the contingents of Raja 'Ali, numbered 20,000 according to Firishta and 15,000 according to Abu'l Fazl. The imperialists encamped at Ashti, on the north bank of the Godawari and twelve *kos* from Pathri.[35]

Both the armies encamped for fifteen days opposite each other, during which period no action beyond slight skirmishes occurred.[36] The course of events of the battle of Ashti is lengthy and controversial but the main features are described here to make the reader realize its importance, as this battle was a decisive factor in the future history of Ahmadnager. It would show that the Mughuls were superior to their opponents in the technique and strategy of pitched battles. The Mughul army was arrayed in the following order: in the centre were Khan Khanan, Mirza Shah Rukh, 'Ali Beg and Ikhtiyar while the right and left wings were commanded by Raja 'Ali Khan and Raja Jagan Nath respectively. The Deccanis had their set rule. "It was their custom", writes Faizi Sirhindi, " when the armies of Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda united against a foreign power, Nizam Shahis commanded the centre; 'Adil Shahis and Qutb Shahis stood in the right and left wings of the joint forces respectively." Faizi Sirhindi's statement is further corroborated by Abu'l Fazl's accouut.[37]

This significant battle was fought on *Jammadi-us-Sani* 18, 1005/January 27, 1597.[38] As the right wing of the Mughul

34. Fuzuni, f. 235b.
35. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 718; Firishta, ii, p. 163.
36. Firishta, ii, p. 163.
37. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 235b; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 718.
38. Firishta, ii, p. 163.

army advanced, the enemy was shaken for a moment but stood firm. The Deccanis discharged artillery so heavily that Raja 'Ali Khan with his five hundred followers died in that action while the total loss of the imperialists was estimated at 3,000 or 4,000. Meantime the news of the death of Khan Khanan was rumoured in the imperial camp and it disheartened the soldiers. The left and right wings of the imperialists gave way by evening and Suhail Khan regarded himself as master of the field. The fugitive imperialists fled to Shahpur, a distance of about a hundred miles and discouraged the Prince by making untrue reports. Murad and his tutor were so alarmed that they prepared to leave the Deccan.[39] But Khan Khanan and Mirza Shah Rukh held their ground and put the Nizam Shahis and Qutb Shahis to flight.[40]

Lack of complete knowledge of the battle field gave a wrong impression to the opposing commanders. Regarding the victory as their's, most of the 'Adil Shahis busied themselves in collecting plunder and without the permission of their commanders returned to deposit their booty. Thus Suhail Khan was left with few of his followers. When Khan Khanan returned in the darkness of night from the pursuit of the Deccanis, he halted to take rest and considered the victory his own. Both Suhail Khan and Khan Khanan did not know until a watch of the night had passed that they were within a distance of a bow-shot from each other. Throughout the night exchange of fire continued and drums were beaten.[42]

As the battle was indecisive, both parties tried to gather their followers to give a final blow. The second day's battle was fought more vigorously. By dawn the Deccanis were able to collect

39. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, 719; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 209-10; Firishta, ii, p. 163; Muhammad Hadi, f. 207.

40. Firishta, ii, p. 163; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 719.

41. Fuzuni, ff. 236b, 237a; Muhammad Hadi, f. 207a, Firishta, ii, p. 163.

42. Firishta i, p. 270, ii, p. 163; Muhammad Hadi, f. 207b.

25,000 while the imperialists numbered 7,000.[43] A fierce battle took place in which the Deccanis were utterly defeated ; their commanders, Ankas Khan, Haibat Khan and Dilpat Rai were killed. Suhail Khan himself was wounded in the beginning of the action and fled to Shahdark. The Nizam Shahis and Qutb Shahis who were defeated the previous day reached Ahmadnagar and Haiderabad with great difficulty.[44] The Mughuls were weary and did not pursue the enemy. The news of victory was sent to Akbar who was very pleased with Khan Khanan and sent him a *khil'at* and a horse [45]

During the course of the battle, when Raja 'Ali Khan could not be found, it was suspected that either he had deserted to the enemy or fled to his country. His camp was looted and few of his followers were slain.[46] After the victory, on the information of a Khandeshi trooper,[47] the body of Raja 'Ali was discovered and buried honourably.[48] His flags, drums and elephants were sent to Bahadur Khan, who succeeded his father to the throne of Khandesh.[49] Bahadur bitterly resented the unfounded suspicion of his father's desertion and plundering of his camp. Thus from the very beginning, Bahadur adopted a hostile attitude towards the Mughuls, the details of which have been discussed elsewhere. Murad sent congratulations to him on his accession and summoned him to his court. Bahadur excused himself from attending the Prince's court in person but sent a contingent of four thousand Khandeshi soldiers to serve

43. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 719 ; while Firishta, (i, p. 270), says that ten or twelve thousand Deccanis and three or four thousand Mughuls gathered again.
44. Firishta, i, p. 207 ; ii, p. 163 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 719.
45. Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 221a.
46. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 720.
47. Fuzuni, ff. 238b, 239a.
48. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 720.
49. Haji Dabir, i, p. 79 ; Firishta, ii, p. 239.

under Murad. Bahadur also agreed to give a Faruqi princess in marriage to Murad as proposed by the latter.[50]

The battle of Ashti had important results. It did much to retrieve the Mughul prestige which had been somewhat tarnished by the unsuccessful attempts on Ahmadnagar. The Mughuls made the Deccanis realize that they were far superior to them in pitched battles and could defeat even their united forces. The defeat disheartened the allies of Nizam Shah so much that they could not dare oppose the Mughuls actively for some time. Thus the alienation of Bijapur and Golconda from Nizam Shah, paved the way for success of the imperialists. To sum up, the victory encouraged the Mughuls to believe that the Deccan states were weak and could easily be overthrown.

As soon as the danger, which had united the hostile parties of the Mughuls, passed away, they resumed their disputes. The reason was the same as before, that is, whose plan would be carried out finally, Murad's or Khan Khanan's? Murad being the formal commander wanted to dictate his own plans. Khan Khanan had his own schemes which were better and more advantageous than those of Murad's. He had won the battle of Ashti due to his own strategy and therefore, was eager to carry out his full plan to achieve success. The policy of Khan Khanan made Murad feel himself an inferior general. Murad, therefore, was not prepared to tolerate this supposed humiliation and the virtual superiority of Khan Khanan. Murad asked Khan Khanan to advance to Ahmadnagar soon after the battle of Ashti. But Khan Khanan suggested the capture of the dependencies of Berar first and then after restoring administration, to proceed to Ahmadnagar next year.[51] Khan Khanan was justified in his proposals as the country had suffered

50. Haji Dabir, i, p. 79.

51. Firishta, ii, p. 163; Muhammad Hadi, f. 208a; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 209-11.

from war for the last two years and the army also required reorganization before it could proceed on any other campaign. But the Prince remained firm in his decision. He and Sadiq Muhammad Khan complained to Akbar of non-cooperation of Khan Khanan.[52]

Akbar tried to cement the relations between Murad and Khan Khanan, but since both were adamant, he decided to recall both the generals to give them advice. Roop Khawas was sent to bring Khan Khanan who had left the Prince's camp and gone to his *jagir*.[53] Disheartened and disappointed as he was, Khan Khanan came to the imperial court where he met with a cold reception.[54] Murad hesitated in comig to Agra. Akbar intended to go to the South personally to set matters right but dropped the idea and sent Abu'l Fazl on January 4, 1599, to bring the Prince from the Deccan. Abu'l Fazl was ordered that if the circumstances permitted, he should accompany the Prince to the North; otherwise he was to despatch the Prince alone and himself stay there to assist Mirza Shah Rukh.[55]

Successful at Ashti, the Mughuls determined to extend their border southward. Within a short period, Murad conquered the forts of Ahubara, Kaveil, Silgarah, Parnala, Kherla and Nasik, which were the dependencies of Ahmadnagar.[56] But the imperial progress was checked owing to the illness of Murad caused by excessive drinking. While coming from Shahpur to Daulatabad, he died on the way near Dihari, on May 12, 1599.[57]

The death of Murad and the absence of Khan Khanan from the Deccan, provided an opportunity to the Ahmadnagaris

52. Firishta, ii, p. 163.
53. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 739.
54. Firishta, i, p. 270.
55. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 749.
56. Ibid., pp. 739, 745-46, 751.
57. Rai Chatraman, f. 101b; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 753; Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 222, Firishta, i, p. 271; ii, p. 164.

to regain their lost territory. When Abu'l Fazl reached the imperial camp, he found it in utter confusion. Some of the im erialists being discouraged by the death of the Prince, deserted to the enemy. After garrisoning Beran, the Mughuls advanced towards Daulatabad, which they soon captured.[58] The Nizam Shahis advanced under Abhang Khan to recapture Bir. Sher Khwaja, the imperial commandant, was on the eve of surrendering, had Abu'l Fazl's timely help not arrived there. Though Abhang Khan could not capture the fort, yet he inflicted heavy losses on the imperialists. Other Nizam Shahi troops took advantage of Abu'l Fazl's incompetency as a general and regained some parts of their lost territory. Unable to face the enemy's growing progress, Abu'l Fazl appealed to Akbar for reinforcements.[59]

The need of the hour obliged Akbar to reconcile his ill-treated commander, Khan Khanan. Akbar knew the capabilities of Khan Khana from his past military record and considered him competent to bring the campaign to a successful conclusion. Thus the ability of Khan Khanan prevailed over the intrigues of his opponents. Akbar sent for Khan Khanan, gave him a *khil'at* and a horse and showed him other marks of favour. The commander soon forgot the harsh treatment of his master and reconciled with him.[60]

As the presence of a prince was regarded a symbol of royalty which won the loyalty of the soldiers, a prince of the royal blood was generally sent on important campaigns with the army. After the death of Murad, Akbar first planned to appoint Salim, but dropped the idea as the Prince could not attend the court at that time. The Emperor then appointed his youngest son Daniyal to lead the Mughul army.[61] The imperialists had suffered previously due to

58. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 756-58.

59. Firishta, ii, p. 164 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 760-61.

60. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 250 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 763.

61. Fuzuni, f. 214b ; Firishta, ii, p. 164 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 757.

non-cooperation, but Akbar was not ready to tolerate the same situation again. Harmony and unity between Khan Khanan and Daniyal were the essential pre-requisites for the success of the expedition. He, therefore, reinforced their relations by having Daniyal married to Janan Begum, the daughter of Khan Khanan, before their march to the Deccan.[62] Akbar himself came as far as Ujjain to hasten the march of the Deccan army, and stayed there for some time.[63]

While the Mughuls were preparing themselves for their second march into the Deccan, the Nizam Shahis were torn by their mutual disputes. Whenever peace was restored through the efforts of 'Adil Shah, it lasted for a short time.[64] In order to gain time to strengthen her own position, Chand Bibi deceived the Mughul commander, Abu'l Fazl, by writing him some diplomatic letters. She represented that when Abhang Khan had been overpowered, she would surrender the fort of Ahmadnagar to the Mughuls and in return demanded Bir to be given to her in *jagir*. She further stated that she would herself go to the imperial court and present Bahadur to Akbar.[65] By employing this strategem she intended to gain time to get rid of Abhang Khan while at the same time she wanted to avoid any open conflict with the Mughuls. Abu'l Fazl agreed to her proposals and was defeated in diplomacy.

Daniyal started in March 1600 towards the Deccan. When he reached Burhanpur he expected that Bahadur Khan of Khandesh, would pay him homage. Bahadur Khan, in the pride of the impregnability of the fortress of Asirgarh, refused to meet the Prince. Daniyal thought of capturing Asir himself, but was ordered by his father to continue his march and leave the matter to him.[66]

62. Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 222b ; Fuzuni, f. 241b ; Khafi Khan, i, p 213.

63. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 766-67 ; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 249a.

64. Fuzuni, f. 240 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 163-64.

65. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 765.

66. Firishta, ii, p. 271 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N*, iii, p. 767.

The arrival of Daniyal and Khan Khanan in the Deccan, in the first week of April 1600 saw the second siege of Ahmadnagar under Akbar. The imperial army, which was now better equipped and better organized than before, numbered 30,000.[67] This time the Mughuls had come with determination and singleness of purpose. The opponents of Khan Khanan were not included in order to secure full harmony in the army. Furthermore, the arrival of the Emperor himself at Asir, a few days after the siege of Ahmadnagar, stimulated the efforts of the Mughuls. So while the imperialists restarted their attempt with rigour and full unity, the Nizam Shahis were exhausted and worn out by their internal dissensions.

The Mughuls tried to induce the besieged to surrender by peaceful means. Khan Khanan offered terms for the surrender of the fort. These were : Bahadur would be given a *mansab* of 5000 ; except the forts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad any other fort would be given to Bahadur and a *jagir* worthy of a *panjhazari mansabdar* would be bestowed on Chand Bibi. The Nizam Shahis preferred to hold the fort and rejected the Mughul offer.[68]

Foiled in their attempt to persuad the enemy, the Mughuls invested the fort closely on April 12, 1600.[69] *Morchals,* i.e. batteries were employed and other siege engines were used. Exchange of fire continued and the besieged were reduced to extremities. The garrison tried their utmost to push back the invading army but failed and suffered heavily. They employed the famous Nizam Shahi gun—*Malik-i-Maidan* which discharged a ball of ten *mans*. Its mouth was so wide that a man could sit and move about easily.

For the downfall of the Nizam Shahi dynasty the nobility was chiefly responsible. Chand Bibi was still there to further the cause of the dynasty, but the dissensions of the nobles had precluded any

67. Firishta, ii, p. 164.

68. Fuzuni, f. 247 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 774.

69. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 741.

affective defence of the state. Bijapur and Golconda, the only possible allies of Nizam Shah did not dare oppose the Mughuls when Akbar himself had come to the South.

The shortage of arms and provisions in the fort was the other cause which weakened the resistance of the besieged. The imperialists dug mines and employed ballistas and the fort was about to fall. In such a discouraging situation Chand Bibi preferred to conclude peace, in order to save the honour of the royal family. She sent for Jita Khan, eunuch to inform him of her intentions. She said that the disunity of Abhang Khan and other Nizam Shahis had brought such an evil day that Akbar had himself come to the Deccan[70] and the fort was about to fall. The only way left for her was to surrender the fort to the Mughuls and retire with Bahadur to Junair. Jita Khan declined to accept her proposal and insisted on continuing to fight. But Chand Bibi was firm in her decision. The evil minded Jita Khan rushed to inform the besieged that the queen—dowager was in league with the Mughuls and was ready to surrender the fort. A deluded mob rushed into her private apartment and murdered her.[71] Thus the last hope of independece of Ahmadnagar was destroyed by the Nizam Shahis themselves.

The death of Chand Bibi was a prelude to the downfall of the Nizam Shahi state. She had some influence over the besieged. But after her death, there was none who could exercise at least that much influence. Each one aspired to take the command] himself. The defenders were divided into many groups and disunity brought about disaster. The Mughuls dug a mine in which a hundred and eighty *mans* of naphtha was put and in the early hours of August

70. Akbar reached Burhanpur on April 10, 1600, to besiege Asirgarh—described elsewhere.

71. Firishta, ii, p. 164; Fuzuni, f. 248; Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, f. 222-24a; Rai Chatraman, f. 101b; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 774, calls the eunuch Habsha Khan whereas Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada (f. 224a) mentions him as Chita Khan.

16, 1600, set it on fire. Twenty thousand men were kept ready to rush into the breach as soon as it appeared. The wall under *Laila Burj* was blown up and caused a breach of thirty yards. The Mughuls rushed into the fort and a general massacre ensued. Jita Khan, the assassin of Chand Bibi, met his reward and was cut to pieces by the invaders.[72]

The innocent Bahadur, only eight years of age, was captured and sent to the fort of Gwaliar as a life prisoner. A vast booty including precious stones, a big library and twenty five elephants fell into the hands of the victorious troops.[73]

Although Akbar after so much and so prolonged an effort now appeared victorious but the mere capture of the fort of Ahmadnagar cannot be called a complete success. The entire state minus Berar and the fort of Ahmadnagar was still in the hands of Nizam Shahis. In the later days of Akbar's reign, the Nizam Shahis redoubled their efforts in driving out the Mughuls out of their state and the imperialists could hardly enjoy the fruit of their labours.

72. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 774-75 ; Fuzuni, ff. 248a, 249a, 258a ; Firishta, (ii, p. 164) says except Bahadur every one was put to death including children, women and the old. But this statement of Firishta seems to be exaggerated. Abu'l Fazl, (*A.N.*, iii, p. 775) states that only fifteen hundred of the besieged were put to sword. Nul-ul-Haq puts the number at 1,000 only.

73. Firishta, ii, p. 164 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 755, 775.

CHAPTER V

CONQUEST OF ASIRGARH BY AKBAR

Qadr Khan, popularly known as Bahadur Shah, succeeded his father in January, 1597, and was the last king of the Faruki dynasty of Khandesh. As mentioned in chapter IV, bitterness arose between him and Akbar from Akbar's unfounded suspicion of loyalty of his father at the battle of Ashti. Relying on the strength of the fortress of Asirgarh, defended by Abyssinians and renegade Portuguese gunners, Bahadur adopted a hostile attitude towards the Mughuls. Akbar tried to soothe Bahadur's embittered feelings by sending him envoys, as he wanted to gain time because 'Abdullah Khan of Turan still posed a threat to the Mughul Empire. It was only after the death of the Uzbeg leader on January 24, 1598,[1] that Akbar felt himself free in the North to deal with a strong hand with Bahadur. Shah 'Abbas Safawi was considered strong enough to settle with 'Abd-ul-Mun'im, the new Khan of Transoxiana. When some imperialists suggested sending an expedition to Turan, Akbar declined and preferred to satisfy his long standing ambition of conquering the Deccan and sent an embassy to condole with 'Abd-ul-Mun'im Khan on his father's death.[2]

Akbar was watching affairs in the Deccan carefully and was not satisfied with the progress of his army. He twice contemplated going in person to the South as the campaign in Ahmadnagar had been dragging on for the last five or six years.[3] Once the threat from the North-west was over, Akbar left for Agra in the fall of 1598 after a stay of fourteen years in the Punjab. His motive in

1. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 736, 738 ; Muhammad Husain Azad, p. 93.

2. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 739.

3. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 249b.

proceeding toward Agra was to go nearer to the scene of war and then to march to Ujjain ostensibly to hasten the march of the Deccan army but in fact to send a strong reinforcement to Ahmadnagar under Bahadur.[4] He aimed to win the latter's confidence.

The refusal of Bahadur to wait upon Prince Daniyal who was on his way to Ahmadnagar, frustrated Akbar's expectations. The uncompromising attitude of Bahadur hastened Akbar's march toward Khandesh as the latter was already in Malwa. He preferred to resolve the matter by diplomacy. He did not want to open a second war front as the Mughuls were then busy in Ahmadnagar. War with Khandesh would mean diverting Mughul attention from the Deccan.

Akbar wished to convey the impression to Bahadur that he, Akbar, considered Bahadur not to be lacking in respect to the Emperor himself; but that having learnt of Akbar's intended march to the Deccan, Bahadur was reserving himself for an act of personal homage to the father rather than to his son. To make his strategem effective, Akbar threatened that if Bahadur did not come to pay homage at the imperial court, he, Akbar, would come himself to Burhanpur to set the matter right. Akbar's threat did not work completely. Bahadur simply agreed to send his son Kabir Khan with a Khandesh contingent to serve under the Mughuls but put off his personal appearance at Akbar's court.

Faizi Sirhindi and Abu'l Fazl record the imperial *farman* sent to Asirgarh. Bahadur was asked to pay personal homage at Ujjain and in order to cultivate the same old relations that existed between the two dynasties, to show obedience as his father had done. Akbar further said that it was Bahadur's duty to co-operate with the Mughuls in order to avenge his father's death. Bahadur excused himself from a personal appearance and merely sent an envoy. Two other imperial missions under Khwaja Mawdud and

4. Ibid., f. 249b.

5. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 767.

Sadr-i-Jahan were sent but Bahadur declined to come to the imperial court.[6]

The report which Sadr-i-Jahan sent to the Emperor, about the mode of life of the Khandesh royal family, is very interesting. It illustrates the characteristics of the Faruqi dynasty and the nature of Bahadur. Sadr-i-Jahan stated that it was the custom of the Faruqi ruling monarch to imprison his sons and other male relatives to guard against any attempt upon his throne. Bahadur himself had passed thirty years in prison before becoming king. He knew nothing of kingly ways and government. As soon as he became king, he plunged himself into dissipation. Unmindful of his duties, he showed no sign of avenging his father.[7]

Once Bahadur had made up his mind to see the Emperor but was dissuaded by his imprudent counsellors who reminded their king of the impregnability of the fortress. Akbar still hoped for a peaceful solution. He sent Peshrau Khan and Abu'l Fazl to Bahadur to offer him forgiveness if he would consent to make a personal appearance at the imperial court. These missions failed likewise.[8] Akbar was thus obliged to take severe action against an insubordinate ally. He had thought that Khandesh would provide a *point d' appui* in capturing the remaining parts of the Deccan but it caused an obstacle in his way. Akbar, the Emperor of Hindustan who had broken the power of mighty Rajputs and Afghans, had extended his borders from Kabul and Qandahar in the North-west to Bengal in the East, could not tolerate such a setback to his prestige at the hands of a minor ruler like Bahadur. He, therefore, resolved to use force.

6. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 252a ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 767.

7. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 252b, 253a ; *Journal of Semetic Studies*, Manchester, April, 1957, ii, No. 2, p. 182.

8. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 769 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 252b, 255a.

The Mughuls now made preparations for the conquest of Asir. An army was sent to capture Burhanpur which fell on March 31, 1600 without much resistance.[9] A contingent of a thousand soldiers was stationed near Asir to prevent any reinforcement to the besieged. Abu'l Fazl was appointed governor of Khandesh ; his brother Abu'l Barakat and his son 'Abd-ur-Rehman were despatched to different places to establish Mughul rule.[10]

Haji Dabir, the besieged author is our only eye witness who gives us the state of affairs in Bahadur's camp. He records that when the news of Akbar's departure for the South reached Khandesh, Bahadur held a council. Afzal Khan, the *wazir*, who was in league with the Mughuls transmitted reports to Akbar secretly. The *wazir* acted with duplicity. Sometime he advised Bahadur to oppose Akbar and at other times he suggested surrender and payment of tribute to the Mughul Emperor. "But", writes Haji Dabir, "Bahadur chose a wrong policy for which he was later sorry."[11] It seems that a plan was made that Bahadur and other princes should remain at different places and in case Bahadur was defeated, the princes may continue to oppose Akbar.[12]

Bahadur's foolish behaviour during such a crisis alienated his followers. He had no sense of kingship and lacked shrewdness and diplomacy to win the confidence of his people. "He raised the low," states Haji Dabir, "and put down the exalted and advanced those who were not successful and kept back those who were sound."[13] The result was that the garrison was divided into different groups and dissension raised its head. The defence of the fort weakened and Akbar's task became easier. Fulad Khan, a prominent noble of Bahadur's court finding himself unable to co-operate with Afzal

9. Faizi Sirhindi ff. 263b, 264a.
10. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 769.
11. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 81-82.
12. Ibid., p. 82.
13. Ibid., p. 81.

Khan any longer, left Bahadur to meet his fate alone. He went to his *jagir* in Sunkir and "That was the last time," writes Haji Dabir, "when Bahadur saw Fulad Khan". The Mughuls took advantage of disunity in the enemy's camp and won over Fulad Khan and his adopted son, Saif-ud-Din Muhammad Amin.[14]

Both Bahadur and Akbar were trying to outdo each other in diplomacy. Bahadur had once refused to see the Emperor as he wanted to take a firm stand. Under the false impression that Akbar would not dare fight with him since the Mughuls were preoccupied at Ahmadnagar and counting on the impregnability of the fortress, Bahadur had taken an independent attitude. Later, when he realized the tense situation, he, in order to avert any armed conflict with the Mughuls, sent a letter of submission to Shaikh Farid Bokhari. He requested the Shaikh to use his good offices in bringing peace and put some excuses for his inability to appear before the Emperor. Akbar was not ready to move an inch from his decision. Bahadur was reminded of the close relations that had existed between Khandesh and Delhi and that Raja 'Ali Khan did not hesitate in sacrificing his life for the Mughuls. He was told that the Emperor had resolved to take his father's revenge and was determined to conquer all the three Deccan states. Bahadur's duty, therefore, was to join hands with the Mughuls. The imperial mission failed as before. To avoid any overt breakdown of negotiations, Bahadur sent Sayyid Isma'il to the Emperor.[15]

Akbar tried once again to make Bahadur accept his terms through diplomacy. He sent an army on March 9, 1600, under Shaikh Farid but instructed him first to persuade Bahadur by peaceful means and in case of failure of his attempt, to besiege Asirgarh.[16] Accordingly Shaikh Farid arranged an interview with Bahadur. As

14. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 770 ; Haji Dabir, i, pp. 82-85.

15. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 256b, 259a.

16. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 769.

this episode is of significant importance in the history of the siege of Asir when the two opponents met each other, it has been recounted in detail.

Given assurances of his safety by his host, Bahadur emerged from the fortress with a large escort to see Shaikh Farid in his tent. Every possible counsel was given to Bahadur to induce him to make his submission to the Emperor. When he could not speak he would just shake his head. He professed fear of the large Mughul army stationed in his country and suggested that when the imperial army was withdrawn from his territory he would appear before the Emperor. "Some injudicious persons suggested", writes Faizi Sirhindi, "that Shaikh Farid ought to have made Bahadur prisoner during the interview but deception and lack of confidence never succeed." It appears that Shaikh Farid could not carry out, even if he had wanted to, the mean device of kindnapping Bahadur as the latter had a sufficient escort with him to defeat the army of Shaikh Farid.[17]

Akbar declined to accept the conditions put forward by Bahadur. Withdrawing from Khandesh without achieving his aim would mean for Akbar a check to his military career. The fort of Asir was thus besieged by the Mughuls. Baz Bahadur and Qara Beg were sent by Akbar to collect information regarding the fort. Their reports on the strength and structure of the fortress of Asir surprised the Mughuls.

Asir was a fort unequalled for its height and strength. It was situated on a high hill. Its position was strengthened by three concentric and cleverly devised lines of fortifications. To the north side of it was the fortress of Maligarh. Whoever desired to enter the main fortress must pass by it. The fort was well equipped with war material and provisions sufficient to last for ten years. The summit of the hill, a space about sixty acres in extent was amply provided

17. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 263.

with water by natural springs and two or three reservoirs. "Men who had seen forts," writes Faizi Sirhindi," in Iran, Turan, Turkey, *Afrang* and in the whole inhabited world have never seen the equal of Asir. In short the fortress is one of the wonders of the world."[18]

These accounts of Asir, made the Emperor more anxious to reach there as early as possible. He arrived there on April 10, 1600. In the light of the above discussion it is difficult to agree with Radhey Shyam's statement that the Emperor came to the Deccan on the sugges-tion of Abu'l Fazl when the latter failed to control the situation at Ahmadnagar. Though the garrison discharged artillery heavily and made the task difficult for the invading army, yet Bahadur, alarmed at the Emperor's arrival, tried to avoid a crisis by offering his submission a more adriot way. He sent his grandmother and son with sixty elephants to Akbar and promised to give his daughter in marriage to Prince Khurram and begged for pardon.[19] Bahadur's attempt to negotiate was a device to gain time and to prolong the siege until provisions became so scarce and costly that the besiegers would be obliged to retire. Akbar would not listen to any such request and repeated his demand for Bahadur's submission in person.[20]

Every type of siege engine was tried but the nature of the fort rendered all efforts of the besiegers useless.[21] Akbar realized that slow progress would discourage his soldiers. He, therefore, summoned Sardar Khan, the grandson of Raja 'Ali Khan from Agra. Sardar Khan managed to win the support of some of the Khandeshis who enabled the Mughuls to capture the Sapan

18. Abu'l Fazl *A.N.*, iii, p. 777 ; Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 259b-262a ; Firishta, ii, pp. 290-91.

19. Radhey Shyam, p. 229 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 777.

20. Du Jarric, p. 98 ; Farnao Guerreiro, *Relacao Annual das Coisas que Fizeram*, i, Coimbra, 1930, p. 6 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 771 ; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 268b.

21. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 265-68b.

Hill in the middle of June 1600[22] It was a hill to the south-west of Asir and one of its outer works. By its capture, the besieged were driven inside the main fortress.

The ring round the fort was tightened by the imperialists but the garrison held on gallantly. There were two reasons for the poor progress by the Mughuls. First, the Mughuls were still desperately fighting at Ahmadnagar. Second, when Akbar came from Agra, he had not enough siege equipment in his train as he did not expect that matters will take such a serious turn at Asir. He probably would have thought of persuading Bahadur to submit by threats. Later, some guns were brought from Parnala, Kawail and Ahmadabad but they did not prove effective against the hard walls of Asirgarh.[23]

News coming from the North was alarming as Prince Salim who had been deputed to subdue the Rana of Mewar, was contemplating rebellion at Allahabad. Should Akbar stay for an unlimited period to conquer Asir? His presence in the South for a considerable length of time in such a critical situation, may put his own Empire in jeopardy. He designed to finish off one enemy with the help of the other—a device which he had employed successfully in Rajputana. He planned to seek help from the ruler of Bijapur against Khandesh.

An imperial letter written with perspicacious and astute skill was sent to 'Adil Shah. Akbar stated that he always thought of subjugating Nizam Shah, the enemy of Bijapur but due to his preoccupations, could not accomplish the task. When the chance arose to conquer Ahmadnagar, Bahadur Shah stood in his way, As friendly relations between 'Adil Shah and the Mughuls had existed for a long time he wanted to bring them closer. He wished Daniyal to be married to an 'Adil Shahi princess and hoped for

22. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 772.

23. Ibid., p. 779.

some assistance against their common enemies (*i.e.* Nizam Shah and Bahadur Shah). Akbar assured 'Adil Shah that the Bijapuri princess would not live far from her native place as Daniyal would be appointed viceroy of the southern parts of the Mughul Empire, after the conquests of Asir and Ahmadnagar.[24]

The imperial letter frightened 'Adil Shah at first but his shrewdness overcame his fear. He knew Akbar's aggressive designs that the Emperor would not be satisfied with Ahmadnagar and Khandesh alone. Bijapur and Golconda would become next victims of the Mughul territorial aggrandizement. But a plain refusal to meet the imperial demands would invoke Akbar's wrath against him. Though weaker militarily than his antagonist, yet he was Akbar's equal in diplomacy. He replied that the Emperor need not worry as the forts would soon fall to the imperialists. Declining to send any reinforcement, he artfully stated that he would have gladly sent some assistance to the Mughuls but his commander Hamid Khan was busy in the campaigns of Tokocha and Gulharoman. He half consented to the proposed matrimonial alliance and kept the matter pending.[25]

After the discouraging letter from 'Adil Shah, the Mughuls redoubled their efforts to take Asir by storm. They conquered the adjoining fortress of Alang on August 13, 1600,[26] and tried to capture Maligarh, without the seizure of which any access to the main fortress was impossible. Bahadur's expectations turned out to be true. Provisions for the besiegers became scarce and local *zamindars* refused to sell anything to the invading army. But treachery and desertion by the garrison eased the situation for the Mughuls. "Afzal Khan," writes Haji Dabir, "who was deputed to guard Maligarh was in correspondence with the Mughuls and was inclined

24. Fuzuni. ff. 250-51a.

25. Ibid., ff. 252b, 253a.

26. Abu'l Fazl *A.N.*, iii, p. 773.

towards them.".[27]

A calamity which shook the defenders and resulted in weakening the defence occurred in the fort. All the contemporary Muslim authors, whether Mughuls or Deccanis, agree on this event, differing slightly over its details, but the Jesuit Fathers make absolutely no mention of it.[28] Abu'l Fazl, Faizi Sirhindi, Firishta, Fuzuni Astrabadi and Haji Dabir state that when Bahadur shut himself in the fortress of Asir, he against the wishes of his counsellors, admitted a large number of common people. Abu'l Fazl mentions 100, 000 people whereas Firishta puts the total number at 1, 20,000. A large number of cattle and other animals had also been collected in the fort. Owing to the prolongation of the siege for about nine months, air in the fort became foul and unhealthy and caused a pestilence. According to Firishta 40, 000 persons perished while Abu'l Fazl puts the figure at 25, 000.[29] Faizi Sirhindi does not mention the number of the dead but he gives some details of the calamity. He states that foulness of air caused two diseases. One was paralysis of the lower extremities from the waist downwards which deprived the sufferer of any power of movement. The second was weakness of eyesight at night.[30] Haji Dabir also mentions that the foulness of air caused by the enormous number of men and animals resulted in a deadly pestilence.[31] We may put doubt on the number of the dead given both by Firishta and Abu'l Fazl but still their accounts taken with the statements of Faizi Sirhindi and Haji Dabir make us believe

27. Haji Dabir, i, p. 85.

28. See Appendix A for a detailed discussion on Asirgarh with regard to the accounts of Jesuit Fathers and those of modern critics.

29. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 781-82 ; Fuzuni, f. 242a ; Firishta, ii, p 290 ; Both Du Jarric, p. 103 and Guerreiro, p. 6, say that 70,000 men defended the fort ; Von Noer, p. 361.

30. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 272.b.

31. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 82, 85.

that the pestilence occurred. There were no hospitals to alleviate suffering.[32] Instead of showing consideration to the besieged at such a critical time, Bahadur treated them harshly. As the siege was prolonged, the common people and the troopers ran short of provisions and they demanded more from Bahadur.[33] Though he had large stores sufficient to feed the besieged for years, yet Bahadur foolishly refused to meet their request. "Bahadur, who was in the company of fools and riff-raff," writes Haji Dabir, "refused to comply with the urgent demands of the besieged."[34]

The deadly pestilence and Bahadur's own harsh treatment caused the besieged to desert. One of the garrison of Afzal Khan's party defected to the imperialists and disclosed to them a secret path to Maligarh. At first no attention was paid to the deserter, who was thought to be mad. Eventually a contingent including Qara Beg and Abu'l Fazl was despatched under the guidance of the deserter to capture Maligarh. "When the besieged were discharging cannon balls like rain," writes Abu'l Fazl, "the fortress of Maligarh was captured on November 29, 1600, by the efforts of the imperial army."[35] But Haji Dabir discredits Abu'l Fazl's statement. He mentions that Afzal Khan and his party, who were guarding the entrance of Maligarh, withdrew their forces and informed the Mughuls of their action. The invading army became encouraged and succeeded in capturing Maligarh.[36]

The fall of such an important fort like Maligarh was a turning point in the siege of Asirgarh. It afforded an easy access to the main fortress. Moreover the conquest of Ahmadnagar by the Mughuls on August 16, 1600, nearly three months before the capture

32. Firishta, ii, p. 290.

33. Von Noer, p. 361 ; Firishta, ii, p. 290.

34. Haji Dabir, i, p. 81.

35. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 777-78.

36. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86.

of Maligarh, had disheartened the besieged as the imperialists could devote their undivided attention to Asirgarh. Bahadur could not expect any help from the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda who were fully concerned with their own borders. Under the leadership of Biljaj, the besieged approached Bahadur and threatened him either to surrender the fort or they would hand him over to Akbar.[37]

The rebellion in the fort and the ever-increasing number of deserters forced Bahadur to review the situation. He was a man of fickle-minded nature. "He had a streak of *tawakkul*," records Haji Dabir, "for he used to say when a matter troubled him, what God wills will be".[38] His belief in *tawakkul* is also corroborated by the accounts of Abu'l Fazl, Firishta and Khafi Khan. It is recorded that Akbar took to religious devotions and repeated *Ism-i-'Azam* (the great Name of God). Bahadur believed that the prevalence of the pestilence and the fall of Maligarh were the result of the Emperor's devotions and of magicians employed by the latter.[39]

Bahadur became disheartened and held a council to discuss the situation. The great nobles like Kabir Khan, Mirza J'afar and Sa'adat Khan were invited to give their opinions. They unanimously suggested that Bahadur should surrender. Forced by his coun-

37. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86 ; Firishta, ii, p. 290 ; Nur-ul-Haq, f. 263a.

38. Haji Dabir, i, p. 80.

39. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 782 ; Firishta, ii, p. 290 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 214-15 gives another story : There was a legend that Shaikh Burhan-ud-Din once told that until the big stone in river Tapti will remain in its true shape, Khandesh will be ruled by the Faruqi kings. If the stone turned into the shape of an elephant, the kingdom will fall out of the Faruqi dynasty. After the fall of Burhanpur when Akbar came to know of the legend, he secretly changed the stone into the shape of an elephant. Bahadur became so frightened at that 'change' that he thought his end had come.

sellors, he agreed to seek peace.[40]

According to *Zafar-al-Walih*, Sa'adat Khan was selected to settle peace terms with the Mughuls. When Sa'adat Khan, who was tired of Bahadar's harsh attitude, reached the Mughul camp, he begged security for himself and his followers from Akbar. The request was granted. Sa'adat Khan and his party joined the Mughul service.[41] "The Emperor was pleased", writes Abu'l Fazl, "with him and granted him a *mansab* of 1000".[42]

There is no discrepancy regarding the terms of the agreement and arrival of Bahadur at Akbar's court between the accounts of Haji Dabir and Abu'l Fazl. "The day when Maligarh fell," states Abu'l Fazl, "Bahadur awoke from his somnolence and sent Muqarrab Khan, his envoy to the author." Muqarrab Khan was presented to the Emperor. The message brought by Muqarrab Khan was that if the country and fortress be restored to Bahadur, the latter would hasten to surrender. Akbar accepted the proposal and promised Bahadur his life and honour.[43] In plain words it was agreed that first Bahadur should appear before the Emperor who then would restore the kingdom to him. Next day Muqarrab Khan returned to the imperial court and made one more request on behalf of his master, that Ram Das Darbari, a Mughul noble should accompany Bahadur from his palace to the outer gate of Asirgarh from where Khan-i-'Azam Mirza 'Aziz Koka should lead him to the imperial court. That request was also granted.[44]

40. Firishta, ii, p. 290; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 779; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 272b.

41. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86.

42. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 782.

43. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 779; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 272b.

44. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 779.

Bahadur's chief objection to the formal surrender was removed when he knew that his country would be restored to him. A critical study of the *Akbar Namah* would show that it was Bahadur's secret plan that the garrison should hold out, till his return. Should Akbar break his promise, he could save himself from the Emperor's wrath by representing rebellion on the part of the besieged. So he descended from the fort in the company of his *wazirs* and Mirza 'Aziz Koka brought him to the imperial court on December 10, 1600.[45]

Akbar held a *darbar* to receive his guest. Bahadur was surprised and amazed at the imperial splendour, He was detained and not permitted to return. Having addressed some polite words to Bahadur, Akbar got him to write a letter to those who held the first line of fortification, that on the receipt of his letter, they should surrender the fort.[46]

The besieged as instructed secretly by Bahadur, refused to submit. Muqarrab Khan who had played his part as an intermediary, was sent to demand keys from the besieged commander. When he approached the fort walls, Malik Yaqut Sultani, the commander, rebuked his son *i.e.* Muqarrab Khan, saying, "First you took Bahadur to the Emperor and now you have come to ask us to surrender the fort to the enemy. May God I may not see your face".[47] The son whose duty was 'nothing more than to be a messenger could not bear the alleged responsibility and the harsh words of his father. Faizi Sirhindi writes that soon after this incident Muqarrab Khan stabbed himself twice or thrice and died after four days.[48] Haji

45. Nur-ul-Haq, f. 263b ; Smith, *Akbar the Great Mogul*, p. 277 is wrong to conclude that the episode occurred in August ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 779-80.

46. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86 ; Faizi Sirhindi, f. 273a; Guerreiro, p. 7 ; Du Jarric, p. 105.

47. Haji Dabir, i, p. 86.

48. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 273a.

Dabir, an independent and accomplished author corroborates Faizi Sirhindi's account of the death of Muqarrab Khan[49] and discredits the Portuguese account. According to Du Jarric and Guerriero, Akbar ordered Muqarrab Khan to be put to death immediately after the Khan's refusal to comply with his request to bring Malik Yaqut Sultani to the imperial court.[50]

Who should be held responsible for the breach of faith. Akbar or Bahadur? Bahadur had come earlier to the imperial court but Akbar was not satisfied as the garrison still held the fort and refused to surrender. Their refusal was taken by the Emperor as 'a diplomatic bargaining counter' arranged earlier by Bahadur. Both Akbar and Bahadur wanted to outdo each other. According to Akbar, refusal of the besieged to surrender the fort did not indicate a spirit of submission. The Emperor considered submission by the ruler to carry with it submission by his subjects. He, therefore, decided not to give back Khandesh to Bahadur because the rich stores of ammunition and food in the fortress of Asir and the geographical position of Khandesh would help the Mughuls tremendously in their conquest of the Deccan. Further, in order to avoid any possible rebellion by a claimant of the Farukis in future, Akbar thought it politic to annex Khandesh and exile the surviving princes of the dynasty. The failure of the expedition could bring a setback to Akbar's imperial ambitions. Bahadur thus failed in his strategem.

Haji Dabir is the only contemporary source and eye witness who provides us with information about the situation in the fort. He records that after his refusal to surrender, Malik Yaqut, who was blind and old, went to the palace and assembled all the seven princes of the royal family. Addressing them he said, "The general condition and the state of defence of the fort is known to you.

49. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 86-87.

50. Du Jarric, pp. 105-06; Guerreiro, p. 7.

Who among you wishes to become the new king and preserve the honour of his ancestors"? But none of them answered. He again spoke, "Would you were women, then you would be excused". After despairing of the sons of Mubarak Shah, he went to his house. He made his will and performed his ablutions and had his shroud brought and took leave of his family. He then went to the mosque, which he had built and prayed there for a long time. He gave gifts to people. He then asked for a grave to be dug in a place he had selected for it. There he ate opium and committed suicide and was buried there. On his committing suicide, the garrison repeated some verses of the *Quran*, "O my servants who have committed extravagances against themselves, don't despair of mercy of God ; indeed God forgives sins wholly, indeed He is Forgiving, the Merciful." In the end they said, "May God forgive him and be merciful to him."[51]

According to Du Jarric and Guerriero, after the death of his son, the Abyssinian governor prayed to God that he might not behold the face of a king so perfidious. Then placing a *chaperon* about his neck, he addressed the besieged. He said that winter was at hand and Akbar would be obliged to return. He advised them to be united against the enemy, to rely on God and encouraged them not to deliver the fort. For himself, he said, he preferred to die than to live to look upon the face of so wicked a man. So saying, he tightened the knot of his *chaperon* and strangled himself.[52] The story told by the Portuguese was based on the reports of the besieged who after the fall of Asir had come out of the fort. The evidence of Haji Dabir is to be preferred to that of the Portuguese Fathers as the former was present in the fort while the latter depended on hearsay evidence.

51. Haji Dabir, i, p. 87.

52. Du Jarric, p. 106 ; Guerreiro, p. 7 ; *Chaperon* means cape—a short loose sleeveless cloak, fitting round the neck and falling over the shoulders.

The continuation of the defence by the besieged upset Akbar. Time was very precious as his son Prince Salim had rebelled at Allahabad and intended to march toward Delhi. The need of the hour forced Akbar to employ any device to compel the garrison to surrender. Abu'l Fazl mentions, "though efforts were made to push on the batteries from Korihyah and big guns were ordered to be brought, yet secretly the experienced soldiers were busy in enticing the besieged by fascinating words."[53] Thus the court chronicler admits that underhand means were used by the imperialists to make the besieged desert their king. The garrison however were reluctant to surrender for sometime. But the refusal by the Khandesh princes to take responsibility of holding the fort in the absence of Bahadur made the garrison rethink their course of action. They, the besieged, concluded that any more resistance to Mughul pressure could be useless. They represented that some letters of Bahadur addressed to noted captains in their personal names and ordering them to submit, should be obtained so that the blame of desertion may not fall on them. They also requested that an imperial *farman* be issued granting the lives, honour and property of the besieged. "Bahadur," writes Abu'l Fazl, "hesitated to give such writings and spoke some improper words. But when pressure was put on him, he wrote and put his seal on his writings."[54]

On the receipt of Bahadur's letters and the imperial *farman* granting a general amnesty, the besieged submitted. Abu'l Fazl went to the main gate of the fortress and sat on a platform known as *Chabutra-i-Tufail Khan*. For four days the besieged swarmed out like locust with their families and goods.[55] On January 15, 1601, the leaders of the garrison such as the Ikhtiyar Khan Ulugh Khan, Marjan Habshi and others decended from the

53. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 780.

54. Ibid., p. 780.

55. Haji Dabir, i, p. 87 ; Firishta, ii, p. 291 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 780.

fort. On January 17, 1601, 'Abd-ur-Rahman, son of Abu'l Fazl, went into the fort and the guard handed over keys formally to the imperialists. Bahadur was sent to the fortress of Gwaliar as state prisoner.[56]

A large booty fell to the victorious army. It included thirteen hundred large cannons, countless mortars and many *manjaniqs*, each of which threw stones of one or two thousand *mans*. Jewels, silver and gold were loaded on three hundred elephants. According to Faizi Sirhindi, "there were still large stores of provisions left untouched."[57]

The responsibility for the fall of Asir entirely rests on Bahadur. Apart from the court writers, the author of *Futuhat-i-'Adil Shahi* also blames him stating that owing to his foolishness and false pride his country was annexed to the Mughul Empire.[58] Holding Bahadur responsible for the decline of his dynasty, Haji Dabir writes that he began to indulge in prohibited pastimes. He angered his father's *wazirs* so much that they prayed for his death for their own security.[59] Bahadur did not have the slightest experience of administration before his accession to the throne. After the custom of his dynasty, also practised in the then contemporary Ethiopian and Ottoman Empires, of imprisoning the male members of the ruling house to avoid succession quarrels, he had passed more than thirty years in a royal prison. When he became king he found circumstances unfavourable. Khandesh had long acknowledged the overlordship of the Mughul Emperor and his father Raja 'Ali Khan,

56. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 780, 785 ; Rev. Heras in *Indian Antiquary*, 1924, p. 40 writes : the capitulation took place on January 17, 1601, according to an inscription that can be still seen on the foscade of *Jama Masjid* in Asirgarh.

57. Faizi Sirhindi, ff. 260-61b ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 781-82.

58. Fuzuni, ff. 243a, 246a.

59. Haji Dabir, i, pp. 81, 87.

"the last Farukid with any ability for successful diplomatic manoevure", had most wisely thrown his lot with the Mughuls to save his country. Bahadur, acting contrary to the policy of his predecessors, not only lost his own kingship but caused the extinction of the kingdom itself. His harsh behaviour towards his followers led to desertions, which enabled the Mughuls to conquer Asir ; otherwise in the face of the strength of the fort, it would have been impossible for Akbar to accomplish his task within the short period at his disposal.

The fall of Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh at first frightened the other Deccani rulers but they could foresee that after those conquests Akbar would hasten to the North to quash the rebellion of Prince Salim. In order to gain time, 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah saw their advantage in sending envoys to the imperial court. 'Adil Shah whose territory ran with the Mughul border took the initiative in despatching his ambassador to Akbar with valuable gifts. Soon, Qutb Shah and Barid Shah sent their envoys to the Emperor. The Deccani envoys were received graciously by Akbar. In return, the Emperor sent on January 2, 1601, Sharif Sarmadi, Mas'ud Beg and Momin as his ambassadors to Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar respectively,[60] The newly conquered *subah* of Khandesh was renamed Dandesh after Daniyal. The imperial Deccan consisted of Khandesh or Dandesh, Berar and Ahmadnagar over which Daniyal was appointed viceroy.[61]

Akbar was now eager to return to Delhi as soon as possible. He could not afford any more time once the administration was settled in the Deccan. He told Khan Khanan that his father, Bairam Khan, had made him Emperor and he, in return, raised him i.e., Khan Khanan to such a high status. It was, therefore, Khan Khanan's duty to conquer the remaining parts of the Deccan and assured him that if time permitted, he, Akbar, would come back to assist him.

60. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 782.

61. Abu'l Fazl, *Ain-i-Akbari*, i, p. 473.

The Emperor advised Daniyal to work in close co-operation with Khan Khanan. After making necessary arrangements for administration of the newly acquired territory, Akbar left for Agra on April 21, 1601.[62]

It is difficult to say that the Mughuls enjoyed complete success in the Deccan. Once Akbar left the Deccan, his generals proved unsuccessful against the enemy. The presence of the Emperor in the Deccan was a check on the dissensions in which Mughul nobles became involved once he had left. The Nizam Shahis who had lost ground to the imperialists owing to their mutual disputes rectified their mistake and gathered around the person of Malik 'Ambar, who had become the new *Peshwa* of Nizam Shah. Under his much needed leadership and able guidance, the Nizam Shahis got a new lease of life.

Malik 'Ambar, an Abyssinian was born in 1035/1549. He was bought as slave from Baghdad and sold to Chingiz Khan, the *wakil* of Murtaza Nizam Shah and gained military experience, After his master's death, he became disappointed at the party strifes and bickering among the nobility at Ahmadnagar. He went to Bijapur and after serving Ibrahim 'Adil Shah for a short while returned to help Chand Bibi in 1595, to defend Ahmadnagar against the Mughuls. He had witnessed the disaster that had befallen the house of Nizam Shah. He determined to save Ahmadnagar kingdom from extinction. After the fall of Ahmadnagar fort, he gathered 7000 soldiers under him and became *Pehswa* of Nizam Shah. The presence of a king was essential as a symbolic head in whose name Malik 'Ambar could justify his efforts. He appealed to Ibrahim 'Adil Shah to release Murtaza b. 'Ali b, Burhan Shah I from Bijapur. On his release, Murtaza was declared Nizam Shah. Malik 'Ambar

62. 'Inayatullah Muhib 'Ali, *Takmila-i-Akbar Namah*, B.M. or 1854, f. 16a ; Rafi-ud-Din Pirzada, ff. 225-27b ; Fuzuni, ff. 244b, 245b ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 789.

made Khirki, the new capital of Nizam Shahi kingdom.[63]

Raju, a Nizam Shahi noble and rival of Malik 'Ambar, recaptured Nasik and the area round Daulatabad from the Mughuls.[64] "Taking the opportunity of the carelessness of the imperial officers,, writes Abu'l Fazl, "Raju came from Daulatabad and seized the area as far as Jalnapur."[65] Raju employed his guerilla tactics, which the imperialists were not accustomed to. He would not allow himself to be beaten in the open field but withdrew himself toward his own borders, encircling the enemy, cutting off their supplies and rendering them helpless. Many engagements took place but Raju was unwilling to surrender. Eventually the Mughuls had to make peace with him on the condition that revenue of the disputed territory should be shared between him and the Mughuls.[66]

Meanwhile Malik 'Ambar captured the area around Ahmadnagar. He was defeated by the Mughuls in May, 1601, near river Manjara but was able to ravage Bidar.[67] The success of the Mughuls was shortlived as they failed to destory one enemy at the hands of other. Khan Khanan made an alliance with Malik 'Ambar against Raju. Secure from the Mughul danger, Malik 'Ambar took Qandahar from Qutb Shah and Chiul from the Portuguese.[68]

In 1013/1614, Ibrahim 'Adil Shah sent his daughter Begam Sultan to Ahmadnagar, to be married to Daniyal. Raju tried to obstruct the path of the Bijapuri princess but was defeated by the

63. Firishta, ii, p. 165 ; Fuzuni, ff. 269b, 270a ; J.D.B. Gribble, *A History of the Deccan*, London, 1896, pp. 251-52.

64. Firishta, ii, p. 165.

65. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 793-94.

66. Firishta, ii, pp. 165-66 ; Fuzuni, f. 269 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 794-97 ; 'Inayatullah Muhib 'Ali, ff. 20b, 21a.

67. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 805.

68. Firishta, ii, p. 165 ; Muhammad Hadi, ff. 209b, 210a ; Fuzuni, f. 271a.

combined forces of Malik 'Ambar and the Mughuls. Malik 'Ambar took Daulatabad from Raju who then finally retired from active politics.[69]

The events during 1604-05, in the Mughul camp gave a chance to Malik 'Ambar to strengthen his position. Prince Daniyal's health was declining owing to excess of drinking. The administration in the imperial Deccan fell into confusion. The Nizam Shahis pushed the Mughuls further back. Akbar sent Abu'l Khair to bring the Prince to Agra.[70] But Daniyal was destined to meet the same fate as that of his elder brother Murad. He died on Saturday, March 11, 1605. The Nizam Shahis increased their attacks. Many imperialists deserted to the enemy. Malik 'Ambar recaptured Daulatabad, Nasik, half of Balaghat, and many *parganahs* of Ahmadnagar.[71] While the Mughuls were already losing ground to the Nizam Shahis, the death of Akbar on October 15, 1605, gave a further setback to the imperial prestige in the Deccan.[72]

There was not much left under the Mughuls in the Deccan at the time of Akbar's death. The Mughul Deccan then consisted of Khandesh, half of Berar and a few districts of Ahmadnagar. Nearly half of Ahmadnagar kingdom was in the hands of the new Nizam Shah. Bijapur and Golconda still stood as an open challenge to Akbar's pride. In the light of these events, it is impossible to believe, that Akbar had succeeded in his long standing desire of bringing the South under the North.

69. Firishta, ii, p. 166 ; Fuuzni, f. 268b.

70. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 828.

71. Muhammad Hadi, f. 210 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 837 ; Firishta, ii, pp. 166.

72. Firishta, i, p. 271 ; Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, p. 841 ; Muhammad Husain Azad, p. 104.

CHAPTER VI

JAHANGIR'S RELATIONS WITH THE DECCAN STATES

Jahangir ascended the throne on Thursday, *Jamadi-us-Sani* 8, 1014/October 16, 1605, at the age of thirty-eight. He was not a warlike monarch as his predecessors, Akbar or Babur had been, but he decided to follow the policy of expansion in the Deccan initiated by Akbar. The Emperor writes in his *Memoirs* that he was inspired to conquer the Deccan by his father. When instructing his son Parwez to stop hostilities against Mewar, provided the Rana waited upon him with his son Karan, he explained the order thus : "There are two reasons for issuing such instructions. One, that the conquest of Transoxiana was always in the mind of my revered father. Whenever he tried to execute his plan, something happened to stop it. If this expedition (of Mewar) comes to a successful end and the danger from the Rana finished, I would leave Parwez in Hindustan and with the help of God, would advance toward my hereditary country, The time is most opportune as there is no permanent ruler in that country now. Baqi Khan, who had established himself, after 'Abdullah Khan and his son 'Abdul Momin Khan, has died, and his brother Wali Muhammad, the present ruler of that region, has not yet fully succeeded in asserting his authority. Two, to subjugate the Deccan part of which was captured during the reign of my father. With the favour of God, I intend to conquer the remaining parts of the Deccan and annex them to the Mughul Empire. I hope that both these designs will be accomplished one day through the mercy of God."[1]

The Emperor expresses similar views at another place. He states, "I always had the desire to capture Transoxiana, which is the

1. Jahangir, p. 11.

land of my forefathers. I desired to free Hindustan from the rebels and miscreants. Leaving one of my sons in this country to lookafter the affairs of the state in my absence, I should advance with a well equipped army including an elephant corps and innumerable treasures to the conquest of my hereditary territory. To achieve this aim, I sent Parwez against the Rana of Mewar and intended to march myself toward the Deccan, but Khusrau rebelled just at the same time. It became necessary to crush the rebellion first. Expediency demanded the conclusion of peace with the Rana on the condition that he should send one of his sons as a hostage to the Mughul court. Now when the rebellion is suppressed and the attack of the Qizilbashs on Qandahar is repulsed, I intend to proceed toward Kabul, my ancestral home. On my return to Hindustan, from Kabul, I am determined to put my long-standing ideas into action."[2] But Jahangir failed to achieve either of his desires.

Jahangir had inherited a well-established Empire from his father and except for Mewar, the whole of Northern India was under him. He, therefore, preferred the Deccan to the conquest of Transoxiana. He, however, could not whole-heartedly devote himself to the accomplishment of his ambition because of court intrigues and jealousies of Mughul nobles who found the Deccan as a fit place for a free play of their ambitions.

The revolt of Khusrau and the siege of Qandahar by the Persians, both of which happened in the beginning of his reign, prevented him from doing so.[3] As soon as his hands were free, he turned his attention toward the Deccan and sent his armies to the South.

The chief feature of this period is court intrigue, which had a direct bearing on Mughul-Deccan relations. In order to have a

2. Ibid., p. 43.

3. Ibid., pp. 24-32.

better understanding of the events, the reign of Jahangir should be divided into three parts.

First Phase: (1605-1612)—The unsuccessful attempts of the Mughuls to regain the lost territories in the Deccan.

Second Phase : (1612-1621)—The period of supremacy of the so-called Nur Jahan junta, which exploited the Deccan affairs for its selfish ends.

Third Phase : (1622-1627)—The period of the break up of the junta which resulted in a serious setback to the imperial prestige in the South and so the Deccanis regained most of their lost territories.

THE FIRST PHASE : (1605—1612)

During the first three years of his reign, Jahangir was busy in restoring peace in the North. The Deccanis seized the opportunity to regain half of Balaghat and many districts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad. The Mughul officers in the South could not be given proper support by the imperial government and some of them deserted to the Deccanis.[4] It was only when the imperialists were hard pressed that the Emperor took a serious view of the situation.

The character and personality of Jahangir considerably influnced the course of events in the Deccan. With the exception of Mewar, which was in extremis, Jahangir was master of northern India. He, however, lacked those qualities which could further Mughul progress in the Deccan. His past record as a commander was not distinguished. He did not possess the military qualities which had distinguished his forefathers, Timur Babur and Akbar. As a king, he never led an expedition in person

4. Muhammad Salih Kambu, *'Amal-i-Salih*, Calcutta 1923, i, p. 59, Kamgar Husaini, *Ma'asir-i-Jahangiri*, B.M. or. 171, f. 51a ; Jahangir, p. 74.

and the officers left to themselves, were mostly occupied in mutual recriminations.

The Nizam Shahis during the reign of Akbar had been worn out by their internal dissensions, and they had no leader, who could restore unity and discipline among them. Malik 'Ambar, who became *Peshwa* of Nizam Shah, supplied the much needed leadership and under his able guidance the state got a new lease of life. The Marathas, with their fine fighting qualities and courage, impressed Malik 'Ambar. He recruited them in the Nizam Shahi army. Regardless of their religious differences, the Marathas and the Nizam Shahis joined hands to throw off the Mughul domination. The Marathas owed their new status in the land to Malik 'Ambar. They were originally marauders, who moved in roving bands, harassed the public and seized whatever they could from the poor peasantry. When trained and disciplined by Malik 'Ambar, they proved a source of great help to the Nizam Shahis in the beginning, though in the end, they started carving out a kingdom of their own at the cost of the Deccan states.

Bijapur and Golconda, which had stopped helping the Nizam Shahis after the battle of Ashti in 1597, restarted giving assistance to Nizam Shah at the request of Malik 'Ambar, who had engendered a new spirit of resistance to Mughul expansionism. The Mughuls were experienced in the art of pitched battles, but their armies moved slowly because of their heavy artillery. Their enemies moved with light artillery and were superior in guerilla warfare.

When Khan Khanan heard of Jahangir's intention to continue the Deccan policy of Akbar, he requested confirmation of his existing appointment as Chief Commander of the Mughul armies in the Deccan. He offered to accept full responsibility for the success of the campaign within two years, provided he received reinforcement of 12,000 men and an additional amount of Rs. 1,000,000. The Emperor was pleased to grant the request. He raised Khan Khanan to the high rank of 7000, honoured him with a *khil'at*

and appointed him the leader of the army. Within a short time, both the demands of Khan Khanan were met and he left Agra on Sha'ban 14, 1017/December 24, 1608, at the head of 1,2,000 horse.[5]

Khan Khanan had to suffer heavily from the guerilla tactics of the Nizam Shahis. They allowed the imperialists to come deep into their country; cut off their communications and when they were about to retire, plundered the imperial camp and played havoc with the invaders. The imperial nobles started to accuse each other of incapacity to match the Deccanis. The Nizam Shahis encouraged by the disunity of the imperialists, captured the whole of Balaghat and many other imperial outposts.[6]

Pressed by the enemy, Khan Khanan appealed to the Emperor for more reinforcements. Jahangir realized that the presence of a royal prince might end the dissensions of the imperialists. He, therefore, recalled Parwez from the Mewar campaign, appointed him governor of the Mughul territories in the Deccan and sent him to Burhanpur. Asaf Khan was appointed guardian of the Prince. In order to strengthen the army, Jahangir despatched Amir-ul-Umara Sharif Khan, Raja Man Singh, Rana Rai Singh, Raja Jai Singh and other famous captains, in addition to one thousand *Ahadis.* Two million rupees were sanctioned to meet the expenses of the army.[7]

Parwez reached Burhanpur in March, 1610, but could do no better in the South. He was a youth of twenty years and was

5. Mu'tamad Khan, *Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri*, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1865, p. 34 ; Kamgar, f. 48b ; Jahangir, pp. 71, 73.
6. Kamgar, f. 51a ; Kambu, i, p. 59.
7. Jahangir, p. 74 ; Kambu, i, p. 160 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 36, 37; Kamgar, f. 51a ; For discussion on *Ahadi* see William Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 43-44. Irvine writes : The title of *Ahadi* was given, we are told, to the men serving singly "because they have the emperor for their immediate colonel". Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughul Empire*, Karachi, 1966, pp. 118-19, says that the *Ahadis* were employed individually and did not form part of any mansabdar's contingent.

prodigal and immoderate. The accounts of the contemporary Indian writers and that of Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador at the court of Jahangir, have depicted the way of life the Prince led in the South. He held a royal court in miniature and passed his days in merry-making.[8] The imperial soldiers followed their leader and became careless. The Nizam Shahis were well organized and disciplined and eager to strike hard at the Mughuls.

Moreover, the imperialists suffered from the inefficiency and treachery of Khan Khanan. Overestimating his strength, he advanced into the enemy country. The Nizam Shahis cut off their supplies and blocked all access to the imperial army. To add to the troubles of the Mughuls, it did not rain that year. Despite high prices, fodder and grain were not procurable and famine conditions prevailed, so much so that Parwez and his party hastened back to Burhanpur.[9]

The Nizam Shahis tightened their ring around the Mughuls and pursuaded Khan Khanan to accept a bribe. Khan Khanan tempted by the gold offered by the enemy, returned to Parwez. The retreat of Khan Khanan resulted in the loss of Ahmadnagar fort, which constituted a serious setback to the Mughul prestige. Khwaja Beg, the imperial commander, who depended on reinforcements from Khan Khanan, defended the fort for a while, but had to give in. On the guarantee of their lives and a free passage, the besieged surrendered the fort.[10] The enemy was encouraged and regained more than half of the territory, conquered by the Mughuls. Parwez and the other nobles accused Khan Khanan of treachery

8. Thomas Roe, *The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to India*, London, 1936, pp. 261-62.

9. Fuzuni, ff. 274-75 ; Jahangir, p. 86 ; Kamgar, f. 56 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 261-62.

10. Kamgar, f 56b ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 45 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 262 ; Jahangir, pp. 87-88 ; Kambu, i, p. 99.

and incapability. They charged him with being in league with Malik 'Ambar, from whom they said, he had received one third revenue of the enemy's country. Asaf Khan requested Jahangir to assume the command himself in the South.[11]

This discouraging news from the Deccan upset Jahangir, who for a while, contemplated taking the command himself, but was advised by a group of flatterers to send further reinforcements only. The Emperor held a council to review the situation. Khan Jahan Lodi suggested that instead of going himself, the Emperor should depute him to the South. Jahangir accepted this proposal.[12]

Khan Jahan Lodi left for the Deccan in October, 1610, with Fidai Khan, Narsingh Deo, Shuja'at Khan, Raja Bikramajit and Badi'uz-Zaman, son of Shah Rukh Mirza, commanding four to five thousand soldiers. Jahangir, anxious to retrieve Mughul prestige, sent Saif Khan Barha, Islam Ullah 'Arab, Haji Beg Uzbeg, officers of royal household, who commanded seven thousand horse to assist Khan Jahan Lodi. The imperial reinforcements thus sent numbered more than eleven thousand. Muhammadi Beg was made *Bakhshi* (i.e. pay master) and ten lakh rupees were granted for expenditure[13].

The decision to send Khan Jahan Lodi, an opponent of Khan Khanan to the South was not a wise one. The non-cooperation between the rival commanders resulted in worsening the Mughul cause. When Khan Khanan had not tolerated the supreme, though nominal command of Parwez in the past, how could he accept the presence of his opponent? Moreover Khan Jahan Lodi was an ambitious soldier and aspired to take the supreme command himself. The accusation of the imperialists against Khan Khanan

11. Jahangir, p. 77 ; Thomas Roe, pp. 242-43.
12. Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 38-39, Kambu, i, p. 60, Jahangir, p. 77.
13. Jahangir, p. 78 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 38 ; Kamgar, f. 51b ; Kambu, i, p. 60.

provided an opportunity for Khan Jahan Lodi to humiliate him in the eyes of the Emperor. He wrote a letter to the Emperor assuring him of Khan Khanan's treachery and incapacity to check the enemy's advance. Later, he wrote an application to the Emperor suggesting either his withdrawal or his appointment as the Chief Commander. He gave an undertaking that he would capture Qandahar, Ahmadnagar Bijapur and adjoining districts within two years provided an additional force of 30,000 horse was supplied to him. If he failed to achieve his goal, the Emperor could deprive him of his *mansab*.[14]

The accusations of his opponents worked effectively against Khan Khanan. Jahangir also felt that Khan Khanan had failed to fulfil his promise. He, therefore, accepted Khan Jahan Lodi's proposals. Because of the pre-occupations of the Mughuls in Mewar, the demanded reinforcement could not be despatched in full. However, a contingent of 10,000 horse and 2000 *Ahadis*, was sent under Khan 'Azam, who was given a dress of honour, a jewelled sword-belt and a horse. Five lakh rupees were sanctioned for the personal use of Khan 'Azam. Other great nobles who accompanied the army such as Faridun Khan Barlas, Khan 'Alam Yusaf Khan, and Baz Bahadur Qalmaq were also duly honoured. Three million rupees were granted for the army.[15] Mahabat Khan was ordered to accompany the reinforcements, investigate the causes of Mughal reverses and conduct Khan Khanan to the royal court. Khan Khanan was reprimanded by Jahangir and was deprived of his *mansab*.[16]

During this time a great change occurred in the politics of the Deccanis. Murtaza Nizam Shah, who was elevated to kingship through the efforts of Malik 'Ambar, turned against his benefactor.

14. Kamgar, f. 56b ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 45 ; Jahangir, p, 86 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 262.

15. Jahangir, pp. 88-89 ; Kamgar, f. 57a ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 46.

16. Kamgar, f. 57 ; Jahangir, p. 89.

'Adil Shah tried to patch up the differences between the two but did dot succeed. Malik 'Ambar saw an easy method to get rid of his opponent. He poisoned Murtaza in 1610, and declared Burhan, a prince of tender age, as the new Nizam Shah with the title of Burhan Shah III. As soon as Malik 'Ambar gained power, he captured some Bijapuri territory. Thus the relations between the two allies got strained. Had Jahangir been a shrewd diplomat like his father, he could have taken advantage of the disunity of the Deccanis, but he did not have great insight and so failed to exploit one enemy against the other. 'Adil Shah sent his envoy to Jahangir and assured him of his co-operation against the Nizam Shahis.[17] But the request of 'Adil Shah was neglected chiefly owing to the carelessness of the Emperor himself. The arrival of Khan Zaman in Deccember, 1610, in the Deccan did not bring much success to the imperialists. Their failure, after repeated attempts to capture more than a few *kos* of Balaghat, despite their large forces, resulted in the accusations of the commanders against each other. The Nizam Shahis took advantage of Mughul disunity and drove the imperialists back.

Another reason for the poor progress of the imperialists in the Deccan was that the Mughuls were pre-occupied elsewhere. Due to the inefficiency of the Mughul commanders the campaign of Mewar dragged on. It was, therefore, deemed advisable first to finish the campaign in the North and then to continue a more active policy in the Deccan. Badi'-uz-Zaman Khan, Khan 'Azam, Raja Nar Singh Dev and Muhammad Khan Niyazi were recalled from the Deccan and sent to Mewar under Prince Khurram.[18] Though the scheme succeeded in the long run, the imperialists suffered badly in the beginning. On the other hand, the Deccanis drove the Mughuls further back. [9]

17. Jahangir, p. 77-78, 114.
18. Kambu, i, p. 70 ; Kamgar, ff. 77, 78a.
19. Kambu, i, p. 70.

Unable to face the Mughul pressure, Rana Amar Singh of Mewar submitted in April, 1611. The imperialists were now in a better position to launch an offensive in the South. In order to make the offensive effective, some administrative changes were brought in the Deccan and its neighbouring provinces. Khwaja Abu'l Hasan was made governor of the imperial Deccan; Khan 'Azam was sent to Malwa and was replaced by 'Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang in Gujarat.[20]

The plan was to cripple the Nizam Shahis by attacking them at different strategic points, in order to force them to dissipate their efforts, divide their resources and thus make it possible for the Mughul forces, to destroy the enemy piecemeal. It was arranged that 'Abdullah Khan should advance with 14,000 horse against the enemy by the route of Nasik and Trimbak, while Khan Jahan Lodi, Amir-ul-Umara and Raja Man Singh were to march from Berar. Both the Mughul armies were ordered to be in contact with each other by making a pincer movement and surprise the enemy on an appointed day. Four lakh rupees were sanctioned for the army under 'Abdullah Khan, who was accompanied by such reputed captains as Raja Ram Das Kachwaha, Khan 'Alam, 'Ali Mardan and Zafar Khan.[21] Every possible assistance was provided to them to make the campaign successful but the jealousy and pride of the nobles rendered the Mughul success difficult.

Proud of his success in Mewar, 'Adbullah Khan overestimated his strength. In the hope of gaining all the credit for himself, he disregarded his instructions. Crossing the Ghats, he advanced towards Daulatabad. Malik'Ambar was not the man to miss this chance. He sent some contingents to check the advance of Raja Man Singh and Khan Jahan Lodi, while he himself marched to meet

20. Jahangir, p. 98.

21. Kamgar, f. 69a ; Jahangir, pp. 97-98, 107 ; Kambu, i, p. 60 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 58 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 273.

'Abdullah Khan. He withdrew toward Daulatabad and enticed the Mughuls into difficult hilly passes. Considering his advance as progress, 'Abdullah Khad left the Berar army behind.[22]

The Deccanis increased their numbers daily, cutt off the supplies of the imperialists, operated their light artillery from all sides and took a heavy toll of the enemy's force. When the Berar army came to know of 'Abdullah Khan's un-cooperative attitude, it discontinued sending any assistance to 'Abdullah Khan who was left alone to face the consequences. After realizing the tactical superiority of the enemy, 'Abdullah Khan decided to retreat to Burhanpur. The Deccanis followed the Mughuls closely, plundered their camp and inflicted crippling lossess on them.[23]

The daily attacks of the Nizam Shahis forced 'Abdullah Khan to change his plan to retreat. He entered the friendly border state of Baglana from where he reached Gujarat. During their retreat the imperialists lost many warriors including 'Ali Mardan and Zulfiqar Beg.[24] Hearing the news of 'Abdullah Khan's fate, Raja Man Singh and Khan Jahan Lodi went back to Parwez to 'Adilabad, in the neighbourhood of Burhanpur.[25] The plan of crushing the enemy failed miserably.

The news of the defeat of the imperial army caused concern at the royal court. Jahangir was much perturbed at the folly of 'Abdullah Khan and in a fit of anger, dismissed him from the governorship of Guajrat, which was given to Muqarrab Khan.[26] The Emperor was further annoyed because Khan Jahan Lodi had failed to fulfill his promise and could do no better than his

22. Kamgar, f. 69 ; Jahangir, pp. 107-08 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 274-76.
23. Kamgar, f. 69b.
24. Jahangir, p. 108 ; Kamgar, f. 69b ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 65-66 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 274-76.
25. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 66 ; Kamgar, f. 70a ; Jahangir, p. 108.
26. Khafi Khan, i, p. 286.

predecessors. Khan Jahan Lodi requested the Emperor to take the command of the Deccan army himself.[27] The critical situation demanded immediate action.

Actually the imperial government had failed to come to grips with the basic causes of Mughul failure in the South. Even the highly reputed commanders could not force the enemy into submission. The Deccanis had shown that they could inflict severe losses on the Mughul forces despite their large numbers. Malik 'Ambar offered his people new hope by his courageous and inspired leadership. To expect good results from the Mughul nobility comprising dissident groups was in fact a great folly on the part of the Emperor. The presence of a supreme commander in the South was an absolute necessity, to force the nobles to operate within the scope of the plan. But there was no one to watch the activities of the nobles, who despite the royal instructions, felt themselves free to act accordingly to their own whims. Hence an ambitious commander like 'Abdullah Khan aspired to take the lead in crushing the enemy. Earlier, Khan Jahan Lodi had promised to capture Qandahar, Ahmadnagar and Bijapur but he had failed to extend the imperial frontier. The Emperor did not deprive Khan Jahan Lodi of his rank as was proper. In fact, Jahangir never tried seriously to make an appraisal of events in the Deccan, and the deluded nobles consoled themselves with the comfortable feeling that the war would turn in their favour and the enemy would wither away.

The Deccanis had proved repeatedly that they were superior to their opponents in jungle warfare. The question arises, why were the Mughul soldiers not given training in guerilla tactics before sending them to the South? The reply lies in the organization of the Mughul army. Since there were no guerilla regiments in the army, no attempt was even made to create such units. Tradition

27. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 73.

ruled the military practices in the imperial forces and nobody was prepared to make any kind of departure.

If the nobility had failed in bringing any glory to the Mughul cause in the South, the Emperor himself cannot be exonerated from bringing about the defeat. His failure to take the command personally, when he was requested repeatedly by the imperial commanders, may be ascribed to two reasons. He had no military success to his credit. He had been sent against Rana of Mewar in 1600 but instead of accomplishing his task he had rebelled against his father. This realization of his inefficient generalship made Jahangir hesitate to take the command in person. Secondly, he seemed to have preferred indolence to administrative activity. A true picture of his private life since his princehood would show that he was not much interested in the affairs of the government. As a prince he had married twenty times and the number of his wives went on increasing even after he became king.[28]

Jahangir started taking wine regularly at the age of fifteen, though he had already tasted it in his childhood. He writes in his *Tuzuk* :

> "I had not taken wine until I was fifteen, except on two or three occasions during my childhood when my mother and nurses gave it to me as a medicine. They asked my respected father for some '*araq* (spirit) to cure other children and a *tola* of it mixed with rosewater and plain water was given to me as a medicine to cure my cough. When the army of my revered father had encamped at the fort of Attock lying on the bank of river Nilab (Indus), to suppress the rebellion of Yusufzai Afghans, I one day set out for hunting. As I had exerted myself much,

28. Beni Prasad, *History of Jahangir*, Madras, 1922, pp. 30-31.

signs of fatigue appeared. Ustad Shah Quli, who had been a renowned *topchi* (gunner) of my revered paternal uncle, Mirza Muhammad Hakim, told me that if I would take a cup of wine, it would relieve me of weariness and fatigue. As I was young at that time and inclined to do such things, I ordered Mahmud, the *abdar* (incharge of the supply of beverages) to go to the house of Hakim 'Ali and bring *sharbat-i-kaifnak* (i,e. wine). Hakim 'Ali sent me one and a half cup of yellow-wine of delicious taste in a small bottle. I drank that and was pleased with it. After that I started drinking and increased its quantity daily so much so that *Sharaab* (wine) made from grapes no longer intoxicated me and I began drinking *'araq*. Gradually during the period of nine years, I began to take twenty cups of *'araq-i-do-atisha* (doubly distilled spirits) daily—fourteen cups during day time and the remaining at night. The wine weighed six Hindustani *sers* or one and a half Irani *man*. In those days my daily diet consisted of one chicken with bread and radish. There was nobody, who could remonstrate me and matters went to such an extent that during the state of intoxication, I could not drink myself from my own cup owing to excessive intemperance and trembling of my hand but others had to help me to drink from my cup. I then sent for Hakim Husain, brother of Hakim Abu'l Fath, who had been a companion of my respected father and informed him of the state of affairs. Through great sincerity and sympathy, he said to

me without any reservation, 'O Lord of the Universe, if you continue drinking *'araq* at the same rate for another six months, God forbid, the matter will come to such a pass that it would become incurable. As his counsel was based on his well-wishing and sweet life is dear to me, his advice had effect on me. From that day onwards, I began decreasing the quantity of wine and started taking *filuniya.** As I lessened the quanity of wine, so I increased the quantity of *filuniya.* I ordered that *'araq* should be mixed with wine of grapes. in the proportion of two parts wine and one part *'araq.* Decreasing the quantity of liquor by degrees, in a period of seven years, I have set for myself (from twenty to) six cups daily. Each cup weighs eighteen and a quarter *misqals** of liquor. I have been drinking wine at the present rate for the last fifteen years, neither less nor more.

I take wine at night except on Thursday nights, when I take in the late afternoon instead of at night, for two reasons. First, Thursday is the day of my accession and secondly, Thursday night is the most sacred night of the week as it precedes blessed Friday. It does not look proper that instead of paying thanks to the real Giver of all gifts (i.e. God), I should spend the Thursday night in negligence. I do not take

* Filuniya is 'a sedative electuary', an antidote or drug invented by Philon of Tarsus Philon lived in or before the 1st century after Christ. Filuniya is also often used apparently as a synonym for opium.—Alexander Rogers, *Memoirs of Jahangir*, London, 1909, i, pp. 308-09 (foot-notes).

* One *misqal* is roughly equal to 86 grains in weight.

meat on Thursdays and Sundays—Thursday being the day of my accession to the throne and Monday is birthday of my respected father. He had great regard for this day (i.e. Monday). After sometime I started taking opium in place of *filuniya*. Now when my age is forty-six solar years and four months, forty-seven lunar years and nine months, I take eight **surkhs* of opium when five ϕ*gahris* of the day have passed and six *surkhs* when one *pahar* (watch) of the night has passed."[29]

Though Jahangir very plainly gives such details in his *Tuzuk*, yet it was not a matter of pride for a king.

The evil associates of the Emperor, who had induced him to rebel against his father and kill the dearest friend of Akbar, dominated him after his accession. This group had a profound influence over the Emperor, who gave them high *mansabs*. He suffered all through his life from lack of resolution and drive and was always ready to submit to the advice of others. He never tried to initiate a policy himself or to think of the problems deeply. In an autocratic rule, if a king who is the fountain-head of authority shows weakness, ambitious elements seize power and the empire crumbles. This was exactly the case with Jahangir. The nobles were sure that the Emperor would never take the field himself, and so worked against each other out of lust of power and weakened the foundations of the Mughul Empire.

A council of war was held to review the situation and explore means to retrieve the imperial prestige in the South. On the suggestion of Khwaja Abu'l Hasan, Khan Khanan was re-appointed to supreme command in the Deccan as he was considered, the fittest person for the job.[30] Khan Khanan was summoned to Agra, pro-

* 1 *surkh*=Formerly 6 now 7¼ rice-grains.

ϕ 1 *garhi* or *gari*=22 minutes and 30 seconds.

29. Jahangir, pp. 150-51.

30. Jahangir, p. 108; Kamgar, f. 70a.

moted to the rank of 6000 *Zat* and rewarded with a *khil'at*. His sons—Shah Nawaz Khan and Darab Khan—were raised to the ranks of 3000 and 2000 *Zat* respectively and given jewelled daggers and 'Iraqi horses. His youngest son Rahman Dad was also honoured.[31] In order to bring full harmony to the imperial camp, Jahangir sent Mahabat Khan to bring back Khan Jahan Lodi. Khwaja Abu'l Hasan conducted Khan Khanan to the South.[32]

Khan Khanan set out for the Deccan on May 5, 1612, in the company of five hundred experienced captains.[33] Most of the rivals of Khan Khanan were either removed from the theatre of war or died before his arrival in the South. *Amir-ul-Umara* Sharif Khan had died on April 15, 1612, in Nihalpur; Asaf Khan Jaffar Beg breathed his last at Burhanpur and Khan A'zam was sent to Mewar.[34] To add to Khan Khanan's good fortune, the Deccanis were worn out by their own dynastic disputes. After defeating the Mughuls, Malik 'Ambar had advanced to seize Bijapuri territory. 'Adil Shah had turned against him and allied himself with the Mughuls.[35] Nature could afford no better opportunity to Khan Khanan for his success. Later events will show that despite all assistance in money and men, Khan Khanan failed to make any definite progress.

In order to keep the means of communication uninterrupted during the war, Khan Khanan guarded Balapur and Burhanpur. He also strengthened the Berar frontier lest the enemy create disturbances during his absence from headquarters. He then busied himself in enticing the Nizam Shahis. Shah Nawaz Khan, the imperial commander won over Yaqut Khan, Adam Khan and some of the influential leaders of the Marathas, who were the backbone of the

31. Jahangir, p. 108.
52. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 73.
33. Jahangir, p. 108 ; Kamgar, f. 70.
34. Jahangir, pp. 113-114.
35. Ibid., p. 141.

resistance in the Deccan. They included Babu Jiu, Dadu Rai and many others. To induce others, the deserters were honoured and given high ranks in the Mughul army.[36]

The weak position of Malik 'Ambar forced him to conciliate 'Adil Shah to whom he appealed for immediate help and begged for forgiveness. He made a defensive and offensive pact both with Bijapur and Golconda and strengthened his position.[37] He himself assumed the command of the confederate forces, which numbered more than 10,000.[38] A fierce battle ensued and the imperialists hurled a blistering fusilads of fire into the enemy camp. Darab Khan, the leader of the imperial vanguard and other officers such as Raja Nar Singh Dev, Jahangir Quli Beg Turkman, 'Ali Khan Niyazi and and Rai Chand displayed their valour. Thousands of the Deccanis died in the battle and Malik 'Ambar could save his life but with great difficulty. The booty that fell to the victorious army, included quantities of fire arms, war elephants and three hundred camels loaded with ammunition. A large number of enemy troops was taken as prisoner.[39] On the following day, the imperialists set out for Khirki, the capital of the Nizam Shahis. They demolished buildings and set the town on fire. Malik 'Ambar was forced to submit and he promised to pay an annual *peshkesh* of twelve lakh *huns* to the Mughul Emperor. Khan Khanan returned to Burhanpur, after a stay of three days at Khirki. The Emperor appreciated the services of his commanders and rewarded them accordingly.[40]

Hostilities had stopped temporarily but the Mughuls took it as permanent peace. Sincerity and devotion were laking on both

36. Kamgar, f. 92b ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 84-85.
37. Kamgar, f. 93a.
38. Fuzuni, f. 278 ; Kamgar, f. 93b ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 85 ; Jahangir, pp. 153-54.
39. Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 86-87 ; Jahangir, p. 154 ; Kamgar, ff. 93b ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 248-285 ; Fuzuni, f. 279b.
40. Kamgar, f. 94a ; Jahangir, p. 154.

sides. The Mughuls agreed to the proposals to avoid rainy season while the Deccanis were exhausted and wanted a respite for sometime.

SECOND PHASE

Jahangir was married to Mehr-un-Nisa later known as Nur Jahan, in May, 1611. This Persian lady endowed with charm and intelligence, was destined to make a name in Mughul history. Her grandfather Khwaja Muhammad Sharif had held the post of *wazir*, first of Khurasan and later of Yazd under Shah Tahmasap of Iran. After his death in 1577, his family suffered an eclipse. Straitened in means, Nur Jahan's parents left their native land, in search of better prospects eleswhere. Mirza Ghiyas at last found a patron in Akbar, who enrolled him in the imperial services. By dint of sheer hardwork, he rose steadily to high rank under Akbar and Jahangir.

Nur Jahan, the most beloved wife of Jahangir, took full opportunity of her influence over the Emperor. Jahangir was fascinated by her exquisite beauty, eloquence and intelligence. Her name also appeared on coins and was included in *khutba.* Her dominating role in the political history of this period affected the Mughul-Deccan relations seriously. The Emperor's unreserved devotion to his wife and trust in her judgement, made him less conscious of the country's administrative problems and it can safely be said that Jahangir reigned while Nur Jahan ruled. She was not alone in her efforts to achieve this political ascendency. She was assisted by I'timad-ud-daulah, her father, Asif Khan, her brother and Prince Khurram, afterwards known as Shah Jahan. This group of four persons is variously known as 'Nur Jahan's junta', 'Nur Jahan's clique' or Nur Jahan's party', in Indian history. The prosperity of the Empire under Jahangir depended on the co-operation and unity among the members of this group, and history witnessed that after the break-up of the junta, the country suffered greatly. The Deccan problem, was exploited by the group to serve its purpose.

Prince Khurram, the third son of Jahangir was selected by Nur Jahan as a candidate of the junta to the Mughul throne. Insubordination or incompetency was proved against other sons of the Emperor. Khusrau's rebellion and Parwez's failure in bringing any success in the Deccan were sufficient proofs to impress upon the Emperor that the choice of Nur Jahan was the best and wisest. However, the rival group consisting of the older nobility—Mahabat Khan, Khan A'zam and Khan Khanan supported Khusrau.

The failure of Khan Khanan in maintaining a permanent peace in the Deccan, afforded an excuse for the junta to push forward the claim of their candidate, and those nobles who were loyal to this group and were serving in the Deccan, thwarted Khan Khanan's plans. The imperial camp, therefore, once more became an arena of mutual disputes of nobility. Meanwhile the Nizam Shahis quietly busied themselves in strengthening their position and lulled the Mughuls into a false sense of security. Secondly, the Portuguese also offered Malik 'Ambar and 'Adil Shah their support against the Mughuls. In 1615, therefore, Malik 'Ambar attacked the Mughuls and forced them to retire from their advanced posts of Balaghat and Ahmadnagar. The desertion in the Mughul camp by some opponents of Khan Khanan weakened the imperial resistance. This gave an opportunity to the junta to fulfil their secret plan. It was, therefore, suggested to the Emperor that both Khan Khanan and Parwez had failed to exact the definite submission of the Nizam Shahis and a change in the command of the Deccan army was necessary to retrieve the Mughul prestige. Khurram was suggested as the leader of the Mughul forces in the South.[41] Jahangir, who was completely under the influence of the junta, agreed to the proposal. Parwez was recalled from the Deccan and posted to Allahabad.

41. Kamgar, ff. 97b ; 98a ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 91 ; Kamtu, i, pp. 100-01 ; Thomas Roe ; pp. 242-43.

Successfully carrying out their plan, the junta now busied themselves in preparations for the Deccan campaign. Khurram, whom Jahangir called *Baba Khurram* was given unprecedented title of Shah, an honour of unique distinction, which no Timurid prince had enjoyed before. He was raised to the high *mansab* of 20,000 *zat* and 10,000 *sawari-do-aspah* and *sih-aspah*. He was also given a *khil'at* whose border and collar were studded with rubies, an 'Iraqi horse with jewelled saddle, a Turkish horse, an elephant named *Bansi-badan*, an English style charriot-carriage, a jewelled sword and a dagger. Later, a *nadri* was also sent to the Prince as a good omen. Jahangir ordered that in future the Prince should be addressed and referred to as Shah Sultan Khurram.[42] By conferring the title of Shah on Khurram, Jahangir most probably wanted to convey an impression to his rival Safawi ruler of Iran, who bore the title of Shah, that a Mughul Emperor was superior and powerful enough to bestow that title on men, who served under him. In the light of the Mughul-Safawi relations, such a possibility should not be dismissed.

The officers in the train of Shah Khurram were also honoured. Khwaja Qasim Qilij Khan was appointed *'Arz-mukarrar*, Mu'tamad Khan, the author of *Iqbal Namah-i-Jahangiri* was raised to the rank of 1000 *zat* and 250 *sawar* and made *Bakhshi* of the Deccan army. On the recommendation of the Prince, 'Abdullah Khan Firuz Jang was pardoned by the Emperor and deputed to accompany the army. Dayanat Khan and many other nobles were likewise honoured. On November 4, 1616, Khurram's army left Ajmer for the Deccan and the Prince himself marched in the following month at the head of 40,000 soldiers.[43]

42. Jahangir, p. 167 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 90 ; Kamgar, f. 98a. Kambu, i, pp. 100-01.

43. Jahangir, p. 167 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 91 ; Kamgar, f. 98 ; Thomas Roe pp. 281-82, 340.

Jahangir records his intentions in these words, "After sending Khurram in advance, I intend to go myself to the Deccan to finish the campaign, the termination of which has been delayed for many reasons."[44] But the Emperor does not explain those reasons. However, he seemed to have been satisfied by going to Mandu to watch the operations from close quarters. His encamping at Mandu was probably intended to hasten the speed of the imperial army, to bring unity of purpose in the Mughul camp, and to impress the enemy of the serious view taken by him (the Emperor) and to frighten her to surrender. As the news about the true state of affairs was not reaching the imperial court, the Emperor ordered that news of the Deccan should be presented in future only through Khurram and ambassadors of the Deccan states had to obtain permission from the Prince to see the Emperor. The royal camp moved so slowly that the Emperor covered a distance of one hundred and fifty-nine miles, from Ajmer to Mandu, in more than four months and reached Mandu on March 14, 1617.[45] Jahangir intended to go himself to the theatre of war, but halted at Mandu at the request of Khurram, probably because the Prince wanted to work independently and take credit for any success and thus press his claim to the throne over his rivals.

The arrival of Khurram at Burhanpur on March 14, 1617,[46] at the head of a large army frightened the enemy. The Prince wanted to avoid any armed conflict and preferred to bring about peace by negotiations, if possible. He sent Afzal Khan and Rai Rayan to 'Adil Shah while Mu'tamad Khan and Rai Jadu Das were despatched to Qutb Shah. Both the rulers were urged to persuade Malik 'Ambar to surrender the imperial territory and tribute was demanded from all the three states.[47]

44. Jahangir, p. 164.
45. Ibid., p. 182.
46. Kambu, i, p. 103 ; Kamgar, f. 103a.
47. Kamgar, f. 103a ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 99 ; Kambu, i, p. 102 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 290-91.

Khurram's plan worked out effectively. Ibrahim 'Adil Shah advanced five *krohs* to receive the imperial envoys and performed *salam-o-zaminbosi* in absentia to the Emperor. Similarly, Qutb Shah accorded a warm welcome to the Mughul ambassadors and expressed his submission.[48]

The Deccani rulers had wisely judged the change in the political situation at the Mughul court. The presence of the Emperor near the theatre of war had infused a new spirit of co-operation and vigour among the Mughul soldiers. The imperialists, who had been divided by mutual bickerings, now stood united under the command of Khurram, who had earned his fame as a military commander in Mewar. Moreover, the spirit of collective defence by which the Deccanis were united in the past was dying out slowly. Bijapur, the most powerful of the states had taken a hostile attitude toward Ahmadnagar because of the aggressive designs of Nizam Shah and was now inclined towards the Mughuls. Qutb Shah, though secretly helping Malik 'Ambar was too weak to oppose the Mughuls openly. The Nizam Shahis were also exhausted and their resources were weakened. Any more resistance without their allies would have proved fatal for the Nizam Shahi dynasty.

Apprehending danger to himself, 'Adil Shah sumbitted to Khurram and assured him of the return of the imperial territory and the payment of the demanded tribute. In order to make Malik 'Ambar realize the seriousness of the situation, 'Adil Shah sent his envoy to induce him to submit to the imperial terms. Malik 'Ambar also visualized that any further resistance might result in the annihilation of the Nizam Shahi dynasty.[49] He, therefore, submitted and surrendered Balaghat and the fort of Ahmadnagar to the Mughuls.

48. Kambu, i, p. 104 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 99. Kamgar, f. 105b.

49. Kambu, i, pp. 104-05 ; Jahangir, p. 182 ; Kamgar, f. 105b ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 290-91.

Rai Rayan, the imperial envoy at Bijapur, took over charge of the ceded territory.[50]

With the arrival of the envoys of 'Adil Shah, Qutb Shah and Nizam Shah at Burhanpur, Khurram despatched Sayyid 'Abdullah Barha to inform his father of his success.[51] The messenger was first received by Nur Jahan who conveyed the news to the Emperor. Jahangir was much pleased with his wife and gave her the *parganah* of Todah (Bodah?) yielding two lakh rupees annually, as a reward for conveying the good news. Sayyid 'Abdullah was given the title of Saif Khan and a robe of honour. A unique Badakhshani diamond worth Rs. 30,000 was sent to Khurram as a token of love.[52]

The efforts of Ibrahim 'Adil Shah in bringing about peace resulted in closer relations between him and the Mughul Emperor. 'Adil Shah sent his envoys to Khurram in the company of the imperial ambassadors, Afzal Khan and Rai Rayan to each of whom he gave two lakh rupees.[53] Khurram was impressed by 'Adil Shah's sincerity and recommended to the Emperor that 'Adil Shah be honoured with the title of *Farzand*. Jahangir accepted the request and ordered the following couplet to be written and sent to 'Adil Shah.

شدی از التماس شاه خرم
بفرزندیِ ما مشهور عالم[54]

i.e. at the request of Shah Khurram, you have won renown in the world as my son.

Proper administration of the ceded territories was necessary before Khurram could leave the Deccan. He appointed Khan

50. Kamgar, f. 106; Kambu, i, pp. 105-06.
51. Kambu, i, pp. 105-06.
52. Jahangir, p. 189, Kambu, i, p. 105; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 100-01.
53. Kamgar, f. 106a.
54. Jahangir p. 192, Muhammad Hadi entitled Kamwar Khan, *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chughta*, i, B.M. Add. 25787, f. 379b; Muhammad Sadiq Khan, *Tawarikh-i-Shah Jahani*, B.M. or. 174, ff. 203-04; Kamgar, f. 106a.

Khanan as *subahdar* of Khandesh, Berar and Ahmadnagar. Shah Nawaz Khan was appointed to the government of Balaghat and 12,000 soldiers were placed under him. Khanjar Khan entitled Sipahdar Khan was deputed to the command of Jalnapur. Similarly, in every *sarkar* and big town suitable persons were appointed and normal administration restored. The Prince left 30,000 cavarly and 7000 musketeers under the charge of different commanders for the general defence of the imperial territories in the Deccan[55] After reorganizing the occupied territory, Khurram proceeded with 25,000 *sawar* and 2,000 gunners toward Mandu where he arrived on Shawwal 11, 1026/October 12, 1617.[56]

The success of Khurram was exaggerated by the junta as a great feat of generalship. Khurram was given a warm reception. After the performance of *kornish* and *zaminbosi* by the Prince, the Emperor called him from the *jharoka*, embraced him and permitted him to sit beside him. Khurram presented 1000 gold *mohars* and 1000 rupees as *nazar* and an equal amount was showered over the Emperor. Regarding the honours conferred on Khurram, the Emperor writes :

"I raised Khurram to the *mansab* of 20,000 *zat* and 10,000 *sawar* as a reward for his success over the Rana (of Mewar). Before his departure for the conquest of the Deccan he received the lofty title of Shah. Now was a reward due for his distinguished services in the conquest of the Deccan. I raised him to the rank of 30,000 *zat* and 20,000 *sawar* and gave him the title of Shah Jahan. I ordered that a chair be placed near my throne for my son. This is a special favour which was never practised in my family before."[57] Besides these honours, Khurram was given a special *khil'at* and a gold-embroidered *charqab* worth Rs. 50,000, a jewelled sword along with a jewell-

55. Kambu, i, pp. 106, 109 ; Kamgar, f. 107 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 292-93.

56. Jahangir, p. 194 ; Thomas Roe, pp. 385-86, Kambu, i, p 110.

37. Jahangir, p. 195.

ed belt and a jewelled dagger.[58] Later, on *Shawwal* 27, 1027/October 28, 1617, Nur Jahan gave a feast of victory for Shah Jahan. She honoured him with a costly *khil'at*, a *nadari* decorated with unique pearls, a *sarpech* (worn on turban) studded with rubies, a jewelled turban, a dagger, a chain, of pearls, two horses and three elephants. The gifts conferred by Nur Jahan were valued at three lakh rupees.[59]

The imperial commanders of the Deccan army also offered gifts to the Emperor. Khan Jahan Lodi presented 1000 gold *mohars*, 1000 rupees as *nazar* and a box full of diamonds. The Emperor accepted gifts worth Rs. 24,000 and a diamond reckoned at one lakh rupees. Similarly, 'Abdullah Khan also presented his offering to the Emperor. Alarmed by the imperial court at Mandu, Raja Partap, the ruler of Baglana, a state lying between Khandesh and Gujarat, presented himself with gifts before the Mughul Emperor. Earlier, he had sent eleven elephants to Shah Jahan at Burhanpur. Jahangir was pleased at the submissive attitude of the Raja and gave him some gifts. They included a jewelled sword, an elephant, a horse, a *khil'at* and three diamond rings. The Emperor rewarded his commanders with an increase in their *mansabs*. Uda Ram was promoted to 3000 *zat* and 1000 *sawar*. Shahbaz Khan was granted a *mansab* of 2000 *zat* and appointed *faujdar* of Sarangpur, Malwa. Similarly, Khan Jahan Lodi, Mahabat Khan, 'Abdullah Khan, Shuja'at Khan, Raja Baha Singh, Darab Khan and Mu'tamad Khan Bakhshi were given valuable gifts.[59] Rai Rayan, who conducted the peace terms was entitled Raja Bikaramajit.[60]

Shah Jahan was eager to impress the whole Empire by the offerings made by the Deccanis. The gifts included Sarnak, an

58. Kambu, i, p. 111 ; Jahangir, p. 195 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 104 ; Kamgar, ff. 107, 108a.

59. Jahangir, p. 196 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 105, Kamgar, f. 109a.

59. Kamgar, ff. 107b, 108a ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 103 ; Jahangir, pp. 195; 199.

60. Jahangir, p. 199.

elephant offered by 'Adil Shah and valued at Rs. 1,25,000. The elephant appealed to the Emperor so much that he changed his name to Nur Bakht and reserved it for his own use.[61]

Aban 10, 1026/October 14, 1617, was the day of the greatest rejoicings, when the public hall of the royal palace of Mandu dazzled the spectators by the glitter of gold offered by the Deccanis. The offerings which could not be shown on the previous occasion were displayed on that day. Jahangir was so impressed that he came down from the *Jharoka* to have a closer look at the offerings. Among the gifts of 'Adil Shah were a diamond bought for Shah Jahan from the port of Koda for two lakh rupees, nineteen *tanks** *in* weight, a sapphire weighing six *tanks* and seven *surkhs* which was valued at one lakh rupees, a diamond called *jamkora* worth Rs. 40,000, a ruby and two pearls of the values of Rs. 37,000. Famous elephants namely, Mahupat (afterwards named Darjansal) and Bakht Buland, included in the gifts, were valued at one lakh rupees each. The offerings of Qutb Shah included a diamond worth Rs. 30,000 and two renowned elephants namely, Quddus Khan and Imam Riza, each valued at rupees one lakh. Similarly, Nizam Shah also sent gifts of great value. To Nur Jahan, Shah Jahan presented gifts worth two lakh rupees while his other step-mothers were also given gifts of sixty thousand rupees.[62]

There were one hundred and fifty elephants with gold and silver trappings and one hundred 'Arab and 'Iraqi horses, three of them with jewelled saddles.[63] Altogether the offerings were valued at Rupees 2,260,000.[64] Jahangir was full of praise for Shah Jahan. He writes in his *Tuzuk* : "Such invaluable *peshkesh* was never presented to any ruler of this dynasty before. Since that day, I have

61. Kambu, i, pp. 111-12 ; Jahangir, p. 198.

* 1 *tank*=about two ounces.

62. Kambu, i, pp. 112-13 ; Jahangir, p. 198 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 293-94.

63. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 105 ; Kambu, i, pp. 112-13 : Kamgar, ff. 108-109a ; Jahangir, p. 198.

64. Jahangir, p. 198.

shown special favour to Khurram, who of all my sons really deserves my sympathy and kindness. I am satisfied and happy with him. May he enjoy a long life and attain sovereignty."[65]

The rejoicings celebrated on Shah Jahan's success were merely vain-glorious. He had conquered no new territory and had in no way extended the limits of the Mughul Empire in the South. Regaining of the lost territory including Ahmadnagar, captured by Akbar as early as 1601, cannot be regarded as new conquest—a term which has often been used by the Emperor and contemporary chroniclers. Shah Jahan could be given credit only for retrieving the Mughul position temporarily in the South. He failed to bring about permanent peace. This entire show of success was a double deception. Shah Jahan and his supporters deceived Jahangir by their analysis of the alleged victory in the South. The Emperor did not care to go to the troubled area personally to frighten the enemy into complete submission. The jewels and gold offered by the Deccanis checked the advance of the Mughuls. 'Adil Shah succeeded diplomatically in keeping the Nizam Shahis alive and at the same time enhanced his own prestige in the eyes of the Emperor. He thus attained the position of leadership of the Deccan sultanates and could speak on their behalf.

Selfish interests seemed to have been preferred to the country's cause. The continued inability to reverse the deteriorating situation in the Deccan during the preceding years finally gave the junta and its syncophants the opportunity to promote their own candidate. The objective of the Nur Jahan group was not the conquest of the Deccan but to impress upon the Emperor that Shah Jahan, the then most beloved son of Jahangir, was an unrivalled general and thus the most suitable candidate for the Mughul throne.

The most unfortunate phenomenon of Mughul history was that in the absence of any law of succession, every prince attempted

65. Ibid., p. 198.

to win the throne. Each rival party tried to minimize the influence of the other. The supporters of each group exerted their best efforts to gain the confidence of the Emperor. Only a strong ruler could enforce his own views and refuse to be dictated to by any party. Jahangir lacked that determination and initiative. The royal court was an arena of intrigues. Nur Jahan had gained tremendous influence over her husband. The temporary submission by the Deccanis was propagated by her party as a victory which could not be achieved by any other Mughul prince or noble. Shah Jahan's elevation to an unprecedented *mansab* and to the title of Shah which no Mughul prince had enjoyed so far, was in fact the result of the working of Nur Jahan's mind. The study of *Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri* shows that the Emperor was fully convinced by the case advanced by the junta and he desired that Shah Jahan should succeed him. Had the conquest of the Deccan been Shah Jahan's real objective, he would have conquered the entire Ahmadnagar kingdom without much resistance. The Deccanis were completely exhausted, their resources limited and their power crippled. Actually Mughul politics saved the Nizam Shahi dynasty from extinction. Shah Jahan seemed to have preferred a diplomatic victory over the Deccanis than facing them in the battlefield. He would not risk a guerilla war of which he had little experience. The object of the junta once achieved, the Prince thought it unwise to stay any longer in the South. Selfish interests overcame the dynastic cause. The task of conquering Nizam Shahi kingdom was left incomplete by Prince Shah Jahan, to be completed by him as emperor after a period of nineteen years.

To show royal favour to 'Adil Shah, Jahangir gave *khil'ats* and valuable gifts to Sayyid Kabir and Bakhtawar Khan, the Bijapuri envoys on their departure.[66] The Emperor also sent his portrait to 'Adil Shah. Jahangir permitted, 'Adil Shah to capture as much of Nizam Shahi and Qutb Shahi territories as he could and

66. Jahangir, p. 197.

ordered Shah Nawaz Khan, the imperial commander, to assist Bijapur if his help was needed. The Emperor acknowledged 'Adil Shah as leader among the Deccan kingdoms. He wrote the following quatrain on his portrait in his own hand and sent it to Bijapur :

اے سوئے تو دائم نظر رحمت ما

آسوده نشین بسایهٔ دولت ما

سوئے تو شبیه خویش کردیم روان

تا معنیٔ ما به بینی از صورت ما[67]

i.e. My blessings are always with you; feel happy under the shadow of my sovereignty. To enable you to see my inner feeling (about you), I have sent you my portrait.

Malik 'Ambar proved himself a better diplomat than the Mughul Emperor. He had bowed before the might of the Mughul storm to let it pass. He, in fact, wanted to gain time to strengthen his position. The peace lasted only for three years and during this period, the Nizam Shahis were busy in bringing their forces together. Malik 'Ambar made strong appeals to 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah for help and warned them of the consequences of the extinction of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Persistence and persuasion through matrimonial relations finally prevailed over 'Adil Shah and he changed his policy. The appeals worked effectively and a confederacy of the three Deccan States once again was formed. The Nizam Shahi *Peshwa* was thus able to muster an army of 60,000 soldiers.

The presence of Jahangir and Shah Jahan in Kashmir in 1619 and their subsequent engagement in the conquest of Kangra of which the Emperor seemed to be proud, encouraged the Deccanis to drive away the Mughuls from their land. Malik 'Ambar advanced in 1620 toward Ahmadnagar. Khanjar Khan, the imperial commander, twice attempted to check the enemy's advance but had

67. Ibid., p. 244.

68. Kamgar, f. 140b ; Kambu, i, p. 135, puts the number at 50,000.

to take refuge in the fort.[69] The enemy seized some area around Ahmadnagar and Berar and started collecting revenue. Unable to face the enemy, Khan Khanan, who had recently been promoted to 7000 *zat-o-sawar*, appealed for reinforcements. A grant of twenty lakh rupees was immediately sanctioned.[70] The enemy captured Makhar. Pressed hard, the Mughuls decided to retreat from Rohingar to Balaghat and intended to wait there till the arrival of imperial reinforcements. As soon as the imperialists retreated, the Deccanis cut off their line of communication and caused heavy loss to the enemy. The imperialists were obliged to change their plan of retreat and encamped at Balapur where they had to stay for four months. Scarcity of food worsened the position, and hundreds of animals died of hunger. Within a period of six months, the Deccanis captured a large portion of Khandesh, Berar and Ahmadnagar.[71]

The growing attacks of the Deccanis forced the Mughuls to retire to Burhanpur, which ultimately was besieged by the former. The siege was so tight that the Mughuls dared not go out of the fort for collection of revenue which fell to the lot of the besiegers.[72] The Deccanis crossed the Narbada in a body of eight thousand and looted the Mughul town of Akbarpur. They advanced as far as Mandu and harassed its population. The timely arrival of the reinforcements saved the imperial situation, otherwise the fort would have fallen to the enemy. Jahangir complains in his *Tuzuk* of the treachery of the Deccanis in advancing into Mughul territory.[73]

A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF COURT POLITICS

The declining health of Jahangir and court politics were the main causes of imperial reverses in the South. Excessive drinking had a frightful effect on the Emperor's health for the last

69. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 160 ; Kamgar, f. 135.
70. Jahangir, p. 305.
71. Jahangir, p. 322 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 160-61 ; Kambu, i, pp. 133-36 ; Kamgar ff. 140b-141a.
72. Kamgar, f. 141a ; Jahangir, p. 322.
73. Jahangir, p. 322.

three years. Congestion of blood resulted in serious eye trouble and the general condition deteriorated to the extent that in 1621, he stopped writing his *Tuzuk* and the task was entrusted to M'utamad Khan. Nur Jahan wielded more and more power. Shah Jahan, whom Nur Jahan had pushed forward as her nominee to the Mughul throne, turned out to be more shrewd than her expectations. She wanted the new king to acknowledge that he owed his sovereignty to her and in return for her assistance, she expected to enjoy the same power and prestige as she had enjoyed during Jahangir's life. She, therefore, turned towards Khusrau and attempted to reconcile with him on the condition that he would marry her only daughter Ladli Begum from her earlier marriage with Sher Afghan. Khusrau foresaw the impending danger and refused to serve as a sacrificial lamb.[74] The ill-fated Prince was, therefore, put to inhuman torture but he stood firm in his decision. Nur Jahan then found a puppet in the person of Shahriyar, son of Jahangir from a concubine, to fulfil her desire. Shahriyar, who could never think of a better opportunity to succeed his father, immediately agreed to her proposal. With the formal consent of the Emperor, Ladli Begum was married in April 1621, to Shahriyar, who now emerged as Nur Jahan's candidate to contest the impending war of succession. As to why was Parwez, another son of Jahangir from a wedded wife, ignored by Nur Jahan, the contemporary histories are silent. Probably due to excessive drinking habits and his negligence towards the country's affairs, Parwez did not fit in with Nur Jahan's strategy. She wanted to keep him in reserve for some other move and later events confirm that supposition.

Nur Jahan's unreserved support for Shahriyar resulted in the break-up of the junta, though its members lingered for sometime to serve their own political ends. Khusrau, the eldest son of Jahangir

74 Pietro Della Vale, *The Travels of Pietro Della Vale*, i, ed. by Edward Grey, London, 1892, pp. 56-57

was passing his days in misery. Shahriyar supported by Nur Jahan registered his name as a candidate for the throne. Shah Jahan now saw his chance fading away, but was determined to check Nur Jahan's every move till the end.

Pressed hard, the Mughul commanders in the Deccan were crying for reinforcements. Nur Jahan took this opportunity to send Shah Jahan away from the royal court. Shah Jahan was ordered to lead the Mughul army once again in the South. He was well aware of the fact that in view of the weak health of his father, who was expected to pass away any time, his absence in the Deccan would be costly to him. He knew his ability to strike terror among the Deccanis as by then he had gained experience of hill warfare in his successful campaigns in Kangra.[75] But he did not want to go alone to the South without Khusrau. If his objective was achieved, one of his rivals could easily be diminished from the scene and in case the worst happened, he would be able to defeat Nur Jahan and her nominee.

Visualizing the impending danger, Shah Jahan demanded the custody of Khusrau as a condition for his departure. He represented to the Emperor that delivering Khusrau to him would frighten the Deccanis. He argued, "When the Deccanis shall hear that he is so favoured by the Emperor that Khusrau has been delivered to him, they will be frightened into surrender." He further said that he had to face a large allied army in the South. Khusrau's presence in the North would always cause him anxiety and in such a position he would not be able to work wholeheartedly in the Deccan.[76] Jahangir who still had some paternal affection for Khusrau, fearing the consequences of Khusrau's delivery to Shah Jahan, refused at first to comply with that request. But the increasing

75. Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 171, 176 ; Jalal Mirza, *Shash Fath Kangra*, B.M. or. 184, ff. 4-30.

76. Fuzuni, ff. 282-83 ; Kamgar, f. 141 ; Tavernier, pp. 335-36, *Thomas Roe*, p. 256 ; Della Vale, pp. 57-58.

attacks of the Nizam Shahis obliged Jahangir to change his mind. Moreover, Nur Jahan also induced her husband to deliver Khusrau to Shah Jahan for her own evil designs, i.e., to kill one enemy with the help of the other. Jahangir reluctantly yielded to her instance but insisted on the safe return of his ill-fated son. Given assurance of his safe return, Khusrau was delivered to his rival never to meet his father again.[77]

The plea put forward by Shah Jahan and the part played by Nur Jahan in the delivery of Khusrau is indefensible. How could a blind prince, suffering misfortunes for the last fifteen years, become suddenly a source of trouble for Shah Jahan? Why was his presence in the North considered dangerous by Shah Jahan? Neither did Shah Jahan explain this in explicit words nor did Jahangir feel any need to demand any explanation. The parties well understood each other. Though Khusrau commanded sympathy and respect from a section of nobility, it was very doubtful whether this section of the nobility could raise arms in his favour. He was merely a victom of circumstance, serving the evil designs of interested parties.

Preparations were made for Shah Jahan's march to the Deccan. He was given a *khil'at*, a jewelled sword and an elephant. He was permitted to have ten crore *dams* out of the Deccan

77. Kamgar, f. 141 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 305 ; Fuzuni, f. 283 ; Kambu, i, p. 137 ; Fuzuni, f. 283. *Thomas Roe*, pp. 256-57, gives a detailed account of the episode. He writes : The poor prince remains in the tiger's powers, refuses meat and requests his father to take his life and not to let it be the triumph and delight of his enemies. The whole court is in whisper, the nobility sad, the multitude like itself, full of rumour and noise without head or foot, only it rages but bends itself upon no direct end. The sisters and diverse women mourned, refused their food and said if he died, there be one hundred of his kindred burn for him. Common people murmer that the king has not delivered his son, but his own life into the hands of an ambitious prince and a treacherous faction.

revenue as a reward of his conquest.[78] One crore rupees were granted to meet the expense of the army. Twenty experienced nobles including Khwaja Abu'l Hasan, Afzal Khan, Raja Bikramajit and Sayyids of Barha accompanied Shah Jahan.[79] The army of the Prince had six hundred and fifty *mansabdars,* one thousand *Ahadis,* one thousand Turkish gunners and five hundred musketeers, excluding thirty one thousand soldiers already in the Deccan. Mu'tamad Khan, was made *Bakhshi* and *Waqi'ah Nawis* of the Deccan army. Shah Jahan left Lahore on December 12, 1620, for the South.[80]

Shah Jahah had taken a great risk in going to the South. It was, therefore, necessary for him to obtain success in the Deccan if he wanted to be sure of his accession, otherwise the Deccanis in the South and his rivals in the North would reduce him to impotence. He infused a spirit of devotion among his followers to face any possible danger that might come in their way. To impress the soldiers with his determination, he revived the tradition of his great-grand-father Babur. On his way to the Deccan, Shah Jahan broke all wine glasses and poured wine into the Narbada. He promised his followers not to drink again, if he succeeded in defeating the Deccanis. Having confidence in their leader's determination, his followers swore on their heads to sacrifice their lives for him.[81]

The arrival of Shah Jahan in the neighbourhood of Ujjain, frightened the Deccanis who were engaged in the siege of Mandu.[82] Khwaja Abu'l Hasan and Bairam Beg were sent with an advance guard of 5,000 men who reached the Narbada by a swift march and forced the enemy to raise the siege. The Mughuls pursued the

78. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 176 ; Kamgar, f. 141b ; Jahangir, p. 322.

79. Kambu, i, pp. 136-37.

80. Jahangir, p. 322 ; Kamgar, f. 141a ; Fuzuni, f. 283b ; Kambu, i, p. 136.

81. Kambu, i, p. 138 ; Kamgar, f. 144b.

82. Kamgar, f. 144b.

Deccanis for four *kos* and the latter retired to Burhanpur.[83]

Shah Jahan arrived at Burhanpur for the second time on February 23, 1621. Khan Khanan and other officers welcomed the Prince and reported the sufferings, they had undergone at the hands of the enemy during the last two years. Shah Jahan spent nine days at Burhanpur reorganizing the army. He distributed thirty lakh rupees among his followers to equip themselves for further operation.[84] He prepared for an offensive plan on a large scale. The army of 30,000 men was divided into five groups and placed under Darab Khan, 'Abdullah Khan, Khwaja Abu'l Hasan, Raja Bikramajit and Raja Bhim.[85]

The imperialists launched their attack vigorously. After defeating the Deccanis at Malkpur, they advanced toward Balaghat, where Malik 'Ambar himself was waiting to meet his opponents. A fierce battle took place in which many Deccani officers such as Tilang Rao, Firuz Khan Habshi and others lost their lives. The eventual success of the Mughuls was bought with the heavy loss of the deaths of Gada Beg, Sayyid Muzaffar Barha and Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali Barha. Malik 'Ambar fled with ten thousand troopers to Khirki.[86] The victorious army pursued the enemy closely. Nizam Shah and his family would have fallen into the hands of the Mughuls, had Malik 'Ambar not removed them to Daulatabad just the day before the arrival of the invading army.[87] The imperialists halted three days at Khirki and "utterly demolished the buildings which had taken nearly twenty years to build and needed another twenty years to be rebuilt."[88]

83. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 181 ; Kamgar; ff. 144b, 145a ; Kambu, i, pp. 140-42
84. Jahangir, p. 331 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 181 ; Kamgar, f. 145b.
85. Kambu, i, p. 145 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 317.
86. Jahangir, p. 331 ; Kamgar, f. 145b ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 182.
87. Kamgar, f. 145b ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 320 ; Kambu, i, p. 151.
88. Jahangir, p. 331 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 182 ; Kamgar, f. 146a. Kambu, i, p. 151.

Shah Jahan had determined to give a crushing defeat to the Deccanis this time in order to be safe at least in his rear, while his attention was fixed on the court. When the Mughuls were returning from Khirki, fifteen thousand Deccanis attacked Raja Bikramajit's army. The timely arrival of Raja Bhim and Darab Khan with their troops saved the Mughul position. The Deccanis suffered heavily and fled. Jadu Rai and Atish Khan, the Nizam Shahi commanders, made another attempt but were defeated by Khwaja Abu'l Hasan.[89]

The next attempt of the Mughuls was to relieve the besieged imperialists at Ahmadnagar. The imperial commander Khanjar Khan, in spite of shortage of arms and provisions had held it doggedly. Encouraged by the expected reinforcements, Khanjar Khan came out of the fort and killed two hundred and fifty besiegers under the command of Jauhar Habshi, the son-in-law of Malik 'Ambar.[90] In order to make the success complete, a Mughul detachment was sent to Nasik where also the enemy experienced a staggering defeat.[91]

The Nizam Shahis suffered heavy losses both in men and animals. Their resources were exhausted and they lost courage from successive defeats. A large number of Malik 'Ambar's followers perished and he did not have enough money to raise new troops. Any further resistance would have resulted in the extinction of the Nizam Shahi dynasty itself. He, therefore, represented to Shah Jahan that if he could be forgiven, he would never offend the imperialists and would ever remain faithful to the Mughul Emperor. His request was granted and peace concluded.[92]

By accepting Malik 'Ambar's submission, the Mughuls were outwitted in diplomacy once again by the enemy. Malik 'Ambar

89. Kambu, i, pp. 152-53.
90. Khafi Khan, i, p. 320 ; Kambu, i, p. 152.
91. Khafi Khan, i, p. 321.
92. Kambu, i, pp. 156-57 ; Kamgar, f. 146 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 182.

was forced to submit because the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda had withdrawn their support.

Malik 'Ambar again bowed before the storm and let it pass over. He rightly conjectured that as soon as Shah Jahan retired to the North, he could force his will upon the Mughuls in the Deccan. On the other hand Shah Jahan preferred to have a free hand to further his ambitions in the North, lest the opposite party at the court, benefit from his long stay in the South. He, therefore, was eager to bring the war to an end as early as possible. The health of the Emperor was another factor. It was declining[93] and the political parties were becoming more and more interested in the question of his succession. When the court was not sincere in appreciating his services, Shah Jahan argued, why should he waste his energies and run the risk of losing the throne ?

Both Malik 'Ambar and Shah Jahan came to terms in June 1621, for their own selfish motives. In the hope of gaining some help in the coming war of succession, Shah Jahan imposed light terms on the Deccanis. Except for the soldiers under his immediate command, he did not expect any assistance from any other quarter. The terms were : in addition to the imperial territory captured by the Deccanis after 1618, the surrender of fourteen *kos* of adjoining area to the Mughuls; a war indemnity of fitfy lakh rupees to be paid as *peshkesh* by the three states. The *peshkesh* was to be paid by Qutb Shah, 'Adil Shah and Nizam Shah in the order of twenty, eighteen and twelve lakh rupees respectively.[94]

This was another precarious peace. Both the parties agreed to the terms under the pressure of circumstances. It was not that the Nizam Shahis were stronger than the Mughuls in military resources, but because court politics provided a chance to the Deccanis

93. Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 186-87.

94. Jahangir, p. 331 ; Kamgar, ff. 146b ; 147a ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 321 ; Kambu, i, pp. 157-59, 161-62.

again and again, so that they could rally their forces and attempt to do away with foreign bondage.

The news of the imperial success was conveyed to the Emperor who rewarded his nobles for their services. Afzal Khan, the *Diwan* of Shah Jahan, who conveyed the news was given a *khil'at*, an elephant and a jewelled sword. To Shah Jahan were sent a ruby-plume reckoned at Rupees 50,000 and *Roop Mati*, a Turkish horse, both of which had earlier been presented to Jahangir by the Shah of Iran out of the Turkish booty. Khanjar Khan, the commander of Ahmadnagar fort was promoted to the rank of 4,000 *zat* and 1000 *sawar*.[95]

Shah Jahan spent a few months in the administration of the Mughul Deccan. Darab Khan and Raja Bikramajit were deputed with 8,000 men to Zafarnagar; Pilpali was placed under Khwaja Abu'l Hasan. Sarbuland Rai and Jan Sipar Khan were ordered to guard Jalnapur and Bir respectively. Similarly, the defence of Mahur and Munipatan was entrusted to Yakub Khan Habshi and Adanji Ram. As there was no fort in the whole of Balaghat area, a new fort of stones was built near Kharkpur. To defend the country against any possible aggression by the Deccanis, new military posts were set up between Burhanpur and Devalgaon.[96] Shah Jahan's sole interest in the administration of the Deccan appeared to be this, that he wanted to have firm control over the South through men, on whom he could depend fully whenever the need arose.

Shah Jahan now was tempted to eliminate one of his rivals to the throne. Jahangir's health was breaking down and the problem of succession became most urgent in the country. Khusrau was still alive and Shah Jahan wanted to get rid of him so as to remove at least one obstacle from his path. The ghastly action of fratricide was performed by him who at one time stood, as a champion of Islam and who apart from saying his compulsory daily prayers, is

95. Jahangir, pp. 331-33 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 183 ; Kamgar, f. 147a.
96. Kambu, i, p. 159 ; Kamgar, f. 147b.

said to have never missed *Tahajjud* prayers. He most cunningly had the blind Khusrau put to death on January 29, 1622, while he himself was artfully away from the scene of the crime. After sometime he informed the Emperor that Khusrau died of *dard-i-qulanj* (colic pains).[97] This was the end of a prince, who had been blinded at the beginning of his father's rule, spent his whole life in captivity, and eventually became a victom of politics.

THE SAFAWI-MUGHUL RELATIONS.

The relations between the Safawis of Iran and the Shi'a States of the Deccan affected Mughul policy towards the Deccan. Since the Deccan states had adopted Shiism, there was a regular exchange of diplomatic missions between Isfahan and the Deccan States. It was but natural that occupation of any part of the Deccan by the Mughuls was not appreciated by the Safawis.

The Safawis remained quiescent over the Mughul seizure of part of the Deccan, under Akbar due to their own political weakness. When Daniyal offered some justification for the Mughul conquest in a letter sent to Shah 'Abbas I in 1602, the latter kept silent.[98] By the time Jahangir ascended the Mughul throne, Shah 'Abbas I had overcome his difficulties at home and abroad and Iran once again had become a great political power. Jahangir, therefore, preferred to avoid any conflict as far as possible between Isfahan and Delhi. The Shah had sent his ambassador Yadgar 'Ali Sultan in 1610, to congratulate Jahangir on his accession. The letter of the Shah expressed love and devotion for the Mughul Emperor and the desire of better relations between the two empires. Jahangir gave a warm reception to the Iranian ambassador and honoured him with a *khil'at*

97. Jahangir, p. 342; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 191; Khafi Khan, i, p. 325. Tavernier, p. 41; William Foster, *The English Factories in* India, ii, Oxford, 1906-09, p. 41; *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, London, 1910, p. 949.

98. Abu'l Qasim 'Iwaghali Haider, *Nuskha-i-Jamia-i-Marasilat-ul-'Abbas*, *B.M. Add.* 7688, ff. 223b, 225b.

and a gift of thirty thousand rupees in cash. The Emperor was overjoyed on the receipt of letter from Shah 'Abbas I, whom he refers to in his *Tuzuk* as 'Shah 'Abbas *biradaram*' (my brother). Yadgar 'Ali returned to Iran in the eighth year of Jahangir's reign in the company of Khan 'Alam, the Mughul ambassador and was given presents worth Rupees 40,000, a jewelled horse and a saddle. Jahangir assured the Shah of his sincerity and brotherly feelings.[99] When the Ottoman Sultan Ahmad I, suggested a combined advance against Iran, the Mughul Emperor declined to act.[100]

Hard pressed by Shah Jahan in 1621, the Deccani Sultans tried to seek help from Iran against the Mughuls. In reply to their request, Shah 'Abbas I sent Talib 'Ali Beg, 'Asim Beg and Muhammad Beg to Bijapur, Golconda and Khirki respectively[101] He wrote to Qutb Shah that he would ask Jahangir not to annex the Deccan states but at the same time he advised the Deccanis to unite themselves against the common enemy[102] (i.e. the Mughuls).

Realizing the situation at the Mughul court, Shah 'Abbas I, through his envoys, aspired to assist his fellow *Shi'a* rulers in the Deccan. He wrote to Jahangir and pleaded at length on behalf of the Deccanis, representing that they were Jahangir's tributaries as well as being friends of the Safawis. Since Jahangir's accession they had always followed the customary rules of a subordinate ally and if they had transgressed, they should be forgiven. Making his own position clear, he said that it was a false charge that the Deccan states were in secret alliance with him against the Mughuls. Concluding his letter, the Shah said that whether the Deccani Sultans remained submissive and tributaries to the Mughuls or the Emperor captured their states and gave them to other people under him, it would not

99. Jahangir, pp. 93, 121.

100. *Tarikh-i-Salim Shahi*, B.M. or 1902, ff. 137-38

101. Iskandar Beg Turkman, *Tarikh-i-'Alam Ara-i-'Abbasi*, Teheran, 1955, p. 470.

102. Abu'l Qasim 'Iwaghali Haider, ff. 230b, 231a.

make such difference to the Mughul government. He suggested that the states should not be annexed and be allowed to enjoy their present status. However, if the Mughul Emperor wanted to expand his Empire, he (i.e. the Shah) would be happy to hand over an equivalent area or even more lands to the former.[103]

The letter of Shah 'Abbas I did not affect the Mughul policy towards the Deccan. The Mughuls whether a weak or a strong power, were not ready to accept interference from a foreign power in the matter of their own policies.

THIRD PHASE (1622—27)

The third phase witnessed the climax of political events during Jahangir's reign. Members of the junta fell out with each other and consequently Shah Jahan rebelled against his father. I'timad-ud-Daulah, who had knitted the members into one thread, died in January 1622. His death was a signal for the rival groups to boost up their efforts. Nur Jahan and Shah Jahan turned into bitter enemies and headed their groups more vigorously. Asaf Khan, though in sympathy with his son-in-law, Shah Jahan, yielded to the call of the times, which demanded from him loyalty for the Emperor. He awaited the opportunity to strike an effective blow to his opponents.

The hostilities between the opposite groups could have flared up any moment. But the immediate cause was provided by the conquest of Qandahar by the Safawis in April, 1622. Soon after, the country plunged into a deadly civil war that adversely affected the prestige of the Mughul Empire at home and abroad.

Qandahar, which now forms a part of Afghanistan is situated to the north-west of Pakistan. In medieval times its occupation was necessary both for the Safawis and the Mughuls, for their defence. Each Empire, therefor, was eager to have it under its control. It was equally important as it lay on the trade route between the sub-continent and Central Asia.

103. Ibid., ff. 229b, 230a.

Qandahar changed many masters and ultimately became a bone of contention between the two great Empires of the East. Babur captured Qandahar from the Arghuns in 1507, for a very short time. In 1522, it was finally retaken by Babur from Shah Beg Arghun, despite the latter's appeal to Shah Isma'il Safawi to intervene on his behalf. When Humayun unwisely parcelled out his kingdom, he gave Qandahar to Kamran Mirza. During Humayun's exile in Iran, Kamran Mirza demanded the person of Humayun from Shah Tahmasp on the condition that he would surrender Qandahar to Iran, but the Irani host rejected the offer. Shah Tahmasp supplied an army of 14,000 to Humayun to recover Qandahar, Kabul and Badakhshan and in return Humayun promised to hand over Qandahar to the Safawis after its couquest. Qandahar was taken by Humayun on *Jamadi-ul-Akhir* 25, 952/September 3, 1545. It now morally belonged to the Shah, but Humayun refused to give it up before he had regained his position in the sub-continent, because he wanted to use it as base of operation for his future campaigns in Kabul and Hindustan. However, after great deliberation, the fort was handed over to the Safawis.

The Safawis became disgusted at the behaviour of the Mughuls and they refused to give any more help to Humayun who had yet to face his great antagonist, Kamran Mirza. With winter fast approaching and the refusal of the Qizilbashs to give any shelter to the Mughuls, Humayun had no alternative, but to retake Qandahar from the Safawis. He achieved his aim by a device in the last week of September, 1545.

Due to political instability, in the early part of Akbar's reign, Qandahar was taken by the Safawis. But the Mughuls were later fortunate enough to recover it without any battle. Hard pressed by the Uzbeg menace under Shaibani Khan and unable to stand the hostile pressure of his own relatives, Sultan Muzaffar Mirza (son of Sultan Husain Mirza, the nephew of Shah Tahmasp Safawi), the Safawi governer of Qandahar agreed to surrender the fort to the Mughuls,

if Akbar would give him a *mansab* in the Mughul army. Akbar readily accepted the offer and ordered the Mughul commander, Shah Beg (entitled Khan Dauran by Emperor Jahangir) to take over the fort. Thus, Qandahar passed into the Mughul hands in 1594, without any bloodshed. Sultan Muzaffar Mirza was given a high *mansab* of 5000 *zat-o-sawar* in the Mughul army. Rustam Mirza, who had accompanied his brother Sultan Muzaffar Mirza to the Mughnl court, was also honoured by Akbar and given a *jagir*.[104]

In the early part of his reign, Shah 'Abbas Safawi was chiefly occupied with the Uzbegs and the Ottomans in regaining the territories lost during his predecessor's time. He, therefore, could not pay any serious attention to the long-standing dispute about the possession of Qandahar. However, in order to keep himself well informed of Mughul politics at Delhi, the Shah kept on sending his envoys to the Mughul court ostensibly to foster closer relations between the 'two brothers.' The most important Persian missions arrived in India in 1611, 1615, 1619 and 1622. Yadgar 'Ali Sultan arrived from Isfahan in 1611, and presented gifts and a letter of Shah of Iran congratulating Jahangir on his accession. In 1615,there came another embassy under Mustafa Beg. Jahangir mentions that Mustafa Beg had been sent from the ruler of Iran, his exalted and successful brother. The envoy was given a hearty welcome, an award of ten thousand rupees and an expensive *khil'at*. At least twice Shah 'Abbas sent verbal messages through his envoys indicating his desire to retake Qandahar. The letter of the Shah brought by Muhammad Riza Beg, the Iranian ambassador, made a mention of a verbal message to be delivered by the envoy to the Mughul Emperor.[105] It seemed that no serious thought was given to the mission of the Safawi envoy. Jahangir sent his envoys to Isfahan at different intervals; with costly gifts to his "sincere brother" Shah 'Abbas. In the letter

104. Abu'l Fazl, *A.N.*, iii, pp. 645-46, 650, 658 ; Jahangir, p. 128.

105. Jahangir, pp. 94-95, 138-39, 164-66.

brought by the Persian envoy, Zambil Beg, in 1619, Shah 'Abbas pointed out to Jahangir that most of the lost territory had been regained and he hoped to recapture the remaining parts. That was a sufficient hint of the Shah's desire to reoccupy Qandahar. Moreover, Zambil Beg also gave a verbal message from his royal master to the same effect. But the Mughul court was so pre-occupied with its politics that it did not take any notice of the embassy of Zambil Beg, till Qandahar was occupied by the Safawis, on Sha'ban 11, 1031/June 11, 1622.[106]

Nur Jahan at this time seized the opportunity of sending Shah Jahan out of the country. She had Shah Jahan appointed to command the Mughul army against the Persians.[107] In order to keep him out of the Mughul Empire for a longer period, he was asked to advance to Isfahan to force humiliating terms on the Qizilbashs, after the conquest of Qandahar. The task entrusted to Shah Jahan was not only hazardous but most difficult.

In order to meet the challenge of Nur Juhan, Shah Jahan presented some demands before his march to Qandahar. He demanded the north-western part of the Empire (i.e. the provinces of Malwa, Gujarat, Sind, Baluchistan and Kabul) to be placed directly under his control, the fort of Ranthambore to be given to him where he could lodge his family during his absence and experienced soldiers of his choice were to accompany him. The demands, as expected, were rejected by the Emperor and Shah Jahan unfurled the flag of rebellion in January, 1623.[108]

106. Iskandar Beg, pp. 682-87 ; Jahangir, pp. 320, 324-25, 343 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 191-93 ; Abu'l Qasim Iwaghali Haider, ff. 219-20 ; *Medieval India, a Miscellany*, i, London, 1969, pp. 277-79 ; Riazul Islam, *Indo-Persian Relations*, Lahore, 1970, mentions (p. 78) Zainal Beg as the name of the Persian envoy instead of Zambil Beg.

107. Jahangir, p. 345 ; Kambu, i, p. 166.

108. Jahangir, pp. 345-48, 352-54 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 194-199 ; Kamgar, ff. 151-53, 158.

The country suffered heavily from the civil war which lasted for a little more than three years. Jahangir became very upset at the course of action taken by Shah Jahan, whom he ordered to be referred to in future as *Be-daulat* (unfortunate). The intensity of his grief could be well understood from his pathetic words in the *Tuzuk* :

> "About which of my griefs, should I write ? I have to ride and advance against such an undutiful son in this painful and physically-weak condition particularly, in such a hot season, which is unsuitable for my health. Most of my servants who had been trained by me for many years and who had attained *Amarat*, should have been deployed these days in the wars against the Uzbegs or the Qizilbashs. But this *be-sa'adat* had them killed or destroyed them with his own hands. Thanks to God, that He, the Most High and Glorious, has given me courage and patience to bear all this, and I shall continue in the same manner and take action. The thing which pains my heart most and arouses strong feelings of indignation is that at such a time when my obedient sons and sincere *Umara* should have sought to take the lead in the campaigns of Qandahar and Khurasan which had become a matter of honour for the Empire—instead this *be-sa'adat*, striking an axe on the foundation of his own kingdom, has become a stumbling block in the path of this objective. Consequently the campaign of Qandahar has been postponed. I hope God will relieve me of these worries."[109]

The loyalty of the Mughul nobility was divided. Some of the prominent imperial nobles serving under Shah Jahan in the South at

109. Jahangir, pp. 353-54.

the time of his rebellion were Khan Khanan, Sardar Khan, Baqi Khan, Jansipar Khan, Mirza Badi'uz-Zaman, Sarbuland Rai, Raja Bikramajit, Raja Gaj Singh, Jadu Rai, Uday Ram and many others. They all joined the rebel group. Shahryar was promoted to 10,000 *zat* and 8000 *sawar* and ordered to lead the Qandahar army[110] but the campaign could not be undertaken in view of the grave situation in the country. Qandahar was lost to the Safawis to be recovered temporarily in Shah Jahan's reign in February, 1638.

Mahabat Khan, the governor of Kabul, who had lost royal favour long ago, was the only commander considered capable of matching the generalship of Shah Jahan. He was recalled from Kabul, given a *khil'at*, raised to the rank of 6000 *zat* and appointed to lead the imperial army against Shah Jahan.[111] This was the most appropriate time for Nur Jahan to set one brother against the other. She had Prince Parwez appointed supreme commander (though his authority was in fact nominal) of the royal army against the rebel prince.

Defeated by Mahabat Khan near Delhi, Shah Jahan fled toward Mandu. He planned to seek help from the Deccanis. He was liberal in imposing terms in 1621 on them and now in return, he expected a reward from them. But he forgot that the Deccanis could raise their heads only in the absence of an efficient Mughul commander. They could not and would not help him, when a general like Mahabat Khan was present in the Deccan. But still the rebel prince hoped against hope and sent Afzal Khan to Malik 'Ambar. He also despatched gifts—a horse, an elephant and a jewelled sword for Malik 'Ambar and an armlet for 'Adil Shah. Foreseeing that any help to Shah Jahan at such a critical hour would mean inviting the imperialists into his own country, Malik 'Ambar evaded the request. He advised Afzal Khan to go first to 'Adil Shah, whom he acknowledged as his patron and who

110. Ibid., pp. 354-55, 394-95.

111. Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 197-98.

was supreme among the Deccani kings. If 'Adil Shah agreed to his request he would render all possible assistance to Shah Jahan, otherwise not.[112] Malik 'Ambar even refused to grant him an audience.[113] However, he secrety accepted the gifts. Failing in his mission, Afzal Khan became disheartened all the more at the news of the death of his son at the hands of Shah Jahan's men.[114]

This was the first instance in the history of the Deccanis when they abstained from allying themselves with the enemies of the Mughul Empire. In fact, it was the terror of Mughul force, present in the South, that obliged them to adopt such a step, otherwise as later events will show, once the bulk of the imperial army withdrew from the South, the Deccanis could emerge from their hide-outs to drive the Mughuls out.

The desertion of his followers weakened Shah Jahan's position in the South, and he planned to try his luck in Bihar-Orissa. A safe passage to Bihar was only possible through Golconda territory. In order to save his state from ruin, Qutb Shah most unwillingly permitted the rebel forces pass through Golconda on promise of the safety of population and cultivation. At the same time Qutb Shah instructed his Commander of the Frontiers to conduct Shah Jahan out of his territory as soon as possible. Shah Jahan stayed in Masulipatam for a short while and left for Bihar.[115] In his eastern campaigns, Shah Jahan was able to capture the forts of Burdwan and Rohtas and a handsome booty of five hundred elephants and fifty lakh rupees.

The presence of Mahabat Khan in the South proved of great advantage to the Mughul cause. Both 'Adil Shah and Malik 'Ambar expected Mahabat Khan to be the next viceroy of the imperial

112. Jahangir, p. 378 ; Kambu, i, p. 177.
113. Jahangir, p. 378.
114. Ibid., p. 378.
115. Kambu, i, pp. 177-78 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 215 ; Kamgar, ff. 167-70.

territories in the Deccan. As long as Shah Jahan was present in the South, Mahabat Khan kept both the Deccani rivals in suspence. He did not commit himself either to 'Adil Shah or to Malik 'Ambar. Eager to employ the imperial force against 'Adil Shah, who had recently deserted the Deccani cause for his personal advantage, Malik 'Ambar sent 'Ali Sher to Mahabat Khan and promised that he himself would wait upon him in Devalgaon. He even agreed to send his elder son to serve under Parwez. Mahabat Khan, the prudent diplomat, in view of the weak position of the Nizam Shahis, evaded Malik 'Ambar's request and joined with 'Adil Shah.[116] In April, 1624, Mahabat Khan sent Qazi 'Abd-ul-'Aziz to Bijapur. 'Adil Shah welcomed the envoy and promised to send Mulla Lari, the *Wakil-us-Sultanat and Madar-ul-Maham* of the state with five hundred soldiers to serve under Mahabat Khan.[117]

As the territory of Nizam Shah lay on the Bijapur-Burhanpur route, Mahabat Khan sent a contingent to conduct Mulla Lari to Burhanpur. Before his march toward the North-east to face Shah Jahan in Bihar, Mahabat Khan appointed able men to safeguard the Mughul Deccan. Burhanpur was placed under Sarbuland Rai. Lashkar Khan, Asad Khan Ma'muri and Manuchehr were appointed over Zafarnagar, Ellichpur and Khanpur respectively. Rizwi Khan was instructed to look after Khandesh. Mulla Lari was sent back with his contingent to help Sarbuland Rai.

However, Muhammad Amin, son-in-law of Mulla Lari, was detained to serve under Parwez in Bihar with 1000 soldiers. Mahabat Khan gave costly gifts to Mulla Lari and to Mulla Lari's son and son-in-law.[118]

The alliance between 'Adil Shah and the Mughuls upset the

116. Jahangir, p. 381 ; Kamgar, f. 174b, Mu'tamad Khan, p. 216.

117. Jahangir, p. 381 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 343 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 216-17, 223.

118. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 224 ; Kamgar, f. 175b.

balance of power in the Deccan. It aimed to serve two purposes of the imperialists. The first was to weaken the Deccanis by helping one state against the other, and the second to exhaust the force of Malik 'Ambar, the most inveterate enemy of the Mughuls, by keeping him at war with Bijapur, until the rebellion of Shah Jahan could be quashed.

Malik 'Ambar rose to the occasion by allying himself with Qutb Shah. He removed the family of Nizam Shah to the fort of Qandahar on the Golconda border, while he sent his own family to Daulatabad and vacated Khirki. He exacted arears of two years' tribute from Qutb Shah with whom he made an alliance.[119] Taking advantage of the pre-occupations of the Mughuls in the North-east, he besieged Bandar, the Bijapuri town. Hard pressed, 'Adil Shah requested Mahabat Khan to send back Mulla Lari and offered three lakh *huns* as the price of withdrawal of Bijapuri troops.[120]

When Mahabat Khan was apprised of the situation, he ordered Sarbuland Rai to send reinforcements to 'Adil Shahis. Leaving a small army for defence, Sarbuland Rai despatched Lashkar Khan, Mirza Manuchehr, Khanjar Khan, the *qala'dar* of Ahmadnagar, Jansipar Khan, Uda Ram and Jadu Rai to help Mulla Lari.[121]

The Mughul reinforcements disturbed Malik 'Ambar. He vainly protested against their arrival to Mahabat Khan. He said that he was one of the loyal servants of the Mughul Emperor and considered himself no better than an imperial dog. He had never been insubordinate to the Emperor. Why were the imperialists bent upon his destruction at the instigation of 'Adil Shah and Mulla Lari? He further stated that the rivalry between Nizam Shah and 'Adil Shah had existed since long over the possession of Sholapur which originally belonged to Nizam Shah but had been seized by 'Adil Shah.

119. Kamgar, f. 180a ; Jahangir, pp. 386, 391.
120. Jahangir, p. 319 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 234-35.
121. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 235.

In the end, he made an earnest request to the Mughul commander to take an unbiased view and proposed to let the parties decide the issue themselves. The request was rejected.[122]

Foiled in this attempt, Malik 'Ambar tried another. On the arrival of Mughul. reinforcements under Lashkar Khan, Malik 'Ambar raised the siege of Bandar and withdrew for some miles with two motives—to give a false impression that he was faithful to the Mughuls and to entice his opponents toward his own borders. He succeeded in his strategem. The allied forces continued their march and were entrapped by the Nizam Shahis.

Malik 'Ambar did not attack for some time so that the Mughul forces be taken completely off their guard. He then made a surprise attack, and a fierce battle ensued at Bahutari. Mulla Lari was killed and his followers and some of the imperial officers fled without any further engagement, while Lashkar Khan, Manuchehr and 'Aqidat Khan fell into the enemy's hands. The Nizam Shahis also captured twenty-five 'Adil Shahi officers including Farhad Khan. Khanjar Khan fled to Ahmadnagar and Jansipur Khan took refuge in the neighbouring town of Babur.[123]

The success of Malik 'Ambar left two impressions. First, the imperialists needed an able general to match the genius of Malik 'Ambar. Secondly, the undivided attention of the Mughuls was required to defeat the Nizam Shahis.

Encouraged by the recent success, Malik 'Ambar advanced to take Ahmadnagar, but Khanjar Khan, the imperial commander defied his attempt.[124] He then marched toward Sholapur, which was captured with the help of famous cannon *Malik-i-Maidan*. He soon became master of the entire Balaghat and sent Yaqut Khan with 10,000 men to besiege Burhanpur.[125] The position of the imperialists

122. Kamgar, f. 181a ; Jahangir, p. 392 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 236.
123. Jahangir, p. 392 ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 236-37 ; Kamgar, f. 181a.
124. Jahangir, p. 392 ; Kamgar, f. 181b ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 237,
125. Kamgar, ff. 181-83 ; Jahangir, pp. 392-93.

became very precarious as the bulk of their army was busy with Shah Jahan in the North-east. Surbuland Rai planned to give battle to the enemy, but was ordered by Jahangir to wait till the arrival of imperial reinforcements.[126]

Defeated in Bengal, Shah Jahan preferred to try his luck once more in the South. He returned to the Deccan in September, 1625. Malik 'Ambar took advantage of the situation by proposing an alliance to Shah Jahan, who readily accepted it.[127] This alliance is a significant phenomenon in the history of the Mugnul-Deccan relations. A Mughul prince no less than Prince Shah Jahan, who had been the hero of the Deccan campaigns and was regarded as the protagonist of a forward Deccan policy, allied himself with the enemy against whom he had been fighting in the past. Shah Jahan, in fact, did not want to lower the Mughul prestige. His war was against the group headed by Nur Jahan, who was actively working in minimizing his chances of succession. In medieval India, when there was despotism and force could be the only method to redress grievances, Shah Jahan had no alternative but to resort to that method. Had he been indifferent to the designs of Nur Jahan, he would have jeopardised his chances of succession. But he was bold enough to challenge Nur Jahan and break the influence, under which his father had fallen. The pressure of time thus threw him in the enemy camp. It can safely be said that the civil war was nothing but a preamble to the subsequent war of succession after Jahangir's death. The alliance which was entered into under pressure of events was bound to fall after the emergency was over. This is borne out by Shah Jahan's attitude towards the Nizam Shahis after his accession to the Mughul throne.

On the demand of Malik 'Ambar, Shah Jahan sent an army under 'Abdullah Khan and Shah Quli to storm Burhanpur, while he

126. Kamgar, f. 183b.

127. Mu'tamad Khan, f. 283a.

himself remained at Devalgaon.. The besiegers made three attempts to capture the fort but failed and lost many men including Sarandaz Khan and Shah Beg.[128] The serious illness of Shah Jahan, when he lost all hopes of survival, and the news of the sudden arrival of Mahabat Khan and Parwez with a large army near the Narbada disheartened the Deccan army which raised the siege.

Desertions in the rebel camp of reputed commanders like Khan Khanan, 'Abdullah Khan, Afzal Khan and many others, thinned Shah Jahan's ranks. He lost innumerable lives and his resources were exhausted. He, therefore, had no alternative but to submit in February, 1626, to his father. His submission was accepted on the condition that he surrenders the forts of Rohtas and Asir to the imperialists and sends two of his sons, Dara and Aurangzeb as hostages to the Mughul court and himself retires to his newly conferred *jagir* in Nasik. He agreed to the hard conditions imposed by Nur Jahan. Thus the country heaved a sigh of relief after a period of more than three years. The civil war had resulted in an unaccountable loss of men and money and the administration was in a miserable state. The Safawis rejoiced over the state of affairs in the rival Empire and their hold over Qandahar became stronger than before. There seemed no possibility of a clash of arms between Safawis and the Mughuls over Qandahar at least in the near future. In recognition of his meritorious services, Mahabat Khan was raised to the high rank of 7,000 *zat* and 7,000 *sawar-i-do-aspah wa sih-aspah*, given the titles of *Khan Khanan* and *Sipahsalar* and appointed governor of Bengal.[130] In order to keep vigilance over the activities of Shah Jahan, Parwez was made viceroy of the imperial Deccan.

128. Jahangir, p. 393-94, 397 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 356-57 ; Kamgar, ff. 183b, 184a.

129. Jahangir, p. 397 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 357 ; Kambu, i, p. 192.

130. Jahangir, p. 398.

EVENTS AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF SHAH JAHAN

The submission of Shah Jahan checked the progress of the Nizam Shahis. Malik 'Ambar preferred to stop hostilities in order to muster his resources but his death on Safar 6, 1034/May 8, 1626,[131] at the age of eighty, sealed the fate of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. His demise was an irreparable loss to the cause of the Deccanies. He had risen to the highest pinnacle of distinction and glory by dint of courage, ability and industry. An estimate of this devoted defender of Nizam Shahi independence may be formed by the tribute paid him by his opponents. Kamgar Husain and Mu'tamad Khan, the contemporary court chroniclers remark," He had no equal in generalship and discipline. He kept the most turbulent element into submission. He knitted the disgruntled Nizam Shahis into one body politic. He spent the whole of his life with such honour and dignity that no other Abyssinian slave in history has risen so high."[132] With his death vanished the spirit of unity, which he tried to inculcate among his followers. In the absence of a strong willed leader, capable of enforcing the central authority, the Nizam Shahis were soon divided into different political units and the life work of Malik 'Ambar was undone. In fact when the Nizam Shahi dynasty was crumbling and her extinction was but a matter of years, the Nizam Shahi nobles were more interested in their own future than in the life of the dynasty.

When the royal families of the Deccan states whose existence was at risk, could not always make a common cause against the Mughul aggression, how could nobles show any loyalty ? Under such conditions the ultimate fall of the Nizam Shahi dynasty was a matter of time.

The rival groups of the Nizam Shahis once again sought Mughul help to overthrow their opponents. In order to make his position strong, Yaqut Habshi, the new *Peshwa* of Nizam Shah,

131. Kamgar, f. 199a ; Jahangir, p. 409 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 271.

132. Kamgar, f. 199a ; Mu'tamad Khan, pp. 271-72.

opened negotiations with the Mughuls. He came to Jalnapur with a band of five hundred followers including Fath Khan, the son of Malik 'Ambar. He sent a letter of submission to Khan Jahan Lodi, who had become governor of the imperial Deccan after the death of Prince Parwez on October 28, 1626. Khan Jahan Lodi failed to understand the diplomacy of the *Peshwa* and ordered Sarbuland Rai to help Yaqut Habshi and Fath Khan.[133]

The political revolution in Khirki upset the treaty concluded between the Nizam Shahis and the Mughuls. Nizam Shah deposed Yaqut Habshi and appointed Hamid Khan as his *Peshwa* and commander of the army.[134] To impress Nizam Shah with his efficiency and generalship, Hamid Khan sent Fath Khan to capture Balaghat. Khan Jahan Lodi himself advanced to face the enemy. He defeated the Nizam Shahi army and marched as far as Khirki.[135] In view of the weak position of the enemy, the Mughul commander could have easily overrun her territory and annex the state but the glitter of gold hampered his advance. An offer of three lakh *huns* made by Hamid Khan, induced Khan Jahan Lodi to hand over the entire Balaghat and fort of Ahmadnagar to the Nizam Shahis. All the Mughul officers obeyed Khan Jahan Lodi's instructions except Khanjar Khan, the commander of Ahmadnagar.[136] Thus a large portion of the imperial territory fell into the hands of the enemy, to fill the purse of a selfish Mughul commander.

We should understand the reason why Khan Jahan Lodi resorted to that course of action. The civil war had resulted in great confusion in the country. The administration was not yet brought to normal and the Empire still faced financial crisis. There was uncertainty everywhere. Jahangir's health was in an alarming condition. Every cure was tried but excess of drinking worsened his

133. Jahangir, p. 413 ; Mu'tamad Khan, p. 280.
134. Kamgar, f. 205a.
135. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 283.
136. Kambu, i, p. 215 ; Kamgar, f. 216b ; Jahangir, pp. 414-15 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 384.

condition. The sole responsibility of the civil war and its consequences lay on the shoulders of Nur Jahan, who still would not subordinate her ambition to the good of the Empire. She was out to place Shahryar on the Mughul throne after her husband's death. She knew well that failure to achieve her aim would mean a dark future for her. She still commanded power and, therefore, redoubled her efforts. When the central authority was so preoccupied with the question of succession and affairs of the Empire had fallen into chaos, Khan Jahan Lodi was not loath to further his own interests. He knew well that the great commanders of the Empire had either perished or were exhausted or had been discarded.[137] Shah Jahan was reduced to helplessness. Parwez had died and Mahabat Khan had become a victim of Nur Jahan's vengeance in 1627 and deprived of all honour. He, therefore, felt himself free to do what he liked without being challenged by anyone. In these circumstances, he gladly accepted the enemy's offer and sold the 'honour' of the Mughul Empire to the Nizam Shahis. Jahangir died at Rajori on Sunday, Safar 28, 1037/October 29, 1627, after a reign of twenty-two years.[138]

The Emperor failed miserably to achieve either of his wishes expressed at the beginning of his reign. He had inherited a stable and extensive Empire. In medieval India, a strong-willed and energetic ruler was the need of the day and Jahangir was neither gifted with a powerful will nor with abundant energy. Nur Jàhan, his beloved wife, weilded all the power and wished to enjoy the same power even after the death of her husband. Her persistance to her policy plunged the country into civil war. Many a time the Mughuls were in a position to crush the Deccanis, but court intrigues saved the Nizam Shahi dynasty from extinction. The Deccanis fully exploited the situation and instead gained ground. The area of the imperial Deccan at the death of Jahangir in 1627 was far less than the area in 1605, the year of his accession.

137. Jahangir, pp. 402-03 ; Kamgar, ff. 187b-89b, 200a-02b.
138. Mu'tamad Khan, p. 293 ; Kambu, i, p. 205.

CHAPTER VII

ANNEXATION OF AHMADNAGAR BY SHAH JAHAN

The reign of Shah Jahan witnessed the golden period of Mughul rule in India. As soon as Shah Jahan had established himself on the throne and consolidated his power in the North, he began to look into the affairs of the Deccan seriously. Shah Jahan's campaigns in the Deccan, have been divided into three sections : his campaigns against Ahmadnagar, Golconda and Bijapur respectively. It has been stated in the previous chapter that the Mughuls suffered reverses in the South because of the treachery of Khan Jahan Lodi. In order to regain the imperial territory, Shah Jahan first started his campaigns against the Nizam Shahis. In 1636, Golconda was the first to acknowledge the Mughul Emperor as her overlord and during the last years of Shah Jahan's reign, Golconda was the first to be invaded by the Mughuls. The attack on Bijapur in 1657, toward the end of Shah Jahan's reign was the last important venture of the Mughuls against the Deccanis during the period under review.

When Shah Jahan ascended the throne in 1037/1628, he confirmed Khan Jahan Lodi in the post as governor of the Mughul Deccan in order to win his loyalty. Shah Jahan ordered him to conquer the imperial territory in the South.[1] On the failure to comply with the imperial orders, Khan Jahan Lodi was replaced by Khan Zaman. The Emperor also wrote a letter to Nizam Shah warning him that if he did not return the Mughul territories voluntarily, an army under Khan Zaman would be sent to take them by force. Nizam Shah submitted to the Emperor stating that he was ready to return

1. 'Abdul Hamid Lahori, *Padshah Namah*, Bib. Ind., Calcutta, 1867-68, i, Pt. I, p. 272.

the Mughul territories but that Sayyid Kamal, the commandant of Bir, was not under his control any longer.[2]

Nizam Shah, in fact, was playing a double game. Though he had submitted outwardly, yet he instructed Sayyid Kamal secretly, to hold the fort with all his strength against the Mughuls. When Khan Zaman besieged Bir, Nizam Shah sent an army of 6000 men under Sahu Bhonsla, the Maratha commander, to Daulatabad to capture Bir.[3] The Nizam Shahi area was now further reduced and it now comprised of Aurangabad, Jalna, Nasik, Baglana and some parts of Konkan. The territory was mostly hilly, where the Deccanis could employ their favourite guerilla tactics and prolong their resistance.

Instead of taking a firm stand against the Mughuls with the much needed co-operation of the other two Deccan states, the Nizam Shahis adopted an aggressive policy against Bijapur. Unable to match the Mughul might, the Nizam Shahis planned to extend their territory by capturing the Bijapuri fort of Bahutari. They advanced into Bijapur territory, killed Mulla Baha, the son-in-law of Mustafa Khan. the *wazir* of 'Adil Shah and took Bahutari. This high-handedness of the Nizam Shahis created a tense situation at the Bijapur court. When Shaikh Mu'in, the Mughul envoy, arrived at Bijapur in 1028/1618, Mustafa Khan attempted to persuade Khwas Khan, the 'Adil Shahi commander to help the Mughuls and suggested dividing the Nizam Shahi territory between 'Adil Shah and the Emperor.

The question of dividing up the Nizam Shahi kingdom created two groups in Bijapur. One was led by Mustafa Khan and the other by Khwas Khan. The party supporting Khwas Khan pleaded that if the Nizam Shahi dynasty was finished, the Mughuls would be

2. Muhammad Amin Qizwini, *Padshah Namah*, B.M. or. 173, ff. 173b, 174a ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 249-50.

3. Amin Qizwini, f. 174 ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 250-51.

drawn nearer to the Bijapur frontiers and would become a perpetual threat to the 'Adil Shahis. After a hot discussion, the offence of the Nizam Shahis was forgiven and it was decided to help them. This attitude of the Bijapuris marks a fundamental change in the nature of their help to the Nizam Shahis. Previously they had been assisting Nizam Shah simply to strengthen a fellow Deccan state, but, henceforth their help was based on self-interest. By helping the Nizam Shahi kingdom now, they intended to use it as a buffer state between Bijapur and the Mughul Empire.

The outbreak of Khan Jahan Lodi's rebellion in 1039/1630 worsened the Mughul position in the Deccan.[5] After his dismissal from the governorship of the imperial Deccan, Khan Jahan Lodi apprehended further punishment from the Emperor for his treachery. He, therefore, saw no other way for his safety than to rebel against his imperial master and to ally himself with Murtaza Nizam Shah. This rebellion is an apt example of the nature of political loyalty in medieval times. Recruitment to the army during that period was based on tribal system. It was on account of the existence of this system of recruitment that Khan Jahan Lodi, counting on the support of his two thousand fellow Afghans, dared to rebel. Passing through the Bandela territory of Jajhar Singh, he hastend toward the Nizam Shahi territory.[6]

Shah Jahan, who after the submission of Jhajhar Singh, enjoyed considerable freedom of action, became eager to curb the rebellion of Khan Jahan Lodi as early as possible. He, therefore, sent five armies to the Deccan to round up Khan Jahan Lodi aad to intimidate the Deccanis into withholding assistance to the rebels.

The despatch of large armies to the Deccan in 1630, opens the

4. Ghulam Murtaza, *Basatin-us-Salatin*, B.M. Add. 26269, ff. 45b, 46a.

5. Amin Qizwini, ff. 179-84; Muhammad Sadiq Khan, *Tawarikh-i-Shah Jahani*, B.M. or. 174, f. 14a.

6. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 274-75, 289; Amin Qizwini, ff. 180-82.

first active phase of Mughul relations with the Nizam Shahis under Shah Jahan. To overpower the Deccanis, Iradat Khan was sent with 20,000 men to enter Balaghat and capture Khan Jahan Lodi. Those who accompanied him included Jajhar Singh, Raja Satarsal, Khiloji Bhonsla and others. The second army of 15,000 men was placed under Raja Gaj Singh. Sha'ista Khan was appointed commander of the third army, which also numbered 15 000. The fourth army of 8,000 was sent under Khwaja Abu'l Hasan to capture Nasik and Trambak while Nasir Khan was instructed to conquer Qandahar and Telingana. Iradat Khan was given the title of 'Azam Khan, a *phul-katarah*, a *khil'at* and jewelled dagger. Both Sha'ista Khan and Raja Gaj Singh were raised to the rank of 5000. 'Azam Khan was appointed the principal commander and others were instructed to work in close co-operation with him.[7] In order to supervise the work of his commanders, Shah Jahan himself left Delhi for the South on Monday, *Jamadi-ul-Awwal* 8, 1039/25 January, 1630.[8]

While the Mughul forces were over-running the Deccan, they attempted to win over the enemy by offering them high rank and other marks of imperial favour. The Deccanis, who offered their services from personal motives rather than on dynastic or national basis, practised in modern times could, therefore, be suborned with the promise of better opportunities for self-advancement. Those who deserted to the Mughuls included Yaqut Khan Habshi and Maloji, each of whom was given the rank of 5000 in the Mughul army. Rahim Khan and Chingiz Khan, the son and son-in-law of Malik 'Ambar, were honoured with the *mansabs* of 2500 and 1500 respectively. Besides, Uda Ram, Sarwah Khan, 'Ali Dilawar Khan, Atish Khan, Qazi Muhammad Sa'eed, the *wakil* of 'Adil Shah and some relatives of Jadu Rai left Nizam Shah and joined the Mughul service.[9]

7. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 294-56, 298, 301 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 193b.
8. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 20a.
9. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 293, 300, 308-10 ; Amin Qizwini, ff. 164a, 176a, 191a ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 20b.

The disunity which arose between Sha'ista Khan and 'Azam Khan on the planning and strategy of war at first delayed the Mughul progress. In order to maintain harmony in the Mughul ranks, Shah Jahan wisely recalled Sha'ista Khan, who was replaced by 'Abdullah Khan.

Help to Khan Jahan Lodi cost the Nizam Shahis heavily. 'Azam Khan, who was now free from internal dissensions, worked more promptly. He led an army into the enemy's country and inflicted heavy losses on the Nizam Shahi forces. To save his country from further devastation, Nizam Shah drove Khan Jahan Lodi out of his state. The rebel fled to Bijapur but was closely followed. He then intended to go to the North-west to arouse Afghan tribal feelings in his favour but was killed by the imperialists in Malwa.[10] The Mughuls now concentrated against the Deccanis with singleness of purpose. 'Azam Khan planned first to take Dharwar. After a heavy discharge of imperial artillery, Salim Siddi, the besieged commander, surrendered the fort on *Jamadi-ul-Akhir* 23, 1040/March, 1631. A booty of seven elephants and eighty horses fell to the victors.[11]

The loss of Dharwar alarmed both 'Adil Shah and Qutb Shah who bought off the Mughul advance by sending back the imperial envoys i.e. Shaikh Mu'een-ud-Din and Shaikh Mohy-id-Din with costly gifts from Bijapur and Golconda respectively. At the same time 'Adil Shah deputed Randola Khan and his father Farhad Khan with 10,000 men to watch the Bijapur frontiers. Randola Khan's efforts to save the Nizam Shahis proved fruitless and the Mughul pressure continued to increase.

ALLIANCE BETWEEN 'ADIL SHAH AND NIZAM SHAH

The next attempt of 'Azam Khan was against Parinda. Hard pressed, Muqarrab Khan, the besieged Nizam Shahi commander,

10. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 333-34.
11. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 32a ; Amin Qizwini, ff. 209-11.
12. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 356 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 213b.

appealed to Randola Khan for help. He wrote him a letter of warning, stressing the deplorable condition of the Nizam Shahis. Muqarrab Khan replied, "Dharwar has been captured ; Nasiri, the Mughul commander, is busy in taking Qandahar and Nasik has fallen to Khwaja Abu'l Hasan. Only Daulatabad and its dependencies are left under Nizam Shah." Muqarrab Khan offered Sholapur to 'Adil Shah in return for his help to Nizam Shah. He warned Randola Khan that if Sholapur also fell to the imperialists, the end of the Nizam Shahi dynasty would soon be at hand and this would result first in the destruction of Bijapur state and then the conquest of the entire Deccan by the Mughuls. This appeal of Muqarrab Khan impressed 'Adil Shah, who concluded a defensive and offensive alliance with Nizam Shah.[14]

MUGHUL PRESSURE ON PARINDA

The alliance between the two Deccan states offended 'Azam Khan who reminded Randola Khan of his promise to further the Mughul cause. Randola Khan did not reply. The Mughuls besieged Parinda. A Bijapur army, sent under Vitholji Maratha to help the besieged, was defeated.[15]

The famine which occured in 1039/1631, and continued for two years in Central and Southern India also badly affected the Deccan. Contemporary Indian writers, like 'Abdu'l Hamid Lahori, Muhammad Sadiq and Muhammad Salih Kambu and Western travellers including Van Twist and Peter Mundy have given a detailed account of the severity of the famine. The famine checked the Mughul progress in the Deccan and the imperialists had to retreat from many places, because of scarcity of food. Provisions were not procurable as far as seven miles from Parinda. Foraging parties could bring only two or

13. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 32b, 33a.
14. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp 356-58.
15. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 355, Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 29-32a.

three days' supply.[16] 'Azam Khan at first redoubled his efforts to capture the fort but later decided to withdraw. The enemy pursued the Mughuls closely and inflicted heavy losses on them.[17]

QANDAHAR

Foiled in his sttempt to capture Parinda, 'Azam Khan advanced to reinforce Nasir Khan who was besieging Qandahar. Despite great resistance offered by 'Adil Shahi commanders, Sarfaraz Khan and Randola Khan, the Mughul pressure intensified. Consequently, the besieged commander Sadiq surrendered the fort on May 7, 1631. A vast booty fell to the victorious army, including ten elephants and one hundred and sixteen cannons, four of them being well renowned-*Malik-i-Maidan, Bijli, Maidan-i-Dip* and *Mulk Zabt*. The fort of Manganu also fell shortly.[18]

The success of 'Azam Khan discouraged the Nizam Shahis so much that some of their commanders deserted to the Mughuls. Sahu* approached 'Azam Khan and requested the Mughul commander to take him in the imperial service. The Maratha chief came with two thousand followers who were genereously treated. Sahu was given a *mansab* of 6000, an elephant and a horse. His nephew Minaji and Minaji's son Sabaji were given ranks of 300 and 200 respectively. His other followers Maloji, Iloji and Habaji were also given appropriate ranks in the Mughul army [19]

TELINGANA AND BERAR

Khwaja Abu'l Hasan, who was deputed to lead the army in

16. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 362-64; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 29-32; Salih Kambu, i, pp. 318-20: William Foster, iv, pp. 180-81; Peter Mundy, *Travels in Asia*, ii, (1628-34) ed. by Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Cambridge, 1914; For a detailed account of the famine see Yar Muhammad Khan, *The Great Indian Famine*, (1631-32) in *Punjab University Historical Studies* (1963-64), Historical Research Institute, Punjab University, Lahore, 1964, pp. 39-46.
17. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 34-35.
18. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 371-77; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 34b, 35a.

* also known as Shahji Bhonsla.

19. Amin Qizwini, f. 213a.

Telingana, made good progress at first, but has to retire later through scarcity of provisions, caused by the famine. He sent Zafar Khan who seized some *parganas* of Galna and came back with a large booty.[20] The Deccanis burnt the stores of provisions in the neighbouring area lest the imperialists could make use of them. The Mughuls had to forage as far as thirty miles to collect provisions and fodder.[21] But in spite of all these hardships, the Mughuls succeeded in capturing Nasik after a siege of four months. Trimbak was next to be taken by the Mughul army. At the request of Sahu, now a Mughul noble, Nasik was handed over to him.[22] The imperialists advannced toward Taltum and Satunda, which fell without much resistance. After strengthening the newly conquered area, Khwaja Abu'l Hasan retired to Shahgarh. Wazir Khan, the Mughul commander drove out the Nizam Shahis who had entered Berar.[23]

CIVIL WAR AMONG THE NIZAM SHAHIS

Although the Nizam Shahis were already suffering badly at the hands of the Mughuls, civil war weakened their defence still further. The reason was, that after the death of Malik 'Ambar, there was no one left who could influence the distracted and selfish Nizam Shahis. Those who claimed to be serving the cause of the dynasty, were in fact, struggling to gain power for themselves. Murtaza Nizam Shah was himself no less responsible for hastening the downfall of his dynasty. He was not a man of will strong enough to enforce his commands. He could be persuaded to change his mind due to his vacillating nature. Because of the rivalry between Fath Khan, the *wakil* and Muqarrab Khan, the supreme commander, Murtaza Nizam Shah, imprisoned Fath Khan. But soon he changed his mind. His wife, who was the sister of Fath Khan, convinced her husband that her brother was the only suitable person to retrieve the Nizam Shahi prestige. Nizam Shah, therefore, brought Fath Khan out of prison

20. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 361.
21. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 22a.
22. Hamid Lahorl, i, Pt. I, p. 367.
23. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 38b ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt I. pp. 367-70.

and reinstated him in his origional post in November, 1631.[24] As a result, Muqarrab Khan was dismissed from his post.

This action of Murtaza Nizam Khan gave Muqarrab Khan the necessary incentive to join the Mughuls. It can, therefore, be suggested that he too was not inspired by dynastic feelings of service to his master, but by a desire to retain power as long as he could. As soon as power was taken from him, he was willing to join the Mughuls against whom he had fought so long. His was not the only instance. In fact, it will be found that throughout the course of Mughul-Deccan relations, many Deccanis who were deprived of power in their country, went over to the Mughuls.

Muqarrab Khan sent Tanaji to 'Azam Khan and asked him to join the imperial service. The Mughal commander accepted his request and sent his son Multafat Khan to welcome Muqarrab Khan. The deserter was given a jewelled dagger, four horses and one lakh rupees in cash. Later, Shah Jahan bestowed the title of Habsh Khan on Muqarrab Khan and gave him the rank of *panj hazari* in the Mughul army.[25]

Muqarrab Khan's dismissal from the post of supreme command of Nizam Shahi army was not the end of the civil war in the state. Fath Khan was well aware of the suspicious and wavering nature of Murtaza Nizam Shah. Actually Fath Khan anticipated Murtaza Nizam Shah's next move and as the saying goes, took time by the forelock. He imprisoned Murtaza Nizam Shah and declared his ten years old son Husain as the new Nizam Shah. In order to gain Mughul support, he alleged that by doing so, his aim was to serve the Emperor. Shah Jahan appreciated Fath Khan's action and asked him to kill his captive as a further proof of his sincerity. Fath Khan complied with the imperial order. He made Murtaza drink a cup of poison and then publicity declared that he had died a natural death.

24. Amin Qizwini, ff. 245-47b.

25. Muhammad Sadiq f. 36a ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 379.

He also killed his other fifty opponents.[26] Shah Jahan sent Shukrullah 'Arab to Daulatabad with eleven horses and a *khila'at* as a reward to Fath Khan for his services. The Emperor further demanded that Fath Khan should send all jewels, valuables and elephants and the boy-king to the imperial court.[27]

Shah Jahan's demands were meant to bring Daulatabad under him, without further hostilities. But the delay of Fath Khan in carrying out the imperial demands forced Shah Jahan to order Wazir Khan and Nusrat Khan to capture Daulatabad. Asaf Khan, who was conducting operations against 'Adil Shah, was instructed not to hand over any newly conquered territory to Fath Khan until the submission of the latter.[28]

The march of the imperial armies toward Daulatabad frightened Fath Khan. He now hastened to submit to the Emperor and apologized for his conduct. He also sent his son 'Abd-ur-Rasul with a letter of submission, thirty elephants, nine 'Iraqi horses and costly diamonds and a *peshkesh* worth twenty lakh rupees. He read the *khutba* and struck coins in Shah Jahan's name and promised to remain loyal to the Mughul Emperor, but cleverly enough, he retained the fort of Daulatabad under his own control. And then, not long afterwards, in March, 1632, Shah Jahan left Burhanpur for Delhi.[29]

With the submission of Fath Khan in 1632, the first phase of Mughul relations with the Nizam Shahis under Shah Jahan comes

26. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 395, 402; Amin Qizwini f. 247a. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 37b, 38a; Jalal-ud-Din Tabatabai, *Padshah Namah*, B.M. or 1676 ff. 4b, 5a.

27. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 402; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 38a.

28. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 39a.

29. Jalal Tabatabai, f. 5a; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 421-22, Amin Qizwini, ff. 244b, 245a, 247a; Abu'l Qasim b. Razi-ud-Din ul-Musawi surnamed Mir 'Alam, *Hadiqat-ul-'Alam*, B. M Add. 26258, f. 245a.

to an end. The state was not formally annexed but was reduced to impotence. The territories lost under Jahangir and in the early years of Shah Jahan's reign were regained. The aim of Shah Jahan in coming to the Deccan was partly accomplished. The rebellion of Khan Jahan Lodi was suppressed. Balaghat, Dharwar and Qandahar were captured by the Mughuls, though this did not mean the final victory over the Nizam Sahis. Sahu still stood for the N zam Shah and challenged the Mughul domination. The unscrupulous 'Adil Shah was ready to help Nizam Shah, though primarily for the safety of his own kingdom, and finally Husain Nizam Shah, the pupet king, was yet not handed over to the Mughuls by Fath Khan.

SHAH JAHAN'S RETIREMENT TO DELHI

The court writers give two reasons for the Emperor's retirement to Delhi. They mention that because the imperial prestige in the South was retrieved and Mumtaz Mahal, the beloved wife of the Emperor, had died at Burhanpur in *Zilqadah* 1040/July, 1631, so he did not wish to stay any longer in the Deccan. There in no doubt that Shah Jahan's grief for Mumtaz Mahal was so intense that he did not wish to prolong his stay at Burhanpur, the place of her death, but he waited for nine months after Mumtaz Mahal's death until the submission of Fath Khan. Why was this so ? A critical examination of the contemporary evidence suggests some other reasons too. Muhammad Salih Kambu, 'Abdu'l Hamid Lahori and Muhammad Sadiq give a gruesome account of the famine of 1631-32, which not only affected southern India, Malwa and Gujarat, but spread over a much greater area and resulted in large scale devastation.[30] Lahori records that human life was offered for a loaf and none bought it. For a long time, dog's flesh was sold in public as mutton and bones of dead animals ground with flour were consumed by people. It appears that it was really the scarcity of provisions, which forced the Emperor to leave the Deccan.[31]

30. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 318-20; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 362-64; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 29-32a.

31. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 362-64.

Another reason for Shah Jahan's departure for the North, was his underrating of the Nizam Shahi resistance. He was under a false impression that after the submission of Fath Khan, the Nizam Shahis were reduced to such a perilous state that if they stood against the imperial might, an able Mughul general would be able to crush them. Under this impression, he transferred many of the commanders to different provinces before his march to Delhi. For example Nasiri Khan was sent to Malwa and 'Abdullah Khan Firuz Jung Bahadur was made governor of Bijar. Asaf Khan was sent with a large army against Bijapur.[32] The imperial commanders deputed to carry on the campaign, during Shah Jahan's absence proved to be unsuccessful. Sahu's activities which took a serious turn during 1633-36, were unexpected and Shah Jahan had to come again to the South to settle this thorny issue once for all.

After Asaf Khan's refusal to accept the governorship of the Deccan, the Emperor appointed 'Azam Khan,[33] to the post. But soon Mahabat Khan took over the administration of the Mughul Deccan. Mahabat Khan and his four sons, namely, Lahrasp, Dilir Himmat, Gurshasp and Afrasiyab and his grandson Shukrullah were given *khil'ats* by the Emperor. Hakim Khushhal Khan was made *Bakhshi* and *Waqi'ah Nawis* of the imperial army.[34]

GALNA

Mahmud Khan, the Nizam Shahi commander of Galna, now turned against Fath Khan. Sahu, who had recently changed his loyalty from the Mughuls to Nizam Shah, tried to induce Mahmud Khan to join hands with him. When Khan Zaman came to know of Sahu's intentions, he sent Mir Qazim to Galna to persuade Mahmud

32. Amin Qizwini, ff. 239-40b ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 424-26.

33. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 424 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 248a ; Jalal Tabatabai, f. 6a.

34. Amin Qizwini, ff. 248b-249b ; Jalal Tabatabai, ff. 7b, 8a ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 41b ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 424-428.

Khan to join the Mughul service and assured him of a high rank. Thinking that his advantage lay in joining with a stronger power, Mahmud dismissed Sahu's envoy and surrendered the fort to the imperialists. He was given a *mansab* of 4000 and fifty thousand rupees in cash.[35] Galna thus came under the Mughuls peacefully due to rivalry among the Nizam Shahis.

MUGHULS AND SAHU

After the death of Malik 'Ambar, the most formidable enemy of the Mughuls was Sahu. Like many other Nizam Shahis, he was true to his own personal interests rather than to the cause of the Nizam Shahi dynasty. Sahu belonged to Maharashtra—a large tract in western India, now a state in India. Hindus known as Ratthas, Maharathas or Rashtrakutas lived in this area. The people spoke Marathi—a *Prakrit* dialect. According to the *Puranas*, Bhonsle Khastriyas, to which clan, Sahu belonged, were *shudras*. For that reason, some Brahmins objected to Shivaji's coronation to be performed according to Brahmanic rites. But modern researchers have claimed that the family of Sahu was connected with the Sisodia Ranas of Udipur.

Sahu was of such an insignificant status under Malik 'Ambar, that no contemporary Muslim author mentions his name. He, however, rose to prominence under Fath Khan, the son of Malik 'Ambar. Sahu changed his loyalties many times. He joined the Mughuls, who gave him a rank of 6000 and fought against the Nizam Shahis. But when he saw better chances in Daulatabad, he deserted the Mughuls. Earlier, when he joined the Mughul service in 1631, some *mahals* of Fath Khan, the then enemy of the Emperor, were given to him. When Fath Khan submitted to the Mughuls in February, 1632, his *mahals*, then held by Sahu, were restored to him. This transfer of his allotment annoyed Sahu, who left the Mughuls and went to Bijapur[36]. Fath Khan's aggressive attitude towards

35. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 443-44.
36. Jalal Tabatabai, f. 48a ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 45b.

Husain Nizam Shah gave an opportunity to Sahu to arouse public feelings against the king-maker. 'Adil Shah, who was then pressed hard by the Mughuls, also saw his advantage in helping Sahu in order to relieve Mughul pressure upon Bijapur.

Sahu planned first to take Daulatabad from Fath Khan before himself striking a blow against the Mughuls. Reinforced by Bijapuri artillery, he advanced toward Daulatabad[37]. Fath Khan, unable to to resist Sahu. became frightened because the fort was not well provisioned due to the prevailing famine. He requested Mahabat Khan for help and in return offered Daulatabad to the Mughuls[38]. This tempting offer made Mahabat Khan send reinforcements to Fath Khan immediately. Khan Zaman was despatched to Daulatabad while Lahrasp was sent to check Sahu's advance. A battle took place at a distance of seven miles from Daulatabad and Sahu was defeated. He was pursued by the victorious army as far as Khirki.[39]

CONQUEST OF DAULATABAD

Foiled in his attempt to take Daulatabad by force, Sahu attempted to win over Fath Khan by peaceful means. 'Adil Shah also wrote a letter to Fath Khan and reminded him of close relations between the Deccan states in the past. He promised to supply Fath Khan with provisions, which were urgently needed by the besieged and offered further three lakh *huns* in cash, if he joined the Bijapuris. Fath Khan was warned by 'Adil Shah that the Mughuls were not helping him out of any sympathy, but to take the fort for themselves. The inducements and warnings worked effectively on Fath Khan and he decided to join 'Adil Shah[40]. News of the desertion of Fath Khan was conveyed to Mahabat Khan, who ordered Khan Zaman Khan to invest the fort. He himself soon followed the messenger.

37. Amin Qizwini, f. 278a.
38. Hamid Lahori. i, Pt. I, pp. 496-97 ; Amin Qizwini f. 279a.
39. Muhammad Sadiq. ff. 45b, 46a ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 497.
40. Amin Qizwini, f. 280a, Mir 'Alam, f. 256a ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 46a.

In order to avoid the past mistakes of the imperialists, Mahabat Khan started the campaign of Daulatabad more vigilantly. He won over local dealers of corn and guarded the communication line for a regular supply of provisions during the course of siege[41]. His arrival at Daulatabad on March 1, 1633, marks the second phase of Shah Jahan's relations with the Nizam Shahis. Batteries were erected and the siege was tightened.

The main fortress of Daulatabad had three adjoining fortifications—'Ambarkot, Mahakot and Kalakot. In order to reach the main fortress, the capture of these fortifications was necessary. The Mughuls first undertook to conquer 'Ambarkot. Fath Khan removed Husain Nizam Shah to Mahakot, while he himself stayed at Kalakot. Though the desertion of a Maratha commander, Khiloji, formerly in the Mughul service, jeopardised the besiegers' position for the time being, yet they stood firm and captured 'Ambarkot[42].

Mahakot was next to be invested by the Mughuls. The besieged attempted to divert Mughul attention by sending Farhad Khan' and Bahlol to create trouble in Berar, but Mahabat Khan saw through the ruse. He despatched Khan Zaman and Rao Satarsal, who drove the enemy out of Berar[43]. The shortage of food made the matter worse for the besieged. Randola Khan and Sahu planned to send them a thousand horseload of provisions guarded by three thousand Karnatak musketeers. The imperialists dispersed the enemy guard and captured the whole train of provisions[44].

With the arrival of Murari Pandit, the Bijapuri commander, the moral of Randola Khan and Sahu rose again and they intensified

41. Jalal Tabatabai, f. 51a ; Amin Qizwini, f. 280b.

42. Amin Qizwini, ff. 281-88b ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 46a, 48a.

43. Salih Kambu, i, p. 585.

44. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 49a ; Salih Kambu, i, p. 586 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 289b.

their guerilla tactics[45]. They intercepted the imperial party, which had gone to bring arms and money from Burhanpur under Khan Zaman. An army of 9000 Deccanis attacked the imperialists near Khirki and inflicted heavy losses on them. After great difficulty the Mughuls arrived at Daulatabad with a cash of six lakh rupees, one hundred *mans* of naphtha and two hundred loads of provisions[46].

The arrival of the reinforcements at the Mughul camp disheartened Fath Khan. The Mughuls dug a mine and placed naphtha in it. Fath Khan requested Mahabat Khan to postpone the firing of the mine for two days. In order to test his fidelity, Mahabat Khan asked Fath Khan to send his son as hostage. On the refusal of Fath Khan to send his son, the Mughul detonated the mine and took the fort[47].

The Mughuls now turned to capture Kalakot. The failure of the Bijapuris in sending provisions to the besieged and the fall of 'Ambarkot and Mahakot, discouraged Fath Khan and lowered his resistance. Moreover, Kalakot was also about to fall. In distress Fath Khan sent his son 'Abd-ur-Rasul, to seek pardon for his past misdeeds. He promised to surrender Daulatabad and demanded seven days in which to evacuate the fort. Mahabat Khan agreed and gave Fath Khan two lakh rupees and supplied him some means of transport. After the expiry of the period, Fath Khan evacuated the fort on June 17, 1633, and the imperialists occupied it. The news of the conquest of Daulatabad was conveyed to the Emperor. Mahabat Khan was given a *khil'at* ornamented with *nadiri* and pearls and was promoted in his *mansab* by 1000 *zat*. Nasiri Khan was entitled Khan Dauran and was raised to 5000 *zat wa sawar*.

45. Jalal Tabatabai, f. 52a ; Salih Kambu, i, pp. 588-89 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 290b.

46. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 592-93 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 50-51b.

47. Amin Qizwini, ff. 295b, 296a ; Jalal Tabatabai, f. 68f ; Salih Kambu, i, pp. 599-601.

Khan Zaman was also rewarded[48].

In order to avoid any possible treachery on the part of Fath Khan, Mahabat Khan put him and Husain Nizam Shah III under strict surveillance. Later, both were sent to Delhi, where they arrived on September 2, 1633. Husain Nizam Shah was sent to the fortress of Gwaliar where Bahadur, one of his predecessors, was already passing his days as a state prisoner. Fath Khan was granted an annual pension of two lakh rupees[49] and he retired from active politics.

Before his march for the North, Mahabat Khan thought it proper to organize the newly conquered area. As the fort of Daulatabad lacked both provisions and equipment, most of the imperialists were reluctant to stay any longer in the South after Mahabat Khan's departure. The choice of Mahabat Khan fell on Khan Dauran who was appointed *qaladar* of Daulatabad. He was assisted by Sayyid Murtaza with two thousand cavalry[50].

The Bijapuris intercepted Mahabat Khan's march to Burhanpur, but in doing so they lost many officers including Tanaji Doriya. Murari Pandit sent Farhad Khan to conclude peace with Mahabat Khan, who refused to listen to any such offer, because of the past treachery of the Bijapuris[51]. Foiled in their attempt to outdo the Mughuls in diplomacy, the Bijapuris advanced to regain Daulatabad. But Khan Dauran made the enemy's efforts fruitless. When Mahabat Khan was apprised of the situation, he hastened from Zafarnagar toward Daulatabad. He was within fifteen miles from the fort when the 'Adil Shahis fled and so Mahabat Khan resumed his journey to Delhi[52].

48. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 603-607 ; Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 46b-47a, Muhammad Sadiq, f. 52b-53b ; Jalal Tabatabai f. 70b.
49. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 618-19 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 54a.
50. Jalal Tabatabai, f. 72a ; Salih Kambu, i, p. 609.
51. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 52b, 53a.
52. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 610-11.

Though the Mughuls had recaptured Daulatabad and Husain Nizam Shah III was made a state prisoner, yet this could not be regarded as their final victory against the Nizam Shahis. The Mughul success had been a successful military operation. Except for some greedy nobles, the Nizam Shahis in general, due to their long association with the royal house of Ahmadnagar, were not ready to change their loyalties easily from Nizam Shah to the Mughul Emperor. The Mughuls no doubt had captured the important cities and forts of Ahmadnagar and Daulatabad but could not capture the hearts of the people. In other words, the Nizam Shahi population had simply submitted to Mughul force but did not acknowledge the Emperor in their hearts. This covert antipathy of the people towards the Mughuls was fully exploited by opportunists like Sahu and others and they began to rally support for their only subversive cause. After the fall of Daulatabad, when Iradat Khan, the imperial commander, attempted to persuade Sahu to join the imperial service, the latter brushed the offer aside. He told Iradat Khan that the loss of Daulatabad did not matter to him much, because he would make Junair the new Nizam Shahi capital and continue to fight against the Mughuls.[53]

The existence of a new Nizam Shah was necessary for Sahu to gain support in the Deccan. He brought Murtaza, an eleven years scion of the Nizam Shahi family, from Jinjan and declared him the new Nizam Shah. This shows the traditional aspect of the dynastic loyalties in the seventeenth century India. A king-maker like Sahu, preferred to have a figurehead from among the royal family, seated on the throne, in whose name he could be *de facto* ruler rather than assuming the throne himself. A declaration of kingship by somebody other than a member of the royal family would be considered usurpation and a rebellious act and he would not be able to rally support for his cause. Hence kingship remained in the royal family. Sahu appealed to the Nizam Shahis in the name of his royal master and soon conquered Balaghat, Junair, Sangmir, Trimbak and Nasik. He

53. Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 48b, 49a.

held Poona and Chakan in his *jagir*.[54] He thus controlled a considerable area in his last bid to establish himself.

There are two reasons for Sahu's rapid progress. First, the bulk of the Mughul army was busy against Bijapur at that time. The Mughuls, therefore, could not pay much attention to Sahu. Second, the recall of Prince Shuja' in August, 1634, from the Deccan and the death of Mahabat Khan in October, 1634, left the imperialists without any able commander there. Murtaza Khan and Allah Wardi Khan, the imperial governors of Daulatabad and Payinghat, were no match for the military skill of Sahu.[55] After devastating the dependencies of Daulatabad, Sahu advanced to capture the main fort. Murtaza Khan was forced to consider the surrender of the fort, but Khan Dauran arrived in time.[56]

SHAH JAHAN'S MARCH TO THE SOUTH

Jajhar Singh's rebellion, which broke out in the middle of 1635, proved to be a blessing in disguise for the Mughuls. The ineffectiveness of the Mughul commanders against both Sahu and Jajhar Sigh Bundela made Shah Jahan think that his own presence at the seat of war may be necessary for success. He, therefore, left Delhi on September 21, 1635, for the South.[57] The march of the Emperor frightened 'Adil Shah, because of his help to Sahu. He sent Shaikh Dabir to Shah Jahan and begged for mercy. But the Emperor was not easily to be satisfied. Shah Jahan sent his envoys to Bijapur and Golconda and asked their rulers to stop assisting

54. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 48 ; Ghulam Murtaza, f. 48b ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 56b.

55. Shah Nawaz Khan, *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*, ed. by Mirza Ashraf 'Ali, Bib. Ind. Calcutta, i, pp. 208-14 ; iii, pp. 280-85 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff 53b, 59b, 70b.

56. Amin Qizwlni, f. 336a.

57. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 63b, 65-69b ; Jalal Tabatabai, ff. 137-38b, 159a ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 101-14, 147-48.

Sahu.[58] The particulars of these missions have been recorded in detail in separate chapters.

The arrival of Shah Jahan at Daulatabad on December 10, 1635, marks the third and last phase of the Nizam Shahi history during this period. By this time the rebellion of Jajhar Singh had been crushed, so the Mughuls could concentrate against the Deccanis with singleness of purpose. An offensive plan on a large scale was devised. Shah Jahan deployed three armies against Sahu and his allies. An army of 12,000 men was placed under Khan Dauran, who was assisted by Raja Jai Singh, Mubariz Khan and Raja Baithal Das. He was ordered to advance toward Qandahar and Nander to check any possible help to Sahu from Bijapur and Golconda. Khan Dauran was further ordered to conquer Ausa and Udgir and then to advance to Bijapur, if needed. A second army of 12,000 soldiers was placed under Khan Zaman, who was assisted by Bahadur Khan Rohilla, Sayyid Shuja'at Shah and Raja Satarsal. Khan Zaman was ordered to take Chunarcond and Ashti—the homeland of Sahu. Sha'ista Khan, the commander of the third army consisting of 6000 men including Allah Wardi Khan, Shaikh Farid and Raja Sang Ram, was deputed to capture Junir, Sangmir, Nasik and Trimbak. The armies left on December 22, 1635.[59]

By despatching his armies toward the enemy's strongholds like Qandahar and Nander, Shah Jahan sealed the Nizam Shahi border against any assistance from outside. To give any more time to Sahu, when the Mughuls were free from any internal disturbance or external aggression, would mean strengthening the Nizam Shahis. It was time therefore, to finish with Sahu once for all and merge the state of Ahmadnagar into the Mughul Empire.

58. Amin Qizwini, ff. 363b-364b ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 153-55.

59. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 153-55 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 69b, 70a ; Jalal Tabatabai, ff. 164b, 165a.

SHA'ISTA KHAN'S SUCCESS

Sha'ista Khan started his campaign by sending Allah Wardi Khan and Sayyid Wahab Ullah to capture Chandore, which fell after a little resistance. Kunhar Rao, the Nizam Shahi commander of Anjari, was next to submit to Allah Wardi Khan on February 8, 1636. Kunhar Rao was given a *mansab* of 2000 and fifty thousand rupees in cash and he helped the Mughuls in the conquest of Kanjhana and Manjhana. Other forts such as Rolah, Jolah, Ahunat, Kol and Achla fell within a short time. The fort of Raj Dev Hara, where some members of the Nizam Shahi family were taking refuge, took a longer time. Given assurance of a *mansab* of 3000, Bhoj Mal, the besieged commander, surrendered the fort to the Mughuls.[60]

While the lieutenants of Sha'ista Khan were making progress in the North-west, he himself was busy in reducing the western parts of the enemy's country. He first captured Sangmir and then took Nasik. Despite the fact that Sahu tried to divert Mughul pressure by creating trouble in Konkan, Sha'ista Khan conquered Junair. The Mughul commander pursued the enemy as far as river Bhima and then marched toward Ramgir, which fell without any battle. In short Sha'ista Khan captured twenty forts, big and small, and seven *parganahs* such as Gulshanabad, Jandori, Angola and others, an area yielding a revenue of 26,000,000 *dams* annually.[61]

A treaty was at last concluded between 'Adil Shah and Shah Jahan in May, 1636, which marked the end of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, after an independent existence of one hundred and six years. The state of Ahmadnagar was finally annexed to the Mughul Empire. In fact the death of Malik 'Ambar had signalled the coming extinction of the dynasty. The Nizam Shahi nobility was no less responsible in hastening the downfall of Ahmadnagar kingdom. The part played by Fath Khan, Muqarrab Khan and Sahu as saviours of the kingdom

60. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 166-69 ; Amin Qizwini, ff. 368b, 369a.
61. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 70b, 71a.

plunged the state into civil war, because each of them was playing for his own ends. The Nizam Shah's political power was greatly reduced, his resources were exhausted and his army attenuated. In a *jagirdari* society like the one prevalent in the Deccan, if once the federal government became weak, the nobles with the support of armies under their immediate command, acted as king-makers. Murtaza Nizam Shah and his successors depended entirely on the help and goodwill of their promoters, who wanted to secure their personal ascendency. On the other hand, Mughul diplomacy caused many to come over to the Mughul side, as tempting offers in the form of *mansabs* were made to the Deccani commanders.

According to the *Ahdnamah* (i.e. treaty) of 1636, 'Adil Shah promised not to render any more assistance to Sahu and to work in closer co-operation with the Mughuls. The overall success of the Mughul commanders against the Nizam Shahis convinced Shah Jahan that his presence in the Deccan was no longer required. He appointed his third son Prince Aurangzab, 18, as viceroy of the Mughul Deccan. Khan Dauran and Khan Zaman were instructed to help the Prince in reducing the remaining forts of the Nizam Shahis. Thus after a stay of nine months, Shah Jahan left the Deccan on June 19, 1636, for Delhi.[62]

AURANGZEB'S FIRST APPOINTMENT IN THE DECCAN

Aurangzeb planned first to reduce the forts of Udgir and Ausa and then to deal with Sahu. He sent Khan Dauran to capture these forts. Khan Dauran made a successful attempt to persuade Sayyidi Miftah, the commander of Udgir, to surrender the fort which was captured on Thursday, September 28, 1636. Sayyidi Miftah was given a rank of 3000 *zat* in the Mughul service and the title of Habsh Khan. Khan Dauran now invested Ausa which fell on October 19, 1636.[36]

62. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 195-98.

63. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 217-21, Muhammad Sadiq, f. 61a.

Khan Zaman was deputed to round up Sahu and in his efforts was assisted by Randola Khan, the Bijapuri commander. Poona, the headquarters of Sahu, was ravaged by the Mughuls. Sahu fled from one place to another with the Mughuls and Bijapuris at his heels. His cattle-drums, flags, elephants and a large quantity of ammuntion was captured. He had only two hundred followers left with him, when he finally took refuge in Mahuli. Khan Zaman promptly reached Mahuli and besieged it. Reduced to extremities, Sahu submitted to the Mughuls. Junair and six other forts and puppet Murtaza Nizam Shah were handed over by Sahu to the imperialists. Murtaza Nizam Shah was later sent by the Emperor to Gwaliar fort as a state prisoner. The campaign against the Nizam Shahis thus ended in October, 1636. Sahu went to 'Adil Shah, who bestowed Poona and Supa on him as his *jagir*. Khan Zaman was rewarded by Aurangzeb for his meritorious services.[64]

The Mughul border became closer to Bijapur and Golconda, which could easily be threatened at slightest offence. Aurangzeb extended the Mughul influence over Baglana and Gondwana in the South.[65] For the sake of better administration the Mughul Deccan was divided into four provinces : (1) Daulatabad including Ahmadnagar with its capital at Daulatabad. (ii) Telingana with its capital at Nander (iii) Khandesh with its capital at Burhanpur and (iv) Berar with its capital at Ellichpur. The Mughul governor himself generally resided at Daulatabad, the headquarters of the Mughul Deccan which by then had sixty-four forts—fifty-three forts in the hills and thirteen in the plains.

64. Hamid Lahori, ii, pp. 225-30 ; Jalal Tabatabai, ff. 161b, 162a.

65. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 219-20, 292 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, pp. 532, 937 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 561-64 ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 219-20, 292.

CHAPTER VIII

SHAH JAHAN'S RELATIONS WITH QUTB SHAH

Shah Jahan's relations with Qutb Shah remained generally cordial but for the crisis of 1656. There were two reasons for maintaining these good relations. Firstly, Shah Jahan acknowledged the help given him by Qutb Shah during the prince's rebellion against Jahangir. Secondly, Golconda was a small and weak state whose new ruler only fourteen years of age, wanted to establish himself first before he could fight against the Mughuls. The Mughuls fully exploited Qutb Shah's political weakness which ultimately resulted in the disintegration of the state.

The first contact of Shah Jahan with Golconda came in April, 1628, when Shaikh Mohy-id-Din was despatched to Qutb Shah to inform him formally of the Emperor's accession to the throne. The imperial envoy was given a warm reception at Haiderabad. On his return journey in March, 1631, the Shaikh was accompanied by Wafa Khan, the Golconda envoy. The presents sent by Qutb Shah were accepted and Wafa Khan was rewarded.[1]

The presence of Shah Jahan at the head of large armies in the South in 1631 to fight the Nizam Shahis frightened Qutb Shah.[2] Shah Jahan sent Shah 'Ali Beg to Golconda and demanded a large *peshkesh.* Qutb Shah complied with the imperial *farman.* He further showed his submission by sending the captured relatives of the rebel Jhajhar Singh to the Emperor. Furthermore, Qutb Shah refused to give any assistance to Nizam Shah in 1632-33, despite 'Adil Shah's request to

1. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 356; Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad, b. 'Abdullah Shirazi us Sa'di, *Hadiqat-us-Salatin* B.M. Add. 6542, f. 228a.
2. Amin Qizwini, ff. 206, 207a.

do so. The fear of Mughul power evidently forced Qutb Shah to adopt a submissive attitude.

Golconda-Iran relations had a direct bearing on the Mughuls' relations with Golconda. It has been already mentioned that Golconda rulers had adopted the *Shi'a* creed as early as 1507 and names of the Twelve Imams were included in the *khutba* which was read after the *Shi'a* style. As to the year in which the name of the Shah of Iran was incorporated in the *khutba* in Golconda, no specific mention is made in the chronicles. However, the name of Shah of Iran was read in the *khutba* in Golconda when Shah Jahan became the Emperor of Hindustan. Akbar and Jahangir were least motivated by religious sentiments in their desire to conquer the Deccan. Shah Jahan was the first Mughul Emperor who was to some extent influenced by religious sentiments in his dealings with Golconda. But the chief cause of Shah Jahan's antipathy towards Qutb Shah was political. But it must be kept in mind that Shah Jahan was orthodox in his religious views during the first half of his reign when he was free from Dara's liberal ideas. Once the Emperor fell under the spell of Dara's 'panthiestic views' he adopted a more liberal policy.[4]

No sovereign state could allow its subordinate ally to have political relations with a foreign country hostile to itself. Shah Jahan, therefore, could not tolerate Golconda acknowledging him as its overlord on the one hand and at the same time continue to have the *khutba* read in the name of a foreign ruler. Qutb Shah had to be made to stop this double dealing. When the Emperor left Delhi in September, 1635, for the South, he sent 'Abdul Latif, his imperial envoy, to Golconda demanding from Qutb Shah a large *peshkesh* and his complete submission to him. The ruler was address-

3. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 34b, 70a ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 157-58, Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad b, 'Abdullah Shirazi us-Sa'di, f. 264b.

4. Iftikhar Ahmad Ghauri, *War of Succession between the sons of Shah Jahan*, Lahore, 1964, pp. 65-74.

ed as Qutb-ul-Mulk and with such titles as are suitable only for a noble and not a king. The letter of Shah Jahan to Qutb Shah has been given at length in order to understand the Empror's policy towards Golconda.

"To Qutb ul-Mulk, who is a well-wisher and faithful to the Mughul Emperor and on whom the royal favours have always been bestowed.

As I am king of Islam and belong to *Sunni* faith it is, therefore, incumbent upon me to enforce the laws of *Sharia't* in all those parts where my authority is exercised, and remove apostasy. It has been brought to my notice that the Companions of the Prophet (meaning Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Usman only) are stigmatized in Golconda, while the *Qur'an* clearly praises them. If such innovations continue, it would be legal for me to conquer your country, Furthermore, the *khutba* is read in the name of the Shah of Iran. How can it be possible that you acknowledge me as your overlord, while you read the *khutba* in the name of a foreign ruler ? You should drop his name and include mine in the *khutba*. You should send *peshkesh* regularly and pay the arrears. *Peshkesh* should consist of jewels, ornamented articles and famous elephants like *Daak Samundar* and *Bashir*. An envoy is being sent to collect the *peshkesh*. If you do not send the *peshkesh* before the New Year's celebrations and do not obey my commands, you would be responsible for the consequences and your state would be annexed."[5]

The contents of the letter frightened Qutb Shah into submission. The reason was that the presence of the Emperor at the head of a large army in the South left no way open for Qutb Shah but to submit. Any reluctance in obeying the imperial *farman* would have resulted in inviting the Mughuls to enter his country. A warm reception was given to 'Abdul Latif, and Qutb Shah himself advanced five

5. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 148 ; Amin Qizwini, ff. 361b, 362a ; Munshi Bhag Chand ; *Jam'i-ul-Insha'*, B.M. or. 1702, ff. 107b-109b ; Jalal Tabatabai ff. 159b, 160a.

miles to receive him. "Though the terms were hard," says the contemporary Deccani author of *Hadiqat-us-Salatin*, "yet on the advice of his counsellors and 'Ulama, Qutb Shah, in order to avoid bloodshed, acepted them."[6]

Qutb Shah stopped the reading of the *khutba* after the *Shi'a* style and included the names of the First Four Caliphs of Islam in it, which henceforth was read in Shah Jahan's name. During 'Abdul Latif's stay in Golconda, Qutb Shah went to *Jam-i-Masjid* of his capital for Friday prayers to see that his orders were carried out. To give further proof of his sincerity, he struck a few rupees and *ashrafis* in Shah Jahan's name and sent them to Delhi.[7]

The contents of the *Ahd Namah* (i.e. treaty) of 1636 will show the political status of Qutb Shah after this time. Qutb Shah promised solemnly that the terms of the *Ahd Namah* would be obeyed by him and his successors sincerely. They were :

(*i*) The names of the First Four Caliphs of Islam would be included in the *khutba*, which henceforth would be read in Shah Jahan's name in the Golconda kingdom. The name of Shah of Iran will be dropped from the *khutba*.

(*ii*) Qutb Shah would strike his gold and silver coins in the name of the Emperor according to the specimen sent to the imperial court.

(*iii*) Qutb Shah used to pay an anual *peshkesh* of four lakhs of *huns* to Nizam Shah. Since the Nizam Shahi kingdom ceased to exist, the Mughul Emperor had the legal right to exact that *peshkesh* from Qutb Shah. But Shah Jahan remitted half of the amount.

Qutb Shah agreed to pay an annual *peshkesh* of two lakhs of *huns* with effect from the ninth regnal year. The balance of past eight years together with the current *peshkesh* would be given either

6. Nizam-ud-Din Ahmad b. 'Abdullah Shirazi-us-Saidi ff. 273b, 274a.
7. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 177-78 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 525-26.

to the governor of the Mughul Deccan or to any other person deputed by the Emperor. The difference between the exchange value of Golconda and Delhi currency would be remitted by Qutb Shah immediately to the imperial treasury.

(*iv*) In case of aggression by 'Adil Shah (against Qutb Shah) the Mughul governor would be instructed to help Qutb Shah. If 'Adil Shah exacted any money from Qutb Shah by force that amount would be deducted from the annual *peshkesh* due to the Emperor.

(*v*) Qutb Shah promised to remain loyal to the Mughul cause.

(*vi*) Qutb Shah swore on the *Qur'an* in the presence of 'Abdul Latif, the imperial envoy, that if he acted contrary to these terms, the Mughul Emperor had the right to conquer his state.[8]

The *Ahd Namah* signed by Qutb Shah was presented to Shah Jahan at Daulatabad in *Safar*, 1045/April, 1636. On June 25, Qutb Shah sent a *peshkesh* worth forty lakhs of rupees through his envoy Shaikh Muhammad Tahir. The *peshkesh* included one hundred elephants, fifty Arabian and 'Iraqi horses, jewels and ornamented articles.

The treaty of 1636 reduced Golconda to a tributary state of the Mughul Empire. Whereas 'Adil Shah submitted at about the same time after considerable devastation of his state, Qutb Shah was over-awed by the threat of Mughul force and surrendered without war. Aurangzeb was appointed viceroy of the Mnghul Deccan for the first time by Shah Jahan before his march for Delhi in June, 1636. The imperial Deccan consisted of Khandesh, Berar, Ahmadnagar, Telingana, Balaghat and Payin Ghat. The affairs in the Deccan on the whole during the eight years of the first viceroyalty of the Prince

8. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 188-89 ; Bhag Chand ; ff. 114b, 115a ; Mulla Fayyaz, *Fayyaz-ul-Qawanin*, i, B.M. or 9617, f. 29 ; Amin Qizwini ff. 382b. 383 ; Hamid Lahori, i, t. II, pp. 177-80 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 77b, 78a.

remained undisturbed. Aurangzeb started the practice of keeping his *Hajib* i.e. representative, permanently at the courts of Bijapur and Golconda, an innovation which proved to be of great help to him during his second viceroyalty of the Deccan.

Relieved from the Deccan affairs in 1636, the Emperor devoted himself chiefly to bringing his ancestral lands in Central Asia under his control. The conquest of Transoxiana—Samarqand, Bukhara, Balkh and Badakhshan—had been the burning desire of Babur and his successors. Jahangir expressed similar views in his *Tuzuk* but his own pre-occupations in Hindustan hardly left him any time to accomplish his desire. The political circumstances in Central Asia provided an opportunity to Shah Jahan to embark upon this hazardous task. Imam Quli Khan, the Astrakhani ruler of Bukhara, left his native place for Mecca in 1642 after a reign of thirty-two years. He was succeeded by his younger brother Nazr Muhammad Khan. The harsh treatment meted out to his nobles by the new Khan resulted in civil war, which ended in the partition of the country.

Shah Jahan seized this opportunity to send his son Murad to Balkh which was captured by the Mughuls in July, 1646. Murad could not withstand the cold climate of Balkh and set out for India without his father's permission. Aurangzeb was deputed to go to Balkh. The Prince had to undergo many hardships but defeated the Uzbegs repeatedly. 'Abdul 'Aziz, son of Nazr Muhammad had to acknowledge the courage and tenacity exhibited by Aurangzeb. Realizing that any further stay by the Mughuls in Bukhara would take a heavy toll of life and money, Shah Jahan most diplomatically decided to restore the city to Nazr Muhammad Khan. The wars in Central Asia cost the Mughul exchequer more than four *krores* of rupees.[9]

Foiled in his attempts to conquer Transoxiana, Shah Jahan now vainly attempted to recapture Qandahar from the Qizilbashs, Lost to the Persians in 1622, Qandahar was regained by the Mughuls

9. Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, *Mirat-i-'Alam*, B.M. 7657 ; f. 336.

through the defection of its Persian governor 'Ali Mardan Khan. Shah 'Abbas II recovered it on February 11, 1649. The loss of Qandahar was a great setback to the Mughul prestige already suffered in Balkh. Shah Jahan, therefore, determined to retake it. Two expeditions were sent under Aurangzeb in 1649 and 1652 but the Mughuls failed to achieve any result. The Prince lacked the necessary seige-equipment and did not have a free hand in determining the conduct of war as Shah Jahan himself was issuing instructions from Kabul regarding the operations. When after great hardships, Aurangzeb was able to breach fort-walls, Shan Jahan ordered the abandonment of the siege. The failure of the campaign affected adversely Aurangzeb's military career. Dara was appointed in 1653 to make another attempt to recover Qandahar. Despite the fact that Dara's army was far superior to Aurangzeb's in men and siege-engines, he miserably failed to add any glory to the Mughul prestige.

Shah Jahan's attempt to form an alliance with Sultan Murad IV of the Ottoman Empire against the Persians had equally failed.[10] The expenditure on the campaigns in Balkh and Qandahar together with fortifications of Kabul and other strongholds in the North-west cost nearly two hundred million rupees to the imperial treasury.[11] A brief account of these campaigns is given in order to acquaint the reader with the setback to Mughul prestige in the North-west which subsequently became a major cause of Shah Jahan's territorial aggrandizement elsewhere. Since the Deccan states were secretly in league with the Shah of Iran, Shah Jahan seemed to have compensated for his failure in capturing Qandahar by the conquest of these states. Moreover, the Deccan states were rich and could easily compensate for the financial stringency with which the Mughuls were faced. During the nine years' absence of Aurangzeb from the South

10. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 319 321, 325, 333 ; iii, pp. 130-32 ; 179, 185, 196 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 574-75, 729, 731 ; Hamid Lahori, ii, pp 595, 602 ; Muhammad 'Ali Najafi, *Burhan-ul-Futuh*, B.M. or. 1884, f. 159a, b.

11. Muhammad Jahangir Khan, pp. 51, 52.

(1644-1653), six different governors were appointed to the Mughul Deccan : Khan Dauran, Islam Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Raja Jai Singh, Prince Murad and Sha'ista Khan.[12] This rapid change of the administrators in the Deccan encouraged Qutb Shah to withhold the *peshkesh.* He could temporize with the imperial representatives who went to collect the annual tribute and thus caused delay in sending it. The Emperor, who was busy in his campaigns in the North-west, seemed to have taken no active interest in the Deccan affairs. When tribute fell in arrears for three years, Sha'ista Khan wrote a threatening letter to Qutb Shah in 1058/1648.[13]

The appointment of Aurangzeb to the viceroyalty of the Deccan for the second time in 1653, marks the second and most significant phase of Qutb Shah's relations with Shah Jahan. Many modern writers have criticised Aurangzeb's relations with the Deccan states and have attributed their downfall to his sectarian fanaticism.

To understand the Mughul relations with the Deccan states during the period 1653-1658, it is necessary to give a picture of the court politics at Delhi and some other events which had a direct bearing on the subject. The court of Shah Jahan was more than ever driven by the issue of succession. It was divided into two major hostile groups, each trying to secure the succession of its own candidate. One party was headed by Dara under the patronage of Shah Jahan and Jahan Ara and the second by Sa'adullah Khan, the Prime Minister of the Empire, in favour of his candidate, Aurangzeb. "Between these two groups, the Emperor swung like a pendulum drawn by sentiment or self-interest in opposite directions with varying force."[14] This rivalry between his most beloved son i.e. Dara and his

12. Harsukh Rai, *Majm'a-ul-Akhbar*, B.M. or 1624, f. 512a ; Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, ff. 331b, 332a, 333a, 337b, 338a.
13. Haji 'Abdul 'Ali Tabrizi, *Murasilat-i-Qutb Shahi*, B.M. Add. 6600, ff. 1b-3a.
14. Islamica, 1925, i, p. 430 ; Bikramajit Hasrat, *Dara Shikoh*, Calcutta, 1953, pp. 84, 86, 218-19, 267 ; K.R. Qanungo ; *Dara Shukoh*, i, Calcutta 1935 ,p. 180.

esteemed *wazir*, made Shah Jahan almost as the enmity between Abu'l Fazl and Prince Salim had made Akbar. Aurangzeb and Sa'adullah Khan were in close co-operation with each other and the latter helped the former on more than one occasion. Many episodes are recorded about Dara attempting to humiliate both Sa'adullah Khan and Aurangzeb in the eyes of his father.[15] Dara had the advantage of being present at the imperial treasury. Aurangzeb's resources were limited and he was thus most anxious to seize any opportunity which would place him at the head of a large army to fight the inevitable war of succession. During the last ten years of his reign, Shah Jahan had redoubled his efforts to further the cause of his eldest son. He devised every method to ensure Dara's succession. The Emperor did his best to achieve that objective even at the cost of the honour and life of Aurangzeb. In order to weaken the power of Aurangzeb, Dara patronized both Qutb Shah and 'Adil Shah and assured them of his help. Dara's patronage of the Deccani rulers and their response to it, gave offence to Aurangzeb. Consequently Qutb Shah and 'Adil Shah did not pay any attention to Aurangzeb's instructions for they received imperial *farmans* directly, from Delhi. Aurangzeb did not even know the contents of these secret letters. He protested many a time against that practice but influenced by Dara, Shah Jahan did not listen to Aurangzeb.[16]

There are many instances when Aurangzeb protested against Shah Jahan's partiality towards *Shah-i-Buland Iqbal* (i.e. Dara).[17] Explaining the reason of his resignation from the viceroyalty of the Deccan in 1644, Aurangzeb once wrote to Jahan Ara in 1654. "If His

15. 'Inayatullah, *Ruqat-i-'Alamgiri*, ed. by Maulwi Karim-ud-Din, Agra, pp. 36-38 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 738 ; Hamid-ud-Din Khan, *Ahkam-i-'Alamgiri*, ed. by J.N. Sarkar, Calcutta, 1912, Rustam Ali, *Tarikh-i-Hindi*, B.M. or. 1628, ff. 198a, 199b, on the death of Sa'adullah Khan, Dara said : *Khar Murd*, i.e. the ass died.

16. Qabil Khan, *Adab-i-'Alamgiri*, B.M. or. 177, f. 32a ; Najib Ashraf, Nadwi, *Muqaddimah-i-Ruqq'at-i-'Alamgiri*, 'Azamgarh, 1930, pp. 264-65.

Majesty wants that of all his followers, I alone should live a dishonourable life, which simply would mean a waste of time, I am willing to do that. Whatever is ordered to me, if it pleases you, I submit. To live and die in this miserable way is no enjoyment but a difficult task. It is hard for me to live in perpetual grief for the sake of trifling things of this baseless world. As I cannot surrender myself to others, it would be better if I was relieved of such a shameless life by the order of the Emperor so that the interest of the Empire may be achieved and there remain no suspicion in the hearts of others. Realizing this fact ten years ago (i.e, 1644) and considering myself as a hinderance in the path of the desired objective, I had resigned from my office. Now in order to please the Emperor, who had pardoned me earlier for such an act, I wish to retire from active life so that I may not hurt anybody's feelings. I don't want to plunge myself into the struggleof life anymore. I wish that His Majesty would advice me about my suggestions so that I may set myself accordingly."[18] On another occasion he wrote to Jahan Ara, "During my twenty years' service, I cared little for my life and property but still I could not gain the confidence of the Emperor...... I may submit that after God, I have given place to no one in my heart but to the Emperor." Aurangzeb added, "If His Majesty has given such big province under my command, he should also uphold my position, so that I may not feel small in the eyes of people and rulers of the Deccan states"[19] The letter that Aurangzeb sent to Jahan Ara after defeating Jaswant Singh at Dharmat on April 15, 1658, further exhibits the Prince's grievances against Dara.[20] *Fayyaz-ul-Qawanin* contains a letter of Aurangzeb written to Shah Jahan before the battle of Samugarh, which sealed the fate of Dara. In that letter, Aurangzeb explains his

17. Qabil Khan, ff. 199b-208b.
18. Ibid., f. 206b.
19. Ibid., ff. 207b, 208a ; 244a.
20. Ibid., ff. 202b, 203a.

motive of coming to the North. He said that Dara had made the Emperor helpless and usurped all power. Whatever Dara demanded the Emperor had granted him.[21]

The mention of these letters, was to show the reader that, Dara, being at the capital helped the enemies of Aurangzeb. Expediency demanded that Golconda and Bijapur should have friendly relations with the viceroy of the Mughul Deccan.

When Aurangzeb came to the Deccan in 1653 for the second time, he found that agriculture and commerce had suffered badly. A new burden on the imperial treasury was put by an additional force of nine thousand soldiers, who had been sent to the Deccan during the past years. The *mansabdars* were promised cash to meet the additional expense but they never received that money. Until 1653, the revenue of the Mughul Deccan never amounted to more than one-third of the estimated amount of three *krores* and sixty-two *lakh rupees*[22] There were mainly two reasons for the poor collection—carelessness of the six governors during the last ten years to improve agriculture and the unsettled condition of peasantry due to warfare and unfertility of the land. Despite the income from *Khalsa* lands and annual tributes from Golconda (often delayed) and Deogarh, the Mughul Governor had to take twenty *lakh* rupees annually from the imperial treasury to meet the deficit. Before going to Qandahar, Aurangzeb used to draw his annual salary in cash for ten months and in kind for the remaining period. In 1653 when he came to the Deccan as viceroy for the second time, he was allotted *jagirs* in lieu of his 2/3rd salary while 1/3rd was paid in cash.[23] "The revenue from these *jagirs*," he writes to Jahan Ara, "realized would not cover more than the amount of my

21. Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 292-94 ; Mulla Fayyaz, ff. 86a-87b, Dara has been referred to (f. 85b) as ولی عہد بادشاہ جہان (i.e. the heir-apparent of the king of the world).

22. Qabil Khan, ff. 26, 31, 45b, 46a.

23. Ibid., f 201a.

salary for seven months. I have thus to bear an annual loss of seventeen lakh rupees."[24] Though Baglana was given to him in *jagir* its revenue also proved insufficient. However, at Aurangzeb's request some lands in more productive provinces were allotted to him but his nobles and common soldiers continued to suffer. Shah Jahan repeatedly asked Aurangzeb to improve the economic condition of the province. Soon after his arrival at Burhanpur, Aurangzeb had informed his father of the pitiable condition of Payin Ghat. He wrote: "The devastation of the Deccan is not unknown to your Majesty. After staying for a few days at Burhanpur, I intended to proceed to Daulatabad." But these few days, turned into months. It was only through the strenuous efforts of his two able *Diwans*—Multafat Khan, *Diwan-i-Payin Ghat* and Murshid Quli Khan, *Diwan-i-Balaghat* that Aurangzeb was able to inform the Emperor after his stay for nine months at Burhanpur, that the situation had improved 25% only.[25] Aurangzeb needed at least another three years to bring back the situation to normal. But the opposite party at the court had been working from the beginning to humiliate Aurangzeb in the eyes of the Emperor by proving his inability to improve the economic condition of the province. However, by the end of 1657, the fiscal condition of the Mughul Deccan was far better than at any other time in the previous years.

The delay caused by Qutb Shah in sending the annual tribute increased Aurangzeb's financial difficulties. Regarding the general condition of Golconda, the Prince informed his father that the state was so well-irrigated that not a single piece of uncultivated land was to be found. There were plenty of tanks and gardens. Aurangzeb waited for a year but Qutb Shah did not despatch any tribute. The viceroy repeatedly sent ineffectual reminders to Qutb Shah Aurangzeb suggested easy methods of payments *i.e.* to pay half the tribute in cash and half in elephants. But this was not

24. Ibid., f. 202b.

25. Ibid., f. 201b.

accepted by Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb further proposed the assignment of some Golconda territory, the revenue of which was to be collected by the Mughuls but this suggestion also was not heeded to by Qutb Shah.[26]

The difference in the exchange value of *hun*, caused another difficulty in the payment of tribute. In 1636 the tribute was fixed in *huns*. The amount was to be paid in kind, which was to be converted in rupees by the Mughuls. It means that in 1636 Golconda had agreed to pay a tribute of two *lakh huns* in kind worth eight *lakh* rupees. The value of *hun* increased gradually. First it was reckoned at four and a half rupees and later in 1654 it was valued at five rupees. Qutb Shah had been paying the tribute according to the old exchange rate of 1636. Taking advantage of Qutb Shah's commitment that he would always pay the difference in the exchange value, the Mughuls now asked him to clear the arrears caused by that difference at once.[27] Thus a new burden of Rs. 20 *lakhs* was thrown on Qutb Shah, who had already been delaying payment of the normal tribute. The Mughuls needed money badly at that time to make up their financial deficiencies caused by their campaigns in the North-west, and insisted on the payment of arrears.

The conquest of the territories in the Karnatak by Qutb Shah was another cause of antagonism between Delhi and Golconda. By the treaty of 1636 Qutb Shah had become a tributary of the Mughuls. The Mughul Emperor, as the paramount lord, thus assumed the responsibility of controlling the foreign policy of his tributary state. It was, therefore, expected that Golconda should have obtained permission from the Emperor before it could undertake any territorial expansion. Both Qutb Shah and 'Adil Shah had captured some

26. Ibid., ff. 66b, 67a, 68-70b.

27. Jadu Nath Sarkar, *History of Aurangzeb*, i, Calcutta, 1912, p. 213; Qabil Khan, f. 70b.

parts of the Karnatak without the permission from the Emperor. The Mughuls, therefore, charged Qutb Shah with the violation of the treaty.

The Karnatak from the Krishna to Tanjore had many Hindu principalities. Its capital was Chandragiri and was under the rule of Raja Sri Ranga, also styled by the Muslim chroniclers as Sri Ranga *Rayal* or *Zamindar* of the Karnatak. The kingdom was fertile and rich in elephants, diamonds and gold mines.

A brief account of the Karnatak affairs will show that Shah Jahan took a weak stand on this point. Whereas Aurangzeb wanted to bring the Karnatak under Mughul rule, Shah Jahan seemed to have been satisfied with allowing the Deccani Sultans to pursue their offensive designs against the Karnatak provided they shared the booty with him. Hard pressed by Bijapur and Golconda, Sri Ranga sent a petition to the Mughul Emperor expressing his willingness to pay a *peshkesh* of fifty *lakh huns* in cash besides costly jewels, two hundred elephants and agreed to become a tributary of the Mughuls and accept Islam if Shah Jahan would help him against his enemies. Aurangzeb strongly recommended the *Rayal's* case for a sympathetic consideration and he even sent his envoy Muhammad Momin to the *Rayal* to take a firm stand against the Deccani rulers.[28] But Shah Jahan under the influence of Dara, rejected the appeal of the *Rayal*. Moreover, the agents of Bijapur and Golconda prevailed upon the Emperor by assuring him of a large share of booty and to reject the *Rayal's* offer. Dara was bitterly opposed to such an annexation to the Mughul De can, as it would ultimately increase Aurangzeb's power.

The Emperor wrote a minatory letter to Aurangzeb in these words : "You would not have sent someone to the Raja of Karnatak. Try to extort as much money as possible from the rulers of Bijapur and Golconda for the imperial treasury and yourself." But Aurangzeb insisted on making the Karnatak a subordinate state of the Mughuls.

28. Qabil Khan, ff. 43a-44a.

He was of the view that the Deccani Sultans would never send any appropriate *peshkesh* from the booty obtained by them from the Kârnatak. But Shah Jahan was firm in his decision.[29] Forced by the Emperor, Aurangzeb had to withdraw his support from the *Rayal*. He asked the Deccani Sultans to send a costly *peshkesh* consisting of diamonds and renowned elephants. It was only when they failed in sending the proposed booty that the Emperor took an aggressive attitude against the Deccani Sultans.

The other cause which led to the eventual invasion of Golconda was the affair of Mir Muhammad Sa'id, known as Mir Jumla. He was a Sayyid of Ardistan in Iran, and a diamond merchant. He traded with various countries and had accumulated considerable riches. His diamonds were usually counted by sacks.[30] He came to the Deccan sometime before 1630. He was introduced into the state service of Golconda by Nawab 'Allami Fahmi Shaikh Muhammad entitled Mir Jumla, the then Peshwa of Qutb Shah. After serving as *Sar Daftar Shahi* and *Hawaldar* of Masulipatam and Mustafanagar, he was appointed *Sar Khail* by Qutb Shah, who saw 'signs of wisdom and ability in him.' Later, Mir Muhammad Sa'id succeeded Shaikh Muhammad as Mir Jumla, though the date of his appointment to this exalted office is uncertain. Due to his administrative qualities and wise counsels, Qutb Shah confided in the Mir so much that the latter became all power in Golconda. No state communication was sent to Qutb Shah without the prior permission of Mir Jumla.[31]

29. Ibid., f. 45b.

30. Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 213 ; Waris, f. 500a ; Francois Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, ed. by Archibald Constable, London, 1891, i, pp. 16-17.

31. J.B. Tavernier, *The Six Voyages of John Baptista Tavernier*, tr. by. John Philips, London, 1678, pp. 5, 11, William Foster, x, pp. 62-63 ; Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, *The life of Mir Jumla*, Calcutta, 1951, pp. 41-42 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, pp. 530-31.

When Qutb Shah intended to extend his kingdom to the eastern side of his kingdom, he sent Mir Jumla in 1646 to conquer the Karnatak. Within five years the Mir captured the forts of Udgir, Sidhout, Tirupati, Chandragiri, Pulicat, Chingleput and Gandikota. For his success in capturing the mighty fortress of Gandikota, Qutb Shah sent the Mir a special *Naurozi Khil 'at*. Qutb Shah was so happy over the Mir's victory, that he gave the Qutb Shahi Karnatak to the latter in *jagir*.[32]

The area of the Karnatak conquered by Mir Jumla was three hundred miles long and fifty miles wide, and it yielded a revenue of forty *lakhs* of rupees. Mir Jumla's position was like that of a petty king as he had a cavalry of five thousand of his own besides an additional force of four thousand Qutb Shahi horsemen in his service. He had an infantry of more than 20,000 men, 300 elephants, 500 camels and 10,000 oxen. Many Europeans—English, Portuguese and Italians—served in his artillery.[33] Qutb Shahi nobles became jealous of Mir Jumla's increasing power and represented that the former intended to usurp power and place on the throne his own son, Muhammad Amin.[34] The remedy suggested to Qutb Shah by his nobles was to arrest the Mir and poison him. Once Mir Jumla came to see Qutb Shah but growing suspicious of him he fled to the Karanatak. Threatened by Qutb Shah, Mir Jumla expressed his desire to return to Iran to serve the Shah to whom he wrote a letter. The Shah because of his friendly relations with Golconda, declined to accept the Qutb Shahi deserter. Mir Jumla then opened negotiations with the Mughuls and 'Adil Shah.[35]

When Aurangzeb came to know of the strained relations

32. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, pp. 530-31.

33. Niccolao Manucci, *Storia do Mogor*, tr. by William Irvine, London, i, 1907, p. 232 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 531.

34. Qabil Khan, f. 57a.

35. Ibid., f. 57a.

between Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla he reported the situation immediately to his father and at the same time instructed his *Hajib* 'Abdul Latif, to assure Mir Jumla of Mughul help.[36]

Both Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb were anxious to win over Mir Jumla. Shah Jahan's sons had failed in recapturing Qandahar from the Persians. Mir Jumla had a brilliant military career and the Emperor wanted to send another army under the Mir to retrieve the imperial prestige.[37] Aurangzeb wanted to gain the confidence of Mir Jumla in order to utilize the latter's army and other resources both against Qutb Shah and Dara. On the earnest requests of Aurangzeb, Shah Jahan assured Mir Jumla of royal favour and instructed the Prince to escort him with an imperial contingent to Burhanpur. On the receipt of the imperial *farman,* Aurangzeb immediately sent a letter to Muhammad Amin, son of Mir Jumla, informing him of the favourable change in the attitude of the Emperor. He also despatched Muhammad Momin to inform the Mir of the Emperor's intentions.[38]

While these secret negotiations were going on between the Mughuls and Mir Jumla, an incident, which adversely affected the situation occurred at Golconda. This was the imprisonment of Muhammad Amin and his mother and confiscation of their property by Qutb Shah, an unwise act, which further excellerated the relations between Qutb Shah and Mir Jumla.

The cause of imprisonment of Muhammad Amin has been wrongly interpreted by some modern writers like Jadu Nath Sarkar, B.P. Saksena and Sayyid Najib Ashraf Nadwi, according to whom it was Muhammad Amin's bad behaviour towards Qutb Shah which led

36. Qabil Khan, ff. 39a, 45a.

37. William Foster, x, p. 73 ; Bernier, pp. 22-23 ; Manucci pp. 237 ; Qabil Khan, ff. 117a, 122a, 194a-95b.

38. Qabil Khan, ff. 88b, 90a ; Waris, f. 500b.

to his imprisonment.[39] Contemporary Indian chronicles, like *Adab-i-'Alamgiri*, *Tawarikh-i-Shah Jahani*, *Padsha Namah* by Waris and *'Amil-i-Salih*, the European travellers—Tavernier, Bernier and Manucci, a later Deccani history, *Hadiqat-ul-'Alam* and *Ma'asir-ul-Umara* are all of the opinion that when Qutb Shah came to know of the secret correspondence between Mir Jumla and the Mughuls and the grant of Mughul *mansabs* of 5000 *zat-o-sawar* and 2,000 *zat-o-sawar* to the Mir and his son respectively, he arrested Muhammad Amin and the members of his family.[40]

At the persistent requests of Aurangzeb, Shah Jahan sent two letters on Safar, 14 1066/December 3, 1655, one to Qutb Shah and the other to the Prince. To Qutb Shah, the Emperor wrote that because Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin had been granted *mansabs* of 5000 *zat-o-sawar* and 2,000 *zat-o-sawar* respectively in the Mughul service, he, therefore, should set Muhammad Amin and other imprisoned persons free and release their property. The Emperor warned Qutb Shah that if he failed to obey his orders, his state would be destroyed. Aurangzeb was ordered to send his son Muhammad Sultan to Qandahar from where a note should be sent to Qutb Shah to free the captives. The army sent against the *Zamindar* of Jatiya, was asked to reinforce Muhammad Sultan.[41]

The letters of Shah Jahan reached Aurangzeb on December 18, 1655, and the latter immediately despatched his envoy to Golconda

39. Jadu Nath Sarkar, *Auraugzeb*, i, Calcutta, 1912, p. 226 ; B.P. Saksena, *History of Shah Jahan of Dihli*, Allahabad, 1932, p. 181 ; Najib Ashraf Nadwi, pp. 286-87.

40. Zahiruddin Faruki, *Aurangzeb and his Times*, Bombay, 1935, p. 279 ; Qabil Khan, ff. 57b, 164a ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 187b, Waris, f. 508a ; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 213, 221-22 ; Tavernier, i, p. 67 ; Bernier, i, pp. 18, 19, Manucci, p. 234 ; Mir 'Alam, f. 259a ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 531.

41. Qabil Khan, ff. 57a, 58a ; Salih Kambu, iii, p. 213 ; Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, f. 343a.

with the imperial letter along with his own note. Hadi Dad Khan assisted by the contingents of Mirza Khan was asked to go to Qandahar. Aurangzeb informed his father that if Qutb Shah did not obey the royal orders, and 'Adil Shah came to his help, he (i.e. Aurangzeb) would advance toward Golconda.[42] In another letter Aurangzeb informed his father that Asadullah Khan, son of Mir Fazl Ullah, would be sent with five hundred horsemen to guard the road by which Mir Jumla might come.[43]

Apprehending Dara's interference in favour of Qutb Shah, Aurangzeb wrote to his father that his mind was perturbed lest the cunning Deccanis might foil the opportunity of a military action by offering costly gifts to His Majesty and in consequence he might be asked to return to Daulatabad after entering the enemy's country. He requested the Emperor to pay no heed to Qutb Shah's appeals. Aurangzeb assured him that by the grace of God, he could, if permitted by the Emperor, conquer the Golconda state by utilizing the resources of the Karnatak (of Mir Jumla), which was as good a state as Golconda itself. In the end he informed Shah Jahan that in obedience to the imperial orders he would leave Daulatabad on January 11, 1656.[44]

The failure of Qutb Shah to obey the Emperor's letter dated December 3, and Aurangzeb's two notes, provided an opportunity to Aurangzeb to proceed to achieve his object. Qutb Shah either underrated the impending danger or relied too much on his allies—'Adil Shah and Dara. Qutb Shah's failure to obey the imperial order was reported to the Emperor, who wrote another letter to him on December 24, 1655, to release Muhammad Amin and send him to the Mughul court with all his father's property. The Emperor also wrote a letter to Aurangzeb on December 29, informing him that he had written a

42. Qabil Khan, f. 71a.
43. Ibid., f. 58a.
44. Ibid., ff. 59a,63b, 64b.

second letter to Qutb Shah to release Muhammad Amin and hoped that his orders would be carried out. However, in case Qutb Shah did not free the captives Aurangzeb was ordered to march to Golconda to secure the release of Muhammad Amin and members of his family. To ensure the success of the campaign, Shah Jahan instructed Sha'ista Khan, governor of Malwa and other *mansabdars* such as Naseer Khan, Rai Singh and Prithi Raj Rathore to help Aurangzeb. The *Zamindar* of Chanda* was also ordered to join the invading army.[46]

How much Aurangzeb was pleased by the receipt of the Emperor's permission for the campaign, may be judged from his letter written to Sha'ista Khan. He wrote :

> "The letter of the Emperor at last reached last Tuesday. I am so happy to receive it that words fail to express may feelings. According to the royal orders, I shall leave Aurangabad on Monday, the 3rd *Rabi-ul-Akhir* 1067 for Haiderabad. I hope you would soon reach Nander for the conquest of Golconda."

In another letter Aurangzeb informed Sha'ista Khan that he would reach Golconda within fifteen days.[47]

How did Aurangzeb manage to receive such encouraging letters from Shah Jahan, when Dara and his party were present at the court to thwart his designs ? It was Sa'adullah Khan, the *Diwan-i-'Ala* and chief ally of Aurangzeb who had prevailed upon the Emperor for a showdown with Qutb Shah. The fact is proved by a letter of Aurangzeb thanking the Prime Minister for having issued the orders which he had been long waiting for. The co-operation

45. Waris, f. 508a ; Salih Kambu, iii, p. 222 ; Qabil Khan, ff. 58b-59a.
46. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 188a ; Salih Kambu, iii, p. 222.
* Chanda is a district in the Central Province of India, *Imperial Gazetteer*, *x*, Oxford, 1908, pp. 148-162.
47. Qabil Khan, ff. 126b, 127a.

between the two is further proved by the fact that Aurangzeb kept Sa'adullah Khan informed of the progress of the campaign.[48]

Shah Jahan's letters dated December 24 and 29, 1655, reached Daulatabad on February 7, 1656. It appears that Aurangzeb managed the despatch of the letter to Qutb Shah in the most diplomatic manner in order to further his own designs. By the letter which Aurangzeb wrote to Shah Jahan it is proved that he sent the letter to Qutb Shah just before the return of Muhammad Mirak who had brought Shah Jahan's letter to Aurangzeb from Delhi. The imperial embassador was detained for two or three days by Aurangzeb on the plea of giving him sometime to rest as he had come from Delhi post-haste. Aurangzeb's sole aim in following this course was to report to the Emperor that he had sent the imperial letter to Qutb Shah in the presence of the imperial messenger and that the Mughul forces had not entered the Golconda territory till then.[49]

As soon as Muhammad Mirak left Aurangzeb's camp on January 10, 1656, Muhammad Sultan entered the enemy's country. In other words, Shah Jahan's letter was still on its way, and the Mughuls had already penetrated far into the Golconda territory. Waris also states that due to his bad luck, Qutb Shah received the Emperor's letter when Muhammad Sultan had entered his state.[50] In the light of these facts, it is hard to accept the statement of Faruki that Aurangzeb had ordered Muhammad Sultan to advance to Golconda when Qutb Shah had received both the letters of Shah Jahan (*i.e.* dated December 3, and 24, 1655 respectively).[51]

It was not until January 21, 1656, when Muhammad Sultan was within twenty miles from Haiderabad that Qutb Shah released

48. Ibid., ff. 122b, 123a.

49. Ibid., f. 60a.

50. Waris, f. 508b.

51. Zahiruddin Faruki, p. 285.

the captives and sought imperial pardon.[52] But Muhammad Sultan refused to listen to Qutb Shah in the absence of his father and continued his advance. Another reason of his continued march was that Qutb Shah had not yet released the property of the captives and hence had not fully obeyed the imperial *farman*.[53] The Emperor was informed that Muhammad Sultan had reached Haiderabad and would encamp near the *Hauz-i-Husain Sagar* and await the arrival of Mir Jumla. Qutb Shah was frightened by the rapid advance of the Mughuls and fled to Golconda fort. The defence of Haiderabad was left to six thousand cavalry and twelve thousand matchlockmen but the imperialists occupied the city.[54]

The story told by 'Aqil Khan Razi and also narrated by the later chronicles, *Hadiqat-ul-'Alam* and *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*, with regard to Muhammad Sultan's ruse to arrest Qutb Shah does not seem correct. According to their authors, Aurangzeb wrote a letter to Qutb Shah that his son was going to Bengal through Golconda and Orissa to marry the daughter of Prince Shuja'. Qutb Shah, therefore, should provide Muhammad Sultan all facilities while passing through his state. It was planned that when Qutb Shah would advance to receive Muhammad Sultan, the latter would arrest him. But in the nick of time Qutb Shah learnt of the plan and took refuge in Golconda fort.[55] The story appears to be evidently untrue. Qutb Shah had earlier been informed both by Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb of the real object of Muhammad Sultan's march toward Golconda. Before his march to Golconda Muhammad Sultan himself had written a letter

52. Qabil Khan, f. 62b ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 188b ; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 222-23.

53. Waris, f. 508b ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 533.

54. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 223 ; Qabil Khan, ff. 62b, 63a.

55. 'Aqil Khan Razi, *Waqi'at-i-'Alamgiri* ed. by Muhammad 'Abdullah Chughtai, Lahore, 1936, pp. 13-15 ; Mir 'Alam, f. 259b. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 532 ; M. Elphinstone, *The History of India*, London, 1905, pp. 574-75.

to Qutb Shah to release the prisoners, threatening him of the havoc which would be caused in his kingdom in case of his non compliance with the imperial orders. Alarmed by the advance of the imperial army, Qutb Shah had released Muhammad Amin while the Mughuls were still twenty miles from the capital. Bernier and Manucci have also given a similar story with regard to Aurangzeb's own plan to arrest Qutb Shah by deception, but in the light of the facts mentioned above their statements are equally incredible.

The most interesting of all such stories is a letter of Aurangzeb given in *Adab-i-'Alamgiri* that needs a minute examination. The letter contains secret instructions by Aurangzeb to his son to capture and behead Qutb Shah. He wrote :

> "Remember that carelessness and cowardice of Qutb-ul-Mulk is known beyond doubt. He is devoid of any courage and sense of honour. He is irascible and impetuos. He is easily frightened. If you act strictly according to my instructions you would succeed (in your mission). Send Muhammad Beg with *top-khanah* (artillery) to encircle his *Haweli*, and Muhammad Tahir should block all access to Golconda. You should then advance with the remaining army to meet Qutb-ul-Mulk. If he awakens from the sleep of headlessness and proceeds to defend the city, you should besiege the town. Then you should send a message to him through Muhammad Beg : 'I have been waiting for you to welcome me and ask me to stay with you. As you have not done so, I have come myself to meet you at your place.' After delivering this message, attack him immediately. If you can manage it cut his head from his neck. You should remember that to accomplish this task vigilance, care and dexterity

are required. In view of the honour of the Mughul Empire you will behave most discreetly."[56]

Zahir-ud-Din Faruki has attributed this letter to the bitterness of Aurangzeb's feelings against Qutb Shah and thinks the text as wholly ironical.[57] Faruki's conclusion seems to be far fetched because Aurangzeb's letters to Mir Jumla also prove that the Prince wanted to finish Qutb Shah and send him to the valley of oblivion. The fact is that Aurangzeb's motives towards his enemy were well known and he wanted to accomplish his object, that is, annex Golconda to the Mughul Empire.

Though Qutb Shah had sent a letter of submission to Muhammad Sultan, yet he at the same time continued to harass the Mughul army. A contingent of five thousand Qutb Shahis appeared to give battle but it was defeated.[58] Qutb Shah then sent Hakim Nizam-ud-Din with two boxes of diamonds, two elephants with silver trappings to Muhammad Sultan. The envoy was detained by the Prince as a hostage for the release of Mir Jumla's property. When Qutb Shah came to know of Muhammad Sultan's action, he released Mir Jumla's property on *Rabi-ul-Akhir 5, 1067*/January 25, 1656. It included sixty horses, eleven elephants and other personal belongings. But Muhammad Sultan would not listen to the appeals of Qutb Shah in the absence of his father.[59]

There are various reasons for Aurangzeb's delaying his march to Haiderabad. Aurangzeb was depending on Mir Jumla's well-equipped military force and his artillery for the successful conduct of the coming campaign. There are many letters of Aurangzeb in *Adab-i-'Alamgiri* which prove that he made repeated requests to the Mir to come post-haste from the Karnatak. Aurangzeb did not bring big

56. Qabil Khan, ff. 219b, 220a.

57. Zahiruddin Faruki, p. 289 (footnote).

58. Waris, f. 508b ; Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, f. 344a.

59. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 533 ; Waris , f. 509a.

cannon and other effective siege equipment to bombard and capture a mighty fort like Golconda. He was eager to employ Mir Jumla's heavy artillery and his European gunners. He wrote to Mir Jumla that his well-wisher (*i.e.* Mir Jumla) should inform him of the date of his arrival at Haiderabad. He had made up his mind to capture Golconda. Any delay, therefore, by the Mir would adversely affect the accomplishment of his goal. When Aurangzeb was informed by the Mir that he could not come for a year as he had to get together his resources and attend to the administration of his territories, the former was very much upset. Aurangzeb sent an urgent letter to Mir Jumla through Mir 'Abdul-Latif. He wrote :[60]

> "Qutb Shah has been defeated and has taken refuge in Golconda. I want to punish him for his haughtiness. He is seeking pardon. Pressed hard, he has sent his son-in-law to me. But I want to send that careless creature to the desert of annihilation."[61]

Aurangzeb urged the Mir to keep in mind the need for speed in carrying out the scheme.

The other reason for Aurangzeb's delay on proceeding was that 'Adil Shah was collecting troops to assist Qutb Shah.[62] When Sultan Muhammad reached Nander on January 7, 1656, Aurangzeb was informed by his agent at Bijapur that 'Adil Shah was mustering his troops to help Golconda. Aurangzeb immediately sent a note of warning to 'Adil Shah that his action would amount to violation of the treaty of 1636.[63] A subsequent reminder was also sent but 'Adil Shah did not pay any heed to Aurangzeb's warning.[64] Aurangzeb immediately informed his father of 'Adil Shah's intentions.

60. Qabil Khan, f. 97a.
61. Ibid., f. 99a.
62. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 533.
63. Qabil Khan, ff. 60b, 190b.
64. Ibid., ff. 59b, 62a.

Before his march to Haiderabad on *Rabi-us-Sani* 3, 1067/ January 20, 1656, Aurangzeb informed Shah Jahan for the second time that a Bijapur army of 15,000 or 20,000 under Afzal Khan was stationed within twenty miles from Golconda.[65]

The third reason was that the *Zamindar* of Jatiya, had not sent his *peshkesh* in time. Aurangzeb wrote to his father:

> "According to your instructions in the *farman* brought by Muhammad Sharif, I wanted to go to Haiderabad on *Rubi-ul-Awwal* 8. As *Zamindar* of Jatiya had not sent *peshkesh* so far, I, therefore, had to postpone my march. However, I have despatched my son. If Qutb-ul-Mulk does not release Mir Jumla's son and his family members, I, in obedience to your order, will advance to Hairderabad to secure the release of the captives by use of force."[66]

Aurangzeb wanted to make use of the *peshkesh* from Jatiya in kind, probably in the form of war material to utilize in his campaign against Golconda.

Aurangzeb's shrewdness lay in the fact that he managed the whole affair in such a way and presented the facts in such a convincing manner to his father that the latter granted his requests. Once he received the imperial *farman* in conformity with his wishes, he wanted to give an impression to his enemies, both in the Deccan and at the imperial court, that he was merely obeying the Emperor's orders with no initiative or responsibility of his own. Such a policy was practised by Aurangzeb throughout the course of his dealings particularly with the Deccan states.

The siege of Golconda began on February 7, 1656, after the arrival of Aurangzeb at Haiderabad on the previous day, *i. e.*

65. Ibid., ff. 58a, 63a.

66. Ibid., f. 59a.

February 6.[67] A Golconda force of seventeen thousand appeared on the first day of the siege but was defeated. Many skirmishes took place between the opposing armies but the defenders were defeated every time. The siege lasted from February 7 till March 30, 1656.[68]

There are many factors to which the failure of the Mughuls to capture the fort may be attributed. First, the Mughuls underestimated the strength of Golconda fort. It was impossible for both Muhammad Sultan and Aurangzeb to bring heavy guns with them while marching rapidly toward Haiderabad. Though Aurangzeb after his arrival at Golconda ordered heavy guns to be brought from Ausa and Udgir they, however, arrived late.[69] "But as he (Aurangzeb) was without a supply of necessary munitions of war", wrote Bernier, the siege was protracted.[70] Secondly, the imperial reinforcements under Sha'ista Khan, Naseer Khan, Rai Sing and *zamindar* of Chanda arrived late. Thirdly, Mir Jumla, whose army and war material Aurangzeb needed so badly, arrived as late as March 20, when peace terms were being concluded at Delhi.[71]

The fort of Golconda, one of the mightiest forts in medieval India, was surrendered to Sultan Muhammad Shah Bahamani in 1363 by the Raja of Warrangal. Sultan Quli Qutb-ul-Mulk, the founder of Qutb Shahi dynasty, changed its name to Muhammadnagar. It is a hill fort lying between 17° 23′ N., 78° 24′ E and situated at a distance of five miles from Haiderabad, the capital city of Golconda state. A river passes by the city walls and falls into the Bay of Bengal. The summit of the fort, called *Bala Hisar* is about 400 feet above the

67. Waris, f. 509a ; Qabil Khan, f. 60b.

68. Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 226-27 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 189b, 190a.

69. Jadu Nath Sarkar, Aurangzeb, i, p. 234.

70. Bernier, p. 21.

71. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 192a ; Waris, f. 511a ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 746 ; Qabil Khan, f. 164a.

surrounding land and commands the whole country side. Golconda is a combination of two Telugu words—*golla* (*shepherd*) and *konda* (hill). The fortifications of the city and *Bala Hisar*, built of granite blocks are threefold. The outermost wall which protects the entire city is 8000 yards in circumference enclosing a vast area in oval shape. The wall crenellated throughout, rises to an average of 55 feet, with eight strong gates and eighty-seven bastions. *Bala Hisar Darwaza* is the second defence line, from where the path going upwards is very steep with hundreds of steps. In the middle of the hill start the double walls that form the third defence line.[72]

Both Qutb Shah and Aurangzeb were trying to checkmate each other in diplomacy. While they were fighting in the South, they were also seeking the help of their allies at the Mughul court. At this particular period Aurangzeb's position grew weak as Sa'adullah Khan, the chief partisan of Aurangzeb was at his death bed and could not attend to the state affairs properly. When Aurangzeb found the structure of his dream crumbling down, he grew more anxious and begged Sa'adullah Khan to recommend the Emperor to annex Golconda.[73] The policy of the Mughuls toward the Deccan was like a bauble tossed from one to another of the warring factions in the course of their intrigues and counter-manoeuvres.

Qutb Shah adopted two methods to counter Aurangzeb's moves to protect himself—by offering costly presents and at the same time sending secret messages to Dara to influence the Emperor to end the war. Mir Fasih was sent to Qutb Shah on 22 *Rabi-us-Sani*/February 8, to Aurangzeb with four boxes of jewels, five trappings with gold and other valuables and begged forgiveness. With the arrival of reinforcements at the Mughul camp, Qutb Shah became more frightened. He sent Mir Ahmad, his son-in-law and his own mother to Muhammad Sultan, who after great reluctance despatched them to

72. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, ii, London, 1965, pp. 1118-19 ; Tavernier, i, p. 63 ; Mun'im Khan, *Sawan-i-Deccan*, B.M. 23885, f. 44b.

73. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 226 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 534.

Aurangzeb. The old lady begged mercy from Aurangzeb for the past misdeeds of her son and agreed to submit a *peshkesh* of one *crore* and twenty-five *lakhs* of rupees in kind and cash. She also consented to give one of Qutb Shah's daughters in marriage to Muhammad Sultan and to surrender the district of Ramgir, whose annual yield was more than Rs. six *lakhs*, in dowry to the princess. Aurangzeb rejected the offer as he was determined to impose more profitable terms on his enemy.[74]

While these offers of submission were being made to Aurangzeb, secret missions by Qutb Shah were working hard to influence the peace party at Delhi. Dara acknowledged three letters of Qutb Shah addressed to the Emperor, Jahan Ara and to himself. Dara informed Qutb Shah that his agent Mulla 'Abd-us-Samad had an audience with the Emperor. In order to assure Qutb Shah of his efforts in persuading the Emperor to terminate the war, Dara wrote :

> "Mulla 'Abd-us-Samad will testify to the excessive and unfailing solicitude that I entertain for you ; the fellow-feeling that I cherish for you will be further manifested when the Mughal forces will give up the siege of Golconda. Had you informed me of the course of events earlier, the matter would not have (I am sure) taken so serious a turn. This day the 2nd *Jamadi-us-Sani* (1068)/18 March 1656."[75]

Despite Dara's working against him, Aurangzeb continued his efforts to achieve his objective. He aroused the feelings of his father by appealing to his religious sentiments and giving a tempting account of Golconda's wealth. The Emperor had ordered Aurangzeb to secure the release of Muhammad Amin and did not permit him to conquer the state. Now when Muhammad Amin was set free and

74. Qabil Khan, f. 164a.

75. *Journal of Bihar Orissa Research Society*, Part IV, 1940, pp. 294-95; Haji 'Abdul Latif Tabrizi, ff. 9a-11b.

Mir Jumla's property was released, should Aurangzeb have returned to Daulatabad without achieving his aim, which by then could be attained easily? The conquest of Golconda according to his calculation would place him in a better position to strike effectively against his enemies in any eventuality. Bernier, the contemporary traveller, has also confirmed the same viewpoint when Shah Jahan ordered Aurangzeb to raise the siege. The traveller writes, "Aurangzeb was aware that in issuing these orders, the Mogol was influenced by Dara and Begum (Saheb), who foresaw that if permitted to pursue his designs against the king of Golconda, he would become too powerful."[76] The Deccan, therefore, was nothing but the cockpit of politics between the sons of Shah Jahan.

To arouse Shah Jahan's hidden desire for territorial expansion, Aurangzeb wrote to him that since he had entered Golconda territory, he was surprised to see its beauty. The area of the state, its population, gold and diamond mines were not unknown to His Majesty. What should he speak of large buildings, abundance of water and springs? At every *manzil*, there were tanks, and populated villages. Not a single piece of land was uncultivated. Owing to those riches Qutb-ul-Mulk had become haughty and ungrateful to the Emperor's kindness and acted like a rebel. Such a revenue yielding country, which was better than any region in the Mughul Empire, had fallen into the hands of such an ungrateful person. Such an opportunity, the like of which may not come again, has come after a long time, and should not be missed. No heed should be paid to the requests of Qutb-ul-Mulk and the offer of *peshkesh* made by him. With the help of Mir Jumla's excellent artillery and war elephants, together with the grace of God and His Majesty's good wishes, the campaign would be successfully concluded.[77]

In spite of the fact that Qutb Shah had promised in 1636 to follow the *Sunni Shari'at* he had not kept his promise. Moreover, he

76. Bernier, i, p. 21.
Qabil Khan, ff. 59, 63b.

continued exchange of envoys with the Safawis secretly.[78] Aurangzeb thus was justified in convincing Shah Jahan of Qutb Shah's violation of the treaty. He stated that owing to his foolishness Qutb Shah did not practise the *Shari'at* and had reintroduced innovations in Islam. He reproached the Companions of Prophet Muhammad—an act which was no less than heresy and infidelity. He had no respect for *Ahl-i-Sunnah.* Aurangzeb added "According to the *Shari'at* it is the duty of the kings of Islam and those in power like you to take a ruler like Qutb-ul-Mulk to task and ask him to promulgate the *Shari'at* and desist from oppressing people. If your Majesty permits, destruction could be caused to an unworthy ruler like Qutb-ul-Mulk. Though many favours have been bestowed upon him by the Mughuls yet he remains ungrateful. He has been sending costly gifts to Iran and there is a constant exchange of envoys between the two kingdoms. I hope that the Emperor would issue orders for Qutb-ul-Mulk's destruction and annexation of Golconda state to gain reward in this world and the life hereafter."[79]

Aurangzeb assured the Emperor that Golconda's annexation would cause happiness to the well-wishers of the Empire and sorrow to its opponents. The Prince wanted to take advantage of Mir Jumla's grievances against Qutb Shah. The Mir was, for personal reasons, anxious more than any one else, to destroy Golconda and Bijapur. Aurangzeb, therefore, requested his father to defer the case till the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court.

The hostile parties manoeuvred to achieve their end. Should Aurangzeb forgive Qutb Shah who had joined hands with Dara ? Qutb Shah had violated the treaty of 1636 by continuing the practices of Shiism in Golconda and maintained relations with the Shah of Iran even after 1636. The letters recorded in *Munshat-i-Tahir Wahid* and *Marasilat-i-Qutb-i-Shahi* sufficiently prove that Qutb Shah continued

78. Mirza Tahir Wahid, *Munshat-i-Tahir Wahid*, B.M. Add. 7650, ff. 9-10.
79. Qabil Khan, f. 64a.

acknowledging the Shah of Iran as his spiritual and temporal lord. He kept the Shah informed of all events. In one of his letters, the Shah wrote to Qutb Shah that if the latter would have informed him of the events of 1656 in time, he would have despatched assistance to Golconda to crush the Mughuls.[80]

At last Dara's party succeeded in making Shah Jahan order the cessation of the campaign. The Emperor issued a letter of pardon to Qutb Shah which reached Aurangzeb on February 24, 1656. After concluding the peace terms which were already in progress, the siege ended on *Jamadi-us-Sani* 14, 1067/ March 30, 1656.[81]

'Abdullah Qutb Shah agreed to :

(*i*) Pay twenty five *lakhs* of *huns* i.e. Rs. 1,25,00,000—one crore of rupees as war indemnity and Rs. 25 *lakhs* as arrears of the annual *peshkesh*; and to pay the annual *peshkesh* regularly in future.

(*ii*) cede the fort of Ramgir and its dependencies to the Mughuls.

(*iii*) give his second daughter in marriage to Prince Muhammad Sultan.

(*iv*) the succession of Muhammad Sultan to the Golconda throne after his death.[82]

(*v*) to send a Golconda contingent of 5000 horsemen to Daulatabad.

80. Tahir Wahid, ff. 9-10, 39-41a ; Haji 'Abdul Latif Tabrizi ff. 141b-144a ; *Journal of Indian History*, 1941, pp. 60-68 ; Riazul Islam, pp. 118-19 : In 1639 Qutb Shah's aunt and other ladies arrived at Qizwin and were granted an audience by Shah of Iran. In 1641 Hakimul Mulk, the envoy of Qutb Shah, arrived at Isfahan along with the retiring Persian ambassador, Imam Quli Beg. In 1650 a Persian envoy came to Golconda in an English boat.

81. Bernier, p. 21 ; Manucci, i, p. 234 ; Waris, f. 510a.

82. William Foster, x, p. 65 ; Qabil Khan, f. 224a ; Manucci (p. 235) says that Qutb Shah "agreed that on one side his coin should bear the impress of King Shah Jahan." But this statement is not borne out by others.

The fourth provision of the treaty was kept secret by Aurangzeb and was not shown to the Emperor. Later, when Shah Jahan came to know of it, he rebuked Aurangzeb for his duplicity and the clause was expunged from the treaty.[83]

Qutb Shah swore on the *Qur'an* in the presence of Muhammad Tahir and Shaikh Nizam-ud-Din, the Mughul envoys, to remain loyal to the Emperor and respect the *'Ahd Namah*.[84] Aurangzeb sent *khil'at* and letter of forgiveness signed by Shah Jahan to Qutb Shah. Muhammad Sultan was married to the Golconda princess on *Rajab* 4, 1067/April 14, 1656, by proxy.[85]

At the request of the mother of Qutb Shah and the ladies of his own harem, Aurangzeb remitted ten *lakh* of rupees out of the indemnity. Two months later, a further reduction of twenty *lakhs* of rupees was made by the Emperor.[86]

The Golconda campaign resulted in heavy financial loss to Aurangzeb. Earlier it had been decided that Shah Jahan would have all the jewels and elephants while Aurangzeb will keep the cash out of the booty obtained during the campaign. In the hope of the imperial victory, Aurangzeb borrowed twenty lakhs of rupees for military expenses, to pay his soldiers whose pay had been in arrears for the last six months. But the exaggerated account of 'Abd-us-Samad, the Golconda agent, that Aurangzeb and his son had received large sums of money during and after the campaign from Qutb Shah which had not been mentioned in the report, made Shah Jahan furious.

83. Waris, f. 511a ; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 226-28 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 434 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 191b ; 'Aqil Khan Razi, p. 15, Qabil Khan, ff. 71a, 72a, 127b, 164a, 224; Mir Khan, *Zafar Namah-i-'Alamgiri*, B.M. Add. 26234, f. 11a.

84. Qabil Khan, ff. 71b, 72a.

85. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 534.

86 Waris, f. 512b ; Salih Kambu, iii, p. 229 ; *Journal of Bihar aud Orissa Research society*, 1940, pp. 273-74.

Aurangzeb pleaded hard that those gifts were too small to be mentioned. He further pleaded that all the booty was shown to Khan Jahan and Mir Jumla, but Shah Jahan was not satisfied. Aurangzeb then requested Mir Jumla to plead his case with the Emperor. He wrote to the Mir, "If nothing is gained out of this business, I should not at least lose anything." He added that the Golconda campaign had caused nothing but humiliation to him and his son. Shah Jahan refused to listen to Aurangzeb's entreaties and the latter had to deposit all that he and his son had received from Qutb Shah, in the imperial treasury at Daulatabad.[87] Thus it is hard to believe Manucci when he writes that Aurangzeb received payment for all the expenses incurred and gained "much more than he had disbursed."[88]

By the death of Sa'adullah Khan on *Jamadi-ul-Akhir* 22, 1067/ April 7, 1656,[89] Aurangzeb lost his ardent supporter at the imperial court. He wished to fill that vacuum with Mir Jumla.[90] The Prince wrote very highly of Mir Jumla to Shah Jahan and Jahan Ara praising his administrative abilities. During Mir Jumla's short stay in the Mughul Deccan, Aurangzeb exerted his influence to gain the confidence of the Mir and wished him to succeed Sa'adullah Khan. Both agreed that their ideas were identical and pledged themselves to support each other in any eventuality. Aurangzeb called Mir Jumla as *Baba* and *Babaji* and told him that Shah Jahan was the father of Dara while he, Aurangzeb, could not find a kinder father than the Mir.[91]

87. Qabil Khan, ff. 72a, 103b, 104a, 222b, 225a.

88. Manucci, i, p. 235.

89. Waris, f. 523b ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 736 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 517b ; Bernier pp. 23-24.

90. Qabil Khan, ff. 107b, 139b, 140a, Aurangzeb's letters to Mahabat Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan to whom he wrote that he wanted Mir Jumla to succeed Sa'adullah Khan.

91. Manucci, i, pp. 236-37 ; 250 ; Bernier, pp. 28, 29.

At Indore, Mir Jumla received a letter of Shah Jahan, conferring on him the lofty title of Mu'azzam Khan. Mir Jumla reached Delhi on July 7, where he was given a rousing reception much against the wishes of Dara. He was promoted to the rank of 6,000 *zat-o-sawar* and appointed as *Diwan-i-'Ala* or *Diwan-i-Kul*, of the Mughul Empire and rewarded by the grant of a studded inkpot and five lakhs of rupees. Later, in order to show more marks of favour, the Emperor gave the Qutb Shahi Karnatak to Mir Jumla as his personal *jagir* free of any tribute for seven years.[92] When Aurangzeb came to know of Mir Jumla's exalted office, he sent him a letter of congratulation and reminded him of his promises.[93]

Mir Jumla also tried to please his new master by presenting him with costly gifts. He gave to the Mughul Emperor a large uncut diamond weighing three hundred and sixty carats according to Manucci and nine *tanks* or 216 *surkhs* according to *Ma'asir-ul-Umara* and valued at two *lakhs* and sixteen thousand rupees. It was regarded as identical with the famous *Koh-i-Noor*. Mir Jumla also presented other gifts consisting of sixty elephants and rubies making the total offerings worth fifteen lakhs of rupees.[94]

With the appointment of Mir Jumla as the Prime Minister of the Mughul Empire, court intrigues regarding the Deccan states were renewed. Before the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court, Shah Jahan was thinking of sending him to Qandahar to regain the Mughul prestige.[95] But the Mir presented a scheme of his own. Convincing Shah Jahan of the benefits which would

92. Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 535 ; William Foster, x, p. 91.

93. Qabil Khan, ff. 100-01.

94. Manucci, i, pp. 237-38 ; Bernier, i, pp. 22-23 ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 535 ; Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, f. 344a ; Shaikh Muhammad Baqa, *Mirat-i-Jahan Numah*, 1.0. 126, f. 347b.

95. Manucci, i, p. 237 ; William Foster, x, p. 73. Qabil Khan, ff. 138a, 148a.

accrue from the conquest of the Deccan states, Mir Jumla argued that if Qandahar could produce such precious stones, only then the Qandahar campaign deserved the Emperor's consideration. But such treasures could be found only in Bijapur, Golconda and Ceylon. He assured Shah Jahan that he could not only conquer the Deccan states but also extend Mughul border to the Coasts of Choromandal and Gingili. Letters of Aurangzeb to Shah Nawaz Khan and Mahabat Khan also show that Shah Jahan who was preparing an army to send to Qandahar changed his mind after the arrival of Mir Jumla at the imperial court. Fascinated by the wealth of the Deccan, Shah Jahan eventually abandoned the idea of recapturing Qandahar the possession of which had always been regarded by the Mughuls as a matter of honour.[96]

THE KARNATAK AFFAIRS

Peace had been made with Golconda but the Karnatak dispute remained unsettled. It remained a source of trouble during the remaining part of Shah Jahan's reign. The Karnatak was conquered with the help of Qutb Shahi army and resources by Mir Jumla, the then *wazir* of 'Abdullah Qutb Shah. The conquered territory was given in *jagir* to Mir Jumla by Qutb Shah, to whom it belonged legally. But Mir Jumla was bent upon retaining it even after his desertion to the Mughuls. Aurangeb's interest in the Karnatak was based on two motives. He preferred the Karnatak under his own benefactor and avowed supporter than under Qutb Shah, an ally of Dara. First, its retention under Mir Jumla would mean direct supervision of 'a rich territory equal in wealth to the kingdom of Golconda' under him, as viceroy of the Mughul Deccan. In other words his own political position would be strengthened. Secondly, Mir Jumla through self-interest would have to depend on Aurangzeb for the administration of his *jagir*.

96. Bernier, pp. 22, 23; Manucci, i, p. 237, Mir 'Alam, f. 261a; 'Aqil Khan Razi, p. 16; William Foster x, p. 73.

This would bring the allies closer. Aurangzeb, enumerating benefits in bringing the Karnatak under the Mughul rule, urged his father not to listen to Qutb Shah's appeals and postpone his decision till the arrival of Mir Jumla at Delhi. Mir Jumla pleaded hard to retain the Karnatak, the conquest of which had made him an enemy of Qutb Shah. Tempted by its wealth in diamonds and gold mines, sea-ports and other rarities and to compensate for the territorial loss of Qandahar, Shah Jahan decided to make the Karnatak a Mughul territory. He conferred it on Mir Jumla as his personal *jagir*.[97]

Qutb Shah as a last attempt offered an annual *peshkesh* of fifteen lakhs of rupees if the Karnatak would be restored to him by the Emperor. In reply Shah Jahan warned Qutb Shah of the consequences of creating trouble in the Karnatak after it had been declared a part of the Mughul Empire.[98]

The decision of Shah Jahan in regard to the Karnatak was unjust. The bestowal of a *jagir* on nobles depended entirely on the good-will of a ruler, who alone had the legal right to confiscate it. A *jagir* was never regarded as the personal property of a noble in medieval times. It was given to a *mansabdar* in lieu of his salary for the services he rendered to his master. The Mughul court had always been a refuge for political deserters coming from distant lands of Tranoxiana, Iran, Arabia, etc. But there is not a single example to prove that a Mughul emperor had ever allowed such a deserter to continue to hold the *jagir* conferred on him by his former master. This in effect amounted to bringing the *jagir* of another state under Mughul suzerainty. The only excuse which Shah Jahan could offer for his unprecedented action was the excuse of his superior power over Golconda's.

97. Qabil Khan, f. 63a ; Manucci, i, pp. 237-38 ; William Foster, x, p. 91 ; Mir 'Alam, f. 261a ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 535.

98. Qabil Khan, f. 63b ; Bernier, p. 23.

The threats of Shah Jahan did not, however, deter Qutb Shah from his efforts to keep the Karnatak under him and in conjunction with 'Adil Shah attempted to expel Mir Jumla's men from the disputed territory. To establish normal conditions, Aurangzeb had organized *dak chaukis* throughout the Mughul Karnatak,[99] but the Deccanis were bent upon creating trouble for the Mughuls. The situation became so difficult that Aurangzeb had to make a secret agreement with Shahji Bhonsla to whom he made some concessions in return for the Maratha chief's help against the Deccanis. Aurangzeb sent an army under Shah Beg Khan and Muhammad Hashim, who after a fierce struggle forced the Qutb Shahi commander 'Abdul Jabbar to retire from the Karnatak. The Qutb Shahis attempted to capture Gaman but were defeated. Meanwhile 'Adil Shah seized some parts of the Mughul Karnatak.[100] In October, 1656, Golconda army conquered an area of eights miles. Mir Jumla, perturbed, wrote a letter to Aurangzeb accusing him of not paying proper attention to the defence of his *jagir*.[101] To remove any doubt of sincerity on his part Aurangzeb explained to Mir Jumla that owing to the Emperor's lack of favour to him (i.e Aurangzeb), Qutb Shah did not desist from aggression despite repeated warnings.[102] The Prince urged Mir Jumla to persuade the Emperor to sanction another war against Qutb Shah. The letters recorded in *Adab-i-'Alamgiri* show the efforts of Aurangzeb and Mir Jumla to achieve their goal. Once Aurangzeb wrote to Mir Jumla, "What we have lost in the Deccan should now be regained."[103] When Mir Jumla replied to Aurangzeb that he was trying his best to achieve his object, the Prince urged the Mir "to increase his efforts lest it

99. Ibid., ff. 223b, 224a.

100. Ibid., ff. 106b, 107a, 224b ; 225a.

101. Qabil Khan, ff. 189b, 190a, 226b ; Jagdish Naryan Sarkar, p. 96.

102. Qabil Khan, f. 106a.

103. Ibid., ff. 189b, 225b, 227a.

becomes too late.[104] Thus it could safely be said that the Mughul policy toward the Deccan after 1665 was shaped by Mir Jumla.

Mir Jumla acted tactfully and convinced the Emperor that he should make another war against Qutb Shah. Aurangzeb acknowledged Mir Jumla's efforts in his letter to Shah Nawaz Khan to whom he wrote that Mir Jumla had obtained the Emperor's permission to send an army against Qutb Shah and had proved himself as his true friend.[105] Aurangzeb could not succeed in capturing Golconda in 1656 due to weak artillery and he did not want to repeat the same mistake. He, therefore, asked Mir Jumla to obtain permission from the Emperor to use his (Mir's) heavy artillery, which was still in the South, in the coming war.[107] From these facts, it is clear that Mir Jumla 'in order to teach a lesson to Qutb Shah for his actions in the Karnatak' had managed another war against Golconda. But the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah on November 4, 1656, diverted the Mughul pressure from Golconda to Bijapur. During the war of succession among the sons of Shah Jahan in 1657-58, Qutb Shah took advantage and seized Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's men and created trouble in the Karnatak. It was only after establishing himself as Emperor that Aurangzeb forced Qutb Shah to surrender the seized territory.

104. Ibid., f. 106b.

105. Ibid., f. 141a.

106. Ibid., ff. 108b, 109a.

CHAPTER IX

SHAH JAHAN'S RELATIONS WITH 'ADIL SHAH

Shah Jahan was the first Mughul Emperor to reduce Bijapur to a vassal state of the Mughuls. Bijapur being the most powerful of all the Deccan states both in resources and manpower, needed serious attention of the Mughuls. As Shah Jahan was busy with the Nizam Shahis from the beginning of his reign, he had to adopt at first a less aggressive policy toward that state before proceeding against 'Adil Shah. It was only after the submission of Fath Khan in 1632 that the Emperor was able to take active action against 'Adil Shahis. Apart from his imperialistic designs, Shah Jahan seemed to have been prejudiced against Bijapur for personal reasons. During the civil war in the Mughul Empire (January 1623-February 1626), 'Adil Shah had joined hands with the loyalist group against Shah Jahan who could not easily forgive the former for such hostile action. The later events will show that the 'Adil Shahis were themselves responsible for the Mughul incursion into their kingdom. In 1630 it was agreed that the 'Adil Shahis would obtain a reward of five Nizam Shahi forts from the Emperor if they helped the Mughuls against Nizam Shah. The 'Adil Shahis did not keep their promise but on the other hand they, in their own interest, preferred to help the Nizam Shahis so as to keep them as a shield against the Mughuls to save their own kingdom. When Dharwar was captured by the Mughuls, Randola Khan, the Bijapuri commander, asked 'Azam Khan to hand over the fort to him as it was one of the five forts promised by the Emperor to 'Adil Shah. 'Azam Khan rejected the request on the plea that the fort had been captured entirely by

the efforts of the Mughuls.[1] However, he promised that if the Bijapuris co-operated with the Mughuls in future, he would recommend Randola Khan to the Emperor to accede to his request. In order to test the fidelity of the Bijapuris, 'Azam Khan asked Randola Khan to encamp at Mandowah to intercept the Nizam Shahis if they fled to the Ghats.[2] But Randola Khan evaded the Mughul demand on the ground that he had insufficient army to oppose the enemy. He further stated that he would go to Naldurg and wait there for fresh instructions from 'Adil Shah. The Bijapuri commander was in fact biding his time as the negotiations were being conducted between Bijapur and Khirki. The Nizam Shahis offered Sholapur to 'Adil Shah for his assistance against the Mughuls.[3]

In 1631, the Bijapuuri attempt to defeat the Mughuls by deception failed. The plan was to pretend friendship to the Mughuls and then take them off their guard and attack them suddenly. Randola Khan wrote to 'Azam Khan that if 'Adil Shah was pardoned he would remain faithful to the Mughul Emperor, and as a token of his sincerity, Shaikh Mu'in-ud-Din, the imperial envoy, who had been detained at Bidar, would be permitted to return to Daulatabad. 'Azam Khan moved to Bhalki and Chitkobah to spend the rainy season there and take action against Randola Khan, should he turn a traitor. According to his plan, Randola Khan advanced quietly with six thousand soldiers and attacked the Mughuls and inflicted heavy loss on them. Shah Nawaz Khan, the Mughul officer, and his son were killed and many others were taken captives by the enemy. 'Azam Khan forced the Bijapuris back and after creating havoc in their ranks compelled them to retire. When the Mughuls retreated to their own frontier they were chased by 14,000 Bijapuris.[4]

1. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I., pp. 345-46 ; Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 32b, 33a.
2. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 416-17.
3. Amin Qizwini, f. 213a ; Hamid Lahori, i. Pt. I, pp. 355-56.
4. Salih Kambu, i, p. 441 ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 380-81.

After the submission of Fath Khan in February 1632, the Mughuls were able to punish the 'Adil Shahis for their treachery. Shah Jahan deputed Asaf Khan to lead an army of more than 30,000 veteran commanders like Sha'ista Khan, Sayyid Khan Jahan, 'Azam Khan and Raja Gaj Singh against Bijapur. The imperial army in Telingana was also ordered to reinforce Asaf Khan. The Mughul commander was asked to force 'Adil Shah to pay *peshkesh* and surrender Parinda and in case he failed to do so, to capture Bijapur. The army set out on March 19, 1632.[5]

The departure in 1632 of Asaf Khan for Bijapur marks the first active phase of Shah Jahan's relations with 'Adil Shah. In order to obtain provisions, an advance guard was sent to take Bhalki, which fell after a short resistance. On his way to Bijapur, Asaf Khan met Rizq Ullah, the 'Adil Shahi envoy, who presented letters of submission both by 'Adil Shah and Khwas Khan, and a small *peshkesh*. No attention was paid to those letters as, according to Asaf Khan, they were meant to buy off the Mughuls.[6] Unsuccessful in taking Gulbarga, the Mughuls besieged Bijapur.[7] Asaf Khan's inability to counter the enemy's tactics, caused sufferings in the imperial camp. The 'Adil Shahis, in order to protract the siege, sent missions to Asaf Khan pretending that they were ready to submit. They hoped that the Mughuls would retire for shortage of provisions if the siege was prolonged. Shaikh Dabir, a representative of Khwas Khan, the wazir of Bijapur, was the first to come and present proposals regarding the amount of *peshkesh*, but he was sent back as he had come without credentials. Mustafa Khan and Mulla Khan tried to deceive Asaf Khan by their false promises of letting the Mughuls enter through their batteries. The Irani ambassador

5. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 39a ; Amin Qazwini, f. 239 ; Ghulam Murtaza, f. 46a.

6. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 412 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 242b.

7. Muhammad Baqa, f. 338b.

to the court of Bijapur also intervened on behalf of the besieged but the Mughuls paid no heed to him.[8]

Being distrust of the 'Adil Shahis, because of their past conduct, Asaf Khan insisted on the personal appearance of Mustafa Khan and Khairiyat Khan as a token of their sincere resolve to make peace. Mustafa Khan came out of the fort and was received by Nasir Khan. It was agreed that 'Adil Shah would pay a *peshkesh* of four million rupees, half in cash and half in kind—pearls, ornamented articles and elephants. 'Abd-ur-Rahim, the Mughul envoy, accompanied Mustafa Khan on the latter's return to the fort, to have the proposals confirmed by 'Adil Shah. The Mughul envoy was sent back after three days with the promise that the agreement confirmed by 'Adil Shah would be sent on the following day to the Mughuls. Next day the Bijapuri representatives brought new proposals which were also approved by Asaf Khan. Before their departure, one of the Bijapuris deserted to the Mughuls and left a note intimating that Khwas Khan was merely gaining time and was not sincere at all.[9]

The catastrophic famine prevailing at that period in the Deccan, Gujarat and Malwa slowed down the Mughul progress. Moreover, the Bijapuris had devasted the neighbouring area to make it impossible for the invading army to procure provisions. The result was that grain was available at a high price but fodder was not available at all. The animals became quite unfit for military service.[10] By their delaying tactics, the Bijapuris had succeeded in their purpose. They wanted to prevent the Mughul attack as long as possible. The imperialists had to go as far as forty miles to collect provisions and the Deccanis distracted passage of the army. Asaf

8. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 39b, Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 412, 415 ; Mir 'Alam, f. 242b.

9. Salih Kambu, i, pp. 471-72 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 243a.

10. Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 29-32a ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 362-64 ; Amin Qizwini, ff. 198, 280, 289.

Khan was forced to raise the siege. An army of 15,000 Bijapuris followed the retiring Mughuls as far as Sholapur and inflicted heavy losses on them both in men and animals.[11]

The Mughul campaign thus ended in utter failure. 'Adil Shah remained unshaken and did not pay any *peshkesh* to the Mughul Emperor. Shah Jahan returned to the North in 1632 after appointing Mahabat Khan to the government of the Mughul Deccan.[12]

Mahabat Khan's recent success over the Nizam Shahis made him believe that he could also defeat the Bijapuris easily. This was an underestimation of the enemy's strength. Mahabat Khan assured the Emperor that if fresh troops were sent to the Deccan under a Mughul prince, the fort of Parinda could be taken without any difficulty. Prince Shuja' was promoted to the rank of 10,000 *zat-o-sawar* and appointed to lead the Mughul army. A large sum was assigned to him to meet the expenses of the campaign.[13]

Soon after his arrival in the South in September 1633, Shuja' moved his forces to besiege Parinda. In order to safeguard the communication line between Parinda and Daulatabad or Burhanpur, Mahabat Khan established military check posts at Zafarnagar, Jalnapur, Shahgadh and Bir. Khan Zaman was sent in advance to check any reinforcement reaching the garrison of Parinda.[14]

The unexpected large scale 'Adil Shahi reinforcements for the besieged and the aggressive activities of Sahu against the Mughuls made Mahabat Khan's task difficult. 'Adil Shah sent Kishnaji Watu and Randola Khan at the head of large armies to Parinda. In order to lessen the Mughul pressure on Parinda, Sahu and Murari Pandit

11. Amin Qizwini, f. 244b ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 41a.

12. Ghulam Murtaza, f. 46b ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, p. 424 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 248a.

13. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 54b ; Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. I, pp. 537-38.

14. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, p. 36.

went to Ahmadnagar to devastate the imperial territory. Randola Khan led an artillery attack against the besiegers[15] who were thus caught between the two fires. Many skirmishes took place between the opposing forces and the siege dragged on.[16] Mahabat Khan no doubt had made every effort in the beginning to maintain the supply line in tact, but could not succeed. The Bijapuris increased their attacks on the Mughul contingents that went to procure food from distant places. Sahu attacked Lahrasp with 10,000 Nizam Shahis but Mahabat Khan's timely arrival saved the situation. Randola Khan and Murari Pandit made such a surprise attack on Mahabat Khan that co-ordination of the Mughul armies became impossible. However, Mahabat Khan's personal courage and valour impressed the enemy. When Khan Dauran came to know of the crisis he hastened to help Mahabat Khan.[17]

The Mughuls dug mines but the besieged countermined them. After great difficulty a mine laid by Allah Wardi Khan was completed. When it was exploded, it caused a breach so small that the Mughuls could not enter the fort. The invaders became discouraged and lessened their exertions.[18] The rivalry between Mahabat Khan and Khan Dauran further checked the Mughul progress. Khan Dauran had saved Mahabat Khan's life and the former often boasted of his valour and underrated that of his immediate chief. The Mughul camp was divided into two rival groups and the Bijapuris took full advantage of the situation. The rainy season was ahead and the imperial position could deteriorate. Under these adverse circumstances the Mughuls raised the siege after a period of seven months on May 8, 1633 and retired to Burhanpur. The Emperor censured Mahabat Khan for his inability to take Parinda. Prince Shuja' was recalled

15. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 36-37 ; Amin Qizwini, f. 323b.

16 Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 50-55.

17. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 37-39, 40-42.

18. Ibid., p. 45.

to the North with the majority of his troops because the Deccan was still under the grip of a terrible famine.

No sooner did the Mughuls leave the enemy's country than the Bijapuris started fighting with each other. The factional strife among them at such a critical time when the Mughuls were labouring hard to capture their state was due to the *jagirdari* system in the Deccan.[19] If the *jagir* of a noble was seized by the Mughuls, the noble would suffer no loss as he was allotted a new *jagir*. Desertion from the Deccani camp was always appreciated by the Mughuls who offered a tempting rank to a deserter. It was the royal family that suffered and not the nobility. The *Peshwa* or *Wakil* of 'Adil Shah had assumed such vast powers during the past few years that the later had become a puppet in his hands. The overweaning power of the *Peshwa* created jealousy among the nobles. For example, Khwas Khan, the haughty and all powerful *Wakil* of 'Adil Shah imprisoned his opponent Mustafa Khan. But the supporters of the captive had Khwas Khan murdered. Mustafa Khan was released and became the new *Peshwa* of Bijapur.[20] He was a farsighted person who realized correctly that in view of the weak position of Bijapur it would be advantageous for 'Adil Shah to submit to the Emperor. The Delhi-Bijapur relations thus underwent a change under Mustafa Khan.

The march of Shah Jahan to the South in September, 1635, marks the second phase of his relations with 'Adil Shah. He had gone there at the head of a large army, chiefly to annex the Ahmadnagar state.

The letter of Shah Jahan sent to Bijapur through Mukarramat Khan, the *Diwan-i-Bayutat**, removes the slightest doubt about the

19. Iftikhar Ahmad Ghauri, *The Political Institutions of Bijapur and Golconda*, Ph. D. thesis London University, 1961, pp. 123, 125.
20. Fuzuni, ff. 331a-41b; Nizam-ud-Din Shirazi, ff. 267b-270a; Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 50b-53b.

* For the duties and functions of *Diwan-i-Bayutat* see I. H. Qureshi, pp. 53, 59, 75, 76, 84.

subordinate position of 'Adil Shah. In the beginning of the letter he was addressed by such titles such as Amir and Khan—titles suitable for a noble and not worthy of an independent king. Shah Jahan wrote : "You should know that as the late 'Adil Khan was submissive and sincere, we were also kind to him. Now when you have expressed your faithfulness and offered submission (*Qabul-i-Ita'at*) we have also shown our graciousness." Considering Bijapur to be a subordinate state and thus formally belonging to him as lord paramount, Shah Jahan added, "We bestow on you the territory of the late 'Adil Khan. As long as you will remain obedient and carry out imperial orders your country will not be ravaged. In recognition of our imperial generosity you should exhibit good faith and submission. Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar have been taken and both the Nizam-ul-Mulks are the prisoners of the Mughuls in the fortress of Gwaliar. Hence, all the territory of Nizam-ul-Mulk, his forts and cannon including *Malik-i-Maydan** thus legally belong to us." The Emperor warned 'Adil Shah that if he wanted his safety he should stop sending help to vagabonds like Sahu who had seized some of Nizam-ul-Mulk's *mahals.* Regarding the despatch of *peshkesh,* Shah Jahan wrote : "You have not sent *peshkesh* since your accession. It is, therefore, incumbent upon you to send *peshkesh* consisting of rare diamonds, valuable ornamented utensils, famous elephants like *Hanunat, Sarnak, Bakht Buland* and *Fath Nauras*, as the late 'Adil Khan used to send. Despite the fact that Sholapur and *mahals* of Wanku, an area yielding a revenue of nine *lakhs* of *huns,* were taken from the late 'Adil Khan and given to Malik Ambar, the former continued sending *peshkesh* to us. Now when Sholapur and those *mahals* have been given to you, you should send a *peshkesh* larger than that of the late 'Adil Khan. The *peshkesh* that has been fixed (پیشکش را که مقرر شده) should be sent through Mukarramat Khan so as to reach Daulatabad during the celebrations of *Nauroz.*" In the

* The famous Nizam Shahi cannon, details of which have been mentioned elsewhere.

end the Emperor warned 'Adil Shah that if he wished that he and his state should remain safe he should act according to his *farman*. If he acted contrary to that he alone would be responsible for the injury done to Bijapur and its people.[21]

'Adil Shah's position became very precarious because despite all shortcomings he wanted to keep the Nizam Shahi dynasty alive as long as possible. In fact the very existence of the Nizam Shahis, particularly after 1630, was entirely due to 'Adil Shah. Whereas he secretly helped Sahu, he (*i.e.* 'Adil Shah) also advanced five miles to give a warm reception to the Mughul envoy. To profess his loyalty to the Emperor, he sent Mir Abu'l Hasan and Qazi Muhammad Sa'id with a letter of submission and a meagre *peshkesh*—five elephants and gifts worth one lakh of rupees.[22] The Emperor was informed of the duplicity of 'Adil Shah. Khan Dauran was ordered to advance with 12,000 troopers toward Bidar while Sayyid Khan Jahan and Khan Zaman left for Sholapur and Aindapur respectively. The Mughul armies ravaged the enemy's country to such an extent that 'Adil Shah was compelled to send a large *peshkesh* and sue for peace.[23] He sent Muhammad Husain Silduz to the Emperor and begged for pardon. Mukarramat Khan also wrote to Shah Jahan that 'Adil Shah had repented of his past misconduct and was sincerely disposed to submit to the Emperor. The imperial envoy added that 'Adil Shah had promised to obey all the imperial instructions and agreed to send twenty lakhs of rupees and rare articles, including diamonds and ornamented utensils, as *peshkesh*. The Emperor then

21. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 125-30, 147 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 68a ; Salih Kambu, ii, p. 148 ; Jalal Tabatabai, f. 159a, Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, ff. 322b, 323b ; J. Grant Duff, *History of the Marahtas*, London, 1826, i, p. 92.

22. Khafi Khan, i, p. 523 ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 162-63.

23. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt II, pp. 144-45, 154-55, Amin Qizwini, ff. 378b, 379a.

asked his commanders to stop hostilities as 'Adil Khan had submitted to his *farmans* and particularly to the demand of sending *peshkesh*.[24]

The imperial *farman* sent to Bijapur in reply to 'Adil Shah's letter of submission would show the inferior status of 'Adil Shah vis-a-vis the Mughul Emperor. Shah Jahan wrote : "Your *arzdasht* (application) reached the imperial court. It is manifest from your appeal that you have agreed to obey all our commands and have promised to be obedient and send *peshkesh* in future. In view of good services of the late 'Adil Khan, we do not want to ravage your country anymore. We have pardoned your faults and now bestow the territory of the late 'Adil Khan on you. If you carry out the following '*Ahdnamah,* (*i.e.* treaty) *Insha Allah* (*i.e.* God willing) we and our successors shall not cause any harm to you".[25]

The terms of the '*Ahdnamah* were :

1. 'Adil Shah would be loyal and obedient to the Mughul Emperor whom he would acknowledge as his overlord. He would obey all the conditions laid down in the '*Ahdnamah* without any hesitation.

2. The Nizam Shahi kingdom henceforth would cease to exist and its territory would be divided between the Emperor and 'Adil Shah. Bijapur would respect the frontiers defined by the imperial officers.

3. In addition to the Bijapur territory, the Emperor gave some parts of old Nizam Shahi kingdom to 'Adil Shah. The additional area, yielding twenty *lakhs* of *huns* annually, included Sholapur, *mahals* of Wanku, Parinda and Chakan. The remaining parts of the Nizam Shahi kingdom were to be included in the Mughul Empire.

24. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 167, 174, 183 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 74b, Khafi Khan, i. pp. 531-33.

25. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 167-74 ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 183-84, Muhammad Sadiq, ff. 75, 76 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 534.

4. A *peshkesh* of twenty lakhs of rupees (to be paid partly in cash and partly in kind) would be sent by 'Adil Shah through Mukarramat Khan.

5. Since Qutb Shah had acknowledged Shah Jahan as his overlord and promised to pay an annual *peshkesh*, therefore, 'Adil Shah would respect the Golconda border and would not demand any money from Qutb Shah. Any dispute arising between Bijapur and Golconda would be referred to the Mughul Emperor whose decision would be binding and final.

6. Sahu and Reehan Sholapuri should not be given refuge or employment by 'Adil Shah, until they surrender Junair, Trambak, Raj Deohir, Trankalwari and other Nizam Shahi forts to the Mughuls. 'Adil Shah undertook to help the Mughuls against Sahu and to deliver forts of Ausa and Udgir to the imperialists.

7. Both the Mughuls and the Bijapuris promised not to give aid or refuge to rebels against the other.

The *'Ahdnamah* or (*Aman Namah* as it is called in some chronicles), was written by the Mir Munshi of the imperial court in golden words. It bore the signatures of Shah Jahan and 'Allami Afzal Khan, the *Diwan-i-'Ala* of the Empire. Shah Jahan advised 'Adil Shah that he should according to the verse of the Qur'an :*

لئن شکر تم لا زید نکم ولئن کفر تم ان عذابی لشدید

(*i.e.* If ye are grateful, I will add more (favours) unto you ; but if you show ingratitude, truly my punishment is terrible indeed.)

feel obliged to the Emperor's kindness. The imperial envoy Muhammad Husain Silduz left Daulatabad in the first week of May 1636, for Daulatabad to give the copy of the *'Ahdnamah* to 'Adil

* *The Qur'an*, 14 : 7, tr. by 'Abdullah Yusuf Ali, Lahore 1957, p. 256.

Shah. At the request of 'Adil Shah the Emperor sent his portrait to Bijapur.[26]

The treaty should not be taken as a mutual agreement between two independent states. Shah Jahan's letter demanded complete submission by 'Adil Shah, who was ordered by the Emperor to comply with the imperial demands and he thus acknowledged the superior position of the Mughul Emperor.

The inferior position of 'Adil Shah vis-a-vis the Mughul Emperor, is further illustrated by 'Adil Shah's letter which he sent after receiving the formal *'Ahdnamah* and the royal portrait. He wrote :

> "The request of a faithful servant Muhammad Ibrahim who is like a small particle of sand to the true caliph, *Sahib-i-Qiran-i-Sani*...... I gratefully acknowledge the illustrious *farman* and incomparable portrait of the King of Kings along with other gifts including a sword with a studded handle. I have no words to express to Your Majesty my gratitude for such a bountiful act. I performed *Sijdah* (prostration) and *taslim* (salutation) in absentia to the Emperor before receiving such an honour. Day and night I pray for the prosperity of Your Majesty, whose name I repeat like a *wazifah*.* On the day following the receipt of the *farman*, Mukarramat Khan left for the Mughul court. This follower of yours has sent selected jewels, ornamented articles and elephants to Your Majesty."[27]

To give further proof of his sincerity, 'Adil Shah sent a copy of an ode of Hafiz Shirazi, the celebrated poet of Iran, inserting Shah

26. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 185, 187, 195-96 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 531-34 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 76b.

* Voluntary religious worship.

27. Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 186-87.

Jahan's name wherever necessary. For example some of its verses ran as follows :

> "I take an oath on the *Qur'an* that I am a slave of the Shah (*i.e.* Shah Jahan). My eagerness to see you is beyond calculation. My love is for no one but you. The name of Shah Jahan is a refuge for my life. Since the shadow of his kingdom's sun has fallen on me, I don't care for the sun of the Universe."[28]

The *peshkesh* by 'Adil Shah included rare diamonds, 'Iraqi horses and an elephant called *Aman Ullah* which was renamed as *Gaj Raj* (Raja of elephants) by the Emperor. After the confirmation of the *Ahdnamah* by 'Adil Shah, Shah Jahan left for the North in June 1636.[29]

The treaty of 1636 turned 'Adil Shah into a vassal of the Mughul Emperor. Whereas Qutb Shah had acknowledged Shah Jahan as his overlord mainly because of the threats of the Mughuls, 'Adil Shah was forced to acknowledge him by sword. In the light of the provisions of the *'Ahdnamah* and subsequent *'Arzdasht* of 'Adil Shah to the Emperor, it is hard to agree with the statements of Qanungo and Sarkar that even after the treaty of 1636 'Adil Shah was an independent king. In the words of Sarkar, "The treaty of 1636 turned the king of Bijapur into a friendly ally of the Emperor of Delhi, but left his sovereignty unimpaired. He had not become a vassal prince nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute."

At another place the critic says :

> "Bijapur was not a vassal state but an independent and equal ally of the Mughul emperor."[30]

28. Shah Nawaz Khan, i, p. 174 ; Khafi Khan, i, p. 535.
29. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 195 ; Jalal Tabatabai, f. 161a, Muhammad Sadiq, f. 161a.
30. K. R. Qanungo, i, p. 193 ; Jadu Nath Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, i, pp. 253, 263.

A critical examination of the facts before and after 1636 would show that Shah Jahan as an Emperor never regarded Bijapur as an independent state. In fact the Mughuls after their re-establishment under Akbar looked upon themselves as sole masters of all India. That is the reason that they always demanded submission from other states whom they regarded as their subordinates. It has been shown in earlier pages that all the Deccan states had acknowledged Jahagir as their overlord. The question of Bijapur as a independent state, particularly after such hard conditions of 1636, therefore, does not arise. 'Adil Shah's acknowledgement of Shah Jahan as his overlord and his promise to remain submissive to the Emperor, hardly leaves any doubt as to Bijapur becoming a vassal state.

The provision of Rs. 20 *lakhs* to be paid by 'Adil Shah as *peshkesh* has been wrongly taken by some modern writers as a peace-offering of Rs. 20 *lakhs*, whereas the amount was demanded in the form of tribute by the Mughul Emperor. A study of the texts will show that the term *peshkesh* has been taken to mean tribute and not peace-offering when the rulers of subordinate states submitted to the Emperor. The following instances may be cited :

> When Aurangzeb recommended the remission of *peshkesh* to be paid by the *Zamindar* of Deogarh, he wrote to his father :
>
> "The *Zamindar* is loyal to the Mughuls but he cannot pay the arrears of *peshkesh*. As Your Majesty have remitted the arrears of the *Zamindar* of Chanda, the arrears of *Zamindar* of Deogarh may also be remitted. The *Zamindar* has promised to deposit the amount of annual *peshkesh* regularly in the imperial treasury."[31]

31. Qabil Khan, f. 42a.

When *Rayal* of the Karnatak was pressed hard by Bijapur and Golconda, he agreed to send *peshkesh* annually to the Emperor, if the latter helped him against the Deccan sultans.[32]

In 1655 Aurangzeb requested his father that state of Chanda, should not be annexed as its *Zamindar* had promised to pay the arrears and send the annual *peshkesh* in time in future.[33]

In 1636 Qutb Shah agreed to pay two *lakhs* of *huns* annually as *peshkesh* to the Mughuls.[34]

In 1656 *Zamindar* of Deogarh presented twenty elephants as *peshkesh*, promised to clear off the arrears and send the *peshkesh* annually,[35]

The symbolic meaning of cash or other articles sent or presented to the Emperor either by the rulers of independent states or by nobles and subordinate allies of the Mughul Emperor has been defined clearly by the chroniclers—whether they were sent in the form of *peshkesh*, (tribute), *nazr* (offer), *tuhaif* (gifts), *jareemana* or *jurmana* (penalty). Articles or precious stones sent to Shah Jahan by the rulers of Iran, Bukhara, Badakhshan, or Turkey have been mentioned as *tuhaif*(presents) and not as *peshkesh*. When Jhajhar Singh Bundela was pardoned in 1636, he presented 1000 *mohar* as *nazr*, Rs. 15,00000 as *jurmana* and forty elephants as *peshkesh* to Shah Jahan.[36] Presentation of *peshkesh* was taken by Mughul emperors as a mark of subordination on the part of their vassal states. They, therefore, always insisted that their subordinate allies, whether annual tributaries or otherwise should always offer valuable articles in the form of *peshkesh*. It is on this account that the Mughuls accused Muhammad 'Adil Shah of not sending *peskhesh* regularly :

32. Ibid., ff. 44-45b.
33. Ibid., f. 60a.
34. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, pp. 177-80.
35. Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, f. 343b.
36. Salih Kambu, i, p. 330.

(*i*) In 1636 'Adil Shah sent a *peshkesh* so small that Aurangzeb was aggrieved to receive it and reported the matter to his father.[37]

(*ii*) On *Sha'aban* 9, 1049/January 6, 1640, 'Iwaz Khan, the Bijapuri envoy, brought a *peshkesh* consisting of pearls, diamonds and ornamented articles worth two lakhs of rupees.[38]

(*iii*) In 1053/1643, Sayyid Hasan brought *peshkesh* from Bijapur.[39]

(*iv*) On 56th birthday celebrations of Shah Jahan (*i.e.* 1055/1645), 'Adil Shah sent *peshkesh* of Arabian horses, two elephants and other valuables.[40]

(*v*) In 1061/1650 Muhammad Safi, the Mughul envoy, brought forty elephants, and other articles as *peshkesh* worth Rs. 40 lakhs from Bijapur.[41]

(*iv*) In 1064/1654-53, 'Adil Shah sent an elephant worth Rs. 60,000 and other articles as *peshkesh* through Bijapuri envoy.[42]

(*vii*) In 1066/1655-56, Sayyid Wali, an 'Adil Shahi noble, brought a *peshkesh* of four elephants, nine Arabian horses, two of them with golden trappings and other valuables to the Mughul Emperor.[43]

In 1632, it was agreed between Mustafa Khan, the 'Adil Shahi representative and Asaf Khan that 'Adil Shah would send Rs. 40

37. Qabil Khan, f. 223b.
38 Ibid., f. 240a.
39. Hamid Lahori, i, Pt. II, p. 352.
40. Ibid., p. 421.
41. Waris, f. 444b.
42. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 192.
43. Waris, ff. 512b, 513a.

lakhs in cash and kind and despatch *peshkesh* regularly in future to the Emperor. But 'Adil Shah did not keep his promise. The Bijapuri nobles, who were running the administration failed to realize the intentions of the Mughuls, who had determined to bring the 'Adil Shahis to task. The reason of the despatch of armies in 1635 against Bijapur was that 'Adil Shah due to his tender age and inexperience had helped the Nizam Shahis and withheld the payment of *peshkesh*. Shah Jahan warned 'Adil Shah in these words : "If you want the safety of your state, you should hand over the captured *mahals** of *Nizam-ul-Mulk* and send *peshkesh* immediately."[45] When Khan Jahan was devastating the Bijapuri territory he wrote to the Emperor that he would force 'Adil Shah to obey the imperial orders and pay the *peshkesh*.[46] In the letter sent through Mukarramat Khan in 1635, Shah Jahan demanded *peshkesh* from 'Adil Shah. When the Emperor issued orders to his commanders to stop hostilities against Bijapur in 1636, he wrote that 'Adil Shah had submitted to his entire demands, particularly the payment of *peshkesh*.[47] Muhammad Hadi, the author of *Haft Gulshan-i-Muhammad Shahi*, records that Shah Jahan despatched Mahabat Khan in 1632 against Bijapur because 'Adil Shah had stopped sending annual *peshkesh*.[48]

While mentioning areas captured by Shah Jahan, Bindraban writes : "The Emperor restored 'Adil Khan and Qutb-ul-Mulk in their states but made them his tributaries (*baj guzar mnqarrare shudah*).[49] According to *Basatin-us-Salatin*, the Mughul Emperor did not consider ruler of an Indian state as equal, much less the Sultans of the Deccan, whom he regarded as his *baj guzar* (*i.e.* tributaries).

44. Muhammad Bakhtawar Khan, f. 318b.
45. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 148.
* A group of villages are included in a *mahal*.
46. Salih Kambu, ii, p. 170.
47. Muhammad Sadiq, f. 74b ; Salih Kambu, ii, pp. 183-84.
48. Muhammad Hadi, f. 301b.
49. Bindraban Das, *Lub-ut-Tawarikh-i-Hind*, B.M. Add. 26251, f. 79a.
50. Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 60b-62a.

While describing the submission of 'Adil Shah in 1636, *Mirat-i-Wardat* mentions that Bijapur agreed to send a large *peshkesh* annually.[51] *Haft Gulshan* records that Ibrahim 'Adil Shah agreed in 1618 to pay a *peshkesh* of Rs. 20 lakhs annually to Jahangir[52] and it is a fact that 'Adil Shah used to send *peshkesh* to Jahangir after 1618. 'Adil Shah had to please Shah Jahan in 1648 by sending him a costly *peshkesh* of Rs. 40 lakhs in cash and forty elephants.[53] There are many letters of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb demanding *peshkesh* from Bijapur even after 1636. The amount of Rs. 20 lakhs was sent as *peshkesh* by 'Adil Shah in 1636, and not as peace-offering. If it was a mere peace-offering why did 'Adil Shah send the so-called peace-offering even after 1636 when there was no war between Bijapur and Delhi till 1657 ? If 'Adil Shah was not a vassal prince but an equal ally and independent king why then did he send *peshkesh* to Shah Jahan ? Shah Jahan's demand for a regular *peshkesh* in future and 'Adil Shah's subsequent submission to the imperial demand strengthens the view that Bijapur was a tributary state. The appointment of a permanent Mughul *Hajib* (agent) at Bijapur in 1636, similar to that of British Resident in an Indian state during the British *raj*, confirms the vassalage of 'Adil Shah.

Generally speaking a Mughul emperor being the paramount lord of India could never tolerate the existence of an independent state in the sub-continent. Shah Jahan, therefore, never regarded 'Adil Shah as an independent king but as a subordinate ally to whom he could dictate his terms. 'Adil Shah also realized the fact that the goodwill of the Emperor could only be obtained by sending him *peshkesh*, withholding of which would result in the destruction of his state by the Mnghuls. Shah Jahan being the paramount

51. Muhammad Shafi, *Mirat-i-Wardat*, B.M. Add. 6579, f. 177a.

52. Muhammad Hadi, ff. 186b, 187a.

53. Lal Ram, *Tuhfa-i-Hind*, B.M. Add. 6583, f. 130b ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 187b.

lord thus had every right to interfere in the internal and external affairs of his subordinate state.

The treaty of 1636 resulted in peace and cordial relations which continued for a long time between Bijapur and the Mughuls. We hear of exchange of goodwill missions between Bijapur and Delhi and occasionally the despatch of *peshkesh* by 'Adil Shah to Shah Jahan. During that period Shah Jahan twice interfered in the internal affairs of Bijapur and the submission by 'Adil Shah to the imperial demands gives further proof of the subordinate status of Bijapur. Once when 'Adil Shah imprisoned his *wazir* Mustafa Khan in 1643, who was pro-Mughul, Shah Jahan demanded his release from 'Adil Shah, who submitted. Mir Rajab, the 'Adil Shahi envoy, who was detained at Delhi due to that reason was then allowed to return.[54] After satisfying his own demand by lowering Bijapur to a subordinate position, Shah Jahan intended to let 'Adil Shah enjoy a little higher status in the eyes of the Deccanis. On the receipt of a large *peshkesh* of Rs. 40 lakhs and forty elephants and on the recommendation of Dara and his party, he conferred the title of *Shah* on the ruler of Bijapur in 1648. 'Adil Shah misunderstood the limit of the imperial concession. He started to address himself as *Zill-i-Ilahi* (shadow of God), held his court outside the citadel ; watched elephant-fight and gave the title of Khan Khanan to Khan Muhammad, his chief noble. When Shah Jahan came to know of these facts he wrote a threatening letter to 'Adil Shah asking him to stop such practices otherwise the Mughul army would devastate his state. 'Adil Shah submitted and sent a letter of apology to the Emperor.[55] The reason for issuing such an imperial order was that the Mughuls regarded the exercising of such prerogatives as legitimate only by independent rulers like themselves

54. Fuzuni Astrabadi, ff. 339b, 400.

55. Rai Chandrabhan Brahman, *Chahar Chaman-i-Brahman*, B.M. or. 1892. f. 73a. Lal Ram, f. 130b ; Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 60b-62a ; Muhammad Hadi, f. 187b; Sayyid Ghulam Muhiy-id-Din Pirzada, *Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur*, B.M. Add. 2670, f. 25b.

and did not regard any other Indian ruler equal in status to them especially the Deccan Sultans whom they took as their tributaries.[56]

'Adil Shah tried to neglect the formalities required for the reception of Mughul envoys and was reprimanded by the Emperor. It was customary in medieval India that as a mark of subordination, a noble or a ruler of a vassal state should advance about five *krohs* to receive the imperial *farman* and again to accompany the envoy for a similar distance to bid him farewell. 'Adil Shah tried to excuse himself from observing such formalities. Aurangzeb reported the matter to his father in these words :

> "In the past 'Adil Khan did not advance to welcome the imperial envoy on the excuse of illness as he had not received strict orders in this respect from Your Majesty. Even after issuing such orders to him, he tried to do the same. By pretending illness, this time also he had attempted to excuse himself by sending a group of people to receive the Mughul envoys and my *Hajib* but did not succeed in his plan. After great discussion he advanced as far as *Bagh-i-Afzal*, which is near the *Hauz*-i-Shahpur and at a distance of two *krohs* from his palace to receive the imperial *manshoor*."

Aurangzeb requested his father that 'Adil Shah be asked to advance without any hesitation as far as Arkahra, a place appointed in the past to welcome Mughul euvoys. The Prince informed his father that according to the Emperor's instructions Muhammad Mirak and Abu Talib, the imperial envoys, had given back to 'Adil Shah whatever they had received from him at the time of their arrival or departure. Challenging this act of insubordination of 'Adil Shah, Aurangzeb wrote to his father : "How could he (*i.e.* Muhammad 'Adil Shah) dare act in such an unjust manner. His ancestors never

56. Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 60b-62a.

put excuses at the time of welcoming imperial envoys."[57] This is yet another proof confirming the subordinate state of Bijapur.

As has already been mentioned in the previous chapter, after the treaties of 1636 with Bijapur and Golconda, the Mughuls were relieved of their preoccupations in the South and took more interest in the affairs of the North-west.

The third and last active phase of Shah Jahan's relations with Bijapur started during the second viceroyalty of Aurangzeb (1653-1658) when the relations between the two governments deteriorated and eventually led to an attack on Bijapur. Court manoeuver and counter-menoeuver which had a direct bearing on the Mughul-Deccan relations became more intensified during the last five years of Shah Jahan's reign. Aurangzeb had been publicly condemned by his father on his failure as a commander in recapturing Qandahar. Aurangzeb was naturally eager to retrieve his lost prestige. Thus he was on the lookout for an opportunity to prove his worth as a commander. But one should keep in mind that for each of his action he obtained prior permission from the Emperor. He would not and did not forgive his enemies particularly the Deccan Sultans, who were adherents of Dara.

The question of succession of 'Ali 'Adil Shah II after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah on November 4, 1656, was not the only cause of the Mughul invasion of Bijapur, as has been generally understood. 'Adil Shah built new forts in Junair and at other places on Bijapur-Mughul border. These fortifications were of tremendous help to Shivaji who passed through Junair when he attacked the Mughul territory. Aurangzeb reported the matter to his father and the forts were demolished.[58] Despite his promise in 1636 to send *peshkesh* regularly to Delhi, 'Adil Shah did not keep his word. Aurangzeb had pointed out this fact once to the Emperor. Similarly,

57. Qabil Khan, f. 52.
58. Ibid., 186b.

on another occasion Aurangzeb wrote to Jahan Ara that 'Adil Shah had promised to send a *peshkesh* of the value of nine lakhs of rupees but when the imperial agent went to collect it, he was sent back from Bijapur with *peshkesh* worth four lakhs of rupees only.[59] In defiance of Mir Jumla's repeated warning, 'Adil Shah had captured some parts of the *wazir's* Karnatak. The Mughuls failed to drive the 'Adil Shahis out of the area. On the instruction of Mir Jumla, Aurangzeb had to make some compromise with Sahu by granting him some concessions in order to counter Dara's secret intrigues with the Sultans. The plan was that Sahu would attack Bijapur to divert 'Adil Shahi pressure from the imperial Karnatak.[60] As has been explained earlier, during the Mughul invasion of Golconda in 1656, 'Adil Shah sent at army of 20,000 men who were stationed twenty miles from Haiderabad. But Aurangzeb's threatening letters to 'Adil Shah and his tactics forced the Bijapur contingents to retire.[61]

The precise sequence of events leading to the succession of 'Ali 'Adil Shah has been the subject of controversy and, therefore, it has been discussed in detail.

Muhammad 'Adil Shah died on *Muharram* 26, 1067/November 4, 1656. As courtesy demanded, Aurangzeb wrote a letter of condolence to the widow of Muhammad 'Adil Shah.[62] Khan Muhammad, the Bijapuri *wazir* and Bari Sahiba, the widow of late 'Adil Shah and sister of Qutb Shah enthroned 'Ali as the new ruler of Bijapur. Aurangzeb was informed of all the events at Bijapur through his *Hajib*, Muhammad Amin. The Prince reported the matter immediately to the Emperor in these words : "After the death of 'Adil Khan, a boy of obscure parentage, 'Ali by name, has been enthroned."[63]

59. Ibid., f. 223b.

60 Ibid., f. 190.

61. Sayyid Ghulam Muhiy-id-Din Pirzada, ff. 27b, 29a ; Qabil Khan, f. 64b.

63. Qabil Khan, ff. 107b, 228b.

The Mughul sources challenge the legality of 'Ali 'Adil Shah's succession and hold the view that he was not the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. Jadu Nath Sarkar, B. P. Saksena, Jagdish Narayan Sarkar and Elphinstone support the view of the Bijapuris that 'Ali 'Adil Shah II was an independent king, therefore, the Mughul Emperor had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. Apart from the Mughul sources such as *'Amal-i-Salih, Padshah Namah* by Waris, *Tawarikh-i-Shah Jahani, Adab-i-'Alamgiri, Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* and *Ma'asir-ul-Umara*, even a Deccani chronicle, *Hadiqat-ul-'Alam* and European travellers like Bernier, Tavernier and Thevenot are of the opinion that 'Ali 'Adil Shah II was not the real son but an adopted son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah.[65]

Thus the information supplied by Aurangzeb was not incorrect. He is not only corroborated by the official historians but by foreign authors as well. In fact, in the presence of a hostile party at the centre, Aurangzeb could not have dared to present distorted facts, detection of which could have decidedly caused him a great humiliation and adversely affected his future. The Bijapuris wrote many letters to Dara, Jahan Ara and Shah Jahan requesting them to stop the war but in none of these letters did they ever challenge Aurangzeb's statement. Before sanctioning the invasion on Bijapur Shah Jahan definitely would have asked Mir Jumla whom he regarded as an expert on the Deccan affairs. It may be presumed that the Mir had also supported Aurangzeb's views regarding the parentage of the new ruler of Bijapur. If 'Ali 'Adil Shah II had been the

64. Jadu Nath Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, i, p. 263; Saksena, p. 167; Jagdish Narayan Sarkar, Mountstuart Elphinstone, pp. 75-76.

65. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 235; Waris f. 517b; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 195b; Qabil Khan, ff. 75b, 107b, 228b, 229a, Khafi Khan, i, p. 754, ii, p. 316; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 535; Mir 'Alam, f. 261a; Bernier p. 197; Tavernier, i, p. 73. Jean de Thevenot, *Indian Travels of Thevenot and Careri*, edited by Surrendra Nath Sen, New Delhi, 1949, p. 128-29.

legitimate and only son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah, then why did the opposition party of Khan Muhammad object to his accession to Bijapur throne.[66]

Had Aurangzeb been not certain about the ineligibility of 'Ali 'Adil Shah II's accession to the throne he would not have written to Qutb Shah that the late 'Adil Shah had no son to succeed him, but Khan Muhammad without the permission of the Emperor had enthroned 'Ali in Bijapur. The Prince added that he failed to understand the intentions of Khan Muhammad. In order to maintain friendly relations with the Mughuls, the Bijapuris should have appealed to the Emperor for right guidance. He informed him that Mir Jumla had been ordered to proceed toward Bijapur with a large army. In the end Aurangzeb advised Qutb Shah that as a well-wisher of the Bijapuris, he should submit their request to the Emperor as early as possible.[67] Aurangzeb's letter to Mir Jumla also shows that Shah Jahan was awaiting the expected death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah (who was seriously ill) when confusion was likely to arise and the Mir would have to be sent to Bijapur. Aurangzeb urged his father to sanction war against Bijapur.[68]

There are only four Deccani chronicles which allege that 'Ali 'Adil Shah II was the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. These are : *Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah, Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur, Basatin-us-Salatin* and *Tarikh-i-Bijapur*. An examination of the value of these chronicles with regard to this issue becomes necessary. *Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah* was written by Sayyid Nurullah Qazi in 1076/1666 by the order of 'Ali Adil Shah II, the then Bijapuri ruler whose succession was in question. The *Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur* of Sayyid Ghulam Muhiy-id-Din Pirzada, was compiled in 1221/1811. Its sources are the histories written in the time of 'Ali Adil Shah II. The author

66. Qabil Khan, ff. 110b, 111a, Khafi Khan, ii, p. 754.

67. Qabil Khan, f. 75b.

68. Ibid., ff. 107b ; 109b.

wrote it with the intention of presenting it to the English Resident Mr. Grant. A history written one hundred and fifty years after the actual incident and based on prejudiced views cannot be regarded as a fair and authentic source. *Basatin-us-Salatin* was written by Ghulam Murtaza in 1237/1821 *i.e.*, one hundred and seventy-one years after the incident in dispute. He used *Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah* as one of its sources. *Tarikh-i-Bijapur* was written by Muhammad Ibrahim Zubairi in 1240/1824 *i.e.* one hundred and sixty-eight years after the disputed succession.

Ahwal-i-Salatin-i-Bijapur puts 1637 as the year of 'Ali 'Adil Shah II's birth. The other three Deccani histories give the date of the birth of 'Ali 'Adil Shah II as *Rabi-ul-Awwal* 16, 1048/August 30, 1638 and say "the succession to the throne was born." These chronicles mention main events of his princehood, but none of them gives the name of his mother. All the three authors agree on one point *i.e.* after his brith, the baby was given to the care of Haji Bari Sahiba, the queen of Muhammad 'Adil Shah, at her request.[69] So the child was brought up under the immediate supervision of the guardian and not that of his mother's. This fact casts further doubt upon the reliability of the Deccani chronicles. They were written after 1656 but still could not give the name of 'Ali's mother. When the chroniclers could mention the name of queen Bari Sahiba, as care-taker of the child, what prevented them from mentioning the name of his real mother, when they were determined to prove him the real son of Muhammad 'Adil Shah. This inability of the authors confirms the view that 'Ali Adil Shah II was of obscure parentage. Whereas the Mughul sources do not give any detail and simply say that 'Ali was *Majhul-un Nasb* (of obscure parentage), the European travellers throw some light on this issue. Tavernier writes :

69. Sayyid Ghulam Muhiy-id-Din, f. 28a ; Sayyid Nurullah ; *Tarikh-i-'Ali 'Adil Shah*. B.M· Add. 27252, ff. 14-19 ; Ghulam Murtaza, ff. 73b, 74a. Mirza Ibrahim Zubairi, *Tarikh-i-Bijapur*, Haiderabad Deccan, India, (n.d.) pp. 361-62.

"Adil Shah died without any child. Some years before the death of the king, the queen perceiving no possibility of having any child adopted a little boy, upon whom was showered all her affection and caused him to be brought up in the doctrine of Haly's sect (*i e.* Ali's sect, 'meaning, Shiism). The king upon his death had caused this adopted son to be proclaimed as king.[70]" Thevenot confirms the statement of Tavernier and records : "The king (who reigns in Viziapour at present (meaning Muhammad 'Adil Shah) was an orphan, whom the late king and queen adopted for their son and after the death of the king, the queen had so much interest as to settle him upon the throne ; but he being as yet very young, the queen was declared regent of the kingdom."[71]

Even if a child of a Muslim was born of a slave girl and was recognized by the father, according to the jurists he had the legal right of succession. For example Shahryar, who contested the succession with Shah Jahan, was born of a slave girl. All the Abbasid Caliphs with the exception of Amin-ur-Rashid were born of *Umm Walad* (*i.e.* slave girls). Explaining the term *Umm Walad*, Hughes writes, "A term used in Muhammadan Law for a female slave who has born a child to her master, and who is consequently free at his death." There is no adoption in Islamic Law, whether *Sunni* or *Shi'a*.[72] Therefore, an adopted son had no legal right to succeed his father unless approved by the ruler.

It is necessary to establish the fact that the Mughuls as sovereigns had the right to control the succession to the *gaddi* in their subordinate states. On the death of a subordinate ruler his

70. Tavernier, i, p. 73.

71. Thevenot, p. 92.

72. Ibn-ul-Asir, *al-Kamil fi Tarikh*, vi, Leiden, 1871, pp. 69, 83, 148 ; Jalal-ud-Din Siyuti, *Tarikh-ul-Khulafa*, Qairo, 1351 A H., pp. 172, 180, 185, 204, 222, 226, 229, 237, 263, 264, 269, 276, 280, 286, 289 ; T P. Hughes, *A Dictionary of Islam*, London, 1885, p. 655 ; William Muir, *The Caliphate, Its rise, Decline and Fall*, Edinburgh, 1924; p. 475.

state in theory passed to the Emperor and not to the claimant to the *gaddi*. The succession was not recognised unless confirmed by the Mughul emperor. Raja Man Singh was nephew and adopted son of Raja Bhagwan Das but it was only with the approval of Akbar that he succeeded his father. Burhan Nizam Shah, the ruler of Ahmadnagar, had acknowledged Akbar as his overlord. After the death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in July, 1595, when confusion arose regarding the succession, the Mughuls also interfered. It has been shown in the earlier pages how Akbar gave superiority to Bahadur Nizam Shah over other claimants and Chand Bibi and 'Adil Shah also agreed upon the Emperor's decision. Shah Jahan confirmed the succession of Raja Raj Singh of Chittor after the death of his father, Raja Jagat Singh. At a later date when Raja Jaswant Singh died in 1678, Aurangzeb confirmed Rana Indar Singh, the grand-nephew of Jaswant Singh on the *gaddi* of Jodhpur and not Ajit Singh, the disputed posthumous son of Jaswant Singh.

When Shah Jahan could interfere in purely administrative matters of Bijapur—demanding the release of Mustafa Khan, the *wazir* of Bijapur, and order Muhammad 'Adil Shah to stop watching elephant-fights and granting the title of Khan Khanan to any of his noble, how could he ignore such an important matter as that of the succession which was disputed. Aurangzeb was thus justified in telling Qutb Shah that the Bijapuris should have consulted the Emperor before taking any decision in this respect. In the light of these facts, Shah Jahan had every right to bring Bijapur under his direct control or confirm its succession on anyone whom he deemed fit.

Mir Jumla himself was no less responsible for the war against Bijapur. But Bijapur itself provided him with an opportunity for speeding up the campaign. Mir Jumla had his personal grievances against Muhammad 'Adil Shah, who had attempted to ruin the former in 1655. After Mir Jumla's departure for Delhi, Muhammad 'Adil Shah not only seized some parts of Mir Jumla's Karnatak but encouraged

Shivaji to avage the Mir's *jagir*. Though Mir Jumla had already persuaded Shah Jahan to sanction another war against Qutb Shah, his most formidable enemy, yet he did not forget 'Adil Shah. The death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah on November 4, 1656, became an excuse for the Mughuls to take a serious view of the events in Bijapur.

Aurangzeb on the other hand also wanted to make the best of the opportunity to bring Bijapur under Mughul rule. By doing so the rich area of Bijapur would fall under his administration and he would be better equipped to fight the inevitable war of succession, after his father's death. Inducing Mir Jumla to obtain Shah Jahan's permission for an invasion, Aurangzeb wrote that he could achieve his desire by giving his wise counsels to the Emperor. He should use all his influence and oratory to have that desire fulfilled.[73] However, he reported to the Mir that till the receipt of the royal sanction to advance into the enemy's territory, he himself would stay in Ahmadnagar while some advance guards will be sent to the border. In another letter Aurangzeb urged Mir Jumla to start the campaign early and pleaded that if delay was caused, the new 'Adil Shah might strengthen his position and such an opportunity might never occur again.[74] In his other letters, Aurangzeb made earnest appeals to his ally to come as early as possible to the South.[75]

Mir Jumla responded to Aurangzeb's requests and tried his utmost to persuade Shah Jahan to allow a war against Bijapur. Fascinated by the prospects of capturing the fertile land and rich diamond mines of Bijapur, Shah Jahan sanctioned war on November 26, 1656. The Emperor gave a free hand to Aurangzeb to settle the affairs of Bijapur as he thought fit. The Emperor's orders were to conquer the state if possible, otherwise to annex all those forts and territory which originally had belonged to Nizam Shah but had been given

73. Qabil Khan, f. 107b.
74. Ibid., ff. 111a, 112b.
75. Ibid., 108a, 126b.

to 'Adil Shah in 1636 and to exact Rs. 1½ crores (Rs. one crore in kind—diamonds, elephants etc. and Rs. 50 lakhs in cash) as *peshkesh* from 'Adil Shah. Aurangzeb was further instructed to enforce the reading of *khutba* and striking of coins in Bijapur in the name of the Mughul Emperor as was the case in Golconda. After achieving these objectives, the Prince was ordered to proceed to the conquest of Golconda which was considered easier than that of Bijapur.[76] By issuing such orders Shah Jahan meant to withdraw all previous concessions granted to 'Adil Shah under expediency in 1636. In order to make the campaign successful, Shah Jahan sent twenty-two renowned *Umara* and 20,000 horsemen under Mir Jumla to reinforce Aurangzeb.[77] They included Nijabat Khan, Mahabat Khan, Rao Sattarsal, Raja Sujan Singh, Nasiri Khan, Muhammad Quli entitled Mu'taqid Khan, Debi Singh Bundela, Rao Amar Singh, Dilir Khan and many others. Sha'ista Khan, governor of Malwa, was asked to proceed to assist the Prince. Qazi Nizam was appointed *Bakhshi* and *Waqi'ah Nawais* of the invading army.[78]

Dara was much perturbed by his father's decision and tried his utmost to create difficulties in Aurangzeb's undertaking the campaign. According to Bernier, "It was evident to Dara that to send troops to the Deccan was in effect to increase by so many men the strength of Aurangzeb. He had, therefore, opposed the measure with many arguments and entreaties and by every art he could employ. He made Shah Jahan lay down the condition that Mir Jumla should alone conduct the war and Aurangzeb remain at Daulatabad."[79] But Shah Jahan refused to listen to any such request by Dara. "But the extreme eagerness of Shah Jahan," writes

76. Waris, f. 517b ; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 235-36 ; Qabil Khan, ff. 109b, 140b.

77. William Foster, x, p. 73.

78. Waris, f. 518a ; Salih Kambu, iii, ff. 235-36 ; 'Aqil Khan Razi, p. 16 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 518a ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, pp. 535-36 ; Khafi Khan, i, pp. 754-55.

79. Bernier, i, p. 24.

Manucci, "to possess himself of the diamond mines weighed more than the petitions of Dara and Begum Sahib."[80] However, Dara was able to detain eighty European artillerymen of Mir Jumla's *topkhana* by bribing them heavily.[81] Mir Jumla's family members including his son Muhammad Amin were detained by Shah Jahan under Dara's pressure as hostages at Delhi.[82]

The Emperor, honoured his nobles before their departure for the South. Mir Jumla was given a *khil'at,* studded dagger, *phul-katarah,* two horses and an elephant. Muhammad Amin, son of Mir Jumla, was raised to the rank of 3000 *zat* and 1000 *sawar* and ordered to act as *Diwan* in the absence of his father. Nijabat Khan was honoured by a *khil'at* and a horse with golden trappings. Mirza Sultan was raised to 3000 *zat* and 500 *sawar.* Similarly other nobles were given gifts by the Emperor.[83]

In the last Golconda campaign Aurangzeb had failed to accomplish his goal, partly because he did not possess sufficiently strong artillery. Realizing this drawback, he urged Mir Jumla to obtain permission from the Emperor to utilize his heavy artillery, which was still in the Deccan, in the Bijapur campaign. Shah Jahan granted Aurangzeb's request.[84] Mir Jumla left Delhi on December 1, 1656, for the Deccan.

The confusion in Bijapur after the death of Muhammad 'Adil Shah further weakned the stability of the state. Even at such a critical moment when the Mughuls were mustering their troops at Ahmadnagar, the Bijapuri nobility was divided into many groups. Khan Muhammad, the *wazir* was opposed by a group of selfish nobles who wanted their own supremancy. The cause of friction was the

80. Manucci, i, p. 239.
81. Ibid., p. 226.
82. William Foster, x, p. 74 ; Bernier, i, p. 24.
83. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 236.
84. Qabil Khan, f. 108b.

usual rivalry between *jagirdar's* mercenaries and Sultan's *Khasa Khayl*. These mercenary troops owed their loyalty to their immediate master *i.e.* the *jagirdar*, who was responsible for their recruitment and promotion.[85] Taking advantage of the unstable position of the newly enthroned boy-king, the local *zamindars* and Sahu seized some parts of Bijapuri Karnatak.[86]

Aurangzeb fully utilized the dissatisfaction prevailing in Bijapur to his advantage. He tried to seduce some 'Adil Shahi nobles by offering them money and high ranks in the imperial service. He informed Mir Jumla that he intended to win over some 'Adil Shahis by any means he could. Those who had little chance for advancement in Bijapur were easily tempted by the offer of Aurangzeb. The deserters included Ghazi Khan, son of Randola Khan, 'Abdul Qadir, Shaikh Mustafa Junaydi, Mustafa Khan and Haji Khan Miyana.[87] Aurangzeb ordered Multafat Khan, governor of Ahmadnagar, to give Rs. 2,000 to each Bijapuri officer who deserted with a hundred followers to join the imperial service. He informed the governor that some Maratha chiefs such as Babaji, Khur Khoji Bhonsla and others intended to join the Mughul army and so they should be given a warm welcome.[88]

With the arrival of Mir Jumla at Aurangabad on *Rabi-ul-Akhir* 10, 1067/January 18, 1657, Aurangzeb started toward Bijapur.[89] The fort of Bidar was first to be invested by the imperialists. It was one of the strongest forts of Bijapur and built by Sultan Ahmad Bahman. A ditch, thirty feet deep, in the form of a triple channel

85. *Journal of Pakistan Historical Society*, Vol. XIV, iii, July 1966, p. 151 ; Qabil Khan, f. 75a ; Iftikhar Ahmad Ghauri ; *The Political Institutions of Bijapur and Golconda*, pp. 123. 125, 273-74.

86. Qabil Khan, ff. 110b, 111a ; Musta'id Khan, p. 33.

87. Qabil Khan, f. 116.

88. Ibid., ff. 173a, 175b.

89. Ibid., f. 172b.

was constructed around the fort whose outer circumference was 2½ miles. The fort had thirty seven bastions, some of them square-shaped. The mounds were well protected to discharge fire on the enemy.[90] The fort was defended by Siddi Marjan at the head of 1000 cavalrymen and 4000 matchlockmen. Aurangzeb reached Bidar on *Jamadi-ul-Awwal* 24/February 28, and besieged the fort the following day. In spite of enemy's heavy fire, the Mughuls managed to take their cannon to the edge of the ditch. The besieged commander was mortally wounded by the imperial rockets and the garrison became disheartened. They surrendered the fort on Wednesday, *Jamadi-ul-Akhir* 23, 1067/March 29, 1657. A large booty fell to the victorious army. It included twelve lakhs of rupees in cash, corn and other articles to the value of eight lakhs of rupees and two hundred and thirty cannon.[91]

The Bijapuris tried to hinder the advance of the Mughuls but were defeated. Khan Muhammad and Afzal Khan mustered an army of 20,000 at Gulbarga to check the Mughuls, who were proceeding toward Kalyani. But Aurangzeb rose equal to the occasion and sent Mahabat Khan with 15,000 cavalry. A fierce battle took place on *Rajab*, 8/April 12, in which the Bijapuris suffered a heavy loss. The imperialists burnt neighbouring villages in Gulbarga and looted the population.[92] Taking advantage of the Mughul preoccupation, Shivaji ravaged Ahmadnagar and Junair. Nasiri Khan and Kaar Talab Khan were sent against Shivaji. The imperialists turned the

90. G. Yazdani, *Bidar, Its History and Monuments*, London, 1947, pp. 14-15; *Fort of Bidar*, pp. 28-44.

91. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 251; Qabil Khan, ff. 172b, 173a; Harsukh Rai, f. 518a; Mir 'Alam, f. 261b. Yazdani, *Bidar*, pp. 14-15: After its fall, Aurangzeb went to the Jami Masjid where *khutba* was read in Shah Jahan's name. Bidar was renamed as Zafarabad and henceforth the Mughul coins minted at Zafarabad bore the same name.

92. Salih Kambu iii, pp. 252-54.

intruders out of the Mughul territory and followed the Maratha chief into his *jagir* of Poona and Chakan.[93]

After defeating the enemy at Gulbarga, Aurangzeb besieged Kaliyani on *Rajab*, 30/May, 4. The fort was stronger than that of Bidar and the Mughuls paid a heavy price in human life. Mir Jumla succeeded in carrying the imperial trenches to the edge of the ditch and the Mughuls were sure of their success when Bijapuri reinforcements hovered around the invader's camp and checked their progress. Once Mahabat Khan, who had only 2000 soldiers with him, was attacked by 20,000 Bijapuris. But the Mughuls forced the enemy to retreat. Later, the sons of Bahlol Bijapuri attacked the trenches of Mir Jumla, who with the assistance of Rao Sattarsal and Shah Nawaz Khan, held the field stubbornly. After a hard struggle the ditch around the fort was filled up by the Mughuls, who then were able to breach the bastions. Dilawar Habshi, the besieged commander, surrendered the fort on July 31, and was sent to Bijapur unmolested. Meanwhile the fort of Nilanga also fell to the Mughuls.[94] News of the conquest of Kaliyani was sent to the Emperor, who rewarded his commanders. Aurangzeb was sent a ruby, a special *khil'at*, a *phul-katarah* and two elephants. For Mir Jumla, Shah Jahan despatched a *khil'at* and a dagger and an area yielding four crores of *dams* annually in the Karnatak, was conferred on him in *jagir*. Shah Nawaz Khan, Nijabat Khan and Raja Sattarsal were promoted in their ranks.[95]

After the fall of Bidar and Kaliyani, the road was open to Bijapur which was to be besieged next and the whole of the state would have fallen into the hands of Aurangzeb but the intrigues of

93. Qabil Khan, ff. 94-95, 133 ; Salih Kambu, iii, p. 258 ; Stanley Lane-Poole, *Rulers of India* (*Aurangzeb*), Oxford, 1893, pp. 154-57.

94. Salih Kambu, iii, p. 260 ; 'Aqil Khan Razi, p. 17 ; Qabil Khan. ff. 150b, 151a ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 536.

95. Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 261-62.

Dara checked Aurangzeb's progress. Dara, who from the beginning was opposed to the campaign, became all the more jealous of Aurangzeb's success. According to Manucci, Dara said to Shah Jahan many times that he was not afraid of any of his brothers except the bigot and prayer-monger (*i,e,* Aurangzeb).[96] He had previously sent his envoy Mulla Shauqi to Bijapur and assured 'Adil Shah of his help in persuading the Emperor to stop the campaign.[97] But it appears as if Shah Jahan in his eagerness to add a vast territory to his Empire, did not pay attention to Dara's appeals at first. After the fall of Kaliyani, 'Adil Shah became much alarmed and despatched Ibrahim Khan Bachattar post haste to Dara requesting him to redouble his efforts to dissuade the Emperor from continuing the campaign. Dara not for the sake of 'Adil Shah but primarily to prevent Aurangzeb from gaining any more power, tried every mean to influence the Emperor. Persuaded by the earnest appeals of *Shah Buland Iqbal*, Shah Jahan ordered Aurangzeb to end the war.[98]

The war ended much against the wishes of Aurangzeb. The reader may well imagine Aurangzeb's state of mind at that time but he most obediently submitted to the command of his father. The terms of the treaty of August, 1657, were: 'Adil Shah agreed to pay a *peshkesh* of one and a half crore of rupees, to cede Parinda and its dependencies, forts in old Nizam Shahi Konkan and *mahals* of Wanku to the Mughuls.[99] The treaty was ratified by Shah Jahan who later remitted Rs. 50,000 out of the agreed *peshkesh*. Mir Jumla was asked to take possession of the forts to be ceded by 'Adil Shah and then to return to the imperial court.[100]

96. Manucci, i, p. 229.
97. Qabil Khan, f. 208a.
98. Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 262-63 ; Qabil Khan, f. 193a.
99. Qabil Khan, ff. 193, 236a ; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 262-63 ; Muhammad Sadiq, f. 193b ; Shah Nawaz Khan, iii, p. 536.
100. Musta'id Khan, p. 3 ; Harsukh Rai, f. 519a ; Salih Kambu iii, p. 263.

How did Dara manage to persuade the Emperor to issue such an order? The answer is simple. Though Bijapur had supplied causes sufficient for the invasion yet the start of the campaign chiefly depended on Mir Jumla. The *Diwan-i-'Ala* was present at the imperial court and tried hard to convince the Emperor to sanction the war. When the Mir was busy in the operations in Bijapur, there was no one left at the imperial court, who could successfully counteract Dara's moves. Thus the abrupt ending of the Bijapur campaign like that of Golconda previously, was not due to any variations in the official policy but mainly due to the apprehensions of Dara Shikoh lest Aurangzeb might grow stronger.

Shah Jahan fell ill on September 6, 1657, and Dara took over the entire administration. The whole of the Mughul Empire was in great suspense.[101] Meanwhile Dara sent orders to Mughul officers in the Deccan to return to Delhi. Both Mahabat Khan and Raja Sattarsal left for Delhi with their retainers without the formal permission of Aurangzeb.[102] Dara had succeeded in his desire of lowering Aurangzeb's position in the eye's of the Deccanis.

Aurangzeb was eager to take Parinda and other ceded forts before the situation got out of hand. But the Bijapuris encouraged both by the circumstances developing in the Mughul Empire and the assurance given by Shah of Iran to give every possible help to 'Adil Shah,[103] refused to comply with the terms of the treaty.

Expediency obliged Aurangzeb to give some concessions to 'Ali 'Adil Shah. He was more eager to secure the Mughul throne for himself

101. Muhammad Kazim, *'Alamgir Namah*, edited by Maulwi Khadim Hussain and Abdul Hye, Calcutta, 1868, pp. 217-18, 'Aqil Khan Razi, pp. 18-19; Iftikhar Ahmad Ghauri, *War of Succession between the sons of Shah Jahan*, pp. 107-08.

102. Mir 'Alam, f. 261b; Salih Kambu, iii, pp. 290-92; Muhammad Kazim, p. 219.

103. Mirza Tahir Wahid, f. 7b-10b, Qabil Khan, f. 236a.

than to waste any more time in the settlement of Bijapur affairs. He left Bidar and arrived at Aurangabad on November 11, 1657. In order to convince 'Adil Shah of his kindness to him, he wrote him a letter in which new terms were proposed. Aurangzeb stated that the entire responsibility of the destruction caused in Bijapur lay with Mir Jumla. As soon as he received orders from the Emperor, he stopped the war. The Prince agreed to give up the fort of Parinda and its dependencies, Konkan, *Mahals* of Wanku, the 'Adil Shahi part of the Karnatak, together with a remittance of thirty *lakhs* of rupees on the condition that 'Ali 'Adil Shah remained loyal to him and supplied a force of 10,000 cavalry to serve under him. Aurangzeb promised that on the arrival of the Bijapuri force in Aurangabad, the title of *Shah** as requested by 'Adil Shah would be bestowed on him. Aurangzeb asked 'Adil Shah that *Sahu* Bhonsla and sons of Bahlol should not be pardoned unless they give a guarantee that they would not molest the imperial territory. Shivaji, if taken in Bijapur service, was to be given a *jagir* in the 'Adil Shahi Karnatak so as keep him away from the Mughul Deccan. In the end Aurangzeb promised his full support to 'Ali 'Adil Shah if the latter had to face any danger from Northern India. The *Iqrar* (*i.e.* promise) was to be binding on him (i,e, Aurangzeb) for generations.[104]

Aurangzeb also wrote a letter to the dowager-queen of Bijapur, the regent of the boy-king, expressing his sincerity towards the 'Adil Shahis. He repeated that it was all due to Mir Jumla's malignancy that great devastation had been inflicted on the state. He had no intentions of his own to ravage Bijapur or capture it. But neither his letter to the dowager-queen nor his new terms to 'Ali 'Adil Shah worked out effectively. The Bijapuris knew well that Aurangzeb was acting under the pressure of time and was not sincere to them. The statement of Muhammad Kazim, the author of '*Alamgir Namah*, that Dara wrote to 'Adil Shah secretly not to fulfil the terms of the treaty

* It may be pointed out that the title of *Shah* had already been conferred on the ruler of Bijapur in 1648 by Shah Jahan. (see p. 246 supra).

104. Qabil Khan, ff. 191b-193b.

seems to be correct, because Dara wanted to weaken Aurangzeb by any means he could. Aurangzeb's own letters written to Jahan Ara Begum and J'affar Beg, the *Diwan-i-'Ala,* before the battle of Samugarh, further confirm the intentions of Dara.[105]

The failure of both the campaigns against Golconda and Bijapur thus rested on the shoulders of Dara. The Mughul policy in the Deccan, if it could be described as such, became a plaything in the hands of the rival parties at the imperial court. Shah Jahan wanted to extend the border of his Empire in the Deccan but Dara, the dearest of all his sons was deadly opposed to the idea. Under such circumstances when the princes were opposed to each other and the nobility divided, it was useless to expect any success. The Deccanis fully utilized the bickerings of the hostile factions at the Mughul court and succeeded in keeping their dynasties alive for a little longer.

105. Muhammad Kazim, p. 83; Qabil Khan, ff. 199b-208b; *Mulla Fayyaz,* ff. 86a-87b.

CONCLUSION

Since ancient times Indian rulers have attempted to create a unified empire comprising the whole peninsula from the northern mountains to the southern sea, the obvious natural frontiers. But history records that the rulers of the North were more successful in this attempt than those of the South. In ancient India, Asoka (269—332 B.C.) tried to bring the South under political dominance of an empire based in the North. Similarly Samudra Gupta II, (376—415 A.D.) of the Gupta dynasty and Harsha Vardhana (606—647 A.D.) attempted to dominate the South. Sultan 'Ala-ud-Din Khalji *(1296-1316 A.D.)* was the first Muslim Sultan who took active steps to bring the South under the Delhi Sultanate. A similar attempt was made by Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq to bring the South under northern domination. But both these Sultans failed to bring the southern peninsula permanently under Delhi rule. The Mughul policy of conquering the South, therefore, can be regarded as the continuation of the traditional policy of northern rulers to dominate the South.

Babur and Humayun, were mainly occupied in extending and consolidating their kingdom and suppressing their opponents. Akbar was the first Mughul Emperor to cherish the idea of becoming the overlord of both the northern and southern India.

A ruler of the North could only move to the South if the political situation in the North permitted him. When Akbar ascended the throne in 1556, his political position was weak and it was after about forty years that he could establish himself completely in the North. After the conquest of Gujarat in 1572, the Mughul border touched the northern borders of the Deccan states. It seemed almost certain that Akbar would next move toward the Deccan but he could not do so owing to his pre-occupations in the North. He was

not secure in the North-west; was threatened both by his brother Mirza Muhammad Hakim of Kabul and 'Abdullah Khan of Turan. It was only after the death of 'Abdullah Khan in 1598, that Akbar was in a position to move toward the South. Again we find that, when prince Salim rebelled at Allahabad in 1600, Akbar had to hasten from Asirgarh toward the North. Similarly at a later date in 1657, we find that prince Aurangzeb, who was then viceroy of the Mughul Deccan had to leave the South for Delhi in order to secure the Mughul throne.

Even while pre-occupied in the North, Akbar kept a close watch over the affairs in the Deccan. He kept himself informed of the situation there by exchange of diplomatic missions with the courts of the rulers of the Deccan Sultanates. It was during this period that he gave refuge to the Deccanis such as Khudawand Khan, Sayyid Murtaza, Burhan Nizam Shah and others. His motive in adopting such a policy was to prepare the ground for his future plan of subjugating the South.

Akbar had many reasons for conquering the Deccan. The Deccani rulers had acknowledged Babur and Humayun as their overlords. Akbar, therefore, wanted to enjoy the same rights as had been exercised by his forefathers. The Deccan states were a refuge for imperial rebels. After the conquest of Gujarat in 1572, Akbar assumed the right to enforce his overlordship over the Deccan states since their rulers paid allegiance to the Sultan of Gujarat. Akbar wanted to push the Portuguese who had captured Goa, the Bijapuri port, in 1510, into sea. They had captured sea ports of Gujarat, which Akbar regarded as his own possessions, since he was master of that province. The Portuguese made agreements with other states and helped them actively against the Mughuls. The safety of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and sea-trade entirely depended on the goodwill of the Portuguese. Akbar could only defeat the Portuguese by land, since the Mughuls had no navy. But the Deccan states which were hostile to him, stood in his way. Akbar was, therefore, obliged first

to conquer these states if he wanted to oust the Portuguese. The wealth of the Deccan states was an inducement for Akbar to conquer them. These states had gold and diamond mines and they had also enriched themselves by the capture of the treasures of Vijayanagar state after 1565. Akbar wanted to be known as *Chakravartin* (i.e. overlord of whole of India), and this was not possible unless he brought both northern and southern India under his sway.

The political weakness of the Deccan states was the chief cause, which encouraged Akbar and his successors to conquer them. These five states, namely, Ahmadnagar (under Nizam Shahis), Bijapur (under 'Adil Shahis), Golconda (under Qutb Shahis), Bidar (under 'Imad Shahis) and Berar (under Barid Shahis), were generally at war with each other for dynastic superiority. When these states came into existence in late 1520s, there was no well established kingdom in the North. Babur and Humayun were so much occupied with their own difficulties that they had hardly any time to pay proper attention to the Deccan affairs. The Deccani rulers, therefore, continued their mutual quarrels and failed to realise the danger posed by Akbar.

The nature of political allegiance in those days was another cause of the weakness of the Deccan states. Many nobles had come to the Deccan from distant places such as Iran and Iraq and obtained high *mansabs*. The Deccanis opposed the foreign element known as *Pardesi* or *Gharib-ud-Dayyar* and thus chaos reigned in these states. Moreover, nobles whether foreigners or native, were not actuated by any feeling of loyalty to the dynasty. They paid their loyalty to the person of a king rather than sincerely serving the cause of the state. Such people, therefore, could easily be seduced by another party if assured of better chances of preferment. For example, during the siege of Asirgarh, Afzal Khan, the *wazir* of Bahadur Khan was in league with Akbar. Similarly, during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, Yaqut Khan, Adam Khan, Babu Jiu, Jadu Rai, Fath Khan and Mir Jumla, among others deserted their masters and joined the Mughuls, who assured them of high ranks.

Lack of leadership was another cause of the weakness of these states. The Deccani monarchies, like that of the Mughuls, who were stronger than them, were based on army. Such states could only stand on a firm footing if the ruler was strong enough to enforce his commands. Recruitment to army was based on tribal basis. The *jagirdari* system in the Deccan was another weakness of these Sultanates. In other words, a soldier paid his allegiance to his immediate officer, i.e. *jagirdar* or *khasa khayal*. The presence of a strong ruler or a leader, therefore, was absolutely necessary to control his subordinates in order to run the government smoothly. For example, after the death of Ibrahim Nizam Shah in 1595, Bahadur, the legal successor to the Nizam Shahi throne, was hardly a year and a half old. The result was that the Ahmadnagaris were divided into four groups, each of which was trying to obtain supremacy with the support of its followers. Akbar took full advantage of their disunity and captured the fort of Ahmadnagar. Malik 'Ambar, the *Peshwa* or *Wakil* of Nizam Shah, was an able leader. He gathered his followers and recaptured half of the Nizam Shahi territory during Jahangir's reign. After Malik 'Ambar's death, the Nizam Shahi kingdom lacked an efficient leader and again fell a victim to internal disputes. The Mughuls, therefore, under Shah Jahan annexed Ahmadnagar state in 1636. The shifting of political alliance among the Deccan states was another cause of their ruin. Instead of uniting against the common enemy, they even helped him. This shows that none of the Deccan states was sincere to the other but that all were selfish and working for their own gains. In 1624, both 'Adil Shah and Malik 'Ambar were eager to gain the support of the Mughuls in order to overthrow the other. In 1636, 'Adil Shah agreed to co-operate with the Mughuls against the Nizam Shahis in order to save his own state from further devastation by the imperialists.

We may now consider why the Mughuls took so long in capturing the Deccan states. They had started active military operations as early as 1595 but could not conquer more than one state, Ahmadnagar, till the year 1636—a period of forty one years. There seem to

be four main reasons for this. First, an initiative by the Emperor was an absolute necessity to advance the Mughul interest in the Deccan. Akbar was a successful warrior. He had reinforced the Mughul Empire by conquering the whole of northern India, and was eager to extend his borders further in the South. He had taken the command himself in many battles in the North and similarly he took the command at Asirgarh. The presence of the Emperor at the scene of war was necessary to create a spirit of unity and enthusiasm among his soldiers otherwise they were prone to victims to mutual disputes which slowed down progress. We find as long as Akbar was present in the South, the imperialists worked unitedly, and were able to capture Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh. As soon as Akbar left for Agra in 1601, his lieutenants fell out with each other and lost ground to the enemy. The result was that at the time of the death of Akbar in 1605, the Nizam Shahis had recaptured half of their lost territory.

Jahangir was not a successful commander as a prince and he never took command in person after his accession to the throne. More than once he was advised to take the command into his own hands in order to remove disunity among the imperialists in the South, but he never did so. Jahangir's pusillanimity suggests that there was no strong consistant policy governing relationships with the Deccan states. Pressure upon them was increased or relaxed according to the whims and the personal interests of powerful figures around the Emperor. The Nizam Shahis took full advantage of Mughul disunity and we find that the Mughul frontiers in 1628, at the death of Jahangir, were less advanced than in 1605, at the time of his accession. Shah Jahan after becoming emperor went twice to the Deccan and eventually annexed Ahmadnagar state to the Mughul Empire and reduced Bijapur and Golconda to tributary status.

The second factor was the guerilla tactics of the Deccanis. The Mughuls were used to fighting in the plains and in pitched battles. The imperial army was heavily equipped and was not mobile,

while on the other hand, the Deccanis were light troopers and swift in their movements. They would withdraw for some distance, drag the enemy into difficult hill passes, deliver a surprise attack, and retreat after inflicting heavy losses before the enemy took its positions. The physical features of the Deccan were, therefore, a great obstacle to the imperial progress. The imperial generals like Khan Khanan, Asaf Khan, 'Abdullah Khan and many others failed to match the strategy of the Deccanis. It took a long time, before the Mughuls could learn guerilla warfare.

The third factor was means of communications. The imperial bases were in Gujarat and Malwa. The Mughuls could bring their reinforcements from Ahmadabad to Burhanpur or Daulatabad safely. But it became difficult for them to maintain their line of communication from Burhanpur to Bijapur or any other distant place in the enemy's territory. The Deccanis often succeeded in cutting the Mughul communications and the imperialists had to retire through shortage of food and fodder. The imperial commander of Ahmadnagar had to surrender to the Nizam Shahis in 1610, only because the Mughuls failed to send reinforcements. The cause of the failure of Asaf Khan in 1632 and that of Mahabat Khan in 1633 in the sieges of Bijapur and Sholapur respectively was that they could not hold their supply line securely. The Deccanis increased their guerilla attacks and forced the Mughuls to retire.

Fourthly, the court intrigues directly affected Mughuls relations with the Deccan states, particularly during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Jahangir had lost the grip on the reins of government and matters of state policy had gone into the hands of the so called Nur Jahan *junta*. As long as harmony existed between the members of the *junta*, the Mughuls were at least able to recapture their lost territory, if not make new conquests in the Deccan, but once disunity arose they lost ground to the enemy. Nur Jahan had favoured Shah Jahan as her candidate to the throne, while the rival group earlier had supported Khusrau. The *junta*, therefore, was chiefly concerned

to prove the superiority of her candidate over the rival group. In this attempt, Nur Jahan exploited the Deccan campaigns as a means of enhancing the prestige of her candidate. The Deccanis took advantage of Mughul disunity and drove them off many times.

The Mughuls could have conquered Ahmadnagar state easily in 1617, but the pre-occupations of the *junta* checked the imperial progress. The Deccanis had submitted and bought off the Mughuls by offering large sums. But the *junta* exaggerated Shah Jahan's success, otherwise it would have been quite possible for the Mughuls to annex the Ahmadnagar state since all its strongholds, such as Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar, had fallen into the hands of the imperialists and resources of the Nizam Shahis were exhausted. As soon as the Mughuls retired to the North, the Nizam Shahis rallied, and after a period of about two years, they were able to advance as far as Mandu, the capital city of the Mughul province of Malwa.

Jahangir's health was failing and Nur Jahan in whose hands administration of the country lay was more interested in the immediate question of succession. She turned against Shah Jahan in 1621 and nominated Shahryar as her new candidate. When Shah Jahan was sent to the Deccan for the second time in 1621, he was eager to finish the campaign as early as possible in order to give more time to his interests in the North. The Deccanis once again bought off the Mughuls. In order to obtain help from the Deccanis in his contest for succession, Shah Jahan dictated light terms. His strained relations with Nur Jahan culminated in his rebellion in 1623. The rebellion continued for three years and the Nizam Shahis regained some parts of their territories. Even after the end of the rebellion, the court intrigues continued and encouraged Khan Jahan Lodi to sell in 1627, the whole of Balaghat and the fort of Ahmadnagar for three lakhs of *huns* to the Nizam Shahis. To conclude, the Mughuls in 1627 had hardly advanced beyond their frontiers of 1605.

After his accession, Shah Jahan took a serious view of the Deccan affairs and was able to annex Ahmadnagar in 1636. But

during the later period of his reign, rivalry between Dara and Aurangzeb increased. Both the brothers were trying hard to secure the throne and thus the imperial court was divided into two groups, one led by Dara and the other by Sa'adullah Khan, the *wazir* on behalf of his candidate, Aurangzeb. Whereas Aurangzeb, the viceroy of the imperial province of the Deccan, wanted to annex Bijapur and Golconda, Dara strongly opposed him. Being at the Centre, Dara misused his power. He had secret relations with Bijapur and Golconda and promised his help to the rulers of these states. Qutb Shah and 'Adil Shah, therefore, cared little for Aurangzeb's instructions. It was Sa'adullah, who influenced Shah Jahan to sanction war against Golconda in 1656. When the *wazir* fell ill and could not attend to affairs of the country, Dara got his opportunity, and persuaded his father to end the campaign. Similarly, it was Mir Jumla, an ally of Aurangzeb, who got the imperial orders issued for a war against 'Adil Shah in 1657. After the capture of Bidar and Kaliyani, Bijapur would have easily fallen but the opposition of Dara checked the imperial advance. Mir Jumla was busy in the Deccan and Dara took advantage of Mir's absence from the imperial court. He tried hard to persuade the Emperor to finish the campaign and at last succeeded. It can be concluded that there was no definite policy of Shah Jahan toward the Deccan states, particularly during the last five years of his reign. The Emperor had no independent views of his own during this period and swung like a pendulum between Dara and his opponents. The Deccanis exploited the rivalaries of the opposite groups at the Centre and kept their dynasties alive a little longer, until their states were finally conquered by Aurangzeb in 1686-87.

The Mughul court intrigues make a student of history believe that the Deccan policy of the Mughuls was purely a lust for territorial expansion. They were not serious in their attempt to capture the Deccan states. The reason probably was that these states were not a threat to the Mughul Empire. All their energies were concentrated

in recapturing the lost territories. Subjugation of the Deccan states was not an essential factor for the existence of the Mughul rule. Had it been so, at least the ruling dynasty, if not the imperial nobles, would have more actively furthered the Mughul cause in the South. But it did not. This analysis of Mughul relations with the Deccan states, with their strong overtones of aristocratic factions and court intrigues suggests that, in order to understand the political character of Mughul rule, a study of the role of the Mughul nobility in politics is desirable.

The relations between the Mughuls and the Safawi Shahs of Iran affected the Mughul relations with the Deccan states, particularly during the reign of Shah Jahan.

Akbar was so pre-occupied with affairs in the North that he had hardly any time to interfere in the relations of the Deccan states with Iran. Moreover Akbar's Deccan policy was his own initiative and not influenced by outside pressure. The relations between the Mughuls and the Safawis became strained owing to the capture of Qandahar by the latter in 1622 but Jahangir chiefly concentrated on the suppression of Shah Jahan's rebellion, which followed in 1623. The Deccanis, therefore, were relieved of any serious threat by the Mughuls. Even after the submission of Shah Jahan, the imperial court was so pre-occupied with the immediate question of succession that it could not properly attend to the affairs in the South.

Shah Jahan's Deccan policy seems to have been affected by the Iran-Mughul relations. He ordered Qutb Shah to drop the name of the Shah of Iran from the *Khutba* and to include that of the Mughul Emperor whom he had acknowledged as his overlord. Again we find that the failure of the three campaigns of the Mughuls aimed at recapturing Qandahar affected their relations with the Deccan states. Twice Shah Jahan sanctioned invasions of Golconda and Bijapur in 1656-57 but on both the occasions the intrigues of Dara saved the Deccan states from annexation.

To conclude, the Mughul policy from 1556 to 1658 as we have seen was on the whole a failure. Akbar had captured the mighty forts of Asirgarh and Ahmadnagar by 1601, but the Mughuls could not enjoy the full fruit of their success. Akbar's lieutenants proved to be inefficient and we find that at the death of Akbar, the Nizam Shahis had regained a large portion of their kingdom. The court of Jahangir was chiefly pre-occupied with intrigues and could not pay serious attention to furthering the Mughul cause in the South. Shah Jahan was actively interested in the Deccan affairs until the year 1636, when he annexed Ahmadnagar state and reduced Bijapur and Golconda to tributary status. During the last five years of Shah Jahan's reign, the imperial court was an arena of political intrigues and the Deccan policy became a plaything in the hands of the rival parties. Thus the Mughul cause in the Deccan made little headway for nearly a century. Aurangzeb 'Alamgir subjugated the South for the first time in Mughul history and was successful in building an All-India Empire. He succeeded, where his predecessors had failed. The responsibility lay entirely with Aurangzeb's successors who could not maintain their conquests in the South.

APPENDIX (A)—Siege of Asirgarh

Many modern writers[1] have written about the siege of Asirgarh and have expressed their views regarding the accounts of the Jesuit Fathers. Among them Smith seems to be the greatest critic of the Muslim chroniclers. He wrote :

> "Abu'l Fazl and Faizi Sirhindi neither knew nor cared what story the Jesuit Father might send to Europe. Their business was to supply matter suitable for Indian readers."

At another place, Smith says, "The detailed story told by the Jesuit author, which must be based on the letters of Jerome Xavier, is in my judgement literally true and deserving of acceptance as being the most authentic history of the events which led to the capitulation of Asirgarh."[2]

General Comments on the Portuguese sources :

The reader should bear in mind that Du Jarric is not the author of these letters but merely a compiler. In the preface of his *Histoire*, Du Jarric says that prior to the year 1959 A.D., he depended on a history in Spanish by Fr. Louys de Guzman, entitled *The*

1. Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, pp. 272-300 ; Count von Noer, pp. 360-63 ; T. W. Haig, pp. 178-83 ; H. Heras, pp. 33-41 ; C.H. Payne (Notes to Chapter IX of *Akbar and the Jesuits*), pp. 252-58 ; Ishwari Prasad, *A Short History of Muslim Rule in India*, Allahabad, 1936, pp. 390-92 ; Roy Choudhry Makhanlal, *The Din-i-Ilahi, Introduction*, Calcutta, 1941 ; pp. 35-35 ; E.D. Maclagan, p. 38 ; Laurence Binyon, pp. 141-45 ; John Correia-Afonso, pp. 85-87.
2. Smith ; *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, pp. 276, 285 ; John Correia-Afonso says (p. 23) : No sane judge of style would ever claim that they (Xavier's letters) are literally masterpieces. They are as a matter of fact, most unliterary.

history of the Missions undertaken by the Religieux in the East Indies and the Kingdom of China. He further says that for the events after 1599 A.D. (where the history of Guzman ends) he wrote to Fr. Fernand Guerreiro, who was then the Superior of the house of the Profes at Lisbon. Fr. Guerreiro sent him some books to help him to continue his writing of the *Histoire.* Among the books he sent a history which was in Ten Books—an account of what Fr. Xavier and other Religieux of the same mission had done in India. This was written by a Portuguese Father, Jean de Lucena. Du Jarric further states : I received a number of books dealing with what has taken place in these regions since the year 1600 from the letters which came therefrom by the said Father Fernard Guerreiro, who besides, supplying me with these and other aids and giving me much valuable advice has continued to put into my hands, the volumes he has published of the letters, arriving year by year from India, so that I am now in possession of all these down to the year 1606.[3]

In other words, Du Jarric's account up till the year 1600 (which also covers the siege of Asirgarh) was based among other authorities (i. e. Guzman, Fr. Xavier and others), on the material supplied by Guerreiro. *Du Jarric's account is, therefore, not entirely* based on the letters of Fr. Xavier as Smith thought. Guerreiro had more access to the Jesuit Letters than Du Jarric. Smith is also mistaken when he says that Guerreiro, who gives no details, confirms Du Jarric's (Scil Xavier's) statement that the capitulation was obtained by bribary." In fact Du Jarric's account (with special regard to the siege of Asirgarh) is nothing more than the mere translation of Guerreiro's *Relacam Annal das Cousas que Fizaram os Padres da Companhia de Jesu nas Partes da India Oriental.........*" Part I.

The important feature of Guerreiro's *Relacam* is that it is generaly based on the Annual Letters of the Jesuit Fathers to their

3. C. H. Payne in the introductory chapter of *Akbar and the Jesuits,* pp. 26-29.

Superiors at Lisben. Guerreiro himself never came to India. He is not the author or an eye witness to those events. He is like Du Jarric, a compiler of these letters.

Regarding the features of the Annual Letters, John Correira-Afonso writes : "The Annual Letters of the major administrative divisions of the Society—the Provinces and the Missions—were to a large extent written on the basis of information supplied by their constituent units—the colleges and mission-stations. They thus make up a synthesis in which minor details are frequently omitted. Often too, the news, at first recorded in a residence away from the administrative centre, is reproduced at second-hand. In these cases, the Annual Letters have consequently less authority than reports drawn up by the protagonists themselves. "The historical value of the General Letters", says Silva Rega, "is inferior to that of the personal ones. These represented the direct testimony of the missionaries themselves. Those giving the indirect testimony of the scribe, were evidently subject to his judgement."[4]

Thus it can be concluded that the Annual letters written by the Fathers to the Society when published, had passed through many hands who made changes according to their own judgements.

With regard to the writing of Guerreiro, Rev. H. Heras has said : These yearly relations published by the Portuguese Jesuits were not the general account based on the Letters of the Missionaries, but consisted of a collection of those very letters, each of them being published as a different chapter of the book, with the address and signature omitted. One can still recognise the different styles of the writers in the various chapters of the work, even in the Spanish translation. Moreover, some Missionaries speak of themselves in the third person—as Fr. Monserrat does in his well known 'Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius"—while others write in the first person. This means that the editor did not trouble to unify the

4. John Correira-Afonso p. 26.

work, but (fortunately) inserted the letters just as they stood."[5]

As these letters were sent yearly to Lisbon, some of the events were written long after the incident. For example, the letter of F. Nicholas Pimenta G.J., on Magor to the General of the Society Fr. Claudius Aquviva, in which he also described the march of Akbar from Agra to Lahore and then to the Deccan in 1598, was written from Goa on December 21, 1599.[6]

While from another letter of Fr. Pimenta to Fr. Claudius Aquaviva, General Secretary, written in December, 1600, it is quite clear that Pimenta was not at Goa on December 21, 1599, as he left it on December 13, 1599, for Chiul.[7] Rev. H. Hosten rightly concludes that at least the end of the letter (dated December 21, 1599 A.D) was not written by Piments but by a secretary unless we suppose that Pimenta ante-dated it.[8]

The account of the Jesuit Fathers is not consistent. For example, they record that Ahmadnagar fell to the Mughuls before Akbar's arrival at Burhanpur, while the historical evidence show that Akbar reached Burhanpur,[9] on April 10, 1599 and Ahmadnagar fell on August 16, 1600.

Though some of the statements of the Jesuit Fathers do not agree with the Muslim chronicles, yet they cannot be discredited altogether. Sometimes Jesuit Fathers give useful information not mentioned by Indian authors. The Portuguese account, to some extent, serves as a check on the Muslim chronicles if the latter wanted to conceal the truth.

These were general comments on the Portuguse accounts. Now we turn to the actual facts and objections raised by the modern

5. H. Heras, p. 33.
6. *Journal of Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1927, p. 57.
7. Ibid., p. 67.
8. Ibid., p. 57.
9. Du Jarric, p. 101.

critics against the authenticity of the Muslim chronicles on Asirgarh.

Smith and Rev. H. Heras, who have also given a detailed account of the siege of Asirgarh, have based their accounts chiefly on the Portuguese version, which according to my opinion is not wholly correct. Apart from the court writers, the Deccani chronicles also do not agree wholly with the Jesuit accounts.

It appears from Smith's account that Muqarrab Khan was sent by his father for the first time to Akbar to demand the release of Bahadur. But it is untrue. It has been shown in the previous pages that it was Muqarrab Khan, who conducted preliminary negotiations for peace terms and he also accompanied Bahadur when the latter appeared before Akbar. Therefore, it is quite obvious that Muqarrab Khan was in the imperial camp and not in the fort as stated by Smith. It was because Muqarrab Khan had conducted the negotiations between the besieged and the imperial court that Akbar preferred sending him to his father to surrender the fort. That was the reason that his father (*i.e.* Malik Yaqut Sultani) reproached him that it was he who took Bahadur and gave him to the enemy and now he had come to demand submission by the garrison.[10]

Smith states that the father of Muqarrab Khan was an un-named Abyssinian,[11] is incorrect. Haji Dabir clearly mentions that he was Malik Yaqut Sultani.[12] Faizi Sirhindi also gives the name as Siddi Yaqub.[13] Perhaps the word Yaqub is a mistake of the copy writer who wrote ب in place of ت.

Smith's statement that Bahadur refused to write a letter to the begieged to surrender, is wrong.[14] Apart from the Muslim chroniclers, even Guerreiro and Du Jarric, the main authorities of Smith's

10. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 224a.
11. Smith, *Akbar The Great Mogul*, p. 278.
12. Haji Dabir, i, p. 87.
13. Faizi Sirhindi, f. 273b.
14. Smith, Akbar, The Great Mogul, p. 279.

account, clearly mention that Akbar made Bahadur write a letter to the defenders of the first line of fortifications that it was on the receipt of his letter saying that they should at once give entrace to the lord who was approaching and whose coming was free from evil intent.[15]

Smith's charge that "the business of Abu'l Fazl and Faizi Sirhindi as to supply matter suitable for Indian readers and that they hid their master's treachery and concealed the final recourse to bribery,"[16] is not correct. Both chroniclers have mentioned that Bahadur appeared before Akbar on the condition that he would be allowed to return and his kingdom would be restored to him, but he was detained by Akbar. Abu'l Fazl clearly mentions that Bahadur was forced to write a letter to the besieged against his own wishers. It is implied from Abu'l Fazl's statement that treachery was employed by the besiegers to win over the besieged. Smith and John Correia-Afonso have relied on the translation of *Akbar Namah* by Beveridge. They have not taken full extract of the reference and seem to have been satisfied with the translation of "soothing words". While the full extract is : the experienced and skilful (soldiers) secretly busied in enticing the besieged by deceitful or fascinating words. They drew their hearts towards them by sweet and kind words".[17] In the light of this discussion, it is proved that the court chroniclers did not conceal "treachery" of their master as mentioned by Smith.

Smith accuses Faizi Sirhindi of giving the wrong date *i.e. Safar* 17/August 15, for the fall of Asirgarh instead of the correct date, which falls in the month of *Rajab*. The critic considers the statement of Sirhindi as absurd.[18] The fact is that the absurdity does not lie in Faizi Sirhindi's account but in the translation on which Smith had to rely. I have consulted both the manuscripts of Faizi Sirhindi

15. Du Jarric, p. 105, Guerreira, p. 7.
16. Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, p. 285.
17. Abu'l Fazl, *Akbar Namah*, iii, p. 780.
18. Smith, Akbar, The Great Mogul, p. 299.

in the British Museum, and they give the date as *Rajab* 17/January 18. The translation of *Akbar Namah* by Prof. Dowson in *E. & D. Vol. VI* is not correct. The words in the manuscripts are :

در روز دوشنبه هفدهم شهر رجب مردم قلع مطیع و منقاد شده

i.e. on Monday, *Rajab* 17/January 12, the besieged submitted and became submissive.

در روز دو شنبه هفدهم شهر رجب مردم پادشاهی را بقلعه بردند و کلید هائی قلعه باویسائی دولت سپردند

i.e. "They took the imperialists into the fort on Monday, *Rajab* 17/January 12, and submitted the keys to the imperial forces."[19] Thus the true reading of the manuscripts gives the same month in which the fort fell. Faizi Sirhindi puts the date when the besieged submitted and started climbing down from the fort and not four or five days later when the fort was surrendered formally. Thus the statement of Faizi Sirhindi corroborates the statement of Abu'l Fazl. Abu'l Fazl says that the besieged kept coming down from the fort for four days and formally surrendered the fort on January 17, 1601. Smith himself agrees with the statement of Abu'l Fazl with regard to the fall of the fort.

At one place Smith says, "It is impossible to reconcile the official statement, that the final capitulation was brought about by the voluntary surrender of Bahadur Shah with Xavier's statement that he had been kidnapped several months earlier, and that during his captivity the fort was surrendered by his officers".[21] Smith's statement is incredible. The court writers state that it was not a voluntary surrender but Bahadur was detained and the besieged were cajoled into surrendering. However, there is one point, which is not mentioned by the court writers and the Deccani authors also have a good reason to

19. Faizi Sirhindi, *Mss.* or. 169, f. 273b ; *Mss.* or. 1656 f. 224a.
20. Abu'l Fazl, *Akbar Namah*, iii, p. 780.
21. Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, p. 284.

omit it. That is, the request of Akbar, as mentioned by the Portuguese to the Jesuit Fathers for their help against the garrison. Portuguese sources say that when Akbar failed to capture the fort by storm he requested Fr. Xavier to write to the Portuguese at Chiul to send artillery to him and that he would also write to them.[22] Abu'l Fazl writes that guns were brought after the Emperor's arrival from Kaweil, Parnala and Ahmadabad but they were of no use. It is, therefore, quite possible that after the death of Malik Yaqut Sultani when the besieged still held the fort, the Emperor might have made such a request to Father Xavier. It is also possible that the court writers, either from the hatred of the Portuguese or thinking the refusal of the Jesuit Father as an insult to the Emperor, would have preferred not to mention the request. Haji Dabir, who was in the fort at that time did not know of such a request and therefore, did not record it in his history. Moreover, as the request was purely verbal, Firishta who was recording the events far from the seat of war could not make a mention of the request in his account.

In Smith's own words, "Fr. Xavier was a shrewd politician."[23] His aim to convert Akbar to Christianity had failed and he had no hope for the success of his mission. It is, therefore, very likely that in order to cover his failure, he represented Akbar as an unscrupulous king to his chiefs in Portugal. He consequently recorded the events the way he liked best and which would appease his own anger[24]. It is to be noted that at one place, the word 'barbarian' has been used for Akbar both in the account of Guerreiro and that of Du Jarric.[25]

22. Du Jarric, p. 107 ; Guerreiro, p. 7. Both the writers say that as the Portuguese had concluded an alliance with Khandesh earlier, therefore, Xavier refused to meet the Mughul request.
23. Smith, *Akbar, The Great Mogul*, p. 280.
24. But Smith (*Akbar, The Great Mogul*, p. 277) says : The narrative of Du Jarric rests upon unquestionable authority.
25. Guerreiro, p. 8 ; Du Jarric, p. 107.

THE RULERS OF VARIOUS KINGDOMS

APPENDIX B

THE MUGHUL EMPERORS

	Year of Accession
Babur	932/1526
Humayun	937/1530
Akbar	963/1556
Jahangir	1014/1605
Shah Jahan	1037/1628
Aurangzeb 'Alamgir	1068/1658
Shah 'Alam Bahadur Shah I	1119/1707
Azim-ush-Shan	1124/1712
Jahandar Shah	1124/1712
Farrukh Siyar	1124/1713
Rafi'-ud-Darajat	1131/1719
Rafi'-ud-Daulah (Shah Jahan II)	1131/1719
Muhammad Shah	1131/1719
Ahmad Shah	1161/1748
'Alamgir II	1167/1754
Shah Jahan III	1173/1759
Shah 'Alam II	1173/1759
Akbar II	1221/1806
Bahadur Shah II	1253/1837

THE BAHMANI KINGS

	Year of Accession
'Ala-ud-Din Hasan Bahman Shah	748/1347
Muhammad I	759/1358
'Ala-ud-Din Mujahid	776/1375
Da'ud I	779/1378
Mahmud I	780/1378
Ghias-ud-Din Tahamtan	799/1397
Shams-ud-Din Da'ud II	799/1397
Taj-ud-Din Firuz	800/1397
Shihab-ud-Din Ahmad I	825/1422
'Ala-ud-Din Ahmad II	838/1435
'Ala-ud-Din Humayun	862/1458
Nizam Shah	865/1461
Shams-ud-Din Muhammad II	867/1463
Shihab-ud-Din Mahmud II	887/1482
Ahmad III	924/1518
'Ala-ud-Din	927/1521
Wali Ullah	929/1523
Kalim Ullah	932/1525

THE 'IMAD SHAHI RULERS

	Year of Accession
Fathullah 'Imad-ul-Mulk	890/1484
'Ala-ud-Din Fathullah	910/1504
Darya b. 'Ala-ud-Din	936/1529
Burhan b. Darya	968/1560
Tufail Khan	976/1568

THE BARID SHAHI RULERS

	Year of Accession
Qasim I	897/1492
Amir	910/1504
'Ali	945/1549
Ibrahim	990/1562
Qasim II	997/1569
Mirza 'Ali	1000/1572
Amir II	1018/1609

THE NIZAM SHAHI RULERS

	Year of Accession
Ahmad I b. Nizam-ul-Mulk Bahri	896/1490
Burhan I	914/1508
Husain	961/1553
Murtaza	972/1565
Miran Husain	996/1588
Isma'il	997/1589
Burhan II	999/1590
Ibrahim	1003/1594
Ahmad II	1004/1594
Bahadur	1004/1595

After the conquest of Ahmadnagar by Akbar in August 1600, Murtaza II, Burhan III, Murtaza III, Husain b. Murtaza III and Murtaza IV continued as nominal rulers of the dynasty, which formally ceased to exist in 1636.

THE QUTB SHAHI RULERS

	Year of Accession
Sultan Quli	918/1511
Jamshed	940/1533
Subhan Quli	957/1550
Ibrahim	957/1550
Muhammad Quli	989/1581
'Abdullah	1020/1611
Abu'l Hasan	1083/1672

THE 'ADIL SHAHI RULERS

	Year of Accession
Yusuf	895/1489
Isma'il b. Yusuf	916/1510
Mallu b. Isma'il	941/1534
Ibrahim I b. Isma'il	941/1535
'Ali b. Ibrahim	965/1557
Ibrahim II b. Tahmasp b. Ibrahim	988/1579
Muhammad b. Ibrahim	1035/1626
'Ali II b. Muhammad	1067/1656
Sikandar b. 'Ali	1083/1672

THE FARUQI RULERS OF KHANDESH

	Year of Accession
Malik Raja Faruqi	772/1370
Nasir Khan	801/1399
'Adil Khan I	841/1437
Miran Mubarak Khan I	844/1441
'Adil Khan II	861/1457
Da'ud Khan	909/1503
Ghazni Khan	916/1510
'Alam Khan	916/1510
'Adil Khan III	916/1510
Miran Muhammad I	926/1520
Ahmad Shah	943/1537
Mubarak Shah II	943/1537
Miran Muhammad II	974/1566
Hasan Shah	984/1576
Raja 'Ali Khan i,e, 'Adil Shah IV	985/1577
Bahadur Shah	1005/1597

THE RULERS OF MALWA

	Year of Accession
Dilawar Khan Husain Ghauri	804 1402
Hoshang Alp Khan b. Dilawar	808/1406
Muhammad I Ghazni Khan	838/1435
Mahmud Shah I Khalji	840/1436
Ghias Shah b. Mahmud	873/1469
Nasir Shah b. Ghias	906/1500
Mahmud Shah II	917/1511
Qadir (Mallu Khan)	943/1536
Shuja‘	949/1542
Baz Bahadur b. Shuja‘	962/1555

THE RULERS OF GUJARAT

	Year of Accession
Zafar Khan Muzaffar I	793/1391
Ahmad I	814/1411
Muhammad Karim	846/1442
Qutb-ud-Din Ahmad II	855/1451
Da'ud	862/1458
Mahmud I Beghra	862/1458
Muzaffar II	917/1511
Sikandar	932/1526
Nasir Khan Mahmud II	932/1526
Bahadur	932/1526
Miran Muhammad I of Khandesh	943/1537
Mahmud III	943/1537
Ahmad III	961/1554
Muzaffar III (first reign)	968/1561
Mughul Conquest	980/1573
Muzaffar III (second reign)	991/1583

ABBREVIATIONS

I.O.=India Office
B.M.=British Musem
Bib. Ind.=Bibliotheca Indica

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INDEX

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

V

W

Y

Z